[{"month":"01","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["9783959773089"],"issn":["18688969"]},"quality_controlled":"1","project":[{"_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","grant_number":"863818","call_identifier":"H2020","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications"}],"external_id":{"arxiv":["2102.13457"]},"tmp":{"name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","image":"/images/cc_by.png"},"oa":1,"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"conference":{"name":"OPODIS: Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems","end_date":"2023-12-08","location":"Tokyo, Japan","start_date":"2023-12-06"},"doi":"10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11","article_number":"11","file_date_updated":"2024-02-26T09:04:58Z","ec_funded":1,"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"publisher":"Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik","acknowledgement":"This work was partially funded by the Academy of Finland, grant 314888, the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt), and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project I 4800-N (ADVISE). LS was supported by the Stochastic Analysis and Application Research Center (SAARC) under National Research Foundation of Korea grant NRF-2019R1A5A1028324.","year":"2024","date_updated":"2024-02-26T09:16:12Z","date_created":"2024-02-18T23:01:01Z","volume":286,"author":[{"last_name":"Hirvonen","first_name":"Juho","full_name":"Hirvonen, Juho"},{"last_name":"Schmid","first_name":"Laura","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Schmid, Laura"},{"full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","first_name":"Krishnendu","last_name":"Chatterjee","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X"},{"first_name":"Stefan","last_name":"Schmid","full_name":"Schmid, Stefan"}],"scopus_import":"1","day":"18","article_processing_charge":"No","has_accepted_license":"1","publication":"27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems","citation":{"short":"J. Hirvonen, L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, S. Schmid, in:, 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024.","mla":"Hirvonen, Juho, et al. “On the Convergence Time in Graphical Games: A Locality-Sensitive Approach.” 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, vol. 286, 11, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11.","chicago":"Hirvonen, Juho, Laura Schmid, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Stefan Schmid. “On the Convergence Time in Graphical Games: A Locality-Sensitive Approach.” In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Vol. 286. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11.","ama":"Hirvonen J, Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Schmid S. On the convergence time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach. In: 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems. Vol 286. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2024. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11","apa":"Hirvonen, J., Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., & Schmid, S. (2024). On the convergence time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach. In 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (Vol. 286). Tokyo, Japan: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2023.11","ieee":"J. Hirvonen, L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, and S. Schmid, “On the convergence time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach,” in 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Tokyo, Japan, 2024, vol. 286.","ista":"Hirvonen J, Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Schmid S. 2024. On the convergence time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach. 27th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems. OPODIS: Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, LIPIcs, vol. 286, 11."},"date_published":"2024-01-18T00:00:00Z","alternative_title":["LIPIcs"],"type":"conference","abstract":[{"text":"Graphical games are a useful framework for modeling the interactions of (selfish) agents who are connected via an underlying topology and whose behaviors influence each other. They have wide applications ranging from computer science to economics and biology. Yet, even though an agent’s payoff only depends on the actions of their direct neighbors in graphical games, computing the Nash equilibria and making statements about the convergence time of \"natural\" local dynamics in particular can be highly challenging. In this work, we present a novel approach for classifying complexity of Nash equilibria in graphical games by establishing a connection to local graph algorithms, a subfield of distributed computing. In particular, we make the observation that the equilibria of graphical games are equivalent to locally verifiable labelings (LVL) in graphs; vertex labelings which are verifiable with constant-round local algorithms. This connection allows us to derive novel lower bounds on the convergence time to equilibrium of best-response dynamics in graphical games. Since we establish that distributed convergence can sometimes be provably slow, we also introduce and give bounds on an intuitive notion of \"time-constrained\" inefficiency of best responses. We exemplify how our results can be used in the implementation of mechanisms that ensure convergence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium. Our results thus also give insight into the convergence of strategy-proof algorithms for graphical games, which is still not well understood.","lang":"eng"}],"status":"public","title":"On the convergence time in graphical games: A locality-sensitive approach","ddc":["000"],"intvolume":" 286","_id":"15006","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","oa_version":"Published Version","file":[{"file_name":"2024_LIPICs_Hirvonen.pdf","access_level":"open_access","creator":"dernst","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":867363,"file_id":"15028","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2024-02-26T09:04:58Z","date_created":"2024-02-26T09:04:58Z","success":1,"checksum":"4fc7eea6e4ba140b904781fc7df868ec"}]},{"has_accepted_license":"1","article_processing_charge":"No","day":"12","scopus_import":"1","date_published":"2023-04-12T00:00:00Z","article_type":"original","citation":{"ieee":"L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, and K. Chatterjee, “Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information,” Nature Communications, vol. 14. Springer Nature, 2023.","apa":"Schmid, L., Ekbatani, F., Hilbe, C., & Chatterjee, K. (2023). Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x","ista":"Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. 2023. Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications. 14, 2086.","ama":"Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications. 2023;14. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x","chicago":"Schmid, Laura, Farbod Ekbatani, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Quantitative Assessment Can Stabilize Indirect Reciprocity under Imperfect Information.” Nature Communications. Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x.","short":"L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, Nature Communications 14 (2023).","mla":"Schmid, Laura, et al. “Quantitative Assessment Can Stabilize Indirect Reciprocity under Imperfect Information.” Nature Communications, vol. 14, 2086, Springer Nature, 2023, doi:10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x."},"publication":"Nature Communications","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The field of indirect reciprocity investigates how social norms can foster cooperation when individuals continuously monitor and assess each other’s social interactions. By adhering to certain social norms, cooperating individuals can improve their reputation and, in turn, receive benefits from others. Eight social norms, known as the “leading eight,\" have been shown to effectively promote the evolution of cooperation as long as information is public and reliable. These norms categorize group members as either ’good’ or ’bad’. In this study, we examine a scenario where individuals instead assign nuanced reputation scores to each other, and only cooperate with those whose reputation exceeds a certain threshold. We find both analytically and through simulations that such quantitative assessments are error-correcting, thus facilitating cooperation in situations where information is private and unreliable. Moreover, our results identify four specific norms that are robust to such conditions, and may be relevant for helping to sustain cooperation in natural populations."}],"type":"journal_article","oa_version":"Published Version","file":[{"file_name":"2023_NatureComm_Schmid.pdf","access_level":"open_access","creator":"dernst","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":1786475,"file_id":"12868","relation":"main_file","date_created":"2023-04-25T09:13:53Z","date_updated":"2023-04-25T09:13:53Z","success":1,"checksum":"a4b3b7b36fbef068cabf4fb99501fef6"}],"intvolume":" 14","title":"Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information","status":"public","ddc":["000"],"_id":"12861","user_id":"4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["2041-1723"]},"month":"04","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x","project":[{"grant_number":"863818","_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","call_identifier":"H2020","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications"},{"call_identifier":"FWF","name":"The Wittgenstein Prize","_id":"25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"Z211"}],"isi":1,"quality_controlled":"1","tmp":{"name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","image":"/images/cc_by.png"},"oa":1,"external_id":{"pmid":["37045828"],"isi":["001003644100020"]},"ec_funded":1,"file_date_updated":"2023-04-25T09:13:53Z","article_number":"2086","volume":14,"date_updated":"2023-08-01T14:15:57Z","date_created":"2023-04-23T22:01:03Z","author":[{"full_name":"Schmid, Laura","last_name":"Schmid","first_name":"Laura","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87"},{"full_name":"Ekbatani, Farbod","first_name":"Farbod","last_name":"Ekbatani"},{"full_name":"Hilbe, Christian","orcid":"0000-0001-5116-955X","id":"2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Hilbe","first_name":"Christian"},{"full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","first_name":"Krishnendu","last_name":"Chatterjee","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X"}],"department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"publisher":"Springer Nature","publication_status":"published","pmid":1,"year":"2023","acknowledgement":"This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). L.S. received additional partial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under grant Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award), and also thanks the support by the Stochastic Analysis and Application Research Center (SAARC) under National Research Foundation of Korea grant NRF-2019R1A5A1028324. The authors additionally thank Stefan Schmid for providing access to his lab infrastructure at the University of Vienna for the purpose of collecting simulation data."},{"keyword":["Computational Theory and Mathematics","Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience","Genetics","Molecular Biology","Ecology","Modeling and Simulation","Ecology","Evolution","Behavior and Systematics"],"scopus_import":"1","article_processing_charge":"No","has_accepted_license":"1","day":"14","article_type":"original","citation":{"ama":"Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. 2022;18(6). doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149","ieee":"L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces,” PLOS Computational Biology, vol. 18, no. 6. Public Library of Science, 2022.","apa":"Schmid, L., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2022). Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. Public Library of Science. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149","ista":"Schmid L, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2022. Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces. PLOS Computational Biology. 18(6), e1010149.","short":"L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PLOS Computational Biology 18 (2022).","mla":"Schmid, Laura, et al. “Direct Reciprocity between Individuals That Use Different Strategy Spaces.” PLOS Computational Biology, vol. 18, no. 6, e1010149, Public Library of Science, 2022, doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149.","chicago":"Schmid, Laura, Christian Hilbe, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Direct Reciprocity between Individuals That Use Different Strategy Spaces.” PLOS Computational Biology. Public Library of Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149."},"publication":"PLOS Computational Biology","date_published":"2022-06-14T00:00:00Z","type":"journal_article","issue":"6","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In repeated interactions, players can use strategies that respond to the outcome of previous rounds. Much of the existing literature on direct reciprocity assumes that all competing individuals use the same strategy space. Here, we study both learning and evolutionary dynamics of players that differ in the strategy space they explore. We focus on the infinitely repeated donation game and compare three natural strategy spaces: memory-1 strategies, which consider the last moves of both players, reactive strategies, which respond to the last move of the co-player, and unconditional strategies. These three strategy spaces differ in the memory capacity that is needed. We compute the long term average payoff that is achieved in a pairwise learning process. We find that smaller strategy spaces can dominate larger ones. For weak selection, unconditional players dominate both reactive and memory-1 players. For intermediate selection, reactive players dominate memory-1 players. Only for strong selection and low cost-to-benefit ratio, memory-1 players dominate the others. We observe that the supergame between strategy spaces can be a social dilemma: maximum payoff is achieved if both players explore a larger strategy space, but smaller strategy spaces dominate."}],"intvolume":" 18","title":"Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces","ddc":["000","570"],"status":"public","user_id":"4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8","_id":"12280","file":[{"creator":"dernst","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":3143222,"file_name":"2022_PlosCompBio_Schmid.pdf","access_level":"open_access","date_created":"2023-01-30T11:28:13Z","date_updated":"2023-01-30T11:28:13Z","success":1,"checksum":"31b6b311b6731f1658277a9dfff6632c","file_id":"12460","relation":"main_file"}],"oa_version":"Published Version","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1553-7358"]},"month":"06","project":[{"call_identifier":"H2020","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications","_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","grant_number":"863818"}],"quality_controlled":"1","isi":1,"tmp":{"name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","image":"/images/cc_by.png"},"external_id":{"isi":["000843626800031"],"pmid":["35700167"]},"oa":1,"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149","article_number":"e1010149","ec_funded":1,"file_date_updated":"2023-01-30T11:28:13Z","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"publisher":"Public Library of Science","publication_status":"published","pmid":1,"acknowledgement":"This work was supported by the European Research Council (https://erc.europa.eu/)\r\nCoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.","year":"2022","volume":18,"date_updated":"2023-08-04T10:27:08Z","date_created":"2023-01-16T10:02:51Z","author":[{"last_name":"Schmid","first_name":"Laura","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Schmid, Laura"},{"orcid":"0000-0001-5116-955X","id":"2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Hilbe","first_name":"Christian","full_name":"Hilbe, Christian"},{"id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X","first_name":"Krishnendu","last_name":"Chatterjee","full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu"},{"full_name":"Nowak, Martin","last_name":"Nowak","first_name":"Martin"}]},{"day":"01","month":"03","article_processing_charge":"No","publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-0-262-04559-9"]},"series_title":"Strüngmann Forum Reports","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_published":"2021-03-01T00:00:00Z","quality_controlled":"1","page":"139-152","publication":"Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://esforum.de/publications/PDFs/sfr29/SFR29_09_Hilbe%20and%20Schmid.pdf","open_access":"1"}],"citation":{"chicago":"Schmid, Laura, and Christian Hilbe. “The Evolution of Strategic Ignorance in Strategic Interaction.” In Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know, edited by Ralph Hertwig and Christoph Engel, 29:139–52. Strüngmann Forum Reports. MIT Press, 2021.","short":"L. Schmid, C. Hilbe, in:, R. Hertwig, C. Engel (Eds.), Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know, MIT Press, 2021, pp. 139–152.","mla":"Schmid, Laura, and Christian Hilbe. “The Evolution of Strategic Ignorance in Strategic Interaction.” Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know, edited by Ralph Hertwig and Christoph Engel, vol. 29, MIT Press, 2021, pp. 139–52.","ieee":"L. Schmid and C. Hilbe, “The evolution of strategic ignorance in strategic interaction,” in Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know, vol. 29, R. Hertwig and C. Engel, Eds. MIT Press, 2021, pp. 139–152.","apa":"Schmid, L., & Hilbe, C. (2021). The evolution of strategic ignorance in strategic interaction. In R. Hertwig & C. Engel (Eds.), Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know (Vol. 29, pp. 139–152). MIT Press.","ista":"Schmid L, Hilbe C. 2021.The evolution of strategic ignorance in strategic interaction. In: Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know. vol. 29, 139–152.","ama":"Schmid L, Hilbe C. The evolution of strategic ignorance in strategic interaction. In: Hertwig R, Engel C, eds. Deliberate Ignorance: Choosing Not To Know. Vol 29. Strüngmann Forum Reports. MIT Press; 2021:139-152."},"oa":1,"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Optimal decision making requires individuals to know their available options and to anticipate correctly what consequences these options have. In many social interactions, however, we refrain from gathering all relevant information, even if this information would help us make better decisions and is costless to obtain. This chapter examines several examples of “deliberate ignorance.” Two simple models are proposed to illustrate how ignorance can evolve among self-interested and payoff - maximizing individuals, and open problems are highlighted that lie ahead for future research to explore."}],"type":"book_chapter","date_created":"2021-05-19T12:25:42Z","date_updated":"2023-02-23T13:57:04Z","volume":29,"oa_version":"Published Version","author":[{"full_name":"Schmid, Laura","last_name":"Schmid","first_name":"Laura","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87"},{"full_name":"Hilbe, Christian","last_name":"Hilbe","first_name":"Christian"}],"status":"public","title":"The evolution of strategic ignorance in strategic interaction","department":[{"_id":"GradSch"},{"_id":"KrCh"}],"intvolume":" 29","publisher":"MIT Press","editor":[{"full_name":"Hertwig, Ralph","last_name":"Hertwig","first_name":"Ralph"},{"full_name":"Engel, Christoph","last_name":"Engel","first_name":"Christoph"}],"user_id":"3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","_id":"9403","year":"2021"},{"file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_name":"submission_new.zip","embargo_to":"open_access","creator":"lschmid","file_size":29703124,"content_type":"application/zip","file_id":"10305","relation":"source_file","checksum":"86a05b430756ca12ae8107b6e6f3c1e5","date_updated":"2022-12-20T23:30:08Z","date_created":"2021-11-18T12:41:46Z"},{"date_updated":"2022-12-20T23:30:08Z","date_created":"2021-11-18T12:59:15Z","checksum":"d940af042e94660c6b6a7b4f0b184d47","embargo":"2022-10-18","file_id":"10306","relation":"main_file","creator":"lschmid","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":8320985,"file_name":"thesis_new_upload.pdf","access_level":"open_access"}],"oa_version":"Published Version","status":"public","title":"Evolution of cooperation via (in)direct reciprocity under imperfect information","ddc":["519","576"],"_id":"10293","user_id":"c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1","abstract":[{"text":"Indirect reciprocity in evolutionary game theory is a prominent mechanism for explaining the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals. In contrast to direct reciprocity, which is based on individuals meeting repeatedly, and conditionally cooperating by using their own experiences, indirect reciprocity is based on individuals’ reputations. If a player helps another, this increases the helper’s public standing, benefitting them in the future. This lets cooperation in the population emerge without individuals having to meet more than once. While the two modes of reciprocity are intertwined, they are difficult to compare. Thus, they are usually studied in isolation. Direct reciprocity can maintain cooperation with simple strategies, and is robust against noise even when players do not remember more\r\nthan their partner’s last action. Meanwhile, indirect reciprocity requires its successful strategies, or social norms, to be more complex. Exhaustive search previously identified eight such norms, called the “leading eight”, which excel at maintaining cooperation. However, as the first result of this thesis, we show that the leading eight break down once we remove the fundamental assumption that information is synchronized and public, such that everyone agrees on reputations. Once we consider a more realistic scenario of imperfect information, where reputations are private, and individuals occasionally misinterpret or miss observations, the leading eight do not promote cooperation anymore. Instead, minor initial disagreements can proliferate, fragmenting populations into subgroups. In a next step, we consider ways to mitigate this issue. We first explore whether introducing “generosity” can stabilize cooperation when players use the leading eight strategies in noisy environments. This approach of modifying strategies to include probabilistic elements for coping with errors is known to work well in direct reciprocity. However, as we show here, it fails for the more complex norms of indirect reciprocity. Imperfect information still prevents cooperation from evolving. On the other hand, we succeeded to show in this thesis that modifying the leading eight to use “quantitative assessment”, i.e. tracking reputation scores on a scale beyond good and bad, and making overall judgments of others based on a threshold, is highly successful, even when noise increases in the environment. Cooperation can flourish when reputations\r\nare more nuanced, and players have a broader understanding what it means to be “good.” Finally, we present a single theoretical framework that unites the two modes of reciprocity despite their differences. Within this framework, we identify a novel simple and successful strategy for indirect reciprocity, which can cope with noisy environments and has an analogue in direct reciprocity. We can also analyze decision making when different sources of information are available. Our results help highlight that for sustaining cooperation, already the most simple rules of reciprocity can be sufficient.","lang":"eng"}],"alternative_title":["ISTA Thesis"],"type":"dissertation","date_published":"2021-11-17T00:00:00Z","page":"171","citation":{"ama":"Schmid L. Evolution of cooperation via (in)direct reciprocity under imperfect information. 2021. doi:10.15479/at:ista:10293","ista":"Schmid L. 2021. Evolution of cooperation via (in)direct reciprocity under imperfect information. Institute of Science and Technology Austria.","apa":"Schmid, L. (2021). Evolution of cooperation via (in)direct reciprocity under imperfect information. Institute of Science and Technology Austria. https://doi.org/10.15479/at:ista:10293","ieee":"L. Schmid, “Evolution of cooperation via (in)direct reciprocity under imperfect information,” Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2021.","mla":"Schmid, Laura. Evolution of Cooperation via (in)Direct Reciprocity under Imperfect Information. Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2021, doi:10.15479/at:ista:10293.","short":"L. Schmid, Evolution of Cooperation via (in)Direct Reciprocity under Imperfect Information, Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2021.","chicago":"Schmid, Laura. “Evolution of Cooperation via (in)Direct Reciprocity under Imperfect Information.” Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2021. https://doi.org/10.15479/at:ista:10293."},"day":"17","has_accepted_license":"1","article_processing_charge":"No","date_created":"2021-11-15T17:12:57Z","date_updated":"2023-11-07T08:28:29Z","author":[{"full_name":"Schmid, Laura","last_name":"Schmid","first_name":"Laura","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87"}],"related_material":{"record":[{"id":"9997","relation":"part_of_dissertation","status":"public"},{"id":"2","status":"public","relation":"part_of_dissertation"},{"relation":"part_of_dissertation","status":"public","id":"9402"}]},"publication_status":"published","publisher":"Institute of Science and Technology Austria","department":[{"_id":"GradSch"},{"_id":"KrCh"}],"year":"2021","file_date_updated":"2022-12-20T23:30:08Z","ec_funded":1,"supervisor":[{"full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","first_name":"Krishnendu","last_name":"Chatterjee","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X"}],"degree_awarded":"PhD","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.15479/at:ista:10293","project":[{"_id":"2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"279307","name":"Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications","call_identifier":"FP7"},{"grant_number":"863818","_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications","call_identifier":"H2020"},{"name":"The Wittgenstein Prize","call_identifier":"FWF","grant_number":"Z211","_id":"25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"},{"call_identifier":"FWF","name":"Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification","grant_number":"P 23499-N23","_id":"2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"},{"call_identifier":"FWF","name":"Rigorous Systems Engineering","_id":"25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"S 11407_N23"}],"oa":1,"month":"11","publication_identifier":{"issn":["2663-337X"]}},{"issue":"1","abstract":[{"text":"Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on social norms. This mechanism requires that individuals in a population observe and judge each other’s behaviors. Individuals with a good reputation are more likely to receive help from others. Previous work suggests that indirect reciprocity is only effective when all relevant information is reliable and publicly available. Otherwise, individuals may disagree on how to assess others, even if they all apply the same social norm. Such disagreements can lead to a breakdown of cooperation. Here we explore whether the predominantly studied ‘leading eight’ social norms of indirect reciprocity can be made more robust by equipping them with an element of generosity. To this end, we distinguish between two kinds of generosity. According to assessment generosity, individuals occasionally assign a good reputation to group members who would usually be regarded as bad. According to action generosity, individuals occasionally cooperate with group members with whom they would usually defect. Using individual-based simulations, we show that the two kinds of generosity have a very different effect on the resulting reputation dynamics. Assessment generosity tends to add to the overall noise and allows defectors to invade. In contrast, a limited amount of action generosity can be beneficial in a few cases. However, even when action generosity is beneficial, the respective simulations do not result in full cooperation. Our results suggest that while generosity can favor cooperation when individuals use the most simple strategies of reciprocity, it is disadvantageous when individuals use more complex social norms.","lang":"eng"}],"type":"journal_article","file":[{"file_id":"10006","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2021-09-13T10:31:21Z","date_created":"2021-09-13T10:31:21Z","success":1,"checksum":"19df8816cf958b272b85841565c73182","file_name":"2021_ScientificReports_Schmid.pdf","access_level":"open_access","creator":"cchlebak","file_size":2424943,"content_type":"application/pdf"}],"oa_version":"Published Version","user_id":"4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8","_id":"9997","intvolume":" 11","status":"public","title":"The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity","ddc":["003"],"has_accepted_license":"1","article_processing_charge":"Yes","day":"31","keyword":["Multidisciplinary"],"date_published":"2021-08-31T00:00:00Z","citation":{"chicago":"Schmid, Laura, Pouya Shati, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “The Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity under Action and Assessment Generosity.” Scientific Reports. Springer Nature, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1.","short":"L. Schmid, P. Shati, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, Scientific Reports 11 (2021).","mla":"Schmid, Laura, et al. “The Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity under Action and Assessment Generosity.” Scientific Reports, vol. 11, no. 1, 17443, Springer Nature, 2021, doi:10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1.","apa":"Schmid, L., Shati, P., Hilbe, C., & Chatterjee, K. (2021). The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity. Scientific Reports. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1","ieee":"L. Schmid, P. Shati, C. Hilbe, and K. Chatterjee, “The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity,” Scientific Reports, vol. 11, no. 1. Springer Nature, 2021.","ista":"Schmid L, Shati P, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. 2021. The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity. Scientific Reports. 11(1), 17443.","ama":"Schmid L, Shati P, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. The evolution of indirect reciprocity under action and assessment generosity. Scientific Reports. 2021;11(1). doi:10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1"},"publication":"Scientific Reports","article_type":"original","ec_funded":1,"file_date_updated":"2021-09-13T10:31:21Z","article_number":"17443","related_material":{"record":[{"id":"10293","status":"public","relation":"dissertation_contains"}]},"author":[{"orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Schmid","first_name":"Laura","full_name":"Schmid, Laura"},{"first_name":"Pouya","last_name":"Shati","full_name":"Shati, Pouya"},{"first_name":"Christian","last_name":"Hilbe","full_name":"Hilbe, Christian"},{"full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X","first_name":"Krishnendu","last_name":"Chatterjee"}],"volume":11,"date_updated":"2024-03-28T23:30:45Z","date_created":"2021-09-11T16:22:02Z","pmid":1,"year":"2021","acknowledgement":"This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). L.S. received additional partial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Grant Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award).","publisher":"Springer Nature","department":[{"_id":"GradSch"},{"_id":"KrCh"}],"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["2045-2322"]},"month":"08","doi":"10.1038/s41598-021-96932-1","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"oa":1,"tmp":{"name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","image":"/images/cc_by.png"},"external_id":{"isi":["000692406400018"],"pmid":["34465830"]},"project":[{"_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","grant_number":"863818","call_identifier":"H2020","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications"},{"call_identifier":"FWF","name":"The Wittgenstein Prize","_id":"25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"Z211"}],"quality_controlled":"1","isi":1},{"day":"13","article_processing_charge":"No","has_accepted_license":"1","scopus_import":"1","date_published":"2021-05-13T00:00:00Z","publication":"Nature Human Behaviour","citation":{"ista":"Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. 2021. A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 5(10), 1292–1302.","ieee":"L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, and M. A. Nowak, “A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity,” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 5, no. 10. Springer Nature, pp. 1292–1302, 2021.","apa":"Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2021). A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8","ama":"Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Hilbe C, Nowak MA. A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity. Nature Human Behaviour. 2021;5(10):1292–1302. doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8","chicago":"Schmid, Laura, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Christian Hilbe, and Martin A. Nowak. “A Unified Framework of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity.” Nature Human Behaviour. Springer Nature, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8.","mla":"Schmid, Laura, et al. “A Unified Framework of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity.” Nature Human Behaviour, vol. 5, no. 10, Springer Nature, 2021, pp. 1292–1302, doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8.","short":"L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, C. Hilbe, M.A. Nowak, Nature Human Behaviour 5 (2021) 1292–1302."},"article_type":"original","page":"1292–1302","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that the well-known ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call ‘generous scoring’. Using an equilibrium analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding their evolvability."}],"issue":"10","type":"journal_article","file":[{"date_created":"2023-11-07T08:27:23Z","date_updated":"2023-11-07T08:27:23Z","success":1,"checksum":"34f55e173f90dc1dab731063458ac780","file_id":"14496","relation":"main_file","creator":"dernst","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":5232761,"file_name":"2021_NatureHumanBehaviour_Schmid_accepted.pdf","access_level":"open_access"}],"oa_version":"Submitted Version","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","_id":"9402","status":"public","ddc":["000"],"title":"A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity","intvolume":" 5","month":"05","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["2397-3374"]},"doi":"10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"external_id":{"isi":["000650304000002"],"pmid":["33986519"]},"oa":1,"isi":1,"quality_controlled":"1","project":[{"_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","grant_number":"863818","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications","call_identifier":"H2020"},{"call_identifier":"FP7","name":"Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications","_id":"2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"279307"}],"file_date_updated":"2023-11-07T08:27:23Z","ec_funded":1,"author":[{"first_name":"Laura","last_name":"Schmid","id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","full_name":"Schmid, Laura"},{"first_name":"Krishnendu","last_name":"Chatterjee","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X","full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu"},{"orcid":"0000-0001-5116-955X","id":"2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Hilbe","first_name":"Christian","full_name":"Hilbe, Christian"},{"full_name":"Nowak, Martin A.","last_name":"Nowak","first_name":"Martin A."}],"related_material":{"record":[{"id":"10293","relation":"dissertation_contains","status":"public"}],"link":[{"url":"https://ist.ac.at/en/news/the-emergence-of-cooperation/","description":"News on IST Homepage","relation":"press_release"}]},"date_created":"2021-05-18T16:56:57Z","date_updated":"2024-03-28T23:30:45Z","volume":5,"year":"2021","acknowledgement":"This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), the European Research Council Start Grant 279307: Graph Games (to K.C.), and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.","pmid":1,"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"},{"_id":"GradSch"}],"publisher":"Springer Nature"},{"scopus_import":"1","article_processing_charge":"No","has_accepted_license":"1","day":"10","citation":{"ama":"Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Schmid S. The evolutionary price of anarchy: Locally bounded agents in a dynamic virus game. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems. Vol 153. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2020. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.21","ista":"Schmid L, Chatterjee K, Schmid S. 2020. The evolutionary price of anarchy: Locally bounded agents in a dynamic virus game. Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems. OPODIS: International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, LIPIcs, vol. 153, 21.","ieee":"L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, and S. Schmid, “The evolutionary price of anarchy: Locally bounded agents in a dynamic virus game,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, 2020, vol. 153.","apa":"Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., & Schmid, S. (2020). The evolutionary price of anarchy: Locally bounded agents in a dynamic virus game. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (Vol. 153). Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.21","mla":"Schmid, Laura, et al. “The Evolutionary Price of Anarchy: Locally Bounded Agents in a Dynamic Virus Game.” Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, vol. 153, 21, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2020, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.21.","short":"L. Schmid, K. Chatterjee, S. Schmid, in:, Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2020.","chicago":"Schmid, Laura, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Stefan Schmid. “The Evolutionary Price of Anarchy: Locally Bounded Agents in a Dynamic Virus Game.” In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems, Vol. 153. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2020. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.21."},"publication":"Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems","date_published":"2020-02-10T00:00:00Z","alternative_title":["LIPIcs"],"type":"conference","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states (in terms of performance and/or costs), compared to a centralized system design. However, the PoA relies on strong assumptions about agents' rationality (e.g., resources and information) and interactions, whereas in many distributed systems agents interact locally with bounded resources. They do so repeatedly over time (in contrast to \"one-shot games\"), and their strategies may evolve. Using a more realistic evolutionary game model, this paper introduces a realized evolutionary Price of Anarchy (ePoA). The ePoA allows an exploration of equilibrium selection in dynamic distributed systems with multiple equilibria, based on local interactions of simple memoryless agents. Considering a fundamental game related to virus propagation on networks, we present analytical bounds on the ePoA in basic network topologies and for different strategy update dynamics. In particular, deriving stationary distributions of the stochastic evolutionary process, we find that the Nash equilibria are not always the most abundant states, and that different processes can feature significant off-equilibrium behavior, leading to a significantly higher ePoA compared to the PoA studied traditionally in the literature. "}],"intvolume":" 153","status":"public","title":"The evolutionary price of anarchy: Locally bounded agents in a dynamic virus game","ddc":["000"],"_id":"7346","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","file":[{"access_level":"open_access","file_name":"2019_LIPIcS_Schmid.pdf","file_size":630752,"content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"dernst","relation":"main_file","file_id":"7608","checksum":"9a91916ac2c21ab42458fcda39ef0b8d","date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:47:56Z","date_created":"2020-03-23T09:14:06Z"}],"oa_version":"Preprint","month":"02","project":[{"name":"Rigorous Systems Engineering","call_identifier":"FWF","_id":"25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"S 11407_N23"}],"quality_controlled":"1","oa":1,"tmp":{"name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","image":"/images/cc_by.png"},"external_id":{"arxiv":["1906.00110"]},"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2019.21","conference":{"end_date":"2019-12-19","location":"Neuchâtel, Switzerland","start_date":"2019-12-17","name":"OPODIS: International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems"},"article_number":"21","file_date_updated":"2020-07-14T12:47:56Z","publisher":"Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"publication_status":"published","year":"2020","volume":153,"date_updated":"2023-02-23T13:05:49Z","date_created":"2020-01-21T16:00:26Z","author":[{"id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","first_name":"Laura","last_name":"Schmid","full_name":"Schmid, Laura"},{"orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Chatterjee","first_name":"Krishnendu","full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu"},{"first_name":"Stefan","last_name":"Schmid","full_name":"Schmid, Stefan"}]},{"type":"journal_article","issue":"48","abstract":[{"text":"Indirect reciprocity explores how humans act when their reputation is at stake, and which social norms they use to assess the actions of others. A crucial question in indirect reciprocity is which social norms can maintain stable cooperation in a society. Past research has highlighted eight such norms, called “leading-eight” strategies. This past research, however, is based on the assumption that all relevant information about other population members is publicly available and that everyone agrees on who is good or bad. Instead, here we explore the reputation dynamics when information is private and noisy. We show that under these conditions, most leading-eight strategies fail to evolve. Those leading-eight strategies that do evolve are unable to sustain full cooperation.Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other’s reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These “leading-eight” strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1","_id":"2","intvolume":" 115","status":"public","title":"Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information","oa_version":"Submitted Version","scopus_import":"1","article_processing_charge":"No","day":"27","citation":{"mla":"Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Indirect Reciprocity with Private, Noisy, and Incomplete Information.” PNAS, vol. 115, no. 48, National Academy of Sciences, 2018, pp. 12241–46, doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115.","short":"C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 115 (2018) 12241–12246.","chicago":"Hilbe, Christian, Laura Schmid, Josef Tkadlec, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Indirect Reciprocity with Private, Noisy, and Incomplete Information.” PNAS. National Academy of Sciences, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115.","ama":"Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 2018;115(48):12241-12246. doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115","ista":"Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 115(48), 12241–12246.","ieee":"C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information,” PNAS, vol. 115, no. 48. National Academy of Sciences, pp. 12241–12246, 2018.","apa":"Hilbe, C., Schmid, L., Tkadlec, J., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115"},"publication":"PNAS","page":"12241-12246","date_published":"2018-11-27T00:00:00Z","ec_funded":1,"pmid":1,"year":"2018","publisher":"National Academy of Sciences","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"publication_status":"published","related_material":{"record":[{"id":"10293","status":"public","relation":"dissertation_contains"}],"link":[{"description":"News on IST Homepage","relation":"press_release","url":"https://ist.ac.at/en/news/no-cooperation-without-open-communication/"}]},"author":[{"last_name":"Hilbe","first_name":"Christian","orcid":"0000-0001-5116-955X","id":"2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Hilbe, Christian"},{"full_name":"Schmid, Laura","last_name":"Schmid","first_name":"Laura","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87"},{"full_name":"Tkadlec, Josef","last_name":"Tkadlec","first_name":"Josef","orcid":"0000-0002-1097-9684","id":"3F24CCC8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87"},{"full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","first_name":"Krishnendu","last_name":"Chatterjee","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X"},{"full_name":"Nowak, Martin","first_name":"Martin","last_name":"Nowak"}],"volume":115,"date_created":"2018-12-11T11:44:05Z","date_updated":"2024-03-28T23:30:45Z","month":"11","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30429320"}],"external_id":{"pmid":["30429320"],"isi":["000451351000063"]},"oa":1,"project":[{"grant_number":"279307","_id":"2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","call_identifier":"FP7","name":"Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications"},{"name":"Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification","call_identifier":"FWF","grant_number":"P 23499-N23","_id":"2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"},{"call_identifier":"FWF","name":"Rigorous Systems Engineering","grant_number":"S 11407_N23","_id":"25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"},{"call_identifier":"FP7","name":"International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme","grant_number":"291734","_id":"25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"}],"quality_controlled":"1","isi":1,"doi":"10.1073/pnas.1810565115","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]}]