TY - JOUR AB - Self-incompatibility (SI) is a genetically based recognition system that functions to prevent self-fertilization and mating among related plants. An enduring puzzle in SI is how the high diversity observed in nature arises and is maintained. Based on the underlying recognition mechanism, SI can be classified into two main groups: self- and non-self recognition. Most work has focused on diversification within self-recognition systems despite expected differences between the two groups in the evolutionary pathways and outcomes of diversification. Here, we use a deterministic population genetic model and stochastic simulations to investigate how novel S-haplotypes evolve in a gametophytic non-self recognition (SRNase/S Locus F-box (SLF)) SI system. For this model the pathways for diversification involve either the maintenance or breakdown of SI and can vary in the order of mutations of the female (SRNase) and male (SLF) components. We show analytically that diversification can occur with high inbreeding depression and self-pollination, but this varies with evolutionary pathway and level of completeness (which determines the number of potential mating partners in the population), and in general is more likely for lower haplotype number. The conditions for diversification are broader in stochastic simulations of finite population size. However, the number of haplotypes observed under high inbreeding and moderate to high self-pollination is less than that commonly observed in nature. Diversification was observed through pathways that maintain SI as well as through self-compatible intermediates. Yet the lifespan of diversified haplotypes was sensitive to their level of completeness. By examining diversification in a non-self recognition SI system, this model extends our understanding of the evolution and maintenance of haplotype diversity observed in a self recognition system common in flowering plants. AU - Bodova, Katarina AU - Priklopil, Tadeas AU - Field, David AU - Barton, Nicholas H AU - Pickup, Melinda ID - 316 IS - 3 JF - Genetics TI - Evolutionary pathways for the generation of new self-incompatibility haplotypes in a non-self recognition system VL - 209 ER - TY - GEN AB - File S1 contains figures that clarify the following features: (i) effect of population size on the average number/frequency of SI classes, (ii) changes in the minimal completeness deficit in time for a single class, and (iii) diversification diagrams for all studied pathways, including the summary figure for k = 8. File S2 contains the code required for a stochastic simulation of the SLF system with an example. This file also includes the output in the form of figures and tables. AU - Bod'ová, Katarína AU - Priklopil, Tadeas AU - Field, David AU - Barton, Nicholas H AU - Pickup, Melinda ID - 9813 TI - Supplemental material for Bodova et al., 2018 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In evolutionary game theory interactions between individuals are often assumed obligatory. However, in many real-life situations, individuals can decide to opt out of an interaction depending on the information they have about the opponent. We consider a simple evolutionary game theoretic model to study such a scenario, where at each encounter between two individuals the type of the opponent (cooperator/defector) is known with some probability, and where each individual either accepts or opts out of the interaction. If the type of the opponent is unknown, a trustful individual accepts the interaction, whereas a suspicious individual opts out of the interaction. If either of the two individuals opt out both individuals remain without an interaction. We show that in the prisoners dilemma optional interactions along with suspicious behaviour facilitates the emergence of trustful cooperation. AU - Priklopil, Tadeas AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu AU - Nowak, Martin ID - 744 JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology SN - 00225193 TI - Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma VL - 433 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We consider mating strategies for females who search for males sequentially during a season of limited length. We show that the best strategy rejects a given male type if encountered before a time-threshold but accepts him after. For frequency-independent benefits, we obtain the optimal time-thresholds explicitly for both discrete and continuous distributions of males, and allow for mistakes being made in assessing the correct male type. When the benefits are indirect (genes for the offspring) and the population is under frequency-dependent ecological selection, the benefits depend on the mating strategy of other females as well. This case is particularly relevant to speciation models that seek to explore the stability of reproductive isolation by assortative mating under frequency-dependent ecological selection. We show that the indirect benefits are to be quantified by the reproductive values of couples, and describe how the evolutionarily stable time-thresholds can be found. We conclude with an example based on the Levene model, in which we analyze the evolutionarily stable assortative mating strategies and the strength of reproductive isolation provided by them. AU - Priklopil, Tadeas AU - Kisdi, Eva AU - Gyllenberg, Mats ID - 1851 IS - 4 JF - Evolution SN - 0014-3820 TI - Evolutionarily stable mating decisions for sequentially searching females and the stability of reproductive isolation by assortative mating VL - 69 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In many social situations, individuals endeavor to find the single best possible partner, but are constrained to evaluate the candidates in sequence. Examples include the search for mates, economic partnerships, or any other long-term ties where the choice to interact involves two parties. Surprisingly, however, previous theoretical work on mutual choice problems focuses on finding equilibrium solutions, while ignoring the evolutionary dynamics of decisions. Empirically, this may be of high importance, as some equilibrium solutions can never be reached unless the population undergoes radical changes and a sufficient number of individuals change their decisions simultaneously. To address this question, we apply a mutual choice sequential search problem in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that allows one to find solutions that are favored by evolution. As an example, we study the influence of sequential search on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. For this, we focus on the classic snowdrift game and the prisoner’s dilemma game. AU - Priklopil, Tadeas AU - Chatterjee, Krishnendu ID - 1681 IS - 4 JF - Games TI - Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals VL - 6 ER -