---
OA_place: repository
OA_type: green
_id: '21134'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "The Nakamoto consensus protocol underlying the Bitcoin blockchain uses proof
    of work as a voting mechanism. Honest miners who contribute hashing power towards
    securing the chain try to extend the longest chain they are aware of. Despite
    its simplicity, Nakamoto consensus achieves meaningful security guarantees assuming
    that at any point in time, a majority of the hashing power is controlled by honest
    parties. This also holds under “resource variability”, i.e., if the total hashing
    power varies greatly over time.\r\nProofs of space (PoSpace) have been suggested
    as a more sustainable replacement for proofs of work. Unfortunately, no construction
    of a “longest-chain” blockchain based on PoSpace, that is secure under dynamic
    availability, is known. In this work, we prove that without additional assumptions
    no such protocol exists. We exactly quantify this impossibility result by proving
    a bound on the length of the fork required for double spending as a function of
    the adversarial capabilities. This bound holds for any chain selection rule, and
    we also show a chain selection rule (albeit a very strange one) that almost matches
    this bound.\r\nThe Nakamoto consensus protocol underlying the Bitcoin blockchain
    uses proof of work as a voting mechanism. Honest miners who contribute hashing
    power towards securing the chain try to extend the longest chain they are aware
    of. Despite its simplicity, Nakamoto consensus achieves meaningful security guarantees
    assuming that at any point in time, a majority of the hashing power is controlled
    by honest parties. This also holds under “resource variability”, i.e., if the
    total hashing power varies greatly over time.\r\n\r\nProofs of space (PoSpace)
    have been suggested as a more sustainable replacement for proofs of work. Unfortunately,
    no construction of a “longest-chain” blockchain based on PoSpace, that is secure
    under dynamic availability, is known. In this work, we prove that without additional
    assumptions no such protocol exists. We exactly quantify this impossibility result
    by proving a bound on the length of the fork required for double spending as a
    function of the adversarial capabilities. This bound holds for any chain selection
    rule, and we also show a chain selection rule (albeit a very strange one) that
    almost matches this bound.\r\n\r\nConcretely, we consider a security game in which
    the honest parties at any point control 0 > 1\r\n times more space than the adversary.
    The adversary can change the honest space by a factor 1+- E with every block (dynamic
    availability), and “replotting” the space (which allows answering two challenges
    using the same space) takes as much time as p blocks.\r\nWe prove that no matter
    what chain selection rule is used, in this game the adversary can create a fork
    of length o^2 . p/E that will be picked as the winner by the chain selection rule.\r\nWe
    also provide an upper bound that matches the lower bound up to a factor o. There
    exists a chain selection rule (albeit a very strange one) which in the above game
    requires forks of length at least o . p/E\r\nOur results show the necessity of
    additional assumptions to create a secure PoSpace based longest-chain blockchain.
    The Chia network in addition to PoSpace uses a verifiable delay function. Our
    bounds show that an additional primitive like that is necessary."
acknowledgement: This research was funded in whole or in part by the Austrian Science
  Fund (FWF) 10.55776/F85.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
  ama: 'Baig MA, Pietrzak KZ. On the (in)security of Proofs-of-space based longest-chain
    blockchains. In: <i>29th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and
    Data Security</i>. Vol 15752. Springer Nature; 2026:127-142. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8">10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8</a>'
  apa: 'Baig, M. A., &#38; Pietrzak, K. Z. (2026). On the (in)security of Proofs-of-space
    based longest-chain blockchains. In <i>29th International Conference on Financial
    Cryptography and Data Security</i> (Vol. 15752, pp. 127–142). Miyakojima, Japan:
    Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8</a>'
  chicago: Baig, Mirza Ahad, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “On the (in)Security of Proofs-of-Space
    Based Longest-Chain Blockchains.” In <i>29th International Conference on Financial
    Cryptography and Data Security</i>, 15752:127–42. Springer Nature, 2026. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8</a>.
  ieee: M. A. Baig and K. Z. Pietrzak, “On the (in)security of Proofs-of-space based
    longest-chain blockchains,” in <i>29th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
    and Data Security</i>, Miyakojima, Japan, 2026, vol. 15752, pp. 127–142.
  ista: 'Baig MA, Pietrzak KZ. 2026. On the (in)security of Proofs-of-space based
    longest-chain blockchains. 29th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
    and Data Security. FC: Financial Cryptography and Data Security, LNCS, vol. 15752,
    127–142.'
  mla: Baig, Mirza Ahad, and Krzysztof Z. Pietrzak. “On the (in)Security of Proofs-of-Space
    Based Longest-Chain Blockchains.” <i>29th International Conference on Financial
    Cryptography and Data Security</i>, vol. 15752, Springer Nature, 2026, pp. 127–42,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8">10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8</a>.
  short: M.A. Baig, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, 29th International Conference on Financial
    Cryptography and Data Security, Springer Nature, 2026, pp. 127–142.
conference:
  end_date: 2025-04-18
  location: Miyakojima, Japan
  name: 'FC: Financial Cryptography and Data Security'
  start_date: 2025-04-14
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2026-02-01T23:01:43Z
date_published: 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-15T08:45:18Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-032-07035-7_8
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '2505.14891'
intvolume: '     15752'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2505.14891
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 127-142
project:
- _id: 34a34d57-11ca-11ed-8bc3-a2688a8724e1
  grant_number: F8509
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
publication: 29th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 1611-3349
  isbn:
  - '9783032070340'
  issn:
  - 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '21651'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: On the (in)security of Proofs-of-space based longest-chain blockchains
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 15752
year: '2026'
...
---
OA_place: publisher
_id: '21651'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "Blockchains enable distributed consensus in permissionless settings, where
    participants\r\nare unknown, dynamically changing, and do not trust each other.
    While Bitcoin,\r\nbased on Proof-of-Work (PoW), was the first protocol in this
    model, significant\r\nresearch has focused on permissionless protocols using alternative
    physical resources,\r\nspecifically Proof-of-Space (PoSpace) and Verifiable Delay
    Functions (VDFs). This\r\nthesis investigates the theoretical limits and design
    space of longest-chain protocols in\r\nthe fully permissionless and dynamically
    available settings using these three resources.\r\nFirst, we address the feasibility
    of blockchains relying solely on storage as a resource.\r\nWe prove a fundamental
    impossibility result: there exists no secure longest-chain\r\nprotocol based exclusively
    on Proof-of-Space in the fully permissionless or dynamically\r\navailable settings.
    Further, we quantify the adversarial capabilities required to execute\r\na double-spend
    attack. Our result formally justifies the necessity of coupling PoSpace\r\nwith
    time-dependent primitives (such as VDFs) or to move to less permissive settings\r\n(quasi-permissionless
    or permissioned) to ensure security.\r\nSecond, we generalize Nakamoto-like heaviest
    chain consensus to protocols utilizing\r\ncombinations of multiple physical resources.
    We analyze chain selection rules governed\r\nby a weight function Γ(S, V,W), which
    assigns weight to blocks based on recorded\r\nSpace (S), VDF speed (V ), and Work
    (W). We provide a complete classification\r\nof secure weight functions, proving
    that a weight function is secure against private\r\ndouble-spend attacks if and
    only if it is homogeneous in the timed resources (V,W)\r\nand sub-homogeneous
    in S. This framework unifies existing protocols like Bitcoin and\r\nChia under
    a single theoretical model and provides a powerful tool for designing new\r\nlongest-chain
    blockchains from a mix of physical resources."
alternative_title:
- ISTA Thesis
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
citation:
  ama: Baig MA. On secure chain selection rules from physical resources in a permissionless
    setting. 2026. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651">10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651</a>
  apa: Baig, M. A. (2026). <i>On secure chain selection rules from physical resources
    in a permissionless setting</i>. Institute of Science and Technology Austria.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651">https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651</a>
  chicago: Baig, Mirza Ahad. “On Secure Chain Selection Rules from Physical Resources
    in a Permissionless Setting.” Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2026.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651">https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651</a>.
  ieee: M. A. Baig, “On secure chain selection rules from physical resources in a
    permissionless setting,” Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2026.
  ista: Baig MA. 2026. On secure chain selection rules from physical resources in
    a permissionless setting. Institute of Science and Technology Austria.
  mla: Baig, Mirza Ahad. <i>On Secure Chain Selection Rules from Physical Resources
    in a Permissionless Setting</i>. Institute of Science and Technology Austria,
    2026, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651">10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651</a>.
  short: M.A. Baig, On Secure Chain Selection Rules from Physical Resources in a Permissionless
    Setting, Institute of Science and Technology Austria, 2026.
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2026-04-02T09:31:34Z
date_published: 2026-03-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-15T08:45:19Z
day: '04'
ddc:
- '000'
degree_awarded: PhD
department:
- _id: GradSch
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.15479/AT-ISTA-21651
file:
- access_level: closed
  checksum: c3986dba90653dac97adba662ebff238
  content_type: application/x-zip-compressed
  creator: mbaig
  date_created: 2026-04-03T17:28:48Z
  date_updated: 2026-04-13T08:24:13Z
  file_id: '21655'
  file_name: PhD-Thesis-Mirza-Ahad-Baig - Library Submission.zip
  file_size: 139353434
  relation: source_file
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: 292a5989262521f7c145a109d1f348cb
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: mbaig
  date_created: 2026-04-03T17:29:30Z
  date_updated: 2026-04-15T07:37:25Z
  file_id: '21656'
  file_name: 2026_Baig_Mirza_Ahad_Thesis.pdf
  file_size: 1942037
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2026-04-15T07:37:25Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - 978-3-99078-078-7
  issn:
  - 2663-337X
publication_status: published
publisher: Institute of Science and Technology Austria
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '21134'
    relation: part_of_dissertation
    status: public
  - id: '20587'
    relation: part_of_dissertation
    status: public
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
title: On secure chain selection rules from physical resources in a permissionless
  setting
tmp:
  image: /images/cc_by_nc_sa.png
  legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/legalcode
  name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC
    BY-NC-SA 4.0)
  short: CC BY-NC-SA (4.0)
type: dissertation
user_id: 8b945eb4-e2f2-11eb-945a-df72226e66a9
year: '2026'
...
---
OA_place: repository
OA_type: green
_id: '19738'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "Garbling is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, with numerous theoretical
    and practical applications. Since the first construction by Yao (FOCS’82, ’86),
    a line of work has concerned itself with reducing the communication and computational
    complexity of that construction. One of the most efficient garbling schemes presently
    is the ‘Half Gates’ scheme by Zahur, Rosulek, and Evans (Eurocrypt’15). Despite
    its widespread adoption, the provable security of this scheme has been based on
    assumptions whose only instantiations are in idealized models. For example, in
    their original paper, Zahur, Rosulek, and Evans showed that hash functions satisfying
    a notion called circular correlation robustness (CCR) suffice for this task, and
    then proved that CCR secure hash functions can be instantiated in the random permutation
    model.\r\nIn this work, we show how to securely instantiate the Half Gates scheme
    in the standard model. To this end, we first show how this scheme can be securely
    instantiated given a (family of) weak CCR hash function, a notion that we introduce.
    Furthermore, we show how a weak CCR hash function can be used to securely instantiate
    other efficient garbling schemes, namely the ones by Rosulek and Roy (Crypto’21)
    and Heath (Eurocrypt’24). Thus we believe this notion to be of independent interest.\r\nFinally,
    we construct such weak CCR hash functions using indistinguishability obfuscation
    and one-way functions. The security proof of this construction constitutes our
    main technical contribution. While our construction is not practical, it serves
    as a proof of concept supporting the soundness of these garbling schemes, which
    we regard to be particularly important given the recent initiative by NIST to
    standardize garbling, and the optimizations in Half Gates being potentially adopted."
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Anasuya
  full_name: Acharya, Anasuya
  last_name: Acharya
- first_name: Karen
  full_name: Azari, Karen
  last_name: Azari
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
- first_name: Dennis
  full_name: Hofheinz, Dennis
  last_name: Hofheinz
- first_name: Chethan
  full_name: Kamath, Chethan
  last_name: Kamath
citation:
  ama: 'Acharya A, Azari K, Baig MA, Hofheinz D, Kamath C. Securely instantiating
    ‘Half Gates’ garbling in the standard model. In: <i>28th IACR International Conference
    on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography</i>. Vol 15677. Springer Nature;
    2025:37-75. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2">10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2</a>'
  apa: 'Acharya, A., Azari, K., Baig, M. A., Hofheinz, D., &#38; Kamath, C. (2025).
    Securely instantiating ‘Half Gates’ garbling in the standard model. In <i>28th
    IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography</i>
    (Vol. 15677, pp. 37–75). Roros, Norway: Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2</a>'
  chicago: Acharya, Anasuya, Karen Azari, Mirza Ahad Baig, Dennis Hofheinz, and Chethan
    Kamath. “Securely Instantiating ‘Half Gates’ Garbling in the Standard Model.”
    In <i>28th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key
    Cryptography</i>, 15677:37–75. Springer Nature, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2</a>.
  ieee: A. Acharya, K. Azari, M. A. Baig, D. Hofheinz, and C. Kamath, “Securely instantiating
    ‘Half Gates’ garbling in the standard model,” in <i>28th IACR International Conference
    on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography</i>, Roros, Norway, 2025, vol.
    15677, pp. 37–75.
  ista: 'Acharya A, Azari K, Baig MA, Hofheinz D, Kamath C. 2025. Securely instantiating
    ‘Half Gates’ garbling in the standard model. 28th IACR International Conference
    on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography. PKC: Public-Key Cryptography,
    LNCS, vol. 15677, 37–75.'
  mla: Acharya, Anasuya, et al. “Securely Instantiating ‘Half Gates’ Garbling in the Standard
    Model.” <i>28th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key
    Cryptography</i>, vol. 15677, Springer Nature, 2025, pp. 37–75, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2">10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2</a>.
  short: A. Acharya, K. Azari, M.A. Baig, D. Hofheinz, C. Kamath, in:, 28th IACR International
    Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, Springer Nature,
    2025, pp. 37–75.
conference:
  end_date: 2025-05-15
  location: Roros, Norway
  name: 'PKC: Public-Key Cryptography'
  start_date: 2025-05-12
date_created: 2025-05-25T22:17:02Z
date_published: 2025-05-05T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-06-02T07:01:45Z
day: '05'
department:
- _id: KrPi
- _id: GradSch
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-91829-2_2
intvolume: '     15677'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/281
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 37-75
publication: 28th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key
  Cryptography
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 1611-3349
  isbn:
  - '9783031918285'
  issn:
  - 0302-9743
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Securely instantiating ‘Half Gates’ garbling in the standard model
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 15677
year: '2025'
...
---
OA_place: publisher
OA_type: gold
_id: '20587'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "The blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain \"record\" the amount of work W that
    went into creating them through proofs of work. When honest parties control a
    majority of the work, consensus is achieved by picking the chain with the highest
    recorded weight. Resources other than work have been considered to secure such
    longest-chain blockchains. In Chia, blocks record the amount of disk-space S (via
    a proof of space) and sequential computational steps V (through a VDF).\r\nIn
    this paper, we ask what weight functions Γ(S,V,W) (that assign a weight to a block
    as a function of the recorded space, speed, and work) are secure in the sense
    that whenever the weight of the resources controlled by honest parties is larger
    than the weight of adversarial parties, the blockchain is secure against private
    double-spending attacks.\r\nWe completely classify such functions in an idealized
    \"continuous\" model: Γ(S,V,W) is secure against private double-spending attacks
    if and only if it is homogeneous of degree one in the \"timed\" resources V and
    W, i.e., αΓ(S,V,W) = Γ(S,α V, α W). This includes the Bitcoin rule Γ(S,V,W) =
    W and the Chia rule Γ(S,V,W) = S ⋅ V. In a more realistic model where blocks are
    created at discrete time-points, one additionally needs some mild assumptions
    on the dependency on S (basically, the weight should not grow too much if S is
    slightly increased, say linear as in Chia).\r\nOur classification is more general
    and allows various instantiations of the same resource. It provides a powerful
    tool for designing new longest-chain blockchains. E.g., consider combining different
    PoWs to counter centralization, say the Bitcoin PoW W₁ and a memory-hard PoW W₂.
    Previous work suggested to use W₁+W₂ as weight. Our results show that using e.g.,
    √{W₁}⋅ √{W₂} or min{W₁,W₂} are also secure, and we argue that in practice these
    are much better choices."
acknowledgement: "This research was funded in whole or in part by the Austrian Science
  Fund (FWF)\r\n10.55776/F85. For open access purposes, the author has applied a CC
  BY public copyright license\r\nto any author-accepted manuscript version arising
  from this submission."
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '16'
article_processing_charge: Yes
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
- first_name: Christoph Ullrich
  full_name: Günther, Christoph Ullrich
  id: ec98511c-eb8e-11eb-b029-edd25d7271a1
  last_name: Günther
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
  ama: 'Baig MA, Günther CU, Pietrzak KZ. Nakamoto consensus from multiple resources.
    In: <i>7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies</i>. Vol 354. Schloss
    Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2025. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16">10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16</a>'
  apa: 'Baig, M. A., Günther, C. U., &#38; Pietrzak, K. Z. (2025). Nakamoto consensus
    from multiple resources. In <i>7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies</i>
    (Vol. 354). Pittsburgh, PA, United States: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
    für Informatik. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16</a>'
  chicago: Baig, Mirza Ahad, Christoph Ullrich Günther, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak.
    “Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources.” In <i>7th Conference on Advances
    in Financial Technologies</i>, Vol. 354. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für
    Informatik, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16</a>.
  ieee: M. A. Baig, C. U. Günther, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Nakamoto consensus from multiple
    resources,” in <i>7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies</i>, Pittsburgh,
    PA, United States, 2025, vol. 354.
  ista: 'Baig MA, Günther CU, Pietrzak KZ. 2025. Nakamoto consensus from multiple
    resources. 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies. AFT: Conference
    on Advances in Financial Technologies, LIPIcs, vol. 354, 16.'
  mla: Baig, Mirza Ahad, et al. “Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources.” <i>7th
    Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies</i>, vol. 354, 16, Schloss Dagstuhl
    - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2025, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16">10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16</a>.
  short: M.A. Baig, C.U. Günther, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, 7th Conference on Advances in
    Financial Technologies, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2025.
conference:
  end_date: 2025-10-10
  location: Pittsburgh, PA, United States
  name: 'AFT: Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies'
  start_date: 2025-10-08
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2025-11-02T23:01:34Z
date_published: 2025-10-06T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-15T08:45:18Z
day: '06'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '2508.01448'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: b638adcd4fbffa77116c35393e165eb7
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: dernst
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  date_updated: 2025-11-04T08:19:02Z
  file_id: '20598'
  file_name: 2025_LIPIcsAFT_Baig.pdf
  file_size: 1061847
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2025-11-04T08:19:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       354'
language:
- iso: eng
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1410
month: '10'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 34a4ce89-11ca-11ed-8bc3-8cc37fb6e11f
  grant_number: F8512
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
- _id: 34a34d57-11ca-11ed-8bc3-a2688a8724e1
  grant_number: F8509
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
publication: 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - '9783959774000'
  issn:
  - 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '21651'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Nakamoto consensus from multiple resources
tmp:
  image: /images/cc_by.png
  legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
  name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
  short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 354
year: '2025'
...
---
OA_place: repository
OA_type: green
_id: '18702'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'In this work we prove lower bounds on the (communication) cost of maintaining
    a shared key among a dynamic group of users. Being “dynamic” means one can add
    and remove users from the group. This captures important protocols like multicast
    encryption (ME) and continuous group-key agreement (CGKA), which is the primitive
    underlying many group messaging applications. We prove our bounds in a combinatorial
    setting where the state of the protocol progresses in rounds. The state of the
    protocol in each round is captured by a set system, with each of its elements
    specifying a set of users who share a secret key. We show this combinatorial model
    implies bounds in symbolic models for ME and CGKA that capture, as building blocks,
    PRGs, PRFs, dual PRFs, secret sharing, and symmetric encryption in the setting
    of ME, and PRGs, PRFs, dual PRFs, secret sharing, public-key encryption, and key-updatable
    public-key encryption in the setting of CGKA. The models are related to the ones
    used by Micciancio and Panjwani (Eurocrypt’04) and Bienstock et al. (TCC’20) to
    analyze ME and CGKA, respectively. We prove – using the Bollobás’ Set Pairs Inequality
    – that the cost (number of uploaded ciphertexts) for replacing a set of d users
    in a group of size n is Ω(dln(n/d)). Our lower bound is asymptotically tight and
    both improves on a bound of Ω(d) by Bienstock et al. (TCC’20), and generalizes
    a result by Micciancio and Panjwani (Eurocrypt’04), who proved a lower bound of
    Ω(log(n)) for d=1. '
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Michael
  full_name: Anastos, Michael
  id: 0b2a4358-bb35-11ec-b7b9-e3279b593dbb
  last_name: Anastos
- first_name: Benedikt
  full_name: Auerbach, Benedikt
  id: D33D2B18-E445-11E9-ABB7-15F4E5697425
  last_name: Auerbach
  orcid: 0000-0002-7553-6606
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
- first_name: Miguel
  full_name: Cueto Noval, Miguel
  id: ffc563a3-f6e0-11ea-865d-e3cce03d17cc
  last_name: Cueto Noval
  orcid: 0000-0002-2505-4246
- first_name: Matthew Alan
  full_name: Kwan, Matthew Alan
  id: 5fca0887-a1db-11eb-95d1-ca9d5e0453b3
  last_name: Kwan
  orcid: 0000-0002-4003-7567
- first_name: Guillermo
  full_name: Pascual Perez, Guillermo
  id: 2D7ABD02-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pascual Perez
  orcid: 0000-0001-8630-415X
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
  ama: 'Anastos M, Auerbach B, Baig MA, et al. The cost of maintaining keys in dynamic
    groups with applications to multicast encryption and group messaging. In: <i>22nd
    International Conference on Theory of Cryptography</i>. Vol 15364. Springer Nature;
    2024:413-443. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14">10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14</a>'
  apa: 'Anastos, M., Auerbach, B., Baig, M. A., Cueto Noval, M., Kwan, M. A., Pascual
    Perez, G., &#38; Pietrzak, K. Z. (2024). The cost of maintaining keys in dynamic
    groups with applications to multicast encryption and group messaging. In <i>22nd
    International Conference on Theory of Cryptography</i> (Vol. 15364, pp. 413–443).
    Milan, Italy: Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14</a>'
  chicago: Anastos, Michael, Benedikt Auerbach, Mirza Ahad Baig, Miguel Cueto Noval,
    Matthew Alan Kwan, Guillermo Pascual Perez, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “The Cost
    of Maintaining Keys in Dynamic Groups with Applications to Multicast Encryption
    and Group Messaging.” In <i>22nd International Conference on Theory of Cryptography</i>,
    15364:413–43. Springer Nature, 2024. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14</a>.
  ieee: M. Anastos <i>et al.</i>, “The cost of maintaining keys in dynamic groups
    with applications to multicast encryption and group messaging,” in <i>22nd International
    Conference on Theory of Cryptography</i>, Milan, Italy, 2024, vol. 15364, pp.
    413–443.
  ista: 'Anastos M, Auerbach B, Baig MA, Cueto Noval M, Kwan MA, Pascual Perez G,
    Pietrzak KZ. 2024. The cost of maintaining keys in dynamic groups with applications
    to multicast encryption and group messaging. 22nd International Conference on
    Theory of Cryptography. TCC: Theory of Cryptography, LNCS, vol. 15364, 413–443.'
  mla: Anastos, Michael, et al. “The Cost of Maintaining Keys in Dynamic Groups with Applications
    to Multicast Encryption and Group Messaging.” <i>22nd International Conference
    on Theory of Cryptography</i>, vol. 15364, Springer Nature, 2024, pp. 413–43,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14">10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14</a>.
  short: M. Anastos, B. Auerbach, M.A. Baig, M. Cueto Noval, M.A. Kwan, G. Pascual
    Perez, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, 22nd International Conference on Theory of Cryptography,
    Springer Nature, 2024, pp. 413–443.
conference:
  end_date: 2024-12-06
  location: Milan, Italy
  name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography'
  start_date: 2024-12-02
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2024-12-22T23:01:47Z
date_published: 2024-12-02T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-12-02T13:55:46Z
day: '02'
department:
- _id: MaKw
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-78011-0_14
external_id:
  isi:
  - '001545628900014'
intvolume: '     15364'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1097
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 413-443
publication: 22nd International Conference on Theory of Cryptography
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 1611-3349
  isbn:
  - '9783031780103'
  issn:
  - 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: The cost of maintaining keys in dynamic groups with applications to multicast
  encryption and group messaging
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 15364
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '12164'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'A shared-memory counter is a widely-used and well-studied concurrent object.
    It supports two operations: An Inc operation that increases its value by 1 and
    a Read operation that returns its current value. In Jayanti et al (SIAM J Comput,
    30(2), 2000), Jayanti, Tan and Toueg proved a linear lower bound on the worst-case
    step complexity of obstruction-free implementations, from read-write registers,
    of a large class of shared objects that includes counters. The lower bound leaves
    open the question of finding counter implementations with sub-linear amortized
    step complexity. In this work, we address this gap. We show that n-process, wait-free
    and linearizable counters can be implemented from read-write registers with O(log2n)
    amortized step complexity. This is the first counter algorithm from read-write
    registers that provides sub-linear amortized step complexity in executions of
    arbitrary length. Since a logarithmic lower bound on the amortized step complexity
    of obstruction-free counter implementations exists, our upper bound is within
    a logarithmic factor of the optimal. The worst-case step complexity of the construction
    remains linear, which is optimal. This is obtained thanks to a new max register
    construction with O(logn) amortized step complexity in executions of arbitrary
    length in which the value stored in the register does not grow too quickly. We
    then leverage an existing counter algorithm by Aspnes, Attiya and Censor-Hillel
    [1] in which we “plug” our max register implementation to show that it remains
    linearizable while achieving O(log2n) amortized step complexity.'
acknowledgement: A preliminary version of this work appeared in DISC’19. Mirza Ahad
  Baig, Alessia Milani and Corentin Travers are supported by ANR projects Descartes
  and FREDDA. Mirza Ahad Baig is supported by UMI Relax. Danny Hendler is supported
  by the Israel Science Foundation (Grants 380/18 and 1425/22).
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
- first_name: Danny
  full_name: Hendler, Danny
  last_name: Hendler
- first_name: Alessia
  full_name: Milani, Alessia
  last_name: Milani
- first_name: Corentin
  full_name: Travers, Corentin
  last_name: Travers
citation:
  ama: Baig MA, Hendler D, Milani A, Travers C. Long-lived counters with polylogarithmic
    amortized step complexity. <i>Distributed Computing</i>. 2023;36:29-43. doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5">10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5</a>
  apa: Baig, M. A., Hendler, D., Milani, A., &#38; Travers, C. (2023). Long-lived
    counters with polylogarithmic amortized step complexity. <i>Distributed Computing</i>.
    Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5</a>
  chicago: Baig, Mirza Ahad, Danny Hendler, Alessia Milani, and Corentin Travers.
    “Long-Lived Counters with Polylogarithmic Amortized Step Complexity.” <i>Distributed
    Computing</i>. Springer Nature, 2023. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5</a>.
  ieee: M. A. Baig, D. Hendler, A. Milani, and C. Travers, “Long-lived counters with
    polylogarithmic amortized step complexity,” <i>Distributed Computing</i>, vol.
    36. Springer Nature, pp. 29–43, 2023.
  ista: Baig MA, Hendler D, Milani A, Travers C. 2023. Long-lived counters with polylogarithmic
    amortized step complexity. Distributed Computing. 36, 29–43.
  mla: Baig, Mirza Ahad, et al. “Long-Lived Counters with Polylogarithmic Amortized
    Step Complexity.” <i>Distributed Computing</i>, vol. 36, Springer Nature, 2023,
    pp. 29–43, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5">10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5</a>.
  short: M.A. Baig, D. Hendler, A. Milani, C. Travers, Distributed Computing 36 (2023)
    29–43.
date_created: 2023-01-12T12:10:08Z
date_published: 2023-03-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-08-16T08:39:36Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/s00446-022-00439-5
external_id:
  isi:
  - '000890138700001'
intvolume: '        36'
isi: 1
keyword:
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Hardware and Architecture
- Theoretical Computer Science
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2019/11310/
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 29-43
publication: Distributed Computing
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 1432-0452
  issn:
  - 0178-2770
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Long-lived counters with polylogarithmic amortized step complexity
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 36
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '10408'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Key trees are often the best solution in terms of transmission cost and storage
    requirements for managing keys in a setting where a group needs to share a secret
    key, while being able to efficiently rotate the key material of users (in order
    to recover from a potential compromise, or to add or remove users). Applications
    include multicast encryption protocols like LKH (Logical Key Hierarchies) or group
    messaging like the current IETF proposal TreeKEM. A key tree is a (typically balanced)
    binary tree, where each node is identified with a key: leaf nodes hold users’
    secret keys while the root is the shared group key. For a group of size N, each
    user just holds   log(N)  keys (the keys on the path from its leaf to the root)
    and its entire key material can be rotated by broadcasting   2log(N)  ciphertexts
    (encrypting each fresh key on the path under the keys of its parents). In this
    work we consider the natural setting where we have many groups with partially
    overlapping sets of users, and ask if we can find solutions where the cost of
    rotating a key is better than in the trivial one where we have a separate key
    tree for each group. We show that in an asymptotic setting (where the number m
    of groups is fixed while the number N of users grows) there exist more general
    key graphs whose cost converges to the cost of a single group, thus saving a factor
    linear in the number of groups over the trivial solution. As our asymptotic “solution”
    converges very slowly and performs poorly on concrete examples, we propose an
    algorithm that uses a natural heuristic to compute a key graph for any given group
    structure. Our algorithm combines two greedy algorithms, and is thus very efficient:
    it first converts the group structure into a “lattice graph”, which is then turned
    into a key graph by repeatedly applying the algorithm for constructing a Huffman
    code. To better understand how far our proposal is from an optimal solution, we
    prove lower bounds on the update cost of continuous group-key agreement and multicast
    encryption in a symbolic model admitting (asymmetric) encryption, pseudorandom
    generators, and secret sharing as building blocks.'
acknowledgement: B. Auerbach, M.A. Baig and K. Pietrzak—received funding from the
  European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research
  and innovation programme (682815 - TOCNeT); Karen Klein was supported in part by
  ERC CoG grant 724307 and conducted part of this work at IST Austria, funded by the
  ERC under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (682815
  - TOCNeT); Guillermo Pascual-Perez was funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020
  research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement
  No. 665385; Michael Walter conducted part of this work at IST Austria, funded by
  the ERC under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
  (682815 - TOCNeT).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Joel F
  full_name: Alwen, Joel F
  id: 2A8DFA8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Alwen
- first_name: Benedikt
  full_name: Auerbach, Benedikt
  id: D33D2B18-E445-11E9-ABB7-15F4E5697425
  last_name: Auerbach
  orcid: 0000-0002-7553-6606
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
- first_name: Miguel
  full_name: Cueto Noval, Miguel
  id: ffc563a3-f6e0-11ea-865d-e3cce03d17cc
  last_name: Cueto Noval
  orcid: 0000-0002-2505-4246
- first_name: Karen
  full_name: Klein, Karen
  id: 3E83A2F8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Klein
- first_name: Guillermo
  full_name: Pascual Perez, Guillermo
  id: 2D7ABD02-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pascual Perez
  orcid: 0000-0001-8630-415X
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Michael
  full_name: Walter, Michael
  id: 488F98B0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Walter
  orcid: 0000-0003-3186-2482
citation:
  ama: 'Alwen JF, Auerbach B, Baig MA, et al. Grafting key trees: Efficient key management
    for overlapping groups. In: <i>19th International Conference</i>. Vol 13044. Springer
    Nature; 2021:222-253. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8">10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8</a>'
  apa: 'Alwen, J. F., Auerbach, B., Baig, M. A., Cueto Noval, M., Klein, K., Pascual
    Perez, G., … Walter, M. (2021). Grafting key trees: Efficient key management for
    overlapping groups. In <i>19th International Conference</i> (Vol. 13044, pp. 222–253).
    Raleigh, NC, United States: Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8</a>'
  chicago: 'Alwen, Joel F, Benedikt Auerbach, Mirza Ahad Baig, Miguel Cueto Noval,
    Karen Klein, Guillermo Pascual Perez, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Michael Walter.
    “Grafting Key Trees: Efficient Key Management for Overlapping Groups.” In <i>19th
    International Conference</i>, 13044:222–53. Springer Nature, 2021. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8</a>.'
  ieee: 'J. F. Alwen <i>et al.</i>, “Grafting key trees: Efficient key management
    for overlapping groups,” in <i>19th International Conference</i>, Raleigh, NC,
    United States, 2021, vol. 13044, pp. 222–253.'
  ista: 'Alwen JF, Auerbach B, Baig MA, Cueto Noval M, Klein K, Pascual Perez G, Pietrzak
    KZ, Walter M. 2021. Grafting key trees: Efficient key management for overlapping
    groups. 19th International Conference. TCC: Theory of Cryptography, LNCS, vol.
    13044, 222–253.'
  mla: 'Alwen, Joel F., et al. “Grafting Key Trees: Efficient Key Management for Overlapping
    Groups.” <i>19th International Conference</i>, vol. 13044, Springer Nature, 2021,
    pp. 222–53, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8">10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8</a>.'
  short: J.F. Alwen, B. Auerbach, M.A. Baig, M. Cueto Noval, K. Klein, G. Pascual
    Perez, K.Z. Pietrzak, M. Walter, in:, 19th International Conference, Springer
    Nature, 2021, pp. 222–253.
conference:
  end_date: 2021-11-11
  location: Raleigh, NC, United States
  name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography'
  start_date: 2021-11-08
date_created: 2021-12-05T23:01:42Z
date_published: 2021-11-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-07T13:01:26Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-90456-2_8
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
  isi:
  - '000728363700008'
intvolume: '     13044'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1158
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 222-253
project:
- _id: 258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '682815'
  name: Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks
- _id: 2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '665385'
  name: International IST Doctoral Program
publication: 19th International Conference
publication_identifier:
  eisbn:
  - 978-3-030-90456-2
  eissn:
  - 1611-3349
  isbn:
  - 9-783-0309-0455-5
  issn:
  - 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '18088'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Grafting key trees: Efficient key management for overlapping groups'
type: conference
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 13044
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '8382'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We present the first deterministic wait-free long-lived snapshot algorithm,
    using only read and write operations, that guarantees polylogarithmic amortized
    step complexity in all executions. This is the first non-blocking snapshot algorithm,
    using reads and writes only, that has sub-linear amortized step complexity in
    executions of arbitrary length. The key to our construction is a novel implementation
    of a 2-component max array object which may be of independent interest.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
- first_name: Danny
  full_name: Hendler, Danny
  last_name: Hendler
- first_name: Alessia
  full_name: Milani, Alessia
  last_name: Milani
- first_name: Corentin
  full_name: Travers, Corentin
  last_name: Travers
citation:
  ama: 'Baig MA, Hendler D, Milani A, Travers C. Long-lived snapshots with polylogarithmic
    amortized step complexity. In: <i>Proceedings of the 39th Symposium on Principles
    of Distributed Computing</i>. Association for Computing Machinery; 2020:31-40.
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3382734.3406005">10.1145/3382734.3406005</a>'
  apa: 'Baig, M. A., Hendler, D., Milani, A., &#38; Travers, C. (2020). Long-lived
    snapshots with polylogarithmic amortized step complexity. In <i>Proceedings of
    the 39th Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing</i> (pp. 31–40). Virtual,
    Italy: Association for Computing Machinery. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3382734.3406005">https://doi.org/10.1145/3382734.3406005</a>'
  chicago: Baig, Mirza Ahad, Danny Hendler, Alessia Milani, and Corentin Travers.
    “Long-Lived Snapshots with Polylogarithmic Amortized Step Complexity.” In <i>Proceedings
    of the 39th Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing</i>, 31–40. Association
    for Computing Machinery, 2020. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3382734.3406005">https://doi.org/10.1145/3382734.3406005</a>.
  ieee: M. A. Baig, D. Hendler, A. Milani, and C. Travers, “Long-lived snapshots with
    polylogarithmic amortized step complexity,” in <i>Proceedings of the 39th Symposium
    on Principles of Distributed Computing</i>, Virtual, Italy, 2020, pp. 31–40.
  ista: 'Baig MA, Hendler D, Milani A, Travers C. 2020. Long-lived snapshots with
    polylogarithmic amortized step complexity. Proceedings of the 39th Symposium on
    Principles of Distributed Computing. PODC: Principles of Distributed Computing,
    31–40.'
  mla: Baig, Mirza Ahad, et al. “Long-Lived Snapshots with Polylogarithmic Amortized
    Step Complexity.” <i>Proceedings of the 39th Symposium on Principles of Distributed
    Computing</i>, Association for Computing Machinery, 2020, pp. 31–40, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3382734.3406005">10.1145/3382734.3406005</a>.
  short: M.A. Baig, D. Hendler, A. Milani, C. Travers, in:, Proceedings of the 39th
    Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, Association for Computing Machinery,
    2020, pp. 31–40.
conference:
  end_date: 2020-08-07
  location: Virtual, Italy
  name: 'PODC: Principles of Distributed Computing'
  start_date: 2020-08-03
date_created: 2020-09-13T22:01:17Z
date_published: 2020-07-31T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-10T10:25:23Z
day: '31'
doi: 10.1145/3382734.3406005
external_id:
  isi:
  - '001436693500004'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02860087/document
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 31-40
publication: Proceedings of the 39th Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - '9781450375825'
publication_status: published
publisher: Association for Computing Machinery
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Long-lived snapshots with polylogarithmic amortized step complexity
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
year: '2020'
...
