Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M. Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2024;121(10). doi:10.1073/pnas.2315558121

Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications. 2023;14. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x

Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications. 2023;14. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9

Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. 2022;18(6). doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149

Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 2021;5(10):1292–1302. doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8

Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Ecology Letters. 2020;23(3):565-574. doi:10.1111/ele.13458

Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. 2020. doi:10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318

Hauser OP, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Social dilemmas among unequals. Nature. 2019;572(7770):524-527. doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5

Reiter J, Hilbe C, Rand D, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. Nature Communications. 2018;9(1). doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8

Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. 2018;559(7713):246-249. doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x

Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 2018;2:469–477. doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9

Hoffman M, Hilbe C, Nowak M. The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour. 2018;2:397-404. doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z

Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 2018;115(48):12241-12246. doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115

Hilbe C, Martinez V, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity. PNAS. 2017;114(18):4715-4720. doi:10.1073/pnas.1621239114

Veller C, Hayward L, Nowak M, Hilbe C. The red queen and king in finite populations. PNAS. 2017;114(27):96-05. doi:10.1073/pnas.1702020114

Hilbe C, Traulsen A. Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on “Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods”10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004__by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze. Physics of Life Reviews. 2016;19:29-31. doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004

Milinski M, Hilbe C, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R, Marotzke J. Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion. Nature Communications. 2016;7. doi:10.1038/ncomms10915

Chakra M, Hilbe C, Traulsen A. Coevolutionary interactions between farmers and mafia induce host acceptance of avian brood parasites. Royal Society Open Science. 2016;3(5). doi:10.1098/rsos.160036

Baek S, Jeong H, Hilbe C, Nowak M. Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity. Scientific Reports. 2016;6. doi:10.1038/srep25676

Hilbe C, Hagel K, Milinski M. Experimental game instructions. 2016. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.s008

Hilbe C, Hagel K, Milinski M. Asymmetric power boosts extortion in an economic experiment. PLoS One. 2016;11(10). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0163867

Hilbe C, Hagel K, Milinski M. Experimental data. 2016. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0163867.s009