@inproceedings{21323,
  abstract     = {We present a unifying framework for proving the knowledge-soundness of KZG-like polynomial commitment schemes, encompassing both univariate and multivariate variants. By conceptualizing the proof technique of Lipmaa, Parisella, and Siim for the univariate KZG scheme (EUROCRYPT 2024), we present tools and falsifiable hardness assumptions that permit black-box extraction of the multivariate KZG scheme. Central to our approach is the notion of a canonical Proof-of-Knowledge of a Polynomial (PoKoP) of a polynomial commitment scheme, which we use to capture the extractability notion required in constructions of practical zk-SNARKs. We further present an explicit polynomial decomposition lemma for multivariate polynomials, enabling a more direct analysis of interpolating extractors and bridging the gap between univariate and multivariate commitments. Our results provide the first standard-model proofs of extractability for the multivariate KZG scheme and many of its variants under falsifiable assumptions.},
  author       = {Belohorec, Juraj and Dvořák, Pavel and Hoffmann, Charlotte and Hubáček, Pavel and Mašková, Kristýna and Pastyřík, Martin},
  booktitle    = {45th Annual International Cryptology Conference},
  isbn         = {9783032018861},
  issn         = {1611-3349},
  location     = {Santa Barbara, CA, United States},
  pages        = {584--616},
  publisher    = {Springer Nature},
  title        = {{On extractability of the KZG family of polynomial commitment schemes}},
  doi          = {10.1007/978-3-032-01887-8_19},
  volume       = {16005},
  year         = {2025},
}