--- OA_place: publisher OA_type: hybrid _id: '19965' abstract: - lang: eng text: Multiagent learning is challenging when agents face mixed-motivation interactions, where conflicts of interest arise as agents independently try to optimize their respective outcomes. Recent advancements in evolutionary game theory have identified a class of “zero-determinant” strategies, which confer an agent with significant unilateral control over outcomes in repeated games. Building on these insights, we present a comprehensive generalization of zero-determinant strategies to stochastic games, encompassing dynamic environments. We propose an algorithm that allows an agent to discover strategies enforcing predetermined linear (or approximately linear) payoff relationships. Of particular interest is the relationship in which both payoffs are equal, which serves as a proxy for fairness in symmetric games. We demonstrate that an agent can discover strategies enforcing such relationships through experience alone, without coordinating with an opponent. In finding and using such a strategy, an agent (“enforcer”) can incentivize optimal and equitable outcomes, circumventing potential exploitation. In particular, from the opponent’s viewpoint, the enforcer transforms a mixed-motivation problem into a cooperative problem, paving the way for more collaboration and fairness in multiagent systems. acknowledgement: 'We gratefully acknowledge the support from the European Research Council (Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT) and the Max Planck Society (C.H.), the European Research Council (Consolidator Grant 863818: ForM-SMArt) (K.C.), the Shanghai Pujiang Program (No. 23PJ1405500) (Q.S.), the Army Research Office (Grant No. W911NF-18-1-0325) (N.E.L.), and the John Templeton Foundation (Grant No. 62281) (J.B.P.).' article_number: e2319927121 article_processing_charge: Yes (in subscription journal) article_type: original author: - first_name: Alex full_name: Mcavoy, Alex last_name: Mcavoy - first_name: Udari Madhushani full_name: Sehwag, Udari Madhushani last_name: Sehwag - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Wolfram full_name: Barfuss, Wolfram last_name: Barfuss - first_name: Qi full_name: Su, Qi last_name: Su - first_name: Naomi Ehrich full_name: Leonard, Naomi Ehrich last_name: Leonard - first_name: Joshua B. full_name: Plotkin, Joshua B. last_name: Plotkin citation: ama: Mcavoy A, Sehwag UM, Hilbe C, et al. Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2025;122(25). doi:10.1073/pnas.2319927121 apa: Mcavoy, A., Sehwag, U. M., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., Barfuss, W., Su, Q., … Plotkin, J. B. (2025). Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2319927121 chicago: Mcavoy, Alex, Udari Madhushani Sehwag, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Wolfram Barfuss, Qi Su, Naomi Ehrich Leonard, and Joshua B. Plotkin. “Unilateral Incentive Alignment in Two-Agent Stochastic Games.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. National Academy of Sciences, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2319927121. ieee: A. Mcavoy et al., “Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 122, no. 25. National Academy of Sciences, 2025. ista: Mcavoy A, Sehwag UM, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Barfuss W, Su Q, Leonard NE, Plotkin JB. 2025. Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 122(25), e2319927121. mla: Mcavoy, Alex, et al. “Unilateral Incentive Alignment in Two-Agent Stochastic Games.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 122, no. 25, e2319927121, National Academy of Sciences, 2025, doi:10.1073/pnas.2319927121. short: A. Mcavoy, U.M. Sehwag, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, W. Barfuss, Q. Su, N.E. Leonard, J.B. Plotkin, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 122 (2025). date_created: 2025-07-06T22:01:23Z date_published: 2025-06-24T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-09-30T13:47:14Z day: '24' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1073/pnas.2319927121 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '001522351900001' pmid: - '40523172' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 3b35befd959a3e37aa9080a64a6afaf3 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2025-07-08T05:52:26Z date_updated: 2025-07-08T05:52:26Z file_id: '19972' file_name: 2025_PNAS_McAvoy.pdf file_size: 29525932 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2025-07-08T05:52:26Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2319927121 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 122' isi: 1 issue: '25' language: - iso: eng license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ month: '06' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' publication: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences publication_identifier: eissn: - 1091-6490 issn: - 0027-8424 publication_status: published publisher: National Academy of Sciences quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games tmp: image: /images/cc_by_nc_nd.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) short: CC BY-NC-ND (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345 volume: 122 year: '2025' ... --- DOAJ_listed: '1' OA_place: publisher OA_type: gold _id: '19843' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Social dilemmas are collective-action problems where individual interests are at odds with group interests. Such dilemmas occur frequently at all scales of human interactions. When dealing with collective-action problems, people often act reciprocally. They adjust their behavior to match the previous behavior of the recipient. The literature distinguishes two kinds of reciprocity. According to direct reciprocity, individuals react to their immediate experiences with the recipient. They are more likely to cooperate if the recipient previously cooperated with them. According to indirect reciprocity, individuals react to the recipient’s general behavior, irrespectively of whether or not they benefited directly. In practice, the two kinds of reciprocity are often intertwined; people typically base their decisions on both direct experiences and indirect observations. Yet only recently have researchers begun to explore how the two kinds of reciprocity interact. So far, this research only addresses a single type of social dilemma, the donation game, where the effects of individual behaviors are independent. Instead, here we allow for all pairwise social dilemmas. By applying novel techniques to generalize the theory of zero-determinant strategies, we establish an important proof of principle: In all social dilemmas, socially optimal outcomes can be sustained as an equilibrium, using either direct or indirect reciprocity, or arbitrary mixtures thereof. These results neither require games to be repeated infinitely often, nor that individual opinions are synchronized. In this way, we considerably generalize the scope of models of reciprocity, and we build further bridges between the literatures on direct and indirect reciprocity.' acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.).' article_number: pgaf154 article_processing_charge: Yes article_type: original author: - first_name: Valentin full_name: Hübner, Valentin id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910 last_name: Hübner orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987 - first_name: Laura full_name: Schmid, Laura id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Schmid orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329 - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X citation: ama: Hübner V, Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas. PNAS Nexus. 2025;4(5). doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154 apa: Hübner, V., Schmid, L., Hilbe, C., & Chatterjee, K. (2025). Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas. PNAS Nexus. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154 chicago: Hübner, Valentin, Laura Schmid, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Stable Strategies of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity across All Social Dilemmas.” PNAS Nexus. Oxford University Press, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154. ieee: V. Hübner, L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, and K. Chatterjee, “Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas,” PNAS Nexus, vol. 4, no. 5. Oxford University Press, 2025. ista: Hübner V, Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. 2025. Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas. PNAS Nexus. 4(5), pgaf154. mla: Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Stable Strategies of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity across All Social Dilemmas.” PNAS Nexus, vol. 4, no. 5, pgaf154, Oxford University Press, 2025, doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154. short: V. Hübner, L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, PNAS Nexus 4 (2025). corr_author: '1' date_created: 2025-06-15T22:01:30Z date_published: 2025-05-01T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2026-09-16T06:58:23Z day: '01' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154 ec_funded: 1 external_id: pmid: - '40417077' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: efd6648db3fc3ea0cdd7155d667e5f11 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2025-06-23T08:09:50Z date_updated: 2025-06-23T08:09:50Z file_id: '19867' file_name: 2025_PNASNexus_Huebner.pdf file_size: 2551195 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2025-06-23T08:09:50Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 4' issue: '5' language: - iso: eng license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ month: '05' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' publication: PNAS Nexus publication_identifier: eissn: - 2752-6542 publication_status: published publisher: Oxford University Press quality_controlled: '1' related_material: record: - id: '19903' relation: dissertation_contains status: public scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas tmp: image: /images/cc_by_nc.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) short: CC BY-NC (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 4 year: '2025' ... --- OA_place: publisher OA_type: hybrid PlanS_conform: '1' _id: '19074' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation in groups. In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions towards a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods games among asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry allows for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment each round. However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals make the same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose contributions along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next. We do so for three different models – one without any budget constraints, one with endowment constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current endowment to be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities: the welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the model with savings.' acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010), and ARC SRIEAS Grant SR200100005 Securing Antarctica’s Environmental Future (to M.K.). Open access funding provided by Institute of Science and Technology (IST Austria).' article_processing_charge: Yes (via OA deal) article_type: original author: - first_name: Valentin full_name: Hübner, Valentin id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910 last_name: Hübner orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987 - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Manuel full_name: Staab, Manuel last_name: Staab - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Kleshnina orcid: 0000-0002-5518-8317 - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X citation: ama: Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications. 2025;15:1617-1645. doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5 apa: Hübner, V., Hilbe, C., Staab, M., Kleshnina, M., & Chatterjee, K. (2025). Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5 chicago: Hübner, Valentin, Christian Hilbe, Manuel Staab, Maria Kleshnina, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.” Dynamic Games and Applications. Springer Nature, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5. ieee: V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, and K. Chatterjee, “Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games,” Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 15. Springer Nature, pp. 1617–1645, 2025. ista: Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. 2025. Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications. 15, 1617–1645. mla: Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.” Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 15, Springer Nature, 2025, pp. 1617–45, doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5. short: V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, K. Chatterjee, Dynamic Games and Applications 15 (2025) 1617–1645. corr_author: '1' date_created: 2025-02-23T23:01:57Z date_published: 2025-11-01T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2026-09-16T06:58:23Z day: '01' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '001415587800001' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: de0a412cbb7d98bf5e6a551c26acbefa content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2025-12-30T08:01:35Z date_updated: 2025-12-30T08:01:35Z file_id: '20888' file_name: 2025_DynGamesAppl_Huebner.pdf file_size: 1126178 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2025-12-30T08:01:35Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 15' isi: 1 language: - iso: eng month: '11' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version page: 1617-1645 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' - _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '754411' name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships publication: Dynamic Games and Applications publication_identifier: eissn: - 2153-0793 issn: - 2153-0785 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature quality_controlled: '1' related_material: record: - id: '19903' relation: dissertation_contains status: public scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 15 year: '2025' ... --- APC_amount: 3041,76 EUR OA_place: publisher OA_type: hybrid _id: '15083' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas. The very logic of reciprocity, however, seems to require that individuals are symmetric, and that everyone has the same means to influence each others’ payoffs. Yet in many applications, individuals are asymmetric. Herein, we study the effect of asymmetry in linear public good games. Individuals may differ in their endowments (their ability to contribute to a public good) and in their productivities (how effective their contributions are). Given the individuals’ productivities, we ask which allocation of endowments is optimal for cooperation. To this end, we consider two notions of optimality. The first notion focuses on the resilience of cooperation. The respective endowment distribution ensures that full cooperation is feasible even under the most adverse conditions. The second notion focuses on efficiency. The corresponding endowment distribution maximizes group welfare. Using analytical methods, we fully characterize these two endowment distributions. This analysis reveals that both optimality notions favor some endowment inequality: More productive players ought to get higher endowments. Yet the two notions disagree on how unequal endowments are supposed to be. A focus on resilience results in less inequality. With additional simulations, we show that the optimal endowment allocation needs to account for both the resilience and the efficiency of cooperation.' acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir Programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010) (to M.K.).' article_number: e2315558121 article_processing_charge: Yes (in subscription journal) article_type: original author: - first_name: Valentin full_name: Hübner, Valentin id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910 last_name: Hübner orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987 - first_name: Manuel full_name: Staab, Manuel last_name: Staab - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria last_name: Kleshnina citation: ama: Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M. Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 2024;121(10). doi:10.1073/pnas.2315558121 apa: Hübner, V., Staab, M., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Kleshnina, M. (2024). Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2315558121 chicago: Hübner, Valentin, Manuel Staab, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Maria Kleshnina. “Efficiency and Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. National Academy of Sciences, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2315558121. ieee: V. Hübner, M. Staab, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. Kleshnina, “Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 121, no. 10. National Academy of Sciences, 2024. ista: Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M. 2024. Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 121(10), e2315558121. mla: Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Efficiency and Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 121, no. 10, e2315558121, National Academy of Sciences, 2024, doi:10.1073/pnas.2315558121. short: V. Hübner, M. Staab, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Kleshnina, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 121 (2024). corr_author: '1' das_tickbox: '1' dataavailabilitystatement: Figures are based on simulation averages over many independent runs of the respective simulation. Results were analyzed and visualized with Python and Matlab R2023a. The computer code is published in (65). All other data are included in the manuscript and/or SI Appendix. date_created: 2024-03-05T09:18:49Z date_published: 2024-03-05T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2026-10-15T10:10:26Z day: '05' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1073/pnas.2315558121 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '001207786500004' pmid: - '38408249' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 068520e3efd4d008bb9177e8aedb7d22 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2024-03-12T13:12:22Z date_updated: 2024-03-12T13:12:22Z file_id: '15109' file_name: 2024_PNAS_Huebner.pdf file_size: 2203220 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2024-03-12T13:12:22Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2315558121 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 121' isi: 1 issue: '10' language: - iso: eng month: '03' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' - _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '754411' name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships publication: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America publication_identifier: eissn: - 1091-6490 issn: - 0027-8424 publication_status: published publisher: National Academy of Sciences quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - description: News on ISTA Website relation: press_release url: https://ista.ac.at/en/news/what-math-tells-us-about-social-dilemmas/ record: - id: '15108' relation: research_data status: public - id: '19903' relation: dissertation_contains status: public researchdata_availability: yes scopus_import: '1' status: public supplementarymaterial: yes title: Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas tmp: image: /images/cc_by_nc_nd.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) short: CC BY-NC-ND (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345 volume: 121 year: '2024' ... --- _id: '12861' abstract: - lang: eng text: The field of indirect reciprocity investigates how social norms can foster cooperation when individuals continuously monitor and assess each other’s social interactions. By adhering to certain social norms, cooperating individuals can improve their reputation and, in turn, receive benefits from others. Eight social norms, known as the “leading eight," have been shown to effectively promote the evolution of cooperation as long as information is public and reliable. These norms categorize group members as either ’good’ or ’bad’. In this study, we examine a scenario where individuals instead assign nuanced reputation scores to each other, and only cooperate with those whose reputation exceeds a certain threshold. We find both analytically and through simulations that such quantitative assessments are error-correcting, thus facilitating cooperation in situations where information is private and unreliable. Moreover, our results identify four specific norms that are robust to such conditions, and may be relevant for helping to sustain cooperation in natural populations. acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). L.S. received additional partial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under grant Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award), and also thanks the support by the Stochastic Analysis and Application Research Center (SAARC) under National Research Foundation of Korea grant NRF-2019R1A5A1028324. The authors additionally thank Stefan Schmid for providing access to his lab infrastructure at the University of Vienna for the purpose of collecting simulation data.' article_number: '2086' article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Laura full_name: Schmid, Laura id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Schmid orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329 - first_name: Farbod full_name: Ekbatani, Farbod last_name: Ekbatani - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X citation: ama: Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications. 2023;14. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x apa: Schmid, L., Ekbatani, F., Hilbe, C., & Chatterjee, K. (2023). Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x chicago: Schmid, Laura, Farbod Ekbatani, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Quantitative Assessment Can Stabilize Indirect Reciprocity under Imperfect Information.” Nature Communications. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x. ieee: L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, and K. Chatterjee, “Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information,” Nature Communications, vol. 14. Springer Nature, 2023. ista: Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. 2023. Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications. 14, 2086. mla: Schmid, Laura, et al. “Quantitative Assessment Can Stabilize Indirect Reciprocity under Imperfect Information.” Nature Communications, vol. 14, 2086, Springer Nature, 2023, doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x. short: L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, Nature Communications 14 (2023). date_created: 2023-04-23T22:01:03Z date_published: 2023-04-12T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:26:15Z day: '12' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '001003644100020' pmid: - '37045828' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: a4b3b7b36fbef068cabf4fb99501fef6 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2023-04-25T09:13:53Z date_updated: 2023-04-25T09:13:53Z file_id: '12868' file_name: 2023_NatureComm_Schmid.pdf file_size: 1786475 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2023-04-25T09:13:53Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 14' isi: 1 language: - iso: eng month: '04' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' - _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: Z211 name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems publication: Nature Communications publication_identifier: eissn: - 2041-1723 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8 volume: 14 year: '2023' ... --- _id: '13258' abstract: - lang: eng text: Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation. acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010) (to M.K.).' article_number: '4153' article_processing_charge: Yes article_type: original author: - first_name: Maria full_name: Kleshnina, Maria id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Kleshnina - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Stepan full_name: Simsa, Stepan id: 409d615c-2f95-11ee-b934-90a352102c1e last_name: Simsa orcid: 0000-0001-6687-1210 - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin A. full_name: Nowak, Martin A. last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications. 2023;14. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9 apa: Kleshnina, M., Hilbe, C., Simsa, S., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2023). The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9 chicago: Kleshnina, Maria, Christian Hilbe, Stepan Simsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin A. Nowak. “The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature Communications. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9. ieee: M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. A. Nowak, “The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games,” Nature Communications, vol. 14. Springer Nature, 2023. ista: Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. 2023. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications. 14, 4153. mla: Kleshnina, Maria, et al. “The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature Communications, vol. 14, 4153, Springer Nature, 2023, doi:10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9. short: M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature Communications 14 (2023). corr_author: '1' date_created: 2023-07-23T22:01:11Z date_published: 2023-07-12T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-04-14T07:43:55Z day: '12' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '001029450400031' pmid: - '37438341' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 5aceefdfe76686267b93ae4fe81899f1 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z date_updated: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z file_id: '13337' file_name: 2023_NatureComm_Kleshnina.pdf file_size: 1601682 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2023-07-31T11:32:36Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 14' isi: 1 language: - iso: eng month: '07' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' - _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '754411' name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships publication: Nature Communications publication_identifier: eissn: - 2041-1723 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature quality_controlled: '1' related_material: record: - id: '13336' relation: research_data status: public scopus_import: '1' status: public title: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 14 year: '2023' ... --- _id: '12280' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'In repeated interactions, players can use strategies that respond to the outcome of previous rounds. Much of the existing literature on direct reciprocity assumes that all competing individuals use the same strategy space. Here, we study both learning and evolutionary dynamics of players that differ in the strategy space they explore. We focus on the infinitely repeated donation game and compare three natural strategy spaces: memory-1 strategies, which consider the last moves of both players, reactive strategies, which respond to the last move of the co-player, and unconditional strategies. These three strategy spaces differ in the memory capacity that is needed. We compute the long term average payoff that is achieved in a pairwise learning process. We find that smaller strategy spaces can dominate larger ones. For weak selection, unconditional players dominate both reactive and memory-1 players. For intermediate selection, reactive players dominate memory-1 players. Only for strong selection and low cost-to-benefit ratio, memory-1 players dominate the others. We observe that the supergame between strategy spaces can be a social dilemma: maximum payoff is achieved if both players explore a larger strategy space, but smaller strategy spaces dominate.' acknowledgement: "This work was supported by the European Research Council (https://erc.europa.eu/)\r\nCoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript." article_number: e1010149 article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Laura full_name: Schmid, Laura id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Schmid orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329 - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. 2022;18(6). doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149 apa: Schmid, L., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2022). Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. Public Library of Science. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149 chicago: Schmid, Laura, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Direct Reciprocity between Individuals That Use Different Strategy Spaces.” PLOS Computational Biology. Public Library of Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149. ieee: L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces,” PLOS Computational Biology, vol. 18, no. 6. Public Library of Science, 2022. ista: Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2022. Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. 18(6), e1010149. mla: Schmid, Laura, et al. “Direct Reciprocity between Individuals That Use Different Strategy Spaces.” PLOS Computational Biology, vol. 18, no. 6, e1010149, Public Library of Science, 2022, doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149. short: L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PLOS Computational Biology 18 (2022). corr_author: '1' date_created: 2023-01-16T10:02:51Z date_published: 2022-06-14T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-04-14T07:52:47Z day: '14' ddc: - '000' - '570' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000843626800031' pmid: - '35700167' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 31b6b311b6731f1658277a9dfff6632c content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2023-01-30T11:28:13Z date_updated: 2023-01-30T11:28:13Z file_id: '12460' file_name: 2022_PlosCompBio_Schmid.pdf file_size: 3143222 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2023-01-30T11:28:13Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 18' isi: 1 issue: '6' keyword: - Computational Theory and Mathematics - Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience - Genetics - Molecular Biology - Ecology - Modeling and Simulation - Ecology - Evolution - Behavior and Systematics language: - iso: eng month: '06' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' publication: PLOS Computational Biology publication_identifier: eissn: - 1553-7358 publication_status: published publisher: Public Library of Science quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8 volume: 18 year: '2022' ... --- _id: '17061' abstract: - lang: eng text: Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on what individuals wish to maximize. A natural objective is one’s own success. However, when two such “selfish” learners interact with each other, the outcome can be detrimental to both, especially when there are conflicts of interest. Here, we explore how a learner can align incentives with a selfish opponent. Moreover, we consider the dynamics that arise when learning rules themselves are subject to evolutionary pressure. By combining extensive simulations and analytical techniques, we demonstrate that selfish learning is unstable in most classical two-player repeated games. If evolution operates on the level of long-run payoffs, selection instead favors learning rules that incorporate social (other-regarding) preferences. To further corroborate these results, we analyze data from a repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment. We find that selfish learning is insufficient to explain human behavior when there is a trade-off between payoff maximization and fairness. acknowledgement: The authors are grateful to Jörg Oechssler for many helpful comments. A.M. was supported by a Simons Postdoctoral Fellowship (Math+X) at the University of Pennsylvania; K.C. was supported by the European Research Council Consolidator Grant 863818 (ForM-SMArt); and C.H. was supported by the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529 (E-DIRECT). article_number: pgac141 article_processing_charge: Yes article_type: original arxiv: 1 author: - first_name: Alex full_name: McAvoy, Alex last_name: McAvoy - first_name: Julian full_name: Kates-Harbeck, Julian last_name: Kates-Harbeck - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X citation: ama: McAvoy A, Kates-Harbeck J, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C. Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games. PNAS Nexus. 2022;1(4). doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac141 apa: McAvoy, A., Kates-Harbeck, J., Chatterjee, K., & Hilbe, C. (2022). Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games. PNAS Nexus. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac141 chicago: McAvoy, Alex, Julian Kates-Harbeck, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Christian Hilbe. “Evolutionary Instability of Selfish Learning in Repeated Games.” PNAS Nexus. Oxford University Press, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac141. ieee: A. McAvoy, J. Kates-Harbeck, K. Chatterjee, and C. Hilbe, “Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games,” PNAS Nexus, vol. 1, no. 4. Oxford University Press, 2022. ista: McAvoy A, Kates-Harbeck J, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C. 2022. Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games. PNAS Nexus. 1(4), pgac141. mla: McAvoy, Alex, et al. “Evolutionary Instability of Selfish Learning in Repeated Games.” PNAS Nexus, vol. 1, no. 4, pgac141, Oxford University Press, 2022, doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac141. short: A. McAvoy, J. Kates-Harbeck, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, PNAS Nexus 1 (2022). date_created: 2024-05-28T14:23:12Z date_published: 2022-09-01T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-06-11T13:54:20Z day: '01' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac141 ec_funded: 1 external_id: arxiv: - '2105.06199' pmid: - '36714856' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 79a8e3e4be7e8a2b407b4efddd65f3f3 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2024-08-06T07:33:30Z date_updated: 2024-08-06T07:33:30Z file_id: '17400' file_name: 2022_PNASNexus_McAvoy.pdf file_size: 2410962 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2024-08-06T07:33:30Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac141 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 1' issue: '4' language: - iso: eng month: '09' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' publication: PNAS Nexus publication_identifier: issn: - 2752-6542 publication_status: published publisher: Oxford University Press quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - relation: software url: https://github.com/alexmcavoy/fmtl/ scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 1 year: '2022' ... --- _id: '9402' abstract: - lang: eng text: Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that the well-known ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call ‘generous scoring’. Using an equilibrium analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding their evolvability. acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), the European Research Council Start Grant 279307: Graph Games (to K.C.), and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.' article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Laura full_name: Schmid, Laura id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Schmid orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329 - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Martin A. full_name: Nowak, Martin A. last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 2021;5(10):1292–1302. doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8 apa: Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2021). A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8 chicago: Schmid, Laura, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Christian Hilbe, and Martin A. Nowak. “A Unified Framework of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity.” Nature Human Behaviour. Springer Nature, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8. ieee: L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, and M. A. Nowak, “A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity,” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 5, no. 10. Springer Nature, pp. 1292–1302, 2021. ista: Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. 2021. A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 5(10), 1292–1302. mla: Schmid, Laura, et al. “A Unified Framework of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity.” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 5, no. 10, Springer Nature, 2021, pp. 1292–1302, doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8. short: L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, M.A. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 5 (2021) 1292–1302. corr_author: '1' date_created: 2021-05-18T16:56:57Z date_published: 2021-05-13T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2026-10-23T22:30:45Z day: '13' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh - _id: GradSch doi: 10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000650304000002' pmid: - '33986519' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 34f55e173f90dc1dab731063458ac780 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2023-11-07T08:27:23Z date_updated: 2023-11-07T08:27:23Z file_id: '14496' file_name: 2021_NatureHumanBehaviour_Schmid_accepted.pdf file_size: 5232761 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2023-11-07T08:27:23Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 5' isi: 1 issue: '10' language: - iso: eng month: '05' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: 1292–1302 pmid: 1 project: - _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E call_identifier: H2020 grant_number: '863818' name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications' - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' publication: Nature Human Behaviour publication_identifier: eissn: - 2397-3374 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - description: News on IST Homepage relation: press_release url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/the-emergence-of-cooperation/ record: - id: '10293' relation: dissertation_contains status: public scopus_import: '1' status: public title: A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 5 year: '2021' ... --- _id: '13060' abstract: - lang: eng text: Coinfections with multiple pathogens can result in complex within-host dynamics affecting virulence and transmission. Whilst multiple infections are intensively studied in solitary hosts, it is so far unresolved how social host interactions interfere with pathogen competition, and if this depends on coinfection diversity. We studied how the collective disease defenses of ants – their social immunity ­– influence pathogen competition in coinfections of same or different fungal pathogen species. Social immunity reduced virulence for all pathogen combinations, but interfered with spore production only in different-species coinfections. Here, it decreased overall pathogen sporulation success, whilst simultaneously increasing co-sporulation on individual cadavers and maintaining a higher pathogen diversity at the community-level. Mathematical modeling revealed that host sanitary care alone can modulate competitive outcomes between pathogens, giving advantage to fast-germinating, thus less grooming-sensitive ones. Host social interactions can hence modulate infection dynamics in coinfected group members, thereby altering pathogen communities at the host- and population-level. article_processing_charge: No author: - first_name: Barbara full_name: Milutinovic, Barbara id: 2CDC32B8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Milutinovic orcid: 0000-0002-8214-4758 - first_name: Miriam full_name: Stock, Miriam id: 42462816-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Stock - first_name: Anna V full_name: Grasse, Anna V id: 406F989C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Grasse - first_name: Elisabeth full_name: Naderlinger, Elisabeth id: 31757262-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Naderlinger - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Sylvia full_name: Cremer, Sylvia id: 2F64EC8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Cremer orcid: 0000-0002-2193-3868 citation: ama: Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. 2020. doi:10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318 apa: Milutinovic, B., Stock, M., Grasse, A. V., Naderlinger, E., Hilbe, C., & Cremer, S. (2020). Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Dryad. https://doi.org/10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318 chicago: Milutinovic, Barbara, Miriam Stock, Anna V Grasse, Elisabeth Naderlinger, Christian Hilbe, and Sylvia Cremer. “Social Immunity Modulates Competition between Coinfecting Pathogens.” Dryad, 2020. https://doi.org/10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318. ieee: B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A. V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, and S. Cremer, “Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens.” Dryad, 2020. ista: Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. 2020. Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens, Dryad, 10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318. mla: Milutinovic, Barbara, et al. Social Immunity Modulates Competition between Coinfecting Pathogens. Dryad, 2020, doi:10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318. short: B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A.V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, S. Cremer, (2020). corr_author: '1' date_created: 2023-05-23T16:11:22Z date_published: 2020-12-19T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-06-12T07:32:35Z day: '19' ddc: - '570' department: - _id: SyCr - _id: KrCh doi: 10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318 fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.5061/DRYAD.CRJDFN318 license: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ main_file_link: - open_access: '1' url: https://doi.org/10.5061/dryad.crjdfn318 month: '12' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version publisher: Dryad related_material: record: - id: '7343' relation: used_in_publication status: public status: public title: Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens tmp: image: /images/cc_0.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication (CC0 1.0) short: CC0 (1.0) type: research_data_reference user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '7343' abstract: - lang: eng text: Coinfections with multiple pathogens can result in complex within‐host dynamics affecting virulence and transmission. While multiple infections are intensively studied in solitary hosts, it is so far unresolved how social host interactions interfere with pathogen competition, and if this depends on coinfection diversity. We studied how the collective disease defences of ants – their social immunity – influence pathogen competition in coinfections of same or different fungal pathogen species. Social immunity reduced virulence for all pathogen combinations, but interfered with spore production only in different‐species coinfections. Here, it decreased overall pathogen sporulation success while increasing co‐sporulation on individual cadavers and maintaining a higher pathogen diversity at the community level. Mathematical modelling revealed that host sanitary care alone can modulate competitive outcomes between pathogens, giving advantage to fast‐germinating, thus less grooming‐sensitive ones. Host social interactions can hence modulate infection dynamics in coinfected group members, thereby altering pathogen communities at the host level and population level. acknowledged_ssus: - _id: LifeSc acknowledgement: "We thank Bernhardt Steinwender and Jorgen Eilenberg for the fungal strains, Xavier Espadaler, Mireia Diaz, Christiane Wanke, Lumi Viljakainen and the Social Immunity Team at IST Austria, for help with ant collection, and Wanda Gorecka and Gertraud Stift of the IST Austria Life Science Facility for technical support. We are thankful to Dieter Ebert for input at all stages of the project, Roger Mundry for statistical advice, Hinrich Schulenburg, Paul Schmid-Hempel, Yuko\r\nUlrich and Joachim Kurtz for project discussion, Bor Kavcic for advice on growth curves, Marcus Roper for advice on modelling work and comments on the manuscript, as well as Marjon de Vos, Weini Huang and the Social Immunity Team for comments on the manuscript.\r\nThis study was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the Priority Programme 1399 Host-parasite Coevolution (CR 118/3 to S.C.) and the People Programme\r\n(Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under REA grant agreement no 291734 (ISTFELLOW to B.M.). " article_processing_charge: Yes (via OA deal) article_type: letter_note author: - first_name: Barbara full_name: Milutinovic, Barbara id: 2CDC32B8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Milutinovic orcid: 0000-0002-8214-4758 - first_name: Miriam full_name: Stock, Miriam id: 42462816-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Stock - first_name: Anna V full_name: Grasse, Anna V id: 406F989C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Grasse - first_name: Elisabeth full_name: Naderlinger, Elisabeth id: 31757262-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Naderlinger - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Sylvia full_name: Cremer, Sylvia id: 2F64EC8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Cremer orcid: 0000-0002-2193-3868 citation: ama: Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Ecology Letters. 2020;23(3):565-574. doi:10.1111/ele.13458 apa: Milutinovic, B., Stock, M., Grasse, A. V., Naderlinger, E., Hilbe, C., & Cremer, S. (2020). Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Ecology Letters. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1111/ele.13458 chicago: Milutinovic, Barbara, Miriam Stock, Anna V Grasse, Elisabeth Naderlinger, Christian Hilbe, and Sylvia Cremer. “Social Immunity Modulates Competition between Coinfecting Pathogens.” Ecology Letters. Wiley, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/ele.13458. ieee: B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A. V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, and S. Cremer, “Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens,” Ecology Letters, vol. 23, no. 3. Wiley, pp. 565–574, 2020. ista: Milutinovic B, Stock M, Grasse AV, Naderlinger E, Hilbe C, Cremer S. 2020. Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens. Ecology Letters. 23(3), 565–574. mla: Milutinovic, Barbara, et al. “Social Immunity Modulates Competition between Coinfecting Pathogens.” Ecology Letters, vol. 23, no. 3, Wiley, 2020, pp. 565–74, doi:10.1111/ele.13458. short: B. Milutinovic, M. Stock, A.V. Grasse, E. Naderlinger, C. Hilbe, S. Cremer, Ecology Letters 23 (2020) 565–574. corr_author: '1' date_created: 2020-01-20T13:32:12Z date_published: 2020-03-01T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-06-12T07:32:35Z day: '01' ddc: - '570' department: - _id: SyCr - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1111/ele.13458 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000507515900001' pmid: - '31950595' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 0cd8be386fa219db02845b7c3991ce04 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2020-11-19T11:27:10Z date_updated: 2020-11-19T11:27:10Z file_id: '8776' file_name: 2020_EcologyLetters_Milutinovic.pdf file_size: 561749 relation: main_file success: 1 file_date_updated: 2020-11-19T11:27:10Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1111/ele.13458 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 23' isi: 1 issue: '3' language: - iso: eng month: '03' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version page: 565-574 pmid: 1 project: - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme - _id: 25DAF0B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 grant_number: CR-118/3-1 name: Host-Parasite Coevolution publication: Ecology Letters publication_identifier: eissn: - 1461-0248 issn: - 1461-023X publication_status: published publisher: Wiley quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - description: News on IST Homepage relation: press_release url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/social-ants-shapes-disease-outcome/ record: - id: '13060' relation: research_data status: public scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Social immunity modulates competition between coinfecting pathogens tmp: image: /images/cc_by_nc.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) short: CC BY-NC (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 23 year: '2020' ... --- _id: '6836' abstract: - lang: eng text: Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions1,2,3,4. It requires that interacting individuals are sufficiently equal, such that everyone faces similar consequences when they cooperate or defect. Yet inequality is ubiquitous among humans5,6 and is generally considered to undermine cooperation and welfare7,8,9,10. Most previous models of reciprocity do not include inequality11,12,13,14,15. These models assume that individuals are the same in all relevant aspects. Here we introduce a general framework to study direct reciprocity among unequal individuals. Our model allows for multiple sources of inequality. Subjects can differ in their endowments, their productivities and in how much they benefit from public goods. We find that extreme inequality prevents cooperation. But if subjects differ in productivity, some endowment inequality can be necessary for cooperation to prevail. Our mathematical predictions are supported by a behavioural experiment in which we vary the endowments and productivities of the subjects. We observe that overall welfare is maximized when the two sources of heterogeneity are aligned, such that more productive individuals receive higher endowments. By contrast, when endowments and productivities are misaligned, cooperation quickly breaks down. Our findings have implications for policy-makers concerned with equity, efficiency and the provisioning of public goods. article_processing_charge: No article_type: letter_note author: - first_name: Oliver P. full_name: Hauser, Oliver P. last_name: Hauser - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin A. full_name: Nowak, Martin A. last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Hauser OP, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. Social dilemmas among unequals. Nature. 2019;572(7770):524-527. doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5 apa: Hauser, O. P., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2019). Social dilemmas among unequals. Nature. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5 chicago: Hauser, Oliver P., Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin A. Nowak. “Social Dilemmas among Unequals.” Nature. Springer Nature, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5. ieee: O. P. Hauser, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. A. Nowak, “Social dilemmas among unequals,” Nature, vol. 572, no. 7770. Springer Nature, pp. 524–527, 2019. ista: Hauser OP, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. 2019. Social dilemmas among unequals. Nature. 572(7770), 524–527. mla: Hauser, Oliver P., et al. “Social Dilemmas among Unequals.” Nature, vol. 572, no. 7770, Springer Nature, 2019, pp. 524–27, doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5. short: O.P. Hauser, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature 572 (2019) 524–527. date_created: 2019-09-01T22:00:56Z date_published: 2019-08-22T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:53:55Z day: '22' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000482219600045' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: a6e0e3168bf62de624e7772cdfaeb26f content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2020-05-14T10:00:32Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:42Z file_id: '7828' file_name: 2019_Nature_Hauser.pdf file_size: 18577756 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:42Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 572' isi: 1 issue: '7770' language: - iso: eng month: '08' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: 524-527 project: - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' - _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S 11407_N23 name: Rigorous Systems Engineering - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme publication: Nature publication_identifier: eissn: - 1476-4687 issn: - 0028-0836 publication_status: published publisher: Springer Nature quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - description: News on IST Homepage relation: press_release url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/too-much-inequality-impedes-support-for-public-goods-according-to-research-published-in-nature/ scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Social dilemmas among unequals type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 572 year: '2019' ... --- _id: '293' abstract: - lang: eng text: People sometimes make their admirable deeds and accomplishments hard to spot, such as by giving anonymously or avoiding bragging. Such ‘buried’ signals are hard to reconcile with standard models of signalling or indirect reciprocity, which motivate costly pro-social behaviour by reputational gains. To explain these phenomena, we design a simple game theory model, which we call the signal-burying game. This game has the feature that senders can bury their signal by deliberately reducing the probability of the signal being observed. If the signal is observed, however, it is identified as having been buried. We show under which conditions buried signals can be maintained, using static equilibrium concepts and calculations of the evolutionary dynamics. We apply our analysis to shed light on a number of otherwise puzzling social phenomena, including modesty, anonymous donations, subtlety in art and fashion, and overeagerness. acknowledgement: This work was supported by a grant from the John Templeton Foundation and by the Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-16-1-2914 (M.A.N.). C.H. acknowledges generous support from the ISTFELLOW programme and by the Schrödinger scholarship of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) J3475. article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Moshe full_name: Hoffman, Moshe last_name: Hoffman - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Hoffman M, Hilbe C, Nowak M. The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour. 2018;2:397-404. doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z apa: Hoffman, M., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. (2018). The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z chicago: Hoffman, Moshe, Christian Hilbe, and Martin Nowak. “The Signal-Burying Game Can Explain Why We Obscure Positive Traits and Good Deeds.” Nature Human Behaviour. Nature Publishing Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z. ieee: M. Hoffman, C. Hilbe, and M. Nowak, “The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds,” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 2. Nature Publishing Group, pp. 397–404, 2018. ista: Hoffman M, Hilbe C, Nowak M. 2018. The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds. Nature Human Behaviour. 2, 397–404. mla: Hoffman, Moshe, et al. “The Signal-Burying Game Can Explain Why We Obscure Positive Traits and Good Deeds.” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 2, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 397–404, doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z. short: M. Hoffman, C. Hilbe, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 397–404. corr_author: '1' date_created: 2018-12-11T11:45:39Z date_published: 2018-05-28T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:50:21Z day: '28' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000435551300009' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 32efaf06a597495c184df91b3fbb19c0 content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2019-11-19T08:17:23Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:54Z file_id: '7051' file_name: 2018_NatureHumanBeh_Hoffman.pdf file_size: 194734 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:54Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0354-z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 2' isi: 1 language: - iso: eng month: '05' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: 397 - 404 project: - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme publication: Nature Human Behaviour publication_status: published publisher: Nature Publishing Group publist_id: '7588' quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - description: News on IST Homepage relation: press_release url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/the-logic-of-modesty-why-it-pays-to-be-humble/ scopus_import: '1' status: public title: The signal-burying game can explain why we obscure positive traits and good deeds type: journal_article user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1 volume: 2 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '157' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with group interests 1-7 . According to the ''tragedy of the commons'', these misalignments can lead to overexploitation and collapse of public resources. The resulting behaviours can be analysed with the tools of game theory 8 . The theory of direct reciprocity 9-15 suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory of stochastic games 16-19 and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates. Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment - either naturally occurring or designed - help to overcome social dilemmas.' acknowledgement: "European Research Council Start Grant 279307, Austrian Science Fund (FWF) grant P23499-N23, \r\nC.H. acknowledges support from the ISTFELLOW programme." article_processing_charge: No author: - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Štepán full_name: Šimsa, Štepán last_name: Šimsa - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. 2018;559(7713):246-249. doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x apa: Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Štepán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature. Nature Publishing Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x. ieee: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games,” Nature, vol. 559, no. 7713. Nature Publishing Group, pp. 246–249, 2018. ista: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. 559(7713), 246–249. mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature, vol. 559, no. 7713, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 246–49, doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x. short: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature 559 (2018) 246–249. date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:56Z date_published: 2018-07-04T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:30:08Z day: '04' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000438240900054' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 011ab905cf9a410bc2b96f15174d654d content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2019-11-19T08:09:57Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z file_id: '7049' file_name: 2018_Nature_Hilbe.pdf file_size: 2834442 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 559' isi: 1 issue: '7713' language: - iso: eng month: '07' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: 246 - 249 project: - _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S11407 name: Game Theory - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' - _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: P 23499-N23 name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification - _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S 11407_N23 name: Rigorous Systems Engineering - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme publication: Nature publication_status: published publisher: Nature Publishing Group publist_id: '7764' quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - description: News on IST Homepage relation: press_release url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/engineering-cooperation/ scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games type: journal_article user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1 volume: 559 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '454' abstract: - lang: eng text: Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows us to analyze “crosstalk” between a player’s concurrent games. In the presence of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person’s decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games. acknowledgement: "This work was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) start grant 279307: Graph Games (C.K.), Austrian Science Fund (FWF) grant no P23499-N23 (C.K.), FWF\r\nNFN grant no S11407-N23 RiSE/SHiNE (C.K.), Office of Naval Research grant N00014-16-1-2914 (M.A.N.), National Cancer Institute grant CA179991 (M.A.N.) and by the John Templeton Foundation. J.G.R. is supported by an Erwin Schrödinger fellowship\r\n(Austrian Science Fund FWF J-3996). C.H. acknowledges generous support from the\r\nISTFELLOW program. The Program for Evolutionary Dynamics is supported in part by\r\na gift from B Wu and Eric Larson." article_number: '555' article_processing_charge: No author: - first_name: Johannes full_name: Reiter, Johannes id: 4A918E98-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Reiter orcid: 0000-0002-0170-7353 - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: David full_name: Rand, David last_name: Rand - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Reiter J, Hilbe C, Rand D, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. Nature Communications. 2018;9(1). doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8 apa: Reiter, J., Hilbe, C., Rand, D., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8 chicago: Reiter, Johannes, Christian Hilbe, David Rand, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Crosstalk in Concurrent Repeated Games Impedes Direct Reciprocity and Requires Stronger Levels of Forgiveness.” Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8. ieee: J. Reiter, C. Hilbe, D. Rand, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness,” Nature Communications, vol. 9, no. 1. Nature Publishing Group, 2018. ista: Reiter J, Hilbe C, Rand D, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. Nature Communications. 9(1), 555. mla: Reiter, Johannes, et al. “Crosstalk in Concurrent Repeated Games Impedes Direct Reciprocity and Requires Stronger Levels of Forgiveness.” Nature Communications, vol. 9, no. 1, 555, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8. short: J. Reiter, C. Hilbe, D. Rand, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature Communications 9 (2018). date_created: 2018-12-11T11:46:34Z date_published: 2018-02-07T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:30:05Z day: '07' ddc: - '004' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000424318200001' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: b6b90367545b4c615891c960ab0567f1 content_type: application/pdf creator: system date_created: 2018-12-12T10:09:18Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:31Z file_id: '4741' file_name: IST-2018-964-v1+1_2018_Hilbe_Crosstalk_in.pdf file_size: 843646 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:31Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 9' isi: 1 issue: '1' language: - iso: eng month: '02' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version project: - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' - _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: P 23499-N23 name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification - _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S11407 name: Game Theory - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme publication: Nature Communications publication_status: published publisher: Nature Publishing Group publist_id: '7368' pubrep_id: '964' quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1 volume: 9 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '419' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Reciprocity is a major factor in human social life and accounts for a large part of cooperation in our communities. Direct reciprocity arises when repeated interactions occur between the same individuals. The framework of iterated games formalizes this phenomenon. Despite being introduced more than five decades ago, the concept keeps offering beautiful surprises. Recent theoretical research driven by new mathematical tools has proposed a remarkable dichotomy among the crucial strategies: successful individuals either act as partners or as rivals. Rivals strive for unilateral advantages by applying selfish or extortionate strategies. Partners aim to share the payoff for mutual cooperation, but are ready to fight back when being exploited. Which of these behaviours evolves depends on the environment. Whereas small population sizes and a limited number of rounds favour rivalry, partner strategies are selected when populations are large and relationships stable. Only partners allow for evolution of cooperation, while the rivals’ attempt to put themselves first leads to defection. Hilbe et al. synthesize recent theoretical work on zero-determinant and ‘rival’ versus ‘partner’ strategies in social dilemmas. They describe the environments under which these contrasting selfish or cooperative strategies emerge in evolution.' article_processing_charge: No article_type: review author: - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 2018;2:469–477. doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9 apa: Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9 chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Partners and Rivals in Direct Reciprocity.” Nature Human Behaviour. Nature Publishing Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9. ieee: C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity,” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 2. Nature Publishing Group, pp. 469–477, 2018. ista: Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 2, 469–477. mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Partners and Rivals in Direct Reciprocity.” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 2, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 469–477, doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9. short: C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 2 (2018) 469–477. corr_author: '1' date_created: 2018-12-11T11:46:22Z date_published: 2018-03-19T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:50:00Z day: '19' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000446612000016' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 571b8cc0ba14e8d5d8b18e439a9835eb content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2019-11-19T08:19:51Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:25Z file_id: '7052' file_name: 2018_NatureHumanBeh_Hilbe.pdf file_size: 598033 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:25Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 2' isi: 1 language: - iso: eng month: '03' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: 469–477 project: - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' - _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: P 23499-N23 name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification - _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S 11407_N23 name: Rigorous Systems Engineering - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme publication: Nature Human Behaviour publication_status: published publisher: Nature Publishing Group publist_id: '7404' quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - relation: erratum url: http://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0342-3 scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity type: journal_article user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1 volume: 2 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '2' abstract: - lang: eng text: Indirect reciprocity explores how humans act when their reputation is at stake, and which social norms they use to assess the actions of others. A crucial question in indirect reciprocity is which social norms can maintain stable cooperation in a society. Past research has highlighted eight such norms, called “leading-eight” strategies. This past research, however, is based on the assumption that all relevant information about other population members is publicly available and that everyone agrees on who is good or bad. Instead, here we explore the reputation dynamics when information is private and noisy. We show that under these conditions, most leading-eight strategies fail to evolve. Those leading-eight strategies that do evolve are unable to sustain full cooperation.Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other’s reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These “leading-eight” strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems. article_processing_charge: No author: - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Laura full_name: Schmid, Laura id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Schmid orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329 - first_name: Josef full_name: Tkadlec, Josef id: 3F24CCC8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Tkadlec orcid: 0000-0002-1097-9684 - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 2018;115(48):12241-12246. doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115 apa: Hilbe, C., Schmid, L., Tkadlec, J., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115 chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Laura Schmid, Josef Tkadlec, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Indirect Reciprocity with Private, Noisy, and Incomplete Information.” PNAS. National Academy of Sciences, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115. ieee: C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information,” PNAS, vol. 115, no. 48. National Academy of Sciences, pp. 12241–12246, 2018. ista: Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 115(48), 12241–12246. mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Indirect Reciprocity with Private, Noisy, and Incomplete Information.” PNAS, vol. 115, no. 48, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, pp. 12241–46, doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115. short: C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 115 (2018) 12241–12246. date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:05Z date_published: 2018-11-27T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2026-10-23T22:30:45Z day: '27' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1073/pnas.1810565115 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000451351000063' pmid: - '30429320' fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115 intvolume: ' 115' isi: 1 issue: '48' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - open_access: '1' url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30429320 month: '11' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: 12241-12246 pmid: 1 project: - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' - _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: P 23499-N23 name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification - _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S 11407_N23 name: Rigorous Systems Engineering - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme publication: PNAS publication_status: published publisher: National Academy of Sciences quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - description: News on IST Homepage relation: press_release url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/no-cooperation-without-open-communication/ record: - id: '10293' relation: dissertation_contains status: public scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information type: journal_article user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1 volume: 115 year: '2018' ... --- _id: '671' abstract: - lang: eng text: Humans routinely use conditionally cooperative strategies when interacting in repeated social dilemmas. They are more likely to cooperate if others cooperated before, and are ready to retaliate if others defected. To capture the emergence of reciprocity, most previous models consider subjects who can only choose from a restricted set of representative strategies, or who react to the outcome of the very last round only. As players memorize more rounds, the dimension of the strategy space increases exponentially. This increasing computational complexity renders simulations for individuals with higher cognitive abilities infeasible, especially if multiplayer interactions are taken into account. Here, we take an axiomatic approach instead. We propose several properties that a robust cooperative strategy for a repeated multiplayer dilemma should have. These properties naturally lead to a unique class of cooperative strategies, which contains the classical Win-Stay Lose-Shift rule as a special case. A comprehensive numerical analysis for the prisoner's dilemma and for the public goods game suggests that strategies of this class readily evolve across various memory-n spaces. Our results reveal that successful strategies depend not only on how cooperative others were in the past but also on the respective context of cooperation. article_processing_charge: Yes (in subscription journal) author: - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Vaquero full_name: Martinez, Vaquero last_name: Martinez - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Hilbe C, Martinez V, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity. PNAS. 2017;114(18):4715-4720. doi:10.1073/pnas.1621239114 apa: Hilbe, C., Martinez, V., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2017). Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity. PNAS. National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1621239114 chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Vaquero Martinez, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Memory-n Strategies of Direct Reciprocity.” PNAS. National Academy of Sciences, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1621239114. ieee: C. Hilbe, V. Martinez, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity,” PNAS, vol. 114, no. 18. National Academy of Sciences, pp. 4715–4720, 2017. ista: Hilbe C, Martinez V, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2017. Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity. PNAS. 114(18), 4715–4720. mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Memory-n Strategies of Direct Reciprocity.” PNAS, vol. 114, no. 18, National Academy of Sciences, 2017, pp. 4715–20, doi:10.1073/pnas.1621239114. short: C. Hilbe, V. Martinez, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 114 (2017) 4715–4720. corr_author: '1' date_created: 2018-12-11T11:47:50Z date_published: 2017-05-02T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2026-06-18T19:11:14Z day: '02' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1073/pnas.1621239114 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000400358000050' pmid: - '28420786' fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1621239114 intvolume: ' 114' isi: 1 issue: '18' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - open_access: '1' url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5422766/ month: '05' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version page: 4715 - 4720 pmid: 1 project: - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' - _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: P 23499-N23 name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification - _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S11407 name: Game Theory publication: PNAS publication_identifier: issn: - 0027-8424 publication_status: published publisher: National Academy of Sciences publist_id: '7053' quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 114 year: '2017' ... --- _id: '699' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'In antagonistic symbioses, such as host–parasite interactions, one population’s success is the other’s loss. In mutualistic symbioses, such as division of labor, both parties can gain, but they might have different preferences over the possible mutualistic arrangements. The rates of evolution of the two populations in a symbiosis are important determinants of which population will be more successful: Faster evolution is thought to be favored in antagonistic symbioses (the “Red Queen effect”), but disfavored in certain mutualistic symbioses (the “Red King effect”). However, it remains unclear which biological parameters drive these effects. Here, we analyze the effects of the various determinants of evolutionary rate: generation time, mutation rate, population size, and the intensity of natural selection. Our main results hold for the case where mutation is infrequent. Slower evolution causes a long-term advantage in an important class of mutualistic interactions. Surprisingly, less intense selection is the strongest driver of this Red King effect, whereas relative mutation rates and generation times have little effect. In antagonistic interactions, faster evolution by any means is beneficial. Our results provide insight into the demographic evolution of symbionts. ' article_processing_charge: No author: - first_name: Carl full_name: Veller, Carl last_name: Veller - first_name: Laura full_name: Hayward, Laura last_name: Hayward - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X citation: ama: Veller C, Hayward L, Nowak M, Hilbe C. The red queen and king in finite populations. PNAS. 2017;114(27):E5396-E5405. doi:10.1073/pnas.1702020114 apa: Veller, C., Hayward, L., Nowak, M., & Hilbe, C. (2017). The red queen and king in finite populations. PNAS. National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1702020114 chicago: Veller, Carl, Laura Hayward, Martin Nowak, and Christian Hilbe. “The Red Queen and King in Finite Populations.” PNAS. National Academy of Sciences, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1702020114. ieee: C. Veller, L. Hayward, M. Nowak, and C. Hilbe, “The red queen and king in finite populations,” PNAS, vol. 114, no. 27. National Academy of Sciences, pp. E5396–E5405, 2017. ista: Veller C, Hayward L, Nowak M, Hilbe C. 2017. The red queen and king in finite populations. PNAS. 114(27), E5396–E5405. mla: Veller, Carl, et al. “The Red Queen and King in Finite Populations.” PNAS, vol. 114, no. 27, National Academy of Sciences, 2017, pp. E5396–405, doi:10.1073/pnas.1702020114. short: C. Veller, L. Hayward, M. Nowak, C. Hilbe, PNAS 114 (2017) E5396–E5405. date_created: 2018-12-11T11:48:00Z date_published: 2017-07-03T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-09-10T11:11:07Z day: '03' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1073/pnas.1702020114 external_id: isi: - '000404576100017' pmid: - '28630336' fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1702020114 intvolume: ' 114' isi: 1 issue: '27' language: - iso: eng main_file_link: - open_access: '1' url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5502615/ month: '07' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: E5396 - E5405 pmid: 1 publication: PNAS publication_identifier: issn: - 0027-8424 publication_status: published publisher: National Academy of Sciences publist_id: '7002' quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: The red queen and king in finite populations type: journal_article user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345 volume: 114 year: '2017' ... --- _id: '1200' acknowledgement: C.H. acknowledges generous support from the ISTFELLOW program. article_processing_charge: No author: - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Arne full_name: Traulsen, Arne last_name: Traulsen citation: ama: 'Hilbe C, Traulsen A. Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on “Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods” by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze. Physics of Life Reviews. 2016;19:29-31. doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004' apa: 'Hilbe, C., & Traulsen, A. (2016). Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on “Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods” by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze. Physics of Life Reviews. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004' chicago: 'Hilbe, Christian, and Arne Traulsen. “Only the Combination of Mathematics and Agent Based Simulations Can Leverage the Full Potential of Evolutionary Modeling: Comment on ‘Evolutionary Game Theory Using Agent-Based Methods’ by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze.” Physics of Life Reviews. Elsevier, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004.' ieee: 'C. Hilbe and A. Traulsen, “Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on ‘Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods’ by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze,” Physics of Life Reviews, vol. 19. Elsevier, pp. 29–31, 2016.' ista: 'Hilbe C, Traulsen A. 2016. Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on “Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods” by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze. Physics of Life Reviews. 19, 29–31.' mla: 'Hilbe, Christian, and Arne Traulsen. “Only the Combination of Mathematics and Agent Based Simulations Can Leverage the Full Potential of Evolutionary Modeling: Comment on ‘Evolutionary Game Theory Using Agent-Based Methods’ by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze.” Physics of Life Reviews, vol. 19, Elsevier, 2016, pp. 29–31, doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004.' short: C. Hilbe, A. Traulsen, Physics of Life Reviews 19 (2016) 29–31. date_created: 2018-12-11T11:50:40Z date_published: 2016-12-01T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2025-09-22T09:42:11Z day: '01' ddc: - '530' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004 ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000390640200003' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 95e6dc78278334b99dacbf8822509364 content_type: application/pdf creator: system date_created: 2018-12-12T10:11:02Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:39Z file_id: '4855' file_name: IST-2017-798-v1+1_comment_adami.pdf file_size: 171352 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:39Z fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2016.10.004 has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 19' isi: 1 language: - iso: eng month: '12' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: 29 - 31 project: - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme publication: Physics of Life Reviews publication_status: published publisher: Elsevier publist_id: '6150' pubrep_id: '798' quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: 'Only the combination of mathematics and agent based simulations can leverage the full potential of evolutionary modeling: Comment on “Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods” by C. Adami, J. Schossau and A. Hintze' tmp: image: /images/cc_by_nc_nd.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) short: CC BY-NC-ND (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345 volume: 19 year: '2016' ...