---
OA_place: publisher
OA_type: gold
_id: '21411'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "To achieve fast recovery from link failures, most modern communication networks
feature fully\r\ndecentralized fast re-routing mechanisms. These re-routing mechanisms
rely on pre-installed static re-routing rules at the nodes (the routers), which
depend only on local failure information, namely on the failed links incident
to the node. Ideally, a network is perfectly resilient: the re-routing rules ensure
that packets are always successfully routed to their destinations as long as the
source and the destination are still physically connected in the underlying network
after the failures. Unfortunately, there are examples where achieving perfect
resilience is not possible. Surprisingly, only very little is known about the
algorithmic aspect of when and how perfect resilience can be achieved. We investigate
the computational complexity of analyzing such local fast re-routing mechanisms.
Our main result is a negative one: we show that even checking whether a given
set of static re-routing rules ensures perfect resilience is coNP-complete. Additionally,
we investigate other fundamental variations of the problem. In particular, we
show that our coNP-completeness proof also applies to scenarios where the re-routing
rules have specific patterns (known as skipping in the literature). On the positive
side, for scenarios where nodes do not have information about the link from which
a packet arrived (the so-called in-port), we present a linear-time algorithm to
realize perfect resilience whenever possible (which we show can also be determined
in linear time). "
acknowledgement: "Matthias Bentert: ERC Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
(grant agreement\r\nNo. 819416) and ERC Consolidator grant AdjustNet (agreement
No. 864228).\r\nEsra Ceylan: German Research Foundation (DFG) project ReNO, Schwerpunktprogramm:\r\nResilienz
in Vernetzten Welten – Beherrschen von Fehlern, Überlast, Angriffen und dem\r\nUnbekannten
(SPP 2378).\r\nStefan Schmid: German Research Foundation (DFG) project ReNO, Schwerpunktprogramm:\r\nResilienz
in Vernetzten Welten – Beherrschen von Fehlern, Überlast, Angriffen und dem\r\nUnbekannten
(SPP 2378)."
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '31'
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Bentert, Matthias
last_name: Bentert
- first_name: Esra
full_name: Ceylan, Esra
last_name: Ceylan
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Hübner, Valentin
id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
last_name: Hübner
orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Schmid, Stefan
last_name: Schmid
- first_name: Jiří
full_name: Srba, Jiří
last_name: Srba
citation:
ama: 'Bentert M, Ceylan E, Hübner V, Schmid S, Srba J. Fast re-routing in networks:
On the complexity of perfect resilience. In: 29th International Conference
on Principles of Distributed Systems. Vol 361. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
für Informatik; 2026. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.31'
apa: 'Bentert, M., Ceylan, E., Hübner, V., Schmid, S., & Srba, J. (2026). Fast
re-routing in networks: On the complexity of perfect resilience. In 29th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (Vol. 361). Iaşi, Romania:
Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.31'
chicago: 'Bentert, Matthias, Esra Ceylan, Valentin Hübner, Stefan Schmid, and Jiří
Srba. “Fast Re-Routing in Networks: On the Complexity of Perfect Resilience.”
In 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems,
Vol. 361. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2026. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.31.'
ieee: 'M. Bentert, E. Ceylan, V. Hübner, S. Schmid, and J. Srba, “Fast re-routing
in networks: On the complexity of perfect resilience,” in 29th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Iaşi, Romania, 2026, vol.
361.'
ista: 'Bentert M, Ceylan E, Hübner V, Schmid S, Srba J. 2026. Fast re-routing in
networks: On the complexity of perfect resilience. 29th International Conference
on Principles of Distributed Systems. OPODIS: Conference on Principles of Distributed
Systems, LIPIcs, vol. 361, 31.'
mla: 'Bentert, Matthias, et al. “Fast Re-Routing in Networks: On the Complexity
of Perfect Resilience.” 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed
Systems, vol. 361, 31, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
2026, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.31.'
short: M. Bentert, E. Ceylan, V. Hübner, S. Schmid, J. Srba, in:, 29th International
Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
für Informatik, 2026.
conference:
end_date: 2025-12-05
location: Iaşi, Romania
name: 'OPODIS: Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems'
start_date: 2025-12-03
date_created: 2026-03-08T23:01:46Z
date_published: 2026-01-07T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-03-09T12:36:11Z
day: '07'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2025.31
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intvolume: ' 361'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication: 29th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1868-8969
isbn:
- '9783959774093'
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Fast re-routing in networks: On the complexity of perfect resilience'
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 361
year: '2026'
...
---
OA_place: publisher
OA_type: hybrid
PlanS_conform: '1'
_id: '19074'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation
in groups. In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions
towards a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to
free-ride on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods
games among asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry
allows for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment
each round. However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals
make the same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose
contributions along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next.
We do so for three different models – one without any budget constraints, one
with endowment constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current
endowment to be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities:
the welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare
corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this
welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution
sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency
across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the
model with savings.'
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818
(ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529:
E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale
de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010),
and ARC SRIEAS Grant SR200100005 Securing Antarctica’s Environmental Future (to
M.K.). Open access funding provided by Institute of Science and Technology (IST
Austria).'
article_processing_charge: Yes (via OA deal)
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Hübner, Valentin
id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
last_name: Hübner
orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Manuel
full_name: Staab, Manuel
last_name: Staab
- first_name: Maria
full_name: Kleshnina, Maria
id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Kleshnina
orcid: 0000-0002-5518-8317
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
citation:
ama: Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. Time-dependent strategies
in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications.
2025;15:1617-1645. doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
apa: Hübner, V., Hilbe, C., Staab, M., Kleshnina, M., & Chatterjee, K. (2025).
Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic
Games and Applications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
chicago: Hübner, Valentin, Christian Hilbe, Manuel Staab, Maria Kleshnina, and Krishnendu
Chatterjee. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.”
Dynamic Games and Applications. Springer Nature, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5.
ieee: V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, and K. Chatterjee, “Time-dependent
strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games,” Dynamic Games and Applications,
vol. 15. Springer Nature, pp. 1617–1645, 2025.
ista: Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. 2025. Time-dependent
strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications.
15, 1617–1645.
mla: Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric
Public Goods Games.” Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 15, Springer
Nature, 2025, pp. 1617–45, doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5.
short: V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, K. Chatterjee, Dynamic Games
and Applications 15 (2025) 1617–1645.
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2025-02-23T23:01:57Z
date_published: 2025-11-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-07T12:30:56Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '001415587800001'
file:
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checksum: de0a412cbb7d98bf5e6a551c26acbefa
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2025-12-30T08:01:35Z
date_updated: 2025-12-30T08:01:35Z
file_id: '20888'
file_name: 2025_DynGamesAppl_Huebner.pdf
file_size: 1126178
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2025-12-30T08:01:35Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 15'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 1617-1645
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '754411'
name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships
publication: Dynamic Games and Applications
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2153-0793
issn:
- 2153-0785
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
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relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 15
year: '2025'
...
---
DOAJ_listed: '1'
OA_place: publisher
OA_type: gold
_id: '19843'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Social dilemmas are collective-action problems where individual interests
are at odds with group interests. Such dilemmas occur frequently at all scales
of human interactions. When dealing with collective-action problems, people often
act reciprocally. They adjust their behavior to match the previous behavior of
the recipient. The literature distinguishes two kinds of reciprocity. According
to direct reciprocity, individuals react to their immediate experiences with the
recipient. They are more likely to cooperate if the recipient previously cooperated
with them. According to indirect reciprocity, individuals react to the recipient’s
general behavior, irrespectively of whether or not they benefited directly. In
practice, the two kinds of reciprocity are often intertwined; people typically
base their decisions on both direct experiences and indirect observations. Yet
only recently have researchers begun to explore how the two kinds of reciprocity
interact. So far, this research only addresses a single type of social dilemma,
the donation game, where the effects of individual behaviors are independent.
Instead, here we allow for all pairwise social dilemmas. By applying novel techniques
to generalize the theory of zero-determinant strategies, we establish an important
proof of principle: In all social dilemmas, socially optimal outcomes can be sustained
as an equilibrium, using either direct or indirect reciprocity, or arbitrary mixtures
thereof. These results neither require games to be repeated infinitely often,
nor that individual opinions are synchronized. In this way, we considerably generalize
the scope of models of reciprocity, and we build further bridges between the literatures
on direct and indirect reciprocity.'
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818
(ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529:
E-DIRECT (to C.H.).'
article_number: pgaf154
article_processing_charge: Yes
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Hübner, Valentin
id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
last_name: Hübner
orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987
- first_name: Laura
full_name: Schmid, Laura
id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Schmid
orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
citation:
ama: Hübner V, Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. Stable strategies of direct and
indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas. PNAS Nexus. 2025;4(5).
doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154
apa: Hübner, V., Schmid, L., Hilbe, C., & Chatterjee, K. (2025). Stable strategies
of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas. PNAS Nexus.
Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154
chicago: Hübner, Valentin, Laura Schmid, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee.
“Stable Strategies of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity across All Social Dilemmas.”
PNAS Nexus. Oxford University Press, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154.
ieee: V. Hübner, L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, and K. Chatterjee, “Stable strategies of direct
and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas,” PNAS Nexus, vol.
4, no. 5. Oxford University Press, 2025.
ista: Hübner V, Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. 2025. Stable strategies of direct
and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas. PNAS Nexus. 4(5), pgaf154.
mla: Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Stable Strategies of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity
across All Social Dilemmas.” PNAS Nexus, vol. 4, no. 5, pgaf154, Oxford
University Press, 2025, doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154.
short: V. Hübner, L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, PNAS Nexus 4 (2025).
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2025-06-15T22:01:30Z
date_published: 2025-05-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-07T12:30:56Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
pmid:
- '40417077'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: efd6648db3fc3ea0cdd7155d667e5f11
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creator: dernst
date_created: 2025-06-23T08:09:50Z
date_updated: 2025-06-23T08:09:50Z
file_id: '19867'
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file_size: 2551195
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fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf154
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 4'
issue: '5'
language:
- iso: eng
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: PNAS Nexus
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2752-6542
publication_status: published
publisher: Oxford University Press
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
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relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Stable strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity across all social dilemmas
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by_nc.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
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short: CC BY-NC (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 4
year: '2025'
...
---
OA_place: publisher
_id: '19903'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Cooperation, that is, one person paying a cost for another's benefit, is
a fundamental principle without which no form of society could exist. The extent
to which humans cooperate with each other is also an essential feature that differentiates
them from other animals. Cooperation occurs even in the absence of altruistic
motivations, when it is selfishly incentivised by the expectation of a future
reward. For example, many economic interactions are well described that way. This
kind of cooperation requires that people exhibit reciprocal behaviour that acts
as a mechanism that rewards cooperation.\r\nWith game-theoretic models, it is
possible to formally study potential such mechanisms and under what conditions
they can exist. This thesis contributes to this effort by analysing recently introduced
models of cooperation that advance on previous work by taking into account the
potential for pre-existing inequality among cooperating individuals as well as
the different forms that reciprocity can take.\r\nIndividuals may differ both
intrinsically, in their abilities, as well as extrinsically, in the amount of
resources they have available. Allowing for such differences in a model of cooperation
helps to understand how inequality affects the potential for, and outcomes of,
cooperation among unequals. In this thesis, it is shown that in the presence of
intrinsic inequality, a similar unequal distribution of resources can increase
the potential for cooperation. This effect is stronger the smaller the group is
in which cooperation takes place. It is also shown that under particular assumptions,
if the unequal members of a group vary the size of their contributions to a cooperative
effort over time, they can thereby increase their efficiency and improve the collective
outcome.\r\nCooperative behaviour in a two-person interaction can be rewarded
either by direct reciprocation whenever the same two people interact again, or
indirectly by a third party who observed the interaction. In the latter case of
indirect reciprocity, individuals are proximally rewarded by a good reputation,
which ultimately translates to being rewarded with cooperative behaviour by others.
This mechanism can enable selfishly motivated cooperation even in circumstances
where individuals are unlikely to meet again, akin to how money facilitates trade.
While these two forms of reciprocity have mostly been studied in isolation, this
thesis analyses both direct and indirect reciprocity in a general model in order
to compare their relative effectiveness under different circumstances. The contribution
of this thesis is an extension of previous work regarding a specific kind of interaction,
whose parameters allow for convenient mathematical analysis, to the most general
set of possible interactions."
acknowledgement: "The research for this thesis was supported by the European Research
Council\r\n(grant agreements No. 863818 and No. 850529), the European Union’s Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme (Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No.
754411),\r\nthe Austrian Science Fund (grant DOI 10.55776/COE12), the French Agence
Nationale\r\nde la Recherche under the Programme d’investissements d’avenir (project
reference 17-\r\nEURE-0010) and the Australian Government through the Australian
Research Council\r\n(grant No. SR200100005, “Securing Antarctica’s Environmental
Future”)."
alternative_title:
- ISTA Thesis
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Hübner, Valentin
id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
last_name: Hübner
orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987
citation:
ama: Hübner V. Reciprocity and inequality in social dilemmas. 2025. doi:10.15479/AT-ISTA-19903
apa: Hübner, V. (2025). Reciprocity and inequality in social dilemmas. Institute
of Science and Technology Austria. https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-19903
chicago: Hübner, Valentin. “Reciprocity and Inequality in Social Dilemmas.” Institute
of Science and Technology Austria, 2025. https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-19903.
ieee: V. Hübner, “Reciprocity and inequality in social dilemmas,” Institute of Science
and Technology Austria, 2025.
ista: Hübner V. 2025. Reciprocity and inequality in social dilemmas. Institute of
Science and Technology Austria.
mla: Hübner, Valentin. Reciprocity and Inequality in Social Dilemmas. Institute
of Science and Technology Austria, 2025, doi:10.15479/AT-ISTA-19903.
short: V. Hübner, Reciprocity and Inequality in Social Dilemmas, Institute of Science
and Technology Austria, 2025.
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2025-06-25T13:50:10Z
date_published: 2025-06-25T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-07T12:30:57Z
day: '25'
ddc:
- '519'
degree_awarded: PhD
department:
- _id: GradSch
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.15479/AT-ISTA-19903
ec_funded: 1
file:
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checksum: 794c02f8c82ca59ba6dda3bd7eed871a
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creator: vhuebner
date_created: 2025-06-25T13:38:07Z
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file_size: 6192760
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has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '06'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: '157'
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '754411'
name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2663-337X
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publisher: Institute of Science and Technology Austria
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status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
title: Reciprocity and inequality in social dilemmas
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abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas.
The very logic of reciprocity, however, seems to require that individuals are
symmetric, and that everyone has the same means to influence each others’ payoffs.
Yet in many applications, individuals are asymmetric. Herein, we study the effect
of asymmetry in linear public good games. Individuals may differ in their endowments
(their ability to contribute to a public good) and in their productivities (how
effective their contributions are). Given the individuals’ productivities, we
ask which allocation of endowments is optimal for cooperation. To this end, we
consider two notions of optimality. The first notion focuses on the resilience
of cooperation. The respective endowment distribution ensures that full cooperation
is feasible even under the most adverse conditions. The second notion focuses
on efficiency. The corresponding endowment distribution maximizes group welfare.
Using analytical methods, we fully characterize these two endowment distributions.
This analysis reveals that both optimality notions favor some endowment inequality:
More productive players ought to get higher endowments. Yet the two notions disagree
on how unequal endowments are supposed to be. A focus on resilience results in
less inequality. With additional simulations, we show that the optimal endowment
allocation needs to account for both the resilience and the efficiency of cooperation.'
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818
(ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529:
E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program
under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale
de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir Programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010)
(to M.K.).'
article_number: e2315558121
article_processing_charge: Yes (in subscription journal)
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Hübner, Valentin
id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
last_name: Hübner
orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987
- first_name: Manuel
full_name: Staab, Manuel
last_name: Staab
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Maria
full_name: Kleshnina, Maria
last_name: Kleshnina
citation:
ama: Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M. Efficiency and resilience
of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America. 2024;121(10). doi:10.1073/pnas.2315558121
apa: Hübner, V., Staab, M., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Kleshnina, M. (2024).
Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. National
Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2315558121
chicago: Hübner, Valentin, Manuel Staab, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee,
and Maria Kleshnina. “Efficiency and Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric Social
Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America. National Academy of Sciences, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2315558121.
ieee: V. Hübner, M. Staab, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. Kleshnina, “Efficiency
and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 121,
no. 10. National Academy of Sciences, 2024.
ista: Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M. 2024. Efficiency and
resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 121(10), e2315558121.
mla: Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Efficiency and Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric
Social Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, vol. 121, no. 10, e2315558121, National Academy of Sciences,
2024, doi:10.1073/pnas.2315558121.
short: V. Hübner, M. Staab, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Kleshnina, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 121 (2024).
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2024-03-05T09:18:49Z
date_published: 2024-03-05T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-07T12:30:56Z
day: '05'
ddc:
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department:
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doi: 10.1073/pnas.2315558121
ec_funded: 1
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oa_version: Published Version
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project:
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call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '754411'
name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships
publication: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
of America
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1091-6490
issn:
- 0027-8424
publication_status: published
publisher: National Academy of Sciences
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on ISTA Website
relation: press_release
url: https://ista.ac.at/en/news/what-math-tells-us-about-social-dilemmas/
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title: Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas
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_id: '15108'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "in the research article \"Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric
social dilemmas\" (by Valentin Hübner, Manuel Staab, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu
Chatterjee, and Maria Kleshnina).\r\n\r\nWe used different implementations for
the case of two and three players, both described below."
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Valentin
full_name: Hübner, Valentin
id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
last_name: Hübner
orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987
- first_name: Maria
full_name: Kleshnina, Maria
last_name: Kleshnina
citation:
ama: Hübner V, Kleshnina M. Computer code for “Efficiency and resilience of cooperation
in asymmetric social dilemmas.” 2024. doi:10.5281/ZENODO.10639167
apa: Hübner, V., & Kleshnina, M. (2024). Computer code for “Efficiency and resilience
of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.” Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.10639167
chicago: Hübner, Valentin, and Maria Kleshnina. “Computer Code for ‘Efficiency and
Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas.’” Zenodo, 2024. https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.10639167.
ieee: V. Hübner and M. Kleshnina, “Computer code for ‘Efficiency and resilience
of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas.’” Zenodo, 2024.
ista: Hübner V, Kleshnina M. 2024. Computer code for ‘Efficiency and resilience
of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas’, Zenodo, 10.5281/ZENODO.10639167.
mla: Hübner, Valentin, and Maria Kleshnina. Computer Code for “Efficiency and
Resilience of Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas.” Zenodo, 2024, doi:10.5281/ZENODO.10639167.
short: V. Hübner, M. Kleshnina, (2024).
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2024-03-12T13:02:58Z
date_published: 2024-02-09T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-04T12:14:54Z
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publisher: Zenodo
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