[{"oa":1,"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2375-1207"],"isbn":["9781538643532"]},"status":"public","day":"26","publisher":"IEEE","type":"conference","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/406","open_access":"1"}],"oa_version":"Preprint","year":"2018","date_updated":"2021-01-12T08:17:56Z","date_published":"2018-07-26T00:00:00Z","extern":"1","page":"583-598","author":[{"full_name":"Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios","last_name":"Kokoris Kogias","id":"f5983044-d7ef-11ea-ac6d-fd1430a26d30","first_name":"Eleftherios"},{"full_name":"Jovanovic, Philipp","last_name":"Jovanovic","first_name":"Philipp"},{"last_name":"Gasser","full_name":"Gasser, Linus","first_name":"Linus"},{"last_name":"Gailly","full_name":"Gailly, Nicolas","first_name":"Nicolas"},{"first_name":"Ewa","full_name":"Syta, Ewa","last_name":"Syta"},{"full_name":"Ford, Bryan","last_name":"Ford","first_name":"Bryan"}],"publication":"2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","title":"OmniLedger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger via sharding","quality_controlled":"1","month":"07","_id":"8297","citation":{"ama":"Kokoris Kogias E, Jovanovic P, Gasser L, Gailly N, Syta E, Ford B. OmniLedger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger via sharding. In: <i>2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i>. IEEE; 2018:583-598. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.000-5\">10.1109/sp.2018.000-5</a>","apa":"Kokoris Kogias, E., Jovanovic, P., Gasser, L., Gailly, N., Syta, E., &#38; Ford, B. (2018). OmniLedger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger via sharding. In <i>2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i> (pp. 583–598). San Francisco, CA, United States: IEEE. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.000-5\">https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.000-5</a>","chicago":"Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios, Philipp Jovanovic, Linus Gasser, Nicolas Gailly, Ewa Syta, and Bryan Ford. “OmniLedger: A Secure, Scale-out, Decentralized Ledger via Sharding.” In <i>2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i>, 583–98. IEEE, 2018. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.000-5\">https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.000-5</a>.","ista":"Kokoris Kogias E, Jovanovic P, Gasser L, Gailly N, Syta E, Ford B. 2018. OmniLedger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger via sharding. 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. SP: Symposium on Security and Privacy, 583–598.","mla":"Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios, et al. “OmniLedger: A Secure, Scale-out, Decentralized Ledger via Sharding.” <i>2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i>, IEEE, 2018, pp. 583–98, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2018.000-5\">10.1109/sp.2018.000-5</a>.","short":"E. Kokoris Kogias, P. Jovanovic, L. Gasser, N. Gailly, E. Syta, B. Ford, in:, 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE, 2018, pp. 583–598.","ieee":"E. Kokoris Kogias, P. Jovanovic, L. Gasser, N. Gailly, E. Syta, and B. Ford, “OmniLedger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger via sharding,” in <i>2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i>, San Francisco, CA, United States, 2018, pp. 583–598."},"article_processing_charge":"No","abstract":[{"text":"Designing a secure permissionless distributed ledger (blockchain) that performs on par with centralized payment\r\nprocessors, such as Visa, is a challenging task. Most existing distributed ledgers are unable to scale-out, i.e., to grow their totalprocessing capacity with the number of validators; and those that do, compromise security or decentralization. We present OmniLedger, a novel scale-out distributed ledger that preserves longterm security under permissionless operation. It ensures security and correctness by using a bias-resistant public-randomness protocol for choosing large, statistically representative shards that process transactions, and by introducing an efficient crossshard commit protocol that atomically handles transactions affecting multiple shards. OmniLedger also optimizes performance via parallel intra-shard transaction processing, ledger pruning via collectively-signed state blocks, and low-latency “trust-butverify” \r\nvalidation for low-value transactions. An evaluation ofour experimental prototype shows that OmniLedger’s throughput\r\nscales linearly in the number of active validators, supporting Visa-level workloads and beyond, while confirming typical transactions in under two seconds.","lang":"eng"}],"conference":{"location":"San Francisco, CA, United States","end_date":"2018-05-24","name":"SP: Symposium on Security and Privacy","start_date":"2018-05-20"},"publication_status":"published","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1109/sp.2018.000-5","date_created":"2020-08-26T11:46:35Z"},{"publication_identifier":{"isbn":["9781509055340"],"issn":["2375-1207"]},"oa":1,"status":"public","publisher":"IEEE","type":"conference","day":"01","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1067","open_access":"1"}],"year":"2017","oa_version":"Preprint","date_updated":"2021-01-12T08:18:02Z","date_published":"2017-06-01T00:00:00Z","extern":"1","page":"444-460","author":[{"first_name":"E.","full_name":"Syta, E.","last_name":"Syta"},{"first_name":"P.","full_name":"Jovanovic, P.","last_name":"Jovanovic"},{"id":"f5983044-d7ef-11ea-ac6d-fd1430a26d30","first_name":"Eleftherios","last_name":"Kokoris Kogias","full_name":"Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios"},{"first_name":"N.","last_name":"Gailly","full_name":"Gailly, N."},{"first_name":"L.","last_name":"Gasser","full_name":"Gasser, L."},{"last_name":"Khoffi","full_name":"Khoffi, I.","first_name":"I."},{"last_name":"Fischer","full_name":"Fischer, M. J.","first_name":"M. J."},{"last_name":"Ford","full_name":"Ford, B.","first_name":"B."}],"user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","publication":"2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","quality_controlled":"1","title":"Scalable bias-resistant distributed randomness","month":"06","_id":"8306","citation":{"ista":"Syta E, Jovanovic P, Kokoris Kogias E, Gailly N, Gasser L, Khoffi I, Fischer MJ, Ford B. 2017. Scalable bias-resistant distributed randomness. 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. SP: Symposium on Security and Privacy, 444–460.","chicago":"Syta, E., P. Jovanovic, Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias, N. Gailly, L. Gasser, I. Khoffi, M. J. Fischer, and B. Ford. “Scalable Bias-Resistant Distributed Randomness.” In <i>2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i>, 444–60. IEEE, 2017. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.45\">https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.45</a>.","apa":"Syta, E., Jovanovic, P., Kokoris Kogias, E., Gailly, N., Gasser, L., Khoffi, I., … Ford, B. (2017). Scalable bias-resistant distributed randomness. In <i>2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i> (pp. 444–460). San Jose, CA, United States: IEEE. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.45\">https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.45</a>","ama":"Syta E, Jovanovic P, Kokoris Kogias E, et al. Scalable bias-resistant distributed randomness. In: <i>2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i>. IEEE; 2017:444-460. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.45\">10.1109/SP.2017.45</a>","ieee":"E. Syta <i>et al.</i>, “Scalable bias-resistant distributed randomness,” in <i>2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i>, San Jose, CA, United States, 2017, pp. 444–460.","mla":"Syta, E., et al. “Scalable Bias-Resistant Distributed Randomness.” <i>2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy</i>, IEEE, 2017, pp. 444–60, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.45\">10.1109/SP.2017.45</a>.","short":"E. Syta, P. Jovanovic, E. Kokoris Kogias, N. Gailly, L. Gasser, I. Khoffi, M.J. Fischer, B. Ford, in:, 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE, 2017, pp. 444–460."},"abstract":[{"text":"Bias-resistant public randomness is a critical component in many (distributed) protocols. Generating public randomness is hard, however, because active adversaries may behave dishonestly to bias public random choices toward their advantage. Existing solutions do not scale to hundreds or thousands of participants, as is needed in many decentralized systems. We propose two large-scale distributed protocols, RandHound and RandHerd, which provide publicly-verifiable, unpredictable, and unbiasable randomness against Byzantine adversaries. RandHound relies on an untrusted client to divide a set of randomness servers into groups for scalability, and it depends on the pigeonhole principle to ensure output integrity, even for non-random, adversarial group choices. RandHerd implements an efficient, decentralized randomness beacon. RandHerd is structurally similar to a BFT protocol, but uses RandHound in a one-time setup to arrange participants into verifiably unbiased random secret-sharing groups, which then repeatedly produce random output at predefined intervals. Our prototype demonstrates that RandHound and RandHerd achieve good performance across hundreds of participants while retaining a low failure probability by properly selecting protocol parameters, such as a group size and secret-sharing threshold. For example, when sharding 512 nodes into groups of 32, our experiments show that RandHound can produce fresh random output after 240 seconds. RandHerd, after a setup phase of 260 seconds, is able to generate fresh random output in intervals of approximately 6 seconds. For this configuration, both protocols operate at a failure probability of at most 0.08% against a Byzantine adversary.","lang":"eng"}],"article_processing_charge":"No","conference":{"end_date":"2017-05-26","location":"San Jose, CA, United States","start_date":"2017-05-22","name":"SP: Symposium on Security and Privacy"},"publication_status":"published","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1109/SP.2017.45","date_created":"2020-08-26T12:26:08Z"}]