@article{22102,
  abstract     = {Differential privacy (DP) has established itself as one of the standards for ensuring privacy of individual data. However, reasoning about DP is a challenging and error-prone task, hence methods for formal verification and refutation of DP properties have received significant interest in recent years. In this work, we present a novel method for automated formal refutation of є-DP. Our method refutes є-DP by searching for a pair of inputs together with a non-negative function over outputs whose expected value on these two inputs differs by a significant amount. The two inputs and the non-negative function over outputs are computed simultaneously, by utilizing upper expectation supermartingales and lower expectation submartingales from probabilistic program analysis, which we leverage to introduce a sound and complete proof rule for є-DP refutation. To the best of our knowledge, our method is the first method for є-DP refutation to offer the following four desirable features: (1) it is fully automated, (2) it is applicable to stochastic mechanisms with sampling instructions from both discrete and continuous distributions, (3) it provides soundness guarantees, and (4) it provides semi-completeness guarantees. Our experiments show that our prototype tool SuperDP achieves superior performance compared to the state of the art and manages to refute є-DP for a number of challenging examples collected from the literature, including ones that were out of the reach of prior methods.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Kafshdar Goharshadi, Ehsan and Zikelic, Dorde},
  issn         = {2475-1421},
  journal      = {Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages},
  keywords     = {Static Program Analysis, Differential Privacy, Probabilistic Programming, Martingales},
  number       = {PLDI},
  publisher    = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  title        = {{SuperDP: Differential privacy refutation via supermartingales}},
  doi          = {10.1145/3808296},
  volume       = {10},
  year         = {2026},
}

@misc{22134,
  abstract     = {This artifact provides the source code, benchmarks, and scripts necessary to build and reproduce the experimental results for `SuperDP` (Accepted at PLDI 2026). It also includes instructions for running the tool on user-provided inputs.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Kafshdar Goharshadi, Ehsan and Zikelic, Dorde},
  publisher    = {Zenodo},
  title        = {{SuperDP: Differential Privacy Refutation via Supermartingales}},
  doi          = {10.5281/ZENODO.18930113},
  year         = {2026},
}

@inproceedings{21717,
  abstract     = {Robust Markov Decision Processes (RMDPs) generalize classical MDPs that consider uncertainties in transition probabilities by defining a set of possible transition functions. An objective is a set of runs (or infinite trajectories) of the RMDP, and the value for an objective is the maximal probability that the agent can guarantee against the adversarial environment. We consider (a) reachability objectives, where given a target set of states, the goal is to eventually arrive at one of them; and (b) parity objectives, which are a canonical representation for ω-regular objectives. The qualitative analysis problem asks whether the objective can be ensured with probability 1. In this work, we study the qualitative problem for reachability and parity objectives on RMDPs without making any assumption over the structures of the RMDPs, e.g., unichain or aperiodic. Our contributions are twofold. We first present efficient algorithms with oracle access to uncertainty sets that solve qualitative problems of reachability and parity objectives. We then report experimental results demonstrating the effectiveness of our oracle-based approach on classical RMDP examples from the literature scaling up to thousands of states.},
  author       = {Asadi, Ali and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Kafshdar Goharshadi, Ehsan and Karrabi, Mehrdad and Shafiee, Ali},
  booktitle    = {Proceedings of the 40th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  issn         = {2374-3468},
  location     = {Singapore, Singapore},
  number       = {43},
  pages        = {36137--36145},
  publisher    = {Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence},
  title        = {{Qualitative analysis of ω-regular objectives on robust MDPs}},
  doi          = {10.1609/aaai.v40i43.40931},
  volume       = {40},
  year         = {2026},
}

@inproceedings{21722,
  abstract     = {Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) are a central model for uncertainty in sequential decision making. The most basic objective is the reachability objective, where a target set must be eventually visited, and the more general parity objectives can model all omega-regular specifications. For such objectives, the computational analysis problems are the following: (a) qualitative analysis that asks whether the objective can be satisfied with probability 1 (almost-sure winning) or probability arbitrarily close to 1 (limit-sure winning); and (b) quantitative analysis that asks for the approximation of the optimal probability of satisfying the objective. For general POMDPs, almost-sure analysis for reachability objectives is EXPTIME-complete, but limit-sure and quantitative analyses for reachability objectives are undecidable; almost-sure, limit-sure, and quantitative analyses for parity objectives are all undecidable. A special class of POMDPs, called revealing POMDPs, has been studied recently in several works, and for this subclass the almost-sure analysis for parity objectives was shown to be EXPTIME-complete. In this work, we show that for revealing POMDPs the limit-sure analysis for parity objectives is EXPTIME-complete, and even the quantitative analysis for parity objectives can be achieved in EXPTIME.},
  author       = {Asadi, Ali and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Lurie, David and Saona Urmeneta, Raimundo J},
  booktitle    = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  issn         = {2374-3468},
  location     = {Singapore, Singapore},
  number       = {43},
  pages        = {36146--36154},
  publisher    = {Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence},
  title        = {{Revealing POMDPs: Qualitative and quantitative analysis for parity objectives}},
  doi          = {10.1609/aaai.v40i43.40932},
  volume       = {40},
  year         = {2026},
}

@article{22101,
  abstract     = {Evolutionary biology examines how the genetic and phenotypic composition
of populations changes over time. An important goal is to determine the
fixation probability of a single advantageous mutant that arises in a homogeneous
population of N residents. Many real populations experience environmental
gradients that cause mutations to be beneficial in some spatial
regions but harmful in others. Here, we study the fixation probability of a
mutant placed on a simple one-dimensional spatial structure that experiences
such a gradient. The mutant’s fitness varies linearly from1 − s to 1 + s, whereas
the resident fitness is constant and equal to 1. The existing literature suggests
that such heterogeneity in the mutant’s fitness should lead to a decrease in its
fixation probability. However, in this work, we find that small, non-negligible
gradients (s < 1=√N) substantially increase the fixation probability,while larger
gradients (s > (log N)/√N) substantially decrease it.Moreover, we quantify the
strength of this phenomenon analytically and we precisely delimit the range of
the gradients for which it occurs. Our computer simulations closely match
those findings. Altogether, our results indicate that subjecting a simple
population structure to natural environmental conditions can produce strong
counterintuitive effects.},
  author       = {Svoboda, Jakub and Nemati, Hossein and Tkadlec, Josef and Kaveh, Kamran and Chatterjee, Krishnendu},
  issn         = {2041-1723},
  journal      = {Nature Communications},
  publisher    = {Springer Nature},
  title        = {{The effect of the fitness gradient on fixation probability}},
  doi          = {10.1038/s41467-026-71777-2},
  volume       = {17},
  year         = {2026},
}

@article{20857,
  abstract     = {Evolutionary games provide a flexible mathematical framework for many problems in biology and social evolution. Prisoners’ dilemma, and in particular, the important special case of donation games, represents social dilemmas where cooperation is mutually beneficial, yet defection is preferred by selfish agents. In evolutionary games on networks, the agents interact over a population structure. The existence of population structures that promote cooperative behavior is a fascinating and active research topic. Previous research establishes structures promoting cooperation in the limit of weak selection where the benefit-to-cost ratio β exceeds 1.5. The existence of such structures for medium and strong selection for 1 < ß < 2 and for weak selection for 1 < ß < 1.5 has been a long-standing open question. First, we answer the open questions in the affirmative: For every selection strength and every ß > 1, we construct networks promoting cooperation. Second, we present a robustness result with respect to β and selection strength: Our structures promote cooperation for a range of these parameter values rather than specific parameter values. Finally, we supplement our theoretical results with simulation results on small population structures that show the effectiveness of our construction over well-studied population structures.},
  author       = {Svoboda, Jakub and Chatterjee, Krishnendu},
  issn         = {1091-6490},
  journal      = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  number       = {51},
  pages        = {e2524109122},
  publisher    = {National Academy of Sciences},
  title        = {{Promoters of cooperation in evolutionary games}},
  doi          = {10.1073/pnas.2524109122},
  volume       = {122},
  year         = {2025},
}

@inproceedings{21268,
  abstract     = {We consider multiple-environment Markov decision processes (MEMDP), which consist of a finite set of MDPs over the same state space, representing different scenarios of transition structure and probability. The value of a strategy is the probability to satisfy the objective, here a parity objective, in the worst-case scenario, and the value of an MEMDP is the supremum of the values achievable by a strategy.
We show that deciding whether the value is 1 is a PSPACE-complete problem, and even in P when the number of environments is fixed, along with new insights to the almost-sure winning problem, which is to decide if there exists a strategy with value 1. Pure strategies are sufficient for theses problems, whereas randomization is necessary in general when the value is smaller than 1. We present an algorithm to approximate the value, running in double exponential space. Our results are in contrast to the related model of partially-observable MDPs where all these problems are known to be undecidable.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Doyen, Laurent and Raskin, Jean-Francois and Sankur, Ocan},
  booktitle    = {52nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming},
  isbn         = {9783959773720},
  location     = {Aarhus, Denmark},
  publisher    = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik},
  title        = {{The value problem for multiple-environment MDPs with parity objective}},
  doi          = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2025.150},
  year         = {2025},
}

@inproceedings{21281,
  abstract     = {A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an ε-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than ε by unilaterally deviating from their strategy. In this work, we use ε-Nash equilibria to approximate the computation of Nash equilibria. Specifically, we focus on turn-based, multiplayer stochastic games played on graphs, where players are restricted to stationary strategies - strategies that use randomness but not memory.
The problem of deciding the constrained existence of stationary Nash equilibria - where each player’s payoff must lie within a given interval - is known to be ∃ℝ-complete in such a setting (Hansen and Sølvsten, 2020). We extend this line of work to stationary ε-Nash equilibria and present an algorithm that solves the following promise problem: given a game with a Nash equilibrium satisfying the constraints, compute an ε-Nash equilibrium that ε-satisfies those same constraints - satisfies the constraints up to an ε additive error. Our algorithm runs in FNP^NP time.
To achieve this, we first show that if a constrained Nash equilibrium exists, then one exists where the non-zero probabilities are at least an inverse of a double-exponential in the input. We further prove that such a strategy can be encoded using floating-point representations, as in the work of Frederiksen and Miltersen (2013), which finally gives us our FNP^NP algorithm. 
We further show that the decision version of the promise problem is NP-hard. Finally, we show a partial tightness result by proving a lower bound for such techniques: if a constrained Nash equilibrium exists, then there must be one where the probabilities in the strategies are double-exponentially small.},
  author       = {Asadi, Ali and Brice, Leonard and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Thejaswini, K. S.},
  booktitle    = {45th Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science},
  isbn         = {9783959774062},
  location     = {Pilani, India},
  pages        = {9:1--9:17},
  publisher    = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik},
  title        = {{ε-stationary Nash equilibria in multi-player stochastic graph games}},
  doi          = {10.4230/lipics.fsttcs.2025.9},
  volume       = {360},
  year         = {2025},
}

@inproceedings{21412,
  abstract     = {Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising technology that alleviates blockchain scalability by shifting the transaction load from the blockchain to the PCN. Nevertheless, the network topology has to be carefully designed to maximise the transaction throughput in PCNs. Additionally, users in PCNs also have to make optimal decisions on which transactions to forward and which to reject to prolong the lifetime of their channels. In this work, we consider an input sequence of transactions over p parties. Each transaction consists of a transaction size, source, and target, and can be either accepted or rejected (entailing a cost). The goal is to design a PCN topology among the p cooperating parties, along with the channel capacities, and then output a decision for each transaction in the sequence to minimise the cost of creating and augmenting channels, as well as the cost of rejecting transactions. Our main contribution is an 𝒪(p) approximation algorithm for the problem with p parties. We further show that with some assumptions on the distribution of transactions, we can reduce the approximation ratio to 𝒪(√p). We complement our theoretical analysis with an empirical study of our assumptions and approach in the context of the Lightning Network.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Křišťan, Jan Matyáš and Schmid, Stefan and Svoboda, Jakub and Yeo, Michelle X},
  booktitle    = {39th International Symposium on Distributed Computing},
  isbn         = {9783959774024},
  issn         = {1868-8969},
  location     = {Berlin, Germany},
  publisher    = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik},
  title        = {{Boosting payment channel network liquidity with topology optimization and transaction selection}},
  doi          = {10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2025.23},
  volume       = {356},
  year         = {2025},
}

@article{21413,
  abstract     = {We present a general framework for applying learning algorithms and heuristical guidance to the verification of Markov decision processes (MDPs).
The primary goal of our techniques is to improve performance by avoiding an exhaustive exploration of the state space, instead focussing on particularly relevant areas of the system, guided by heuristics. Our work builds on the previous results of Br{á}zdil et al., significantly extending it as well as refining several details and fixing errors.
The presented framework focuses on probabilistic reachability, which is a core problem in verification, and is instantiated in two distinct scenarios.
The first assumes that full knowledge of the MDP is available, in particular precise transition probabilities. It performs a heuristic-driven partial exploration of the model, yielding precise lower and upper bounds on the required probability. The second tackles the case where we may only sample the MDP without knowing the exact transition dynamics. Here, we obtain probabilistic guarantees, again in terms of both the lower and upper bounds, which provides efficient stopping criteria for the approximation. In particular, the latter is an extension of statistical model-checking (SMC) for unbounded properties in MDPs. In contrast to other related approaches, we do not restrict our attention to time-bounded (finite-horizon) or discounted properties, nor assume any particular structural properties of the MDP.},
  author       = {Brázdil, Tomáš and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Chmelik, Martin and Forejt, Vojtěch and Kretinsky, Jan and Kwiatkowska, Marta and Meggendorfer, Tobias and Parker, David and Ujma, Mateusz},
  issn         = {2751-4838},
  journal      = {TheoretiCS},
  publisher    = {TheoretiCS Foundation},
  title        = {{Learning algorithms for verification of Markov decision processes}},
  doi          = {10.46298/theoretics.25.10},
  volume       = {4},
  year         = {2025},
}

@article{18529,
  abstract     = {Temporal networks are obtained from time-dependent interactions among individuals, whereas the interactions can be emails, phone calls, face-to-face meetings, or work collaboration. In this article, a temporal game framework is established, in which interactions among rational individuals are embedded into two-player games in a time-dependent manner. This allows studying the time-dependent complexity and variability of interactions, and the way they affect prosocial behaviors. Based on this simple mathematical model, it is found that the level of cooperation is promoted when the time of collaboration is equally limited for every individual. This observation is confirmed by a series of systematic human experiments on over 1,400 subjects, forming a foundation for comprehensively describing human temporal interactions in collaboration. The research results reveal an important incentive for human cooperation, leading to a better understanding of a fascinating aspect of human nature in society.},
  author       = {Zhang, Yichao and Wang, Jiasheng and Wen, Guanghui and Guan, Jihong and Zhou, Shuigeng and Chen, Guanrong and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Perc, Matjaz},
  issn         = {2327-4697},
  journal      = {IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {4--12},
  publisher    = {IEEE},
  title        = {{Limitation of time promotes cooperation in structured collaboration systems}},
  doi          = {10.1109/TNSE.2024.3481434},
  volume       = {12},
  year         = {2025},
}

@article{19074,
  abstract     = {The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation in groups. In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions towards a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods games among asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry allows for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment each round. However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals make the same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose contributions along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next. We do so for three different models – one without any budget constraints, one with endowment constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current endowment to be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities: the welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the model with savings.},
  author       = {Hübner, Valentin and Hilbe, Christian and Staab, Manuel and Kleshnina, Maria and Chatterjee, Krishnendu},
  issn         = {2153-0793},
  journal      = {Dynamic Games and Applications},
  pages        = {1617--1645},
  publisher    = {Springer Nature},
  title        = {{Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games}},
  doi          = {10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5},
  volume       = {15},
  year         = {2025},
}

@article{19499,
  abstract     = {Quantum hardware is inherently fragile and noisy. We find that the accuracy of traditional quantum error correction algorithms can be improved depending on the hardware. Given different hardware specifications, we automatically synthesize hardware-optimal algorithms for parity correction, qubit resetting, and GHZ (Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger) state preparation. Using stochastic techniques from computer science, our method presents a computational tool to compute exact accuracy guarantees and synthesize optimal algorithms that are often different from traditional ones. We also show that improvements can be gained with respect to the Qiskit transpiler as we compute the hardware-optimal qubit mapping for the GHZ state-preparation problem.},
  author       = {Muroya Lei, Stefanie and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Henzinger, Thomas A},
  issn         = {1091-6490},
  journal      = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
  number       = {12},
  publisher    = {National Academy of Sciences},
  title        = {{Hardware-optimal quantum algorithms}},
  doi          = {10.1073/pnas.2419273122},
  volume       = {122},
  year         = {2025},
}

@inproceedings{19667,
  abstract     = {The problem of checking satisfiability of linear real arithmetic (LRA) and non-linear real arithmetic (NRA) formulas has broad applications, in particular, they are at the heart of logic-related applications such as logic for artificial intelligence, program analysis, etc. While there has been much work on checking satisfiability of unquantified LRA and NRA formulas, the problem of checking satisfiability of quantified LRA and NRA formulas remains a significant challenge. The main bottleneck in the existing methods is a computationally expensive quantifier elimination step. In this work, we propose a novel method for efficient quantifier elimination in quantified LRA and NRA formulas. We propose a template-based Skolemization approach, where we automatically synthesize linear/polynomial Skolem functions in order to eliminate quantifiers in the formula. The key technical ingredient in our approach are Positivstellensätze theorems from algebraic geometry, which allow for an efficient manipulation of polynomial inequalities. Our method offers a range of appealing theoretical properties combined with a strong practical performance. On the theory side, our method is sound, semi-complete, and runs in subexponential time and polynomial space, as opposed to existing sound and complete quantifier elimination methods that run in doubly-exponential time and at least exponential space. On the practical side, our experiments show superior performance compared to state of the art SMT solvers in terms of the number of solved instances and runtime, both on LRA and on NRA benchmarks.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Kafshdar Goharshadi, Ehsan and Karrabi, Mehrdad and Motwani, Harshit J. and Seeliger, Maximilian and Zikelic, Dorde},
  booktitle    = {Proceedings of the 39th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  issn         = {2374-3468},
  location     = {Philadelphia, PA, United States},
  number       = {11},
  pages        = {11158--11166},
  publisher    = {Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence},
  title        = {{Quantified linear and polynomial arithmetic satisfiability via template-based skolemization}},
  doi          = {10.1609/aaai.v39i11.33213},
  volume       = {39},
  year         = {2025},
}

@inproceedings{19669,
  abstract     = {We consider a class of optimization problems defined by a system of linear equations with min and max operators. This class of optimization problems has been studied under restrictive conditions, such as, (C1) the halting or stability condition; (C2) the non-negative coefficients condition; (C3) the sum upto 1 condition; and (C4) the only min or only max operator condition. Several seminal results in the literature focus on special cases. For example, turn-based stochastic games correspond to conditions C2 and C3; and Markov decision process to conditions C2, C3, and C4. However, the systematic computational complexity study of all the cases has not been explored, which we address in this work. Some highlights of our results are: with conditions C2 and C4, and with conditions C3 and C4, the problem is NP-complete, whereas with condition C1 only, the problem is in UP intersects coUP. Finally, we establish the computational complexity of the decision problem of checking the respective conditions.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Luo, Ruichen and Saona Urmeneta, Raimundo J and Svoboda, Jakub},
  booktitle    = {Proceedings of the 39th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  issn         = {2374-3468},
  location     = {Philadelphia, PA, United States},
  number       = {11},
  pages        = {11150--11157},
  publisher    = {Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence},
  title        = {{Linear equations with min and max operators: Computational complexity}},
  doi          = {10.1609/aaai.v39i11.33212},
  volume       = {39},
  year         = {2025},
}

@inproceedings{19740,
  abstract     = {Two standard models for probabilistic systems are Markov chains (MCs) and Markov decision processes (MDPs). Classic objectives for such probabilistic models for control and planning problems are reachability and stochastic shortest path. The widely studied algorithmic approach for these problems is the Value Iteration (VI) algorithm which iteratively applies local updates called Bellman updates. There are many practical approaches for VI in the literature but they all require exponentially many Bellman updates for MCs in the worst case. A preprocessing step is an algorithm that is discrete, graph-theoretical, and requires linear space. An important open question is whether, after a polynomial-time preprocessing, VI can be achieved with sub-exponentially many Bellman updates. In this work, we present a new approach for VI based on guessing values. Our theoretical contributions are twofold. First, for MCs, we present an almost-linear-time preprocessing algorithm after which, along with guessing values, VI requires only subexponentially many Bellman updates. Second, we present an improved analysis of the speed of convergence of VI for MDPs. Finally, we present a practical algorithm for MDPs based on our new approach. Experimental results show that our approach provides a considerable improvement over existing VI-based approaches on several benchmark examples from the literature.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Jafariraviz, Mahdi and Saona Urmeneta, Raimundo J and Svoboda, Jakub},
  booktitle    = {31st International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems},
  isbn         = {9783031906527},
  issn         = {1611-3349},
  location     = {Hamilton, ON, Canada},
  pages        = {217--236},
  publisher    = {Springer Nature},
  title        = {{Value iteration with guessing for Markov chains and Markov decision processes}},
  doi          = {10.1007/978-3-031-90653-4_11},
  volume       = {15697},
  year         = {2025},
}

@inproceedings{19743,
  abstract     = {The possibility of errors in human-engineered formal verification software, such as model checkers, poses a serious threat to the purpose of these tools. An established approach to mitigate this problem are certificates—lightweight, easy-to-check proofs of the verification results. In this paper, we develop novel certificates for model checking of Markov decision processes (MDPs) with quantitative reachability and expected reward properties. Our approach is conceptually simple and relies almost exclusively on elementary fixed point theory. Our certificates work for arbitrary finite MDPs and can be readily computed with little overhead using standard algorithms. We formalize the soundness of our certificates in Isabelle/HOL and provide a formally verified certificate checker. Moreover, we augment existing algorithms in the probabilistic model checker Storm with the ability to produce certificates and demonstrate practical applicability by conducting the first formal certification of the reference results in the Quantitative Verification Benchmark Set.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Quatmann, Tim and Schäffeler, Maximilian and Weininger, Maximilian and Winkler, Tobias and Zilken, Daniel},
  booktitle    = {31st International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems},
  isbn         = {9783031906527},
  issn         = {1611-3349},
  location     = {Hamilton, ON, Canada},
  pages        = {130--151},
  publisher    = {Springer Nature},
  title        = {{Fixed point certificates for reachability and expected rewards in MDPs}},
  doi          = {10.1007/978-3-031-90653-4_7},
  volume       = {15697},
  year         = {2025},
}

@inproceedings{19744,
  abstract     = {We consider the problem of refuting equivalence of probabilistic programs, i.e., the problem of proving that two probabilistic programs induce different output distributions. We study this problem in the context of programs with conditioning (i.e., with observe and score statements), where the output distribution is conditioned by the event that all the observe statements along a run evaluate to true, and where the probability densities of different runs may be updated via the score statements. Building on a recent work on programs without conditioning, we present a new equivalence refutation method for programs with conditioning. Our method is based on weighted restarting, a novel transformation of probabilistic programs with conditioning to the output equivalent probabilistic programs without conditioning that we introduce in this work. Our method is the first to be both a) fully automated, and b) providing provably correct answers. We demonstrate the applicability of our method on a set of programs from the probabilistic inference literature.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Kafshdar Goharshadi, Ehsan and Novotný, Petr and Zikelic, Dorde},
  booktitle    = {31st International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems},
  isbn         = {9783031906527},
  issn         = {1611-3349},
  location     = {Hamilton, ON, Canada},
  pages        = {279--300},
  publisher    = {Springer Nature},
  title        = {{Refuting equivalence in probabilistic programs with conditioning}},
  doi          = {10.1007/978-3-031-90653-4_14},
  volume       = {15697},
  year         = {2025},
}

@misc{19771,
  abstract     = {This artifact allows to review and reproduce the Isabelle proofs and practical experiments from the paper *Fixed Point Certificates for Reachability and Expected Rewards in MDPs*.
The contents are two-fold:
First, the artifact contains a formally verified certificate checker for the certificates presented in the paper.
The formal Isabelle/HOL proofs of the background theory can be inspected, checked by Isabelle and the code extraction can be retraced.

Second, the artifact contains a modified version of the model checking tool `Storm` with support for certificate generation. Together with the provided scripts and benchmark files, this allows to reproduce the experiments from the paper.
An appropriate subset of the experiments is given to allow a review in a timely manner. In addition, original logfiles from our experiments are provided, allowing a detailed inspection.

The package includes convenient installation scripts for [the TACAS 2023 VM](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7113223) (based on Ubuntu 22.04).
A native installation on Linux or macOS systems (including the newer ARM-based machines) is also possible.},
  author       = {Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Quatmann, Tim and Schäffeler, Maximilian and Weininger, Maximilian and Winkler, Tobias and Zilken, Daniel},
  publisher    = {Zenodo},
  title        = {{Artifact: Fixed point certificates for reachability and expected rewards in MDPs}},
  doi          = {10.5281/ZENODO.14626585},
  year         = {2025},
}

@article{19843,
  abstract     = {Social dilemmas are collective-action problems where individual interests are at odds with group interests. Such dilemmas occur frequently at all scales of human interactions. When dealing with collective-action problems, people often act reciprocally. They adjust their behavior to match the previous behavior of the recipient. The literature distinguishes two kinds of reciprocity. According to direct reciprocity, individuals react to their immediate experiences with the recipient. They are more likely to cooperate if the recipient previously cooperated with them. According to indirect reciprocity, individuals react to the recipient’s general behavior, irrespectively of whether or not they benefited directly. In practice, the two kinds of reciprocity are often intertwined; people typically base their decisions on both direct experiences and indirect observations. Yet only recently have researchers begun to explore how the two kinds of reciprocity interact. So far, this research only addresses a single type of social dilemma, the donation game, where the effects of individual behaviors are independent. Instead, here we allow for all pairwise social dilemmas. By applying novel techniques to generalize the theory of zero-determinant strategies, we establish an important proof of principle: In all social dilemmas, socially optimal outcomes can be sustained as an equilibrium, using either direct or indirect reciprocity, or arbitrary mixtures thereof. These results neither require games to be repeated infinitely often, nor that individual opinions are synchronized. In this way, we considerably generalize the scope of models of reciprocity, and we build further bridges between the literatures on direct and indirect reciprocity.},
  author       = {Hübner, Valentin and Schmid, Laura and Hilbe, Christian and Chatterjee, Krishnendu},
  issn         = {2752-6542},
  journal      = {PNAS Nexus},
  number       = {5},
  publisher    = {Oxford University Press},
  title        = {{Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas}},
  doi          = {10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154},
  volume       = {4},
  year         = {2025},
}

