Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games
V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, K. Chatterjee, Dynamic Games and Applications 15 (2025) 1617–1645.

Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas
V. Hübner, L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, PNAS Nexus 4 (2025).

Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games
A. Mcavoy, U.M. Sehwag, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, W. Barfuss, Q. Su, N.E. Leonard, J.B. Plotkin, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 122 (2025).

Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas
V. Hübner, M. Staab, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Kleshnina, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 121 (2024).

Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information
L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, Nature Communications 14 (2023).

The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature Communications 14 (2023).

Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces
L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PLOS Computational Biology 18 (2022).

Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games
A. McAvoy, J. Kates-Harbeck, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, PNAS Nexus 1 (2022).

A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity
L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, M.A. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 5 (2021) 1292–1302.

Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens
B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A.V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, S. Cremer, (2020).

Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens
B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A.V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, S. Cremer, Ecology Letters 23 (2020) 565–574.

Social dilemmas among unequals
O.P. Hauser, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature 572 (2019) 524–527.

The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds
M. Hoffman, C. Hilbe, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 397–404.

Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature 559 (2018) 246–249.

Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness
J. Reiter, C. Hilbe, D. Rand, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature Communications 9 (2018).

Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity
C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 469–477.

Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information
C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 115 (2018) 12241–12246.

Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity
C. Hilbe, V. Martinez, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 114 (2017) 4715–4720.

The red queen and king in finite populations
C. Veller, L. Hayward, M. Nowak, C. Hilbe, PNAS 114 (2017) 96–05.

Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on cEvolutionary game theory using agent-based methodsd by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze
C. Hilbe, A. Traulsen, Physics of Life Reviews 19 (2016) 29–31.