@article{11669,
  abstract     = {We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we prove a positive result for randomized mechanisms, and a negative result for deterministic mechanisms. While the positive result allows for private budgets, the negative result is for public budgets. For multidimensional valuations and public budgets we prove an impossibility result that applies to deterministic and randomized mechanisms. Taken together this shows the power of randomization in certain settings with heterogeneous items, but it also shows its limitations.},
  author       = {Dütting, Paul and Henzinger, Monika H and Starnberger, Martin},
  issn         = {2167-8383},
  journal      = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation},
  keywords     = {Algorithmic game theory, auction theory, Clinching auction, Pareto optimality, Budget limits},
  number       = {1},
  publisher    = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  title        = {{Auctions for heterogeneous items and budget limits}},
  doi          = {10.1145/2818351},
  volume       = {4},
  year         = {2015},
}