---
_id: '637'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: For many cryptographic primitives, it is relatively easy to achieve selective
security (where the adversary commits a-priori to some of the choices to be made
later in the attack) but appears difficult to achieve the more natural notion
of adaptive security (where the adversary can make all choices on the go as the
attack progresses). A series of several recent works shows how to cleverly achieve
adaptive security in several such scenarios including generalized selective decryption
(Panjwani, TCC ’07 and Fuchsbauer et al., CRYPTO ’15), constrained PRFs (Fuchsbauer
et al., ASIACRYPT ’14), and Yao garbled circuits (Jafargholi and Wichs, TCC ’16b).
Although the above works expressed vague intuition that they share a common technique,
the connection was never made precise. In this work we present a new framework
that connects all of these works and allows us to present them in a unified and
simplified fashion. Moreover, we use the framework to derive a new result for
adaptively secure secret sharing over access structures defined via monotone circuits.
We envision that further applications will follow in the future. Underlying our
framework is the following simple idea. It is well known that selective security,
where the adversary commits to n-bits of information about his future choices,
automatically implies adaptive security at the cost of amplifying the adversary’s
advantage by a factor of up to 2n. However, in some cases the proof of selective
security proceeds via a sequence of hybrids, where each pair of adjacent hybrids
locally only requires some smaller partial information consisting of m ≪ n bits.
The partial information needed might be completely different between different
pairs of hybrids, and if we look across all the hybrids we might rely on the entire
n-bit commitment. Nevertheless, the above is sufficient to prove adaptive security,
at the cost of amplifying the adversary’s advantage by a factor of only 2m ≪ 2n.
In all of our examples using the above framework, the different hybrids are captured
by some sort of a graph pebbling game and the amount of information that the adversary
needs to commit to in each pair of hybrids is bounded by the maximum number of
pebbles in play at any point in time. Therefore, coming up with better strategies
for proving adaptive security translates to various pebbling strategies for different
types of graphs.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Zahra
full_name: Jafargholi, Zahra
last_name: Jafargholi
- first_name: Chethan
full_name: Kamath Hosdurg, Chethan
id: 4BD3F30E-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Kamath Hosdurg
orcid: 0009-0006-6812-7317
- first_name: Karen
full_name: Klein, Karen
id: 3E83A2F8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Klein
- first_name: Ilan
full_name: Komargodski, Ilan
last_name: Komargodski
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Wichs, Daniel
last_name: Wichs
citation:
ama: 'Jafargholi Z, Kamath Hosdurg C, Klein K, Komargodski I, Pietrzak KZ, Wichs
D. Be adaptive avoid overcommitting. In: Katz J, Shacham H, eds. Vol 10401. Springer;
2017:133-163. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_5'
apa: 'Jafargholi, Z., Kamath Hosdurg, C., Klein, K., Komargodski, I., Pietrzak,
K. Z., & Wichs, D. (2017). Be adaptive avoid overcommitting. In J. Katz &
H. Shacham (Eds.) (Vol. 10401, pp. 133–163). Presented at the CRYPTO: Cryptology,
Santa Barbara, CA, United States: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_5'
chicago: Jafargholi, Zahra, Chethan Kamath Hosdurg, Karen Klein, Ilan Komargodski,
Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Daniel Wichs. “Be Adaptive Avoid Overcommitting.” edited
by Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, 10401:133–63. Springer, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_5.
ieee: 'Z. Jafargholi, C. Kamath Hosdurg, K. Klein, I. Komargodski, K. Z. Pietrzak,
and D. Wichs, “Be adaptive avoid overcommitting,” presented at the CRYPTO: Cryptology,
Santa Barbara, CA, United States, 2017, vol. 10401, pp. 133–163.'
ista: 'Jafargholi Z, Kamath Hosdurg C, Klein K, Komargodski I, Pietrzak KZ, Wichs
D. 2017. Be adaptive avoid overcommitting. CRYPTO: Cryptology, LNCS, vol. 10401,
133–163.'
mla: Jafargholi, Zahra, et al. Be Adaptive Avoid Overcommitting. Edited by
Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, vol. 10401, Springer, 2017, pp. 133–63, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_5.
short: Z. Jafargholi, C. Kamath Hosdurg, K. Klein, I. Komargodski, K.Z. Pietrzak,
D. Wichs, in:, J. Katz, H. Shacham (Eds.), Springer, 2017, pp. 133–163.
conference:
end_date: 2017-07-24
location: Santa Barbara, CA, United States
name: 'CRYPTO: Cryptology'
start_date: 2017-07-20
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:47:38Z
date_published: 2017-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-08T07:01:44Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_5
ec_funded: 1
editor:
- first_name: Jonathan
full_name: Katz, Jonathan
last_name: Katz
- first_name: Hovav
full_name: Shacham, Hovav
last_name: Shacham
external_id:
isi:
- '000438672600005'
intvolume: ' 10401'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/515
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 133 - 163
project:
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '682815'
name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-331963687-0
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '7151'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '10035'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Be adaptive avoid overcommitting
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 10401
year: '2017'
...