---
OA_place: publisher
OA_type: hybrid
_id: '21020'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Runtime verification offers scalable solutions to improve the safety and
reliability of systems. However, systems that require verification or monitoring
by a third party to ensure compliance with a specification might contain sensitive
information, causing privacy concerns when usual runtime verification approaches
are used. Privacy is compromised if protected information about the system, or
sensitive data that is processed by the system, is revealed. In addition, revealing
the specification being monitored may undermine the essence of third-party verification.\r\nIn
this work, we propose two novel protocols for the privacy-preserving runtime verification
of systems against formal sequential specifications. In our first protocol, the
monitor verifies whether the system satisfies the specification without learning
anything else, though both parties are aware of the specification. Our second
protocol ensures that the system remains oblivious to the monitored specification,
while the monitor learns only whether the system satisfies the specification and
nothing more. Our protocols adapt and improve existing techniques used in cryptography,
and more specifically, multi-party computation.\r\nThe sequential specification
defines the observation step of the monitor, whose granularity depends on the
situation (e.g., banks may be monitored on a daily basis). Our protocols exchange
a single message per observation step, after an initialisation phase. This design
minimises communication overhead, enabling relatively lightweight privacy-preserving
monitoring. We implement our approach for monitoring specifications described
by register automata and evaluate it experimentally."
acknowledgement: This work is a part of projects VAMOS that has received fund-ing
from the European Research Council (ERC), grant agreementNo 101020093 and the Austrian
Science Fund (FWF) SFB projectSpyCoDe F8502.We thank anonymous reviewers for pointing
us to related work [ 3] and for their valuable suggestions that improved this paper.
article_processing_charge: Yes (via OA deal)
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000-0002-2985-7724
- first_name: Mahyar
full_name: Karimi, Mahyar
id: 6e5417ba-5355-11ee-ae5a-94c2e510b26b
last_name: Karimi
orcid: 0009-0005-0820-1696
- first_name: K. S.
full_name: Thejaswini, K. S.
id: 3807fb92-fdc1-11ee-bb4a-b4d8a431c753
last_name: Thejaswini
citation:
ama: 'Henzinger TA, Karimi M, Thejaswini KS. Privacy-preserving runtime verification.
In: Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security. Association for Computing Machinery; 2025:2774-2787. doi:10.1145/3719027.3765137'
apa: 'Henzinger, T. A., Karimi, M., & Thejaswini, K. S. (2025). Privacy-preserving
runtime verification. In Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (pp. 2774–2787). Taipei, Taiwan: Association for
Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765137'
chicago: Henzinger, Thomas A, Mahyar Karimi, and K. S. Thejaswini. “Privacy-Preserving
Runtime Verification.” In Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 2774–87. Association for Computing Machinery,
2025. https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765137.
ieee: T. A. Henzinger, M. Karimi, and K. S. Thejaswini, “Privacy-preserving runtime
verification,” in Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, Taipei, Taiwan, 2025, pp. 2774–2787.
ista: 'Henzinger TA, Karimi M, Thejaswini KS. 2025. Privacy-preserving runtime verification.
Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
CCS: Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2774–2787.'
mla: Henzinger, Thomas A., et al. “Privacy-Preserving Runtime Verification.” Proceedings
of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
Association for Computing Machinery, 2025, pp. 2774–87, doi:10.1145/3719027.3765137.
short: T.A. Henzinger, M. Karimi, K.S. Thejaswini, in:, Proceedings of the 2025
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Association for
Computing Machinery, 2025, pp. 2774–2787.
conference:
end_date: 2025-10-17
location: Taipei, Taiwan
name: 'CCS: Conference on Computer and Communications Security'
start_date: 2025-10-13
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2026-01-20T10:17:10Z
date_published: 2025-11-22T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-03-13T13:37:19Z
day: '22'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
- _id: GradSch
doi: 10.1145/3719027.3765137
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2505.09276'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 615ffddab6c7285158c2953acec6fa6f
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2026-01-21T07:34:58Z
date_updated: 2026-01-21T07:34:58Z
file_id: '21024'
file_name: 2025_CCS_HenzingerT.pdf
file_size: 1241912
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2026-01-21T07:34:58Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3765137
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 2774-2787
project:
- _id: 62781420-2b32-11ec-9570-8d9b63373d4d
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '101020093'
name: Vigilant Algorithmic Monitoring of Software
- _id: 34a1b658-11ca-11ed-8bc3-c75229f0241e
grant_number: F8502
name: Interface Theory for Security and Privacy
publication: Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
Security
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9798400715259'
publication_status: published
publisher: Association for Computing Machinery
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '21401'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Privacy-preserving runtime verification
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2025'
...