---
_id: '18066'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Graph games lie at the algorithmic core of many automated design problems
in computer science. These are games usually played between two players on a given
graph, where the players keep moving a token along the edges according to pre-determined
rules (turn-based, concurrent, etc.), and the winner is decided based on the infinite
path (aka play) traversed by the token from a given initial position. In bidding
games, the players initially get some monetary budgets which they need to use
to bid for the privilege of moving the token at each step. Each round of bidding
affects the players'' available budgets, which is the only form of update that
the budgets experience. We introduce bidding games with charging where the players
can additionally improve their budgets during the game by collecting vertex-dependent
monetary rewards, aka the "charges." Unlike traditional bidding games (where all
charges are zero), bidding games with charging allow non-trivial recurrent behaviors.
For example, a reachability objective may require multiple detours to vertices
with high charges to earn additional budget. We show that, nonetheless, the central
property of traditional bidding games generalizes to bidding games with charging:
For each vertex there exists a threshold ratio, which is the necessary and sufficient
fraction of the total budget for winning the game from that vertex. While the
thresholds of traditional bidding games correspond to unique fixed points of linear
systems of equations, in games with charging, these fixed points are no longer
unique. This significantly complicates the proof of existence and the algorithmic
computation of thresholds for infinite-duration objectives. We also provide the
lower complexity bounds for computing thresholds for Rabin and Streett objectives,
which are the first known lower bounds in any form of bidding games (with or without
charging), and we solve the following repair problem for safety and reachability
games that have unsatisfiable objectives: Can we distribute a given amount of
charge to the players in a way such that the objective can be satisfied?'
acknowledgement: This work was supported in part by the ERC projects ERC-2020-AdG
101020093 and CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) and by ISF grant no. 1679/21.
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '8'
article_processing_charge: Yes
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Ehsan Kafshdar
full_name: Goharshady, Ehsan Kafshdar
last_name: Goharshady
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000-0002-2985-7724
- first_name: Kaushik
full_name: Mallik, Kaushik
id: 0834ff3c-6d72-11ec-94e0-b5b0a4fb8598
last_name: Mallik
orcid: 0000-0001-9864-7475
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Goharshady EK, Henzinger TA, Mallik K. Bidding games with charging.
In: 35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory. Vol 311. Schloss
Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2024. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.8'
apa: 'Avni, G., Goharshady, E. K., Henzinger, T. A., & Mallik, K. (2024). Bidding
games with charging. In 35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
(Vol. 311). Calgary, Canada: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik.
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.8'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Ehsan Kafshdar Goharshady, Thomas A Henzinger, and Kaushik Mallik.
“Bidding Games with Charging.” In 35th International Conference on Concurrency
Theory, Vol. 311. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2024.
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.8.
ieee: G. Avni, E. K. Goharshady, T. A. Henzinger, and K. Mallik, “Bidding games
with charging,” in 35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory,
Calgary, Canada, 2024, vol. 311.
ista: 'Avni G, Goharshady EK, Henzinger TA, Mallik K. 2024. Bidding games with charging.
35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory. CONCUR: Conference on Concurrency
Theory, LIPIcs, vol. 311, 8.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Bidding Games with Charging.” 35th International Conference
on Concurrency Theory, vol. 311, 8, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für
Informatik, 2024, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.8.
short: G. Avni, E.K. Goharshady, T.A. Henzinger, K. Mallik, in:, 35th International
Conference on Concurrency Theory, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
2024.
conference:
end_date: 2024-09-13
location: Calgary, Canada
name: 'CONCUR: Conference on Concurrency Theory'
start_date: 2024-09-09
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2024-09-15T22:01:39Z
date_published: 2024-09-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-12-02T13:46:11Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.8
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2407.06288'
isi:
- '001556847400008'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: cb6f2254b84922cd7bf224f550b73f4a
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2024-09-17T09:35:03Z
date_updated: 2024-09-17T09:35:03Z
file_id: '18083'
file_name: 2024_LIPICS_Avni.pdf
file_size: 854430
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2024-09-17T09:35:03Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 311'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 62781420-2b32-11ec-9570-8d9b63373d4d
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '101020093'
name: Vigilant Algorithmic Monitoring of Software
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: 35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783959773393'
issn:
- 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Bidding games with charging
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 311
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '15376'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Sequential decision-making tasks often require satisfaction of multiple, partially-contradictory
objectives. Existing approaches are monolithic, where a single policy fulfills
all objectives. We present auction-based scheduling, a decentralized framework
for multi-objective sequential decision making. Each objective is fulfilled using
a separate and independent policy. Composition of policies is performed at runtime,
where at each step, the policies simultaneously bid from pre-allocated budgets
for the privilege of choosing the next action. The framework allows policies to
be independently created, modified, and replaced. We study path planning problems
on finite graphs with two temporal objectives and present algorithms to synthesize
policies together with bidding policies in a decentralized manner. We consider
three categories of decentralized synthesis problems, parameterized by the assumptions
that the policies make on each other. We identify a class of assumptions called
assume-admissible for which synthesis is always possible for graphs whose every
vertex has at most two outgoing edges.
acknowledgement: This work was supported in part by the ERC project ERC-2020-AdG 101020093
and by ISF grant no. 1679/21.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: Yes (in subscription journal)
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Kaushik
full_name: Mallik, Kaushik
id: 0834ff3c-6d72-11ec-94e0-b5b0a4fb8598
last_name: Mallik
orcid: 0000-0001-9864-7475
- first_name: Suman
full_name: Sadhukhan, Suman
last_name: Sadhukhan
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Mallik K, Sadhukhan S. Auction-based scheduling. In: 30th International
Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems.
Vol 14572. Springer Nature; 2024:153-172. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-57256-2_8'
apa: 'Avni, G., Mallik, K., & Sadhukhan, S. (2024). Auction-based scheduling.
In 30th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction
and Analysis of Systems (Vol. 14572, pp. 153–172). Luxembourg City, Luxembourg:
Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57256-2_8'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Kaushik Mallik, and Suman Sadhukhan. “Auction-Based Scheduling.”
In 30th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction
and Analysis of Systems, 14572:153–72. Springer Nature, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57256-2_8.
ieee: G. Avni, K. Mallik, and S. Sadhukhan, “Auction-based scheduling,” in 30th
International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis
of Systems, Luxembourg City, Luxembourg, 2024, vol. 14572, pp. 153–172.
ista: 'Avni G, Mallik K, Sadhukhan S. 2024. Auction-based scheduling. 30th International
Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems.
TACAS: Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, LNCS,
vol. 14572, 153–172.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Auction-Based Scheduling.” 30th International Conference
on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, vol.
14572, Springer Nature, 2024, pp. 153–72, doi:10.1007/978-3-031-57256-2_8.
short: G. Avni, K. Mallik, S. Sadhukhan, in:, 30th International Conference on Tools
and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, Springer Nature,
2024, pp. 153–172.
conference:
end_date: 2024-04-11
location: Luxembourg City, Luxembourg
name: 'TACAS: Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems'
start_date: 2024-04-06
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2024-05-12T22:01:02Z
date_published: 2024-04-05T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-08T07:33:43Z
day: '05'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-57256-2_8
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2310.11798'
isi:
- '001284187100008'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: dbeb123510997886d11925aedbf9c400
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2024-05-22T07:09:24Z
date_updated: 2024-05-22T07:09:24Z
file_id: '15414'
file_name: 2024_LNCS_Avni.pdf
file_size: 508191
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2024-05-22T07:09:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 14572'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '04'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 153-172
project:
- _id: 62781420-2b32-11ec-9570-8d9b63373d4d
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '101020093'
name: Vigilant Algorithmic Monitoring of Software
publication: 30th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction
and Analysis of Systems
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1611-3349
isbn:
- '9783031572555'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Auction-based scheduling
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 14572
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '14243'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Two-player zero-sum "graph games" are central in logic, verification, and
multi-agent systems. The game proceeds by placing a token on a vertex of a graph,
and allowing the players to move it to produce an infinite path, which determines
the winner or payoff of the game. Traditionally, the players alternate turns in
moving the token. In "bidding games", however, the players have budgets and in
each turn, an auction (bidding) determines which player moves the token. So far,
bidding games have only been studied as full-information games. In this work we
initiate the study of partial-information bidding games: we study bidding games
in which a player''s initial budget is drawn from a known probability distribution.
We show that while for some bidding mechanisms and objectives, it is straightforward
to adapt the results from the full-information setting to the partial-information
setting, for others, the analysis is significantly more challenging, requires
new techniques, and gives rise to interesting results. Specifically, we study
games with "mean-payoff" objectives in combination with "poorman" bidding. We
construct optimal strategies for a partially-informed player who plays against
a fully-informed adversary. We show that, somewhat surprisingly, the "value" under
pure strategies does not necessarily exist in such games.'
acknowledgement: This research was supported in part by ISF grant no.1679/21, by the
ERC CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt), and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 665385.
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Ismael R
full_name: Jecker, Ismael R
id: 85D7C63E-7D5D-11E9-9C0F-98C4E5697425
last_name: Jecker
- first_name: Dorde
full_name: Zikelic, Dorde
id: 294AA7A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Zikelic
orcid: 0000-0002-4681-1699
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Jecker IR, Zikelic D. Bidding graph games with partially-observable
budgets. In: Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Vol 37. ; 2023:5464-5471. doi:10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25679'
apa: Avni, G., Jecker, I. R., & Zikelic, D. (2023). Bidding graph games with
partially-observable budgets. In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 37, pp. 5464–5471). Washington, DC, United States.
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25679
chicago: Avni, Guy, Ismael R Jecker, and Dorde Zikelic. “Bidding Graph Games with
Partially-Observable Budgets.” In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, 37:5464–71, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25679.
ieee: G. Avni, I. R. Jecker, and D. Zikelic, “Bidding graph games with partially-observable
budgets,” in Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Washington, DC, United States, 2023, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 5464–5471.
ista: 'Avni G, Jecker IR, Zikelic D. 2023. Bidding graph games with partially-observable
budgets. Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI:
Conference on Artificial Intelligence vol. 37, 5464–5471.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Bidding Graph Games with Partially-Observable Budgets.”
Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol.
37, no. 5, 2023, pp. 5464–71, doi:10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25679.
short: G. Avni, I.R. Jecker, D. Zikelic, in:, Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, 2023, pp. 5464–5471.
conference:
end_date: 2023-02-14
location: Washington, DC, United States
name: 'AAAI: Conference on Artificial Intelligence'
start_date: 2023-02-07
date_created: 2023-08-27T22:01:18Z
date_published: 2023-06-27T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-03-31T16:01:08Z
day: '27'
department:
- _id: ToHe
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25679
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2211.13626'
intvolume: ' 37'
issue: '5'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25679
month: '06'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 5464-5471
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '665385'
name: International IST Doctoral Program
publication: Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9781577358800'
publication_status: published
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Bidding graph games with partially-observable budgets
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 37
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '14518'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We consider bidding games, a class of two-player zero-sum graph games. The
game proceeds as follows. Both players have bounded budgets. A token is placed
on a vertex of a graph, in each turn the players simultaneously submit bids, and
the higher bidder moves the token, where we break bidding ties in favor of Player
1. Player 1 wins the game iff the token visits a designated target vertex. We
consider, for the first time, poorman discrete-bidding in which the granularity
of the bids is restricted and the higher bid is paid to the bank. Previous work
either did not impose granularity restrictions or considered Richman bidding (bids
are paid to the opponent). While the latter mechanisms are technically more accessible,
the former is more appealing from a practical standpoint. Our study focuses on
threshold budgets, which is the necessary and sufficient initial budget required
for Player 1 to ensure winning against a given Player 2 budget. We first show
existence of thresholds. In DAGs, we show that threshold budgets can be approximated
with error bounds by thresholds under continuous-bidding and that they exhibit
a periodic behavior. We identify closed-form solutions in special cases. We implement
and experiment with an algorithm to find threshold budgets.
acknowledgement: This research was supported in part by ISF grant no. 1679/21, ERC
CoG 863818 (FoRM-SMArt) and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under the Marie SkłodowskaCurie Grant Agreement No. 665385.
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Meggendorfer, Tobias
id: b21b0c15-30a2-11eb-80dc-f13ca25802e1
last_name: Meggendorfer
orcid: 0000-0002-1712-2165
- first_name: Suman
full_name: Sadhukhan, Suman
last_name: Sadhukhan
- first_name: Josef
full_name: Tkadlec, Josef
id: 3F24CCC8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Tkadlec
orcid: 0000-0002-1097-9684
- first_name: Dorde
full_name: Zikelic, Dorde
id: 294AA7A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Zikelic
orcid: 0000-0002-4681-1699
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Meggendorfer T, Sadhukhan S, Tkadlec J, Zikelic D. Reachability poorman
discrete-bidding games. In: Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications.
Vol 372. IOS Press; 2023:141-148. doi:10.3233/FAIA230264'
apa: 'Avni, G., Meggendorfer, T., Sadhukhan, S., Tkadlec, J., & Zikelic, D.
(2023). Reachability poorman discrete-bidding games. In Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications (Vol. 372, pp. 141–148). Krakow, Poland: IOS
Press. https://doi.org/10.3233/FAIA230264'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Tobias Meggendorfer, Suman Sadhukhan, Josef Tkadlec, and Dorde
Zikelic. “Reachability Poorman Discrete-Bidding Games.” In Frontiers in Artificial
Intelligence and Applications, 372:141–48. IOS Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.3233/FAIA230264.
ieee: G. Avni, T. Meggendorfer, S. Sadhukhan, J. Tkadlec, and D. Zikelic, “Reachability
poorman discrete-bidding games,” in Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and
Applications, Krakow, Poland, 2023, vol. 372, pp. 141–148.
ista: 'Avni G, Meggendorfer T, Sadhukhan S, Tkadlec J, Zikelic D. 2023. Reachability
poorman discrete-bidding games. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications.
ECAI: European Conference on Artificial Intelligence vol. 372, 141–148.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Reachability Poorman Discrete-Bidding Games.” Frontiers
in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, vol. 372, IOS Press, 2023, pp.
141–48, doi:10.3233/FAIA230264.
short: G. Avni, T. Meggendorfer, S. Sadhukhan, J. Tkadlec, D. Zikelic, in:, Frontiers
in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, IOS Press, 2023, pp. 141–148.
conference:
end_date: 2023-10-04
location: Krakow, Poland
name: 'ECAI: European Conference on Artificial Intelligence'
start_date: 2023-09-30
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2023-11-12T23:00:56Z
date_published: 2023-09-28T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-03-31T16:01:09Z
day: '28'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.3233/FAIA230264
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2307.15218'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 1390ca38480fa4cf286b0f1a42e8c12f
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2023-11-13T10:16:10Z
date_updated: 2023-11-13T10:16:10Z
file_id: '14529'
file_name: 2023_FAIA_Avni.pdf
file_size: 501011
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-11-13T10:16:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 372'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 141-148
project:
- _id: 2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '665385'
name: International IST Doctoral Program
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
publication: Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9781643684369'
issn:
- 0922-6389
publication_status: published
publisher: IOS Press
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Reachability poorman discrete-bidding games
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by_nc.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)
short: CC BY-NC (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 372
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '12509'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: A graph game is a two-player zero-sum game in which the players move a token
throughout a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or
payoff of the game. In bidding games, both players have budgets, and in each turn,
we hold an "auction" (bidding) to determine which player moves the token. In this
survey, we consider several bidding mechanisms and their effect on the properties
of the game. Specifically, bidding games, and in particular bidding games of infinite
duration, have an intriguing equivalence with random-turn games in which in each
turn, the player who moves is chosen randomly. We summarize how minor changes
in the bidding mechanism lead to unexpected differences in the equivalence with
random-turn games.
acknowledgement: "Guy Avni: Work partially supported by the Israel Science Foundation,
ISF grant agreement\r\nno 1679/21.\r\nThomas A. Henzinger: This work was supported
in part by the ERC-2020-AdG 101020093.\r\nWe would like to thank all our collaborators
Milad Aghajohari, Ventsislav Chonev, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen, Ismäel Jecker, Petr Novotný,
Josef Tkadlec, and Ðorđe Žikelić; we hope the collaboration was as fun and meaningful
for you as it was for us."
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000-0002-2985-7724
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Henzinger TA. An updated survey of bidding games on graphs. In: 47th
International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science. Vol
241. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany:
Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2022:3:1-3:6. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.3'
apa: 'Avni, G., & Henzinger, T. A. (2022). An updated survey of bidding games
on graphs. In 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer
Science (Vol. 241, p. 3:1-3:6). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.3'
chicago: 'Avni, Guy, and Thomas A Henzinger. “An Updated Survey of Bidding Games
on Graphs.” In 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of
Computer Science, 241:3:1-3:6. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
(LIPIcs). Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
2022. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.3.'
ieee: G. Avni and T. A. Henzinger, “An updated survey of bidding games on graphs,”
in 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science,
Vienna, Austria, 2022, vol. 241, p. 3:1-3:6.
ista: 'Avni G, Henzinger TA. 2022. An updated survey of bidding games on graphs.
47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science.
MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer ScienceLeibniz International Proceedings
in Informatics (LIPIcs) vol. 241, 3:1-3:6.'
mla: Avni, Guy, and Thomas A. Henzinger. “An Updated Survey of Bidding Games on
Graphs.” 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer
Science, vol. 241, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2022,
p. 3:1-3:6, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.3.
short: G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, in:, 47th International Symposium on Mathematical
Foundations of Computer Science, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
Dagstuhl, Germany, 2022, p. 3:1-3:6.
conference:
end_date: 2022-08-26
location: Vienna, Austria
name: 'MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science'
start_date: 2022-08-22
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2023-02-05T17:26:01Z
date_published: 2022-08-22T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:50:27Z
day: '22'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2022.3
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 1888ec9421622f9526fbec2de035f132
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creator: dernst
date_created: 2023-02-06T09:13:04Z
date_updated: 2023-02-06T09:13:04Z
file_id: '12519'
file_name: 2022_LIPICs_Avni.pdf
file_size: 624586
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intvolume: ' 241'
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month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 3:1-3:6
place: Dagstuhl, Germany
project:
- _id: 62781420-2b32-11ec-9570-8d9b63373d4d
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '101020093'
name: Vigilant Algorithmic Monitoring of Software
publication: 47th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer
Science
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783959772563'
issn:
- 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
series_title: Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)
status: public
title: An updated survey of bidding games on graphs
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name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
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type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
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...
---
_id: '10674'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to
produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games
are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a non-terminating
system and its environment. In bidding games the players bid for the right to
move the token: in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the
higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Bidding games are known
to have a clean and elegant mathematical structure that relies on the ability
of the players to submit arbitrarily small bids. Many applications, however, require
a fixed granularity for the bids, which can represent, for example, the monetary
value expressed in cents. We study, for the first time, the combination of discrete-bidding
and infinite-duration games. Our most important result proves that these games
form a large determined subclass of concurrent games, where determinacy is the
strong property that there always exists exactly one player who can guarantee
winning the game. In particular, we show that, in contrast to non-discrete bidding
games, the mechanism with which tied bids are resolved plays an important role
in discrete-bidding games. We study several natural tie-breaking mechanisms and
show that, while some do not admit determinacy, most natural mechanisms imply
determinacy for every pair of initial budgets.'
acknowledgement: "This research was supported in part by the Austrian Science Fund
(FWF) under grants S11402-N23 (RiSE/SHiNE), Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award), and M
2369-N33 (Meitner fellowship).\r\n"
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Milad
full_name: Aghajohari, Milad
last_name: Aghajohari
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000-0002-2985-7724
citation:
ama: Aghajohari M, Avni G, Henzinger TA. Determinacy in discrete-bidding infinite-duration
games. Logical Methods in Computer Science. 2021;17(1):10:1-10:23. doi:10.23638/LMCS-17(1:10)2021
apa: Aghajohari, M., Avni, G., & Henzinger, T. A. (2021). Determinacy in discrete-bidding
infinite-duration games. Logical Methods in Computer Science. International
Federation for Computational Logic. https://doi.org/10.23638/LMCS-17(1:10)2021
chicago: Aghajohari, Milad, Guy Avni, and Thomas A Henzinger. “Determinacy in Discrete-Bidding
Infinite-Duration Games.” Logical Methods in Computer Science. International
Federation for Computational Logic, 2021. https://doi.org/10.23638/LMCS-17(1:10)2021.
ieee: M. Aghajohari, G. Avni, and T. A. Henzinger, “Determinacy in discrete-bidding
infinite-duration games,” Logical Methods in Computer Science, vol. 17,
no. 1. International Federation for Computational Logic, p. 10:1-10:23, 2021.
ista: Aghajohari M, Avni G, Henzinger TA. 2021. Determinacy in discrete-bidding
infinite-duration games. Logical Methods in Computer Science. 17(1), 10:1-10:23.
mla: Aghajohari, Milad, et al. “Determinacy in Discrete-Bidding Infinite-Duration
Games.” Logical Methods in Computer Science, vol. 17, no. 1, International
Federation for Computational Logic, 2021, p. 10:1-10:23, doi:10.23638/LMCS-17(1:10)2021.
short: M. Aghajohari, G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, Logical Methods in Computer Science
17 (2021) 10:1-10:23.
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2022-01-25T16:32:13Z
date_published: 2021-02-03T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:25:56Z
day: '03'
ddc:
- '510'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.23638/LMCS-17(1:10)2021
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1905.03588'
isi:
- '000658724600010'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: b35586a50ed1ca8f44767de116d18d81
content_type: application/pdf
creator: alisjak
date_created: 2022-01-26T08:04:50Z
date_updated: 2022-01-26T08:04:50Z
file_id: '10690'
file_name: 2021_LMCS_AGHAJOHAR.pdf
file_size: 819878
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2022-01-26T08:04:50Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 17'
isi: 1
issue: '1'
keyword:
- computer science
- computer science and game theory
- logic in computer science
language:
- iso: eng
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 10:1-10:23
project:
- _id: 264B3912-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
- _id: 25F2ACDE-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11402-N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
publication: Logical Methods in Computer Science
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1860-5974
publication_status: published
publisher: International Federation for Computational Logic
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Determinacy in discrete-bidding infinite-duration games
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 17
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '10694'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In a two-player zero-sum graph game the players move a token throughout a
graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the
game. Traditionally, the players alternate turns in moving the token. In bidding
games, however, the players have budgets, and in each turn, we hold an “auction”
(bidding) to determine which player moves the token: both players simultaneously
submit bids and the higher bidder moves the token. The bidding mechanisms differ
in their payment schemes. Bidding games were largely studied with variants of
first-price bidding in which only the higher bidder pays his bid. We focus on
all-pay bidding, where both players pay their bids. Finite-duration all-pay bidding
games were studied and shown to be technically more challenging than their first-price
counterparts. We study for the first time, infinite-duration all-pay bidding games.
Our most interesting results are for mean-payoff objectives: we portray a complete
picture for games played on strongly-connected graphs. We study both pure (deterministic)
and mixed (probabilistic) strategies and completely characterize the optimal and
almost-sure (with probability 1) payoffs the players can respectively guarantee.
We show that mean-payoff games under all-pay bidding exhibit the intriguing mathematical
properties of their first-price counterparts; namely, an equivalence with random-turn
games in which in each turn, the player who moves is selected according to a (biased)
coin toss. The equivalences for all-pay bidding are more intricate and unexpected
than for first-price bidding.'
acknowledgement: This research was supported in part by the Austrian Science Fund
(FWF) under grant Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award), ERC CoG 863818 (FoRM-SMArt), and
by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the
Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 665385.
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Ismael R
full_name: Jecker, Ismael R
id: 85D7C63E-7D5D-11E9-9C0F-98C4E5697425
last_name: Jecker
- first_name: Dorde
full_name: Zikelic, Dorde
id: 294AA7A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Zikelic
orcid: 0000-0002-4681-1699
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Jecker IR, Zikelic D. Infinite-duration all-pay bidding games. In:
Marx D, ed. Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms.
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics; 2021:617-636. doi:10.1137/1.9781611976465.38'
apa: 'Avni, G., Jecker, I. R., & Zikelic, D. (2021). Infinite-duration all-pay
bidding games. In D. Marx (Ed.), Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium
on Discrete Algorithms (pp. 617–636). Virtual: Society for Industrial and
Applied Mathematics. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611976465.38'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Ismael R Jecker, and Dorde Zikelic. “Infinite-Duration All-Pay
Bidding Games.” In Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
edited by Dániel Marx, 617–36. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics,
2021. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611976465.38.
ieee: G. Avni, I. R. Jecker, and D. Zikelic, “Infinite-duration all-pay bidding
games,” in Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
Virtual, 2021, pp. 617–636.
ista: 'Avni G, Jecker IR, Zikelic D. 2021. Infinite-duration all-pay bidding games.
Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. SODA: Symposium
on Discrete Algorithms, 617–636.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Infinite-Duration All-Pay Bidding Games.” Proceedings
of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, edited by Dániel Marx,
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2021, pp. 617–36, doi:10.1137/1.9781611976465.38.
short: G. Avni, I.R. Jecker, D. Zikelic, in:, D. Marx (Ed.), Proceedings of the
2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics, 2021, pp. 617–636.
conference:
end_date: 2021-01-13
location: Virtual
name: 'SODA: Symposium on Discrete Algorithms'
start_date: 2021-01-10
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2022-01-27T12:11:23Z
date_published: 2021-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:26:15Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: GradSch
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1137/1.9781611976465.38
ec_funded: 1
editor:
- first_name: Dániel
full_name: Marx, Dániel
last_name: Marx
external_id:
arxiv:
- '2005.06636'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06636
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 617-636
project:
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '863818'
name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '665385'
name: International IST Doctoral Program
publication: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-61197-646-5
publication_status: published
publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Infinite-duration all-pay bidding games
type: conference
user_id: 8b945eb4-e2f2-11eb-945a-df72226e66a9
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '9239'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'A graph game proceeds as follows: two players move a token through a graph
to produce a finite or infinite path, which determines the payoff of the game.
We study bidding games in which in each turn, an auction determines which player
moves the token. Bidding games were largely studied in combination with two variants
of first-price auctions called “Richman” and “poorman” bidding. We study taxman
bidding, which span the spectrum between the two. The game is parameterized by
a constant : portion τ of the winning bid is paid to the other player, and portion to
the bank. While finite-duration (reachability) taxman games have been studied
before, we present, for the first time, results on infinite-duration taxman games:
we unify, generalize, and simplify previous equivalences between bidding games
and a class of stochastic games called random-turn games.'
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000-0002-2985-7724
- first_name: Đorđe
full_name: Žikelić, Đorđe
last_name: Žikelić
citation:
ama: Avni G, Henzinger TA, Žikelić Đ. Bidding mechanisms in graph games. Journal
of Computer and System Sciences. 2021;119(8):133-144. doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2021.02.008
apa: Avni, G., Henzinger, T. A., & Žikelić, Đ. (2021). Bidding mechanisms in
graph games. Journal of Computer and System Sciences. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2021.02.008
chicago: Avni, Guy, Thomas A Henzinger, and Đorđe Žikelić. “Bidding Mechanisms in
Graph Games.” Journal of Computer and System Sciences. Elsevier, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2021.02.008.
ieee: G. Avni, T. A. Henzinger, and Đ. Žikelić, “Bidding mechanisms in graph games,”
Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 119, no. 8. Elsevier, pp.
133–144, 2021.
ista: Avni G, Henzinger TA, Žikelić Đ. 2021. Bidding mechanisms in graph games.
Journal of Computer and System Sciences. 119(8), 133–144.
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Bidding Mechanisms in Graph Games.” Journal of Computer
and System Sciences, vol. 119, no. 8, Elsevier, 2021, pp. 133–44, doi:10.1016/j.jcss.2021.02.008.
short: G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, Đ. Žikelić, Journal of Computer and System Sciences
119 (2021) 133–144.
date_created: 2021-03-14T23:01:32Z
date_published: 2021-03-03T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:53:57Z
day: '03'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.1016/j.jcss.2021.02.008
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1905.03835'
isi:
- '000634149800009'
intvolume: ' 119'
isi: 1
issue: '8'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1905.03835
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 133-144
publication: Journal of Computer and System Sciences
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1090-2724
issn:
- 0022-0000
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '6884'
relation: earlier_version
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Bidding mechanisms in graph games
type: journal_article
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 119
year: '2021'
...
---
_id: '8599'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: A graph game is a two-player zero-sum game in which the players move a token
throughout a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or
payoff of the game. In bidding games, both players have budgets, and in each turn,
we hold an "auction" (bidding) to determine which player moves the token. In this
survey, we consider several bidding mechanisms and study their effect on the properties
of the game. Specifically, bidding games, and in particular bidding games of infinite
duration, have an intriguing equivalence with random-turn games in which in each
turn, the player who moves is chosen randomly. We show how minor changes in the
bidding mechanism lead to unexpected differences in the equivalence with random-turn
games.
acknowledgement: We would like to thank all our collaborators Milad Aghajohari, Ventsislav
Chonev, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen, Ismäel Jecker, Petr Novotný, Josef Tkadlec, and Ðorđe
Žikelić; we hope the collaboration was as fun and meaningful for you as it was for
us.
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '2'
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000-0002-2985-7724
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Henzinger TA. A survey of bidding games on graphs. In: 31st International
Conference on Concurrency Theory. Vol 171. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
für Informatik; 2020. doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2020.2'
apa: 'Avni, G., & Henzinger, T. A. (2020). A survey of bidding games on graphs.
In 31st International Conference on Concurrency Theory (Vol. 171). Virtual:
Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2020.2'
chicago: Avni, Guy, and Thomas A Henzinger. “A Survey of Bidding Games on Graphs.”
In 31st International Conference on Concurrency Theory, Vol. 171. Schloss
Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2020. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2020.2.
ieee: G. Avni and T. A. Henzinger, “A survey of bidding games on graphs,” in 31st
International Conference on Concurrency Theory, Virtual, 2020, vol. 171.
ista: 'Avni G, Henzinger TA. 2020. A survey of bidding games on graphs. 31st International
Conference on Concurrency Theory. CONCUR: Conference on Concurrency Theory, LIPIcs,
vol. 171, 2.'
mla: Avni, Guy, and Thomas A. Henzinger. “A Survey of Bidding Games on Graphs.”
31st International Conference on Concurrency Theory, vol. 171, 2, Schloss
Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2020, doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2020.2.
short: G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, in:, 31st International Conference on Concurrency
Theory, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2020.
conference:
end_date: 2020-09-04
location: Virtual
name: 'CONCUR: Conference on Concurrency Theory'
start_date: 2020-09-01
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2020-10-04T22:01:36Z
date_published: 2020-08-06T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:57:09Z
day: '06'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2020.2
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 8f33b098e73724e0ac817f764d8e1a2d
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2020-10-05T14:13:19Z
date_updated: 2020-10-05T14:13:19Z
file_id: '8611'
file_name: 2020_LIPIcsCONCUR_Avni.pdf
file_size: 868510
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2020-10-05T14:13:19Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 171'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
publication: 31st International Conference on Concurrency Theory
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783959771603'
issn:
- 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: A survey of bidding games on graphs
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
short: CC BY (3.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 171
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '9040'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Machine learning and formal methods have complimentary benefits and drawbacks.
In this work, we address the controller-design problem with a combination of techniques
from both fields. The use of black-box neural networks in deep reinforcement learning
(deep RL) poses a challenge for such a combination. Instead of reasoning formally
about the output of deep RL, which we call the wizard, we extract from it a decision-tree
based model, which we refer to as the magic book. Using the extracted model as
an intermediary, we are able to handle problems that are infeasible for either
deep RL or formal methods by themselves. First, we suggest, for the first time,
a synthesis procedure that is based on a magic book. We synthesize a stand-alone
correct-by-design controller that enjoys the favorable performance of RL. Second,
we incorporate a magic book in a bounded model checking (BMC) procedure. BMC allows
us to find numerous traces of the plant under the control of the wizard, which
a user can use to increase the trustworthiness of the wizard and direct further
training.
acknowledgement: This research was supported in part by the Austrian Science Fund
(FWF) under grant Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award).
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Par Alizadeh
full_name: Alamdari, Par Alizadeh
last_name: Alamdari
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000-0002-2985-7724
- first_name: Anna
full_name: Lukina, Anna
id: CBA4D1A8-0FE8-11E9-BDE6-07BFE5697425
last_name: Lukina
citation:
ama: 'Alamdari PA, Avni G, Henzinger TA, Lukina A. Formal methods with a touch of
magic. In: Proceedings of the 20th Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided
Design. TU Wien Academic Press; 2020:138-147. doi:10.34727/2020/isbn.978-3-85448-042-6_21'
apa: 'Alamdari, P. A., Avni, G., Henzinger, T. A., & Lukina, A. (2020). Formal
methods with a touch of magic. In Proceedings of the 20th Conference on Formal
Methods in Computer-Aided Design (pp. 138–147). Online Conference: TU Wien
Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.34727/2020/isbn.978-3-85448-042-6_21'
chicago: Alamdari, Par Alizadeh, Guy Avni, Thomas A Henzinger, and Anna Lukina.
“Formal Methods with a Touch of Magic.” In Proceedings of the 20th Conference
on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design, 138–47. TU Wien Academic Press,
2020. https://doi.org/10.34727/2020/isbn.978-3-85448-042-6_21.
ieee: P. A. Alamdari, G. Avni, T. A. Henzinger, and A. Lukina, “Formal methods with
a touch of magic,” in Proceedings of the 20th Conference on Formal Methods
in Computer-Aided Design, Online Conference, 2020, pp. 138–147.
ista: 'Alamdari PA, Avni G, Henzinger TA, Lukina A. 2020. Formal methods with a
touch of magic. Proceedings of the 20th Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided
Design. FMCAD: Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design, 138–147.'
mla: Alamdari, Par Alizadeh, et al. “Formal Methods with a Touch of Magic.” Proceedings
of the 20th Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design, TU Wien
Academic Press, 2020, pp. 138–47, doi:10.34727/2020/isbn.978-3-85448-042-6_21.
short: P.A. Alamdari, G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, A. Lukina, in:, Proceedings of the
20th Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design, TU Wien Academic Press,
2020, pp. 138–147.
conference:
end_date: 2020-09-24
location: Online Conference
name: 'FMCAD: Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design'
start_date: 2020-09-21
date_created: 2021-01-24T23:01:10Z
date_published: 2020-09-21T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T12:01:32Z
day: '21'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.34727/2020/isbn.978-3-85448-042-6_21
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: d616d549a0ade78606b16f8a9540820f
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2021-02-09T09:39:02Z
date_updated: 2021-02-09T09:39:02Z
file_id: '9109'
file_name: 2020_FMCAD_Alamdari.pdf
file_size: 990999
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2021-02-09T09:39:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 138-147
project:
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
publication: Proceedings of the 20th Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided
Design
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2708-7824
isbn:
- '9783854480426'
publication_status: published
publisher: TU Wien Academic Press
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Formal methods with a touch of magic
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2020'
...
---
OA_place: repository
OA_type: green
_id: '9197'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper we introduce and study all-pay bidding games, a class of two
player, zero-sum games on graphs. The game proceeds as follows. We place a token
on some vertex in the graph and assign budgets to the two players. Each turn,
each player submits a sealed legal bid (non-negative and below their remaining
budget), which is deducted from their budget and the highest bidder moves the
token onto an adjacent vertex. The game ends once a sink is reached, and Player
1 pays Player 2 the outcome that is associated with the sink. The players attempt
to maximize their expected outcome. Our games model settings where effort (of
no inherent value) needs to be invested in an ongoing and stateful manner. On
the negative side, we show that even in simple games on DAGs, optimal strategies
may require a distribution over bids with infinite support. A central quantity
in bidding games is the ratio of the players budgets. On the positive side, we
show a simple FPTAS for DAGs, that, for each budget ratio, outputs an approximation
for the optimal strategy for that ratio. We also implement it, show that it performs
well, and suggests interesting properties of these games. Then, given an outcome
c, we show an algorithm for finding the necessary and sufficient initial ratio
for guaranteeing outcome c with probability 1 and a strategy ensuring such. Finally,
while the general case has not previously been studied, solving the specific game
in which Player 1 wins iff he wins the first two auctions, has been long stated
as an open question, which we solve.
acknowledgement: This research was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under
grants S11402-N23 (RiSE/SHiNE), Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award), and M 2369-N33 (Meitner
fellowship).
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Rasmus
full_name: Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus
id: 3B699956-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Ibsen-Jensen
orcid: 0000-0003-4783-0389
- first_name: Josef
full_name: Tkadlec, Josef
id: 3F24CCC8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Tkadlec
orcid: 0000-0002-1097-9684
citation:
ama: Avni G, Ibsen-Jensen R, Tkadlec J. All-pay bidding games on graphs. Proceedings
of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 2020;34(02):1798-1805.
doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5546
apa: 'Avni, G., Ibsen-Jensen, R., & Tkadlec, J. (2020). All-pay bidding games
on graphs. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
New York, NY, United States: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.
https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5546'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen, and Josef Tkadlec. “All-Pay Bidding Games
on Graphs.” Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5546.
ieee: G. Avni, R. Ibsen-Jensen, and J. Tkadlec, “All-pay bidding games on graphs,”
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 34,
no. 02. Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, pp. 1798–1805,
2020.
ista: Avni G, Ibsen-Jensen R, Tkadlec J. 2020. All-pay bidding games on graphs.
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 34(02), 1798–1805.
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “All-Pay Bidding Games on Graphs.” Proceedings of the
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 34, no. 02, Association for
the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, 2020, pp. 1798–805, doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5546.
short: G. Avni, R. Ibsen-Jensen, J. Tkadlec, Proceedings of the AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence 34 (2020) 1798–1805.
conference:
end_date: 2020-02-12
location: New York, NY, United States
name: 'AAAI: Conference on Artificial Intelligence'
start_date: 2020-02-07
date_created: 2021-02-25T09:05:18Z
date_published: 2020-04-03T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-03T11:44:58Z
day: '03'
department:
- _id: ToHe
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5546
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1911.08360'
intvolume: ' 34'
issue: '02'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08360
month: '04'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 1798-1805
project:
- _id: 25F2ACDE-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11402-N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
- _id: 264B3912-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
publication: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2374-3468
isbn:
- '9781577358350'
issn:
- 2159-5399
publication_status: published
publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: All-pay bidding games on graphs
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 34
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '6761'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In resource allocation games, selfish players share resources that are needed
in order to fulfill their objectives. The cost of using a resource depends on
the load on it. In the traditional setting, the players make their choices concurrently
and in one-shot. That is, a strategy for a player is a subset of the resources.
We introduce and study dynamic resource allocation games. In this setting, the
game proceeds in phases. In each phase each player chooses one resource. A scheduler
dictates the order in which the players proceed in a phase, possibly scheduling
several players to proceed concurrently. The game ends when each player has collected
a set of resources that fulfills his objective. The cost for each player then
depends on this set as well as on the load on the resources in it – we consider
both congestion and cost-sharing games. We argue that the dynamic setting is the
suitable setting for many applications in practice. We study the stability of
dynamic resource allocation games, where the appropriate notion of stability is
that of subgame perfect equilibrium, study the inefficiency incurred due to selfish
behavior, and also study problems that are particular to the dynamic setting,
like constraints on the order in which resources can be chosen or the problem
of finding a scheduler that achieves stability.
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000−0002−2985−7724
- first_name: Orna
full_name: Kupferman, Orna
last_name: Kupferman
citation:
ama: Avni G, Henzinger TA, Kupferman O. Dynamic resource allocation games. Theoretical
Computer Science. 2020;807:42-55. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2019.06.031
apa: Avni, G., Henzinger, T. A., & Kupferman, O. (2020). Dynamic resource allocation
games. Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2019.06.031
chicago: Avni, Guy, Thomas A Henzinger, and Orna Kupferman. “Dynamic Resource Allocation
Games.” Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2019.06.031.
ieee: G. Avni, T. A. Henzinger, and O. Kupferman, “Dynamic resource allocation games,”
Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 807. Elsevier, pp. 42–55, 2020.
ista: Avni G, Henzinger TA, Kupferman O. 2020. Dynamic resource allocation games.
Theoretical Computer Science. 807, 42–55.
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Dynamic Resource Allocation Games.” Theoretical Computer
Science, vol. 807, Elsevier, 2020, pp. 42–55, doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2019.06.031.
short: G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, O. Kupferman, Theoretical Computer Science 807 (2020)
42–55.
date_created: 2019-08-04T21:59:20Z
date_published: 2020-02-06T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-16T09:35:15Z
day: '06'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.1016/j.tcs.2019.06.031
external_id:
isi:
- '000512219400004'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: e86635417f45eb2cd75778f91382f737
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2020-10-09T06:31:22Z
date_updated: 2020-10-09T06:31:22Z
file_id: '8639'
file_name: 2020_TheoreticalCS_Avni.pdf
file_size: 1413001
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2020-10-09T06:31:22Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 807'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 42-55
project:
- _id: 25F2ACDE-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11402-N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
- _id: 264B3912-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
publication: Theoretical Computer Science
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0304-3975
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '1341'
relation: earlier_version
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Dynamic resource allocation games
type: journal_article
user_id: ba8df636-2132-11f1-aed0-ed93e2281fdd
volume: 807
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '6462'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: A controller is a device that interacts with a plant. At each time point,it
reads the plant’s state and issues commands with the goal that the plant oper-ates
optimally. Constructing optimal controllers is a fundamental and challengingproblem.
Machine learning techniques have recently been successfully applied totrain controllers,
yet they have limitations. Learned controllers are monolithic andhard to reason
about. In particular, it is difficult to add features without retraining,to guarantee
any level of performance, and to achieve acceptable performancewhen encountering
untrained scenarios. These limitations can be addressed bydeploying quantitative
run-timeshieldsthat serve as a proxy for the controller.At each time point, the
shield reads the command issued by the controller andmay choose to alter it before
passing it on to the plant. We show how optimalshields that interfere as little
as possible while guaranteeing a desired level ofcontroller performance, can be
generated systematically and automatically usingreactive synthesis. First, we abstract the plant by building a stochastic model.Second,
we consider the learned controller to be a black box. Third, we mea-surecontroller
performanceandshield interferenceby two quantitative run-timemeasures that are
formally defined using weighted automata. Then, the problemof constructing a shield
that guarantees maximal performance with minimal inter-ference is the problem
of finding an optimal strategy in a stochastic2-player game“controller versus
shield” played on the abstract state space of the plant with aquantitative objective
obtained from combining the performance and interferencemeasures. We illustrate
the effectiveness of our approach by automatically con-structing lightweight shields
for learned traffic-light controllers in various roadnetworks. The shields we
generate avoid liveness bugs, improve controller per-formance in untrained and
changing traffic situations, and add features to learnedcontrollers, such as giving
priority to emergency vehicles.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Roderick
full_name: Bloem, Roderick
last_name: Bloem
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000−0002−2985−7724
- first_name: Bettina
full_name: Konighofer, Bettina
last_name: Konighofer
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Pranger, Stefan
last_name: Pranger
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Bloem R, Chatterjee K, Henzinger TA, Konighofer B, Pranger S. Run-time
optimization for learned controllers through quantitative games. In: 31st International
Conference on Computer-Aided Verification. Vol 11561. Springer; 2019:630-649.
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25540-4_36'
apa: 'Avni, G., Bloem, R., Chatterjee, K., Henzinger, T. A., Konighofer, B., &
Pranger, S. (2019). Run-time optimization for learned controllers through quantitative
games. In 31st International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification
(Vol. 11561, pp. 630–649). New York, NY, United States: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25540-4_36'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Roderick Bloem, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Thomas A Henzinger, Bettina
Konighofer, and Stefan Pranger. “Run-Time Optimization for Learned Controllers
through Quantitative Games.” In 31st International Conference on Computer-Aided
Verification, 11561:630–49. Springer, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25540-4_36.
ieee: G. Avni, R. Bloem, K. Chatterjee, T. A. Henzinger, B. Konighofer, and S. Pranger,
“Run-time optimization for learned controllers through quantitative games,” in
31st International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification, New York,
NY, United States, 2019, vol. 11561, pp. 630–649.
ista: 'Avni G, Bloem R, Chatterjee K, Henzinger TA, Konighofer B, Pranger S. 2019.
Run-time optimization for learned controllers through quantitative games. 31st
International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification. CAV: Computer Aided Verification,
LNCS, vol. 11561, 630–649.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Run-Time Optimization for Learned Controllers through Quantitative
Games.” 31st International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification, vol.
11561, Springer, 2019, pp. 630–49, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25540-4_36.
short: G. Avni, R. Bloem, K. Chatterjee, T.A. Henzinger, B. Konighofer, S. Pranger,
in:, 31st International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification, Springer, 2019,
pp. 630–649.
conference:
end_date: 2019-07-18
location: New York, NY, United States
name: 'CAV: Computer Aided Verification'
start_date: 2019-07-13
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2019-05-16T11:22:30Z
date_published: 2019-07-12T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:26:05Z
day: '12'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-25540-4_36
external_id:
isi:
- '000491468000036'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: c231579f2485c6fd4df17c9443a4d80b
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2019-08-14T09:35:24Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:31Z
file_id: '6816'
file_name: 2019_CAV_Avni.pdf
file_size: 659766
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 11561'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 630-649
project:
- _id: 264B3912-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
publication: 31st International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783030255398'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Run-time optimization for learned controllers through quantitative games
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8
volume: 11561
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '6752'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Two-player games on graphs are widely studied in formal methods, as they
model the interaction between a system and its environment. The game is played
by moving a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path. There are several
common modes to determine how the players move the token through the graph; e.g.,
in turn-based games the players alternate turns in moving the token. We study
the bidding mode of moving the token, which, to the best of our knowledge, has
never been studied in infinite-duration games. The following bidding rule was
previously defined and called Richman bidding. Both players have separate budgets,
which sum up to 1. In each turn, a bidding takes place: Both players submit bids
simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed the available budget,
and the higher bidder pays his bid to the other player and moves the token. The
central question studied in bidding games is a necessary and sufficient initial
budget for winning the game: a threshold budget in a vertex is a value t ∈ [0,
1] such that if Player 1’s budget exceeds t, he can win the game; and if Player
2’s budget exceeds 1 − t, he can win the game. Threshold budgets were previously
shown to exist in every vertex of a reachability game, which have an interesting
connection with random-turn games—a sub-class of simple stochastic games in which
the player who moves is chosen randomly. We show the existence of threshold budgets
for a qualitative class of infinite-duration games, namely parity games, and a
quantitative class, namely mean-payoff games. The key component of the proof is
a quantitative solution to strongly connected mean-payoff bidding games in which
we extend the connection with random-turn games to these games, and construct
explicit optimal strategies for both players.'
article_number: '31'
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000−0002−2985−7724
- first_name: Ventsislav K
full_name: Chonev, Ventsislav K
id: 36CBE2E6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chonev
citation:
ama: Avni G, Henzinger TA, Chonev VK. Infinite-duration bidding games. Journal
of the ACM. 2019;66(4). doi:10.1145/3340295
apa: Avni, G., Henzinger, T. A., & Chonev, V. K. (2019). Infinite-duration bidding
games. Journal of the ACM. ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3340295
chicago: Avni, Guy, Thomas A Henzinger, and Ventsislav K Chonev. “Infinite-Duration
Bidding Games.” Journal of the ACM. ACM, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3340295.
ieee: G. Avni, T. A. Henzinger, and V. K. Chonev, “Infinite-duration bidding games,”
Journal of the ACM, vol. 66, no. 4. ACM, 2019.
ista: Avni G, Henzinger TA, Chonev VK. 2019. Infinite-duration bidding games. Journal
of the ACM. 66(4), 31.
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Infinite-Duration Bidding Games.” Journal of the ACM,
vol. 66, no. 4, 31, ACM, 2019, doi:10.1145/3340295.
short: G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, V.K. Chonev, Journal of the ACM 66 (2019).
date_created: 2019-08-04T21:59:16Z
date_published: 2019-07-16T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:53:47Z
day: '16'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.1145/3340295
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1705.01433'
isi:
- '000487714900008'
intvolume: ' 66'
isi: 1
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.01433
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
project:
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
- _id: 25F2ACDE-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11402-N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
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call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
publication: Journal of the ACM
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1557-735X
issn:
- 0004-5411
publication_status: published
publisher: ACM
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '950'
relation: earlier_version
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Infinite-duration bidding games
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 66
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '6822'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to
produce an infinite path, which determines the qualitative winner or quantitative
payoff of the game. In bidding games, in each turn, we hold an auction between
the two players to determine which player moves the token. Bidding games have
largely been studied with concrete bidding mechanisms that are variants of a first-price
auction: in each turn both players simultaneously submit bids, the higher\r\nbidder
moves the token, and pays his bid to the lower bidder in Richman bidding, to the
bank in poorman bidding, and in taxman bidding, the bid is split between the other
player and the bank according to a predefined constant factor. Bidding games are
deterministic games. They have an intriguing connection with a fragment of stochastic
games called \r\n randomturn games. We study, for the first time, a combination
of bidding games with probabilistic behavior; namely, we study bidding games that
are played on Markov decision processes, where the players bid for the right to
choose the next action, which determines the probability distribution according
to which the next vertex is chosen. We study parity and meanpayoff bidding games
on MDPs and extend results from the deterministic bidding setting to the probabilistic
one."
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000−0002−2985−7724
- first_name: Rasmus
full_name: Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus
id: 3B699956-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Ibsen-Jensen
orcid: 0000-0003-4783-0389
- first_name: Petr
full_name: Novotny, Petr
last_name: Novotny
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Henzinger TA, Ibsen-Jensen R, Novotny P. Bidding games on Markov decision
processes. In: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference of Reachability
Problems. Vol 11674. Springer; 2019:1-12. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30806-3_1'
apa: 'Avni, G., Henzinger, T. A., Ibsen-Jensen, R., & Novotny, P. (2019). Bidding
games on Markov decision processes. In Proceedings of the 13th International
Conference of Reachability Problems (Vol. 11674, pp. 1–12). Brussels, Belgium:
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30806-3_1'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Thomas A Henzinger, Rasmus Ibsen-Jensen, and Petr Novotny. “Bidding
Games on Markov Decision Processes.” In Proceedings of the 13th International
Conference of Reachability Problems, 11674:1–12. Springer, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30806-3_1.
ieee: G. Avni, T. A. Henzinger, R. Ibsen-Jensen, and P. Novotny, “Bidding games
on Markov decision processes,” in Proceedings of the 13th International Conference
of Reachability Problems, Brussels, Belgium, 2019, vol. 11674, pp. 1–12.
ista: 'Avni G, Henzinger TA, Ibsen-Jensen R, Novotny P. 2019. Bidding games on Markov
decision processes. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference of Reachability
Problems. RP: Reachability Problems, LNCS, vol. 11674, 1–12.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “Bidding Games on Markov Decision Processes.” Proceedings
of the 13th International Conference of Reachability Problems, vol. 11674,
Springer, 2019, pp. 1–12, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30806-3_1.
short: G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, R. Ibsen-Jensen, P. Novotny, in:, Proceedings of
the 13th International Conference of Reachability Problems, Springer, 2019, pp.
1–12.
conference:
end_date: 2019-09-13
location: Brussels, Belgium
name: 'RP: Reachability Problems'
start_date: 2019-09-11
date_created: 2019-08-19T07:58:10Z
date_published: 2019-09-06T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-10T10:39:56Z
day: '06'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-30806-3_1
external_id:
isi:
- '001333747500001'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 45ebbc709af2b247d28c7c293c01504b
content_type: application/pdf
creator: gavni
date_created: 2019-08-19T07:56:40Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:41Z
file_id: '6823'
file_name: prob.pdf
file_size: 436635
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:41Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 11674'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 1-12
project:
- _id: 264B3912-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
- _id: 25F2ACDE-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11402-N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
publication: ' Proceedings of the 13th International Conference of Reachability Problems'
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-303030805-6
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Bidding games on Markov decision processes
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 11674
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '6884'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to
produce a finite or infinite path, which determines the qualitative winner or
quantitative payoff of the game. We study bidding games in which the players bid
for the right to move the token. Several bidding rules were studied previously.
In Richman bidding, in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and
the higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Poorman bidding is
similar except that the winner of the bidding pays the "bank" rather than the
other player. Taxman bidding spans the spectrum between Richman and poorman bidding.
They are parameterized by a constant tau in [0,1]: portion tau of the winning
bid is paid to the other player, and portion 1-tau to the bank. While finite-duration
(reachability) taxman games have been studied before, we present, for the first
time, results on infinite-duration taxman games. It was previously shown that
both Richman and poorman infinite-duration games with qualitative objectives reduce
to reachability games, and we show a similar result here. Our most interesting
results concern quantitative taxman games, namely mean-payoff games, where poorman
and Richman bidding differ significantly. A central quantity in these games is
the ratio between the two players'' initial budgets. While in poorman mean-payoff
games, the optimal payoff of a player depends on the initial ratio, in Richman
bidding, the payoff depends only on the structure of the game. In both games the
optimal payoffs can be found using (different) probabilistic connections with
random-turn games in which in each turn, instead of bidding, a coin is tossed
to determine which player moves. While the value with Richman bidding equals the
value of a random-turn game with an un-biased coin, with poorman bidding, the
bias in the coin is the initial ratio of the budgets. We give a complete classification
of mean-payoff taxman games that is based on a probabilistic connection: the value
of a taxman bidding game with parameter tau and initial ratio r, equals the value
of a random-turn game that uses a coin with bias F(tau, r) = (r+tau * (1-r))/(1+tau).
Thus, we show that Richman bidding is the exception; namely, for every tau <1,
the value of the game depends on the initial ratio. Our proof technique simplifies
and unifies the previous proof techniques for both Richman and poorman bidding. '
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '11'
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000−0002−2985−7724
- first_name: Dorde
full_name: Zikelic, Dorde
id: 294AA7A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Zikelic
orcid: 0000-0002-4681-1699
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Henzinger TA, Zikelic D. Bidding mechanisms in graph games. In: Vol
138. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2019. doi:10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2019.11'
apa: 'Avni, G., Henzinger, T. A., & Zikelic, D. (2019). Bidding mechanisms in
graph games (Vol. 138). Presented at the MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer
Science, Aachen, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2019.11'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Thomas A Henzinger, and Dorde Zikelic. “Bidding Mechanisms in
Graph Games,” Vol. 138. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2019.11.
ieee: 'G. Avni, T. A. Henzinger, and D. Zikelic, “Bidding mechanisms in graph games,”
presented at the MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, Aachen, Germany,
2019, vol. 138.'
ista: 'Avni G, Henzinger TA, Zikelic D. 2019. Bidding mechanisms in graph games.
MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, LIPIcs, vol. 138, 11.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. Bidding Mechanisms in Graph Games. Vol. 138, 11, Schloss
Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2019, doi:10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2019.11.
short: G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, D. Zikelic, in:, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
für Informatik, 2019.
conference:
end_date: 2019-08-30
location: Aachen, Germany
name: 'MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science'
start_date: 2019-08-26
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2019-09-18T08:04:26Z
date_published: 2019-08-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:53:57Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: ToHe
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2019.11
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1905.03835'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 6346e116a4f4ed1414174d96d2c4fbd7
content_type: application/pdf
creator: kschuh
date_created: 2019-09-27T11:45:15Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:42Z
file_id: '6913'
file_name: 2019_LIPIcs_Avni.pdf
file_size: 554457
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 138'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: H2020
grant_number: '665385'
name: International IST Doctoral Program
- _id: 264B3912-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
- _id: 25F2ACDE-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11402-N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '9239'
relation: later_version
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Bidding mechanisms in graph games
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 138
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '6886'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to
produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games
are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a non-terminating
system and its environment. In bidding games the players bid for the right to
move the token: in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, and the
higher bidder moves the token and pays the other player. Bidding games are known
to have a clean and elegant mathematical structure that relies on the ability
of the players to submit arbitrarily small bids. Many applications, however, require
a fixed granularity for the bids, which can represent, for example, the monetary
value expressed in cents. We study, for the first time, the combination of discrete-bidding
and infinite-duration games. Our most important result proves that these games
form a large determined subclass of concurrent games, where determinacy is the
strong property that there always exists exactly one player who can guarantee
winning the game. In particular, we show that, in contrast to non-discrete bidding
games, the mechanism with which tied bids are resolved plays an important role
in discrete-bidding games. We study several natural tie-breaking mechanisms and
show that, while some do not admit determinacy, most natural mechanisms imply
determinacy for every pair of initial budgets. '
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '20'
article_processing_charge: No
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Milad
full_name: Aghajohari, Milad
last_name: Aghajohari
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Thomas A
full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Henzinger
orcid: 0000−0002−2985−7724
citation:
ama: 'Aghajohari M, Avni G, Henzinger TA. Determinacy in discrete-bidding infinite-duration
games. In: Vol 140. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2019. doi:10.4230/LIPICS.CONCUR.2019.20'
apa: 'Aghajohari, M., Avni, G., & Henzinger, T. A. (2019). Determinacy in discrete-bidding
infinite-duration games (Vol. 140). Presented at the CONCUR: Conference on Concurrency
Theory, Amsterdam, Netherlands: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik.
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.CONCUR.2019.20'
chicago: Aghajohari, Milad, Guy Avni, and Thomas A Henzinger. “Determinacy in Discrete-Bidding
Infinite-Duration Games,” Vol. 140. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik,
2019. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.CONCUR.2019.20.
ieee: 'M. Aghajohari, G. Avni, and T. A. Henzinger, “Determinacy in discrete-bidding
infinite-duration games,” presented at the CONCUR: Conference on Concurrency Theory,
Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2019, vol. 140.'
ista: 'Aghajohari M, Avni G, Henzinger TA. 2019. Determinacy in discrete-bidding
infinite-duration games. CONCUR: Conference on Concurrency Theory, LIPIcs, vol.
140, 20.'
mla: Aghajohari, Milad, et al. Determinacy in Discrete-Bidding Infinite-Duration
Games. Vol. 140, 20, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2019,
doi:10.4230/LIPICS.CONCUR.2019.20.
short: M. Aghajohari, G. Avni, T.A. Henzinger, in:, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
für Informatik, 2019.
conference:
end_date: 2019-08-30
location: Amsterdam, Netherlands
name: 'CONCUR: Conference on Concurrency Theory'
start_date: 2019-08-27
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2019-09-18T08:06:58Z
date_published: 2019-08-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:53:58Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.4230/LIPICS.CONCUR.2019.20
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1905.03588'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 4df6d3575c506edb17215adada03cc8e
content_type: application/pdf
creator: kschuh
date_created: 2019-09-27T12:21:38Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:43Z
file_id: '6915'
file_name: 2019_LIPIcs_Aghajohari.pdf
file_size: 741425
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:47:43Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 140'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 25F2ACDE-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11402-N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 264B3912-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Determinacy in discrete-bidding infinite-duration games
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0)
short: CC BY (3.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 140
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '6005'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems.
In the classicalmodel, each player selects a path connecting her source and target
vertices. The cost of traversingan edge depends on theload; namely, number of
players that traverse it. Thus, it abstracts the factthat different users may
use a resource at different times and for different durations, which playsan important
role in determining the costs of the users in reality. For example, when transmittingpackets
in a communication network, routing traffic in a road network, or processing a
task in aproduction system, actual sharing and congestion of resources crucially
depends on time.In [13], we introducedtimed network games, which add a time component
to network games.Each vertexvin the network is associated with a cost function,
mapping the load onvto theprice that a player pays for staying invfor one time
unit with this load. Each edge in thenetwork is guarded by the time intervals
in which it can be traversed, which forces the players tospend time in the vertices.
In this work we significantly extend the way time can be referred toin timed network
games. In the model we study, the network is equipped withclocks, and, as intimed
automata, edges are guarded by constraints on the values of the clocks, and their
traversalmay involve a reset of some clocks. We argue that the stronger model
captures many realisticnetworks. The addition of clocks breaks the techniques
we developed in [13] and we developnew techniques in order to show that positive
results on classic network games carry over to thestronger timed setting.
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '23'
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Shibashis
full_name: Guha, Shibashis
last_name: Guha
- first_name: Orna
full_name: Kupferman, Orna
last_name: Kupferman
citation:
ama: 'Avni G, Guha S, Kupferman O. Timed network games with clocks. In: Vol 117.
Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2018. doi:10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2018.23'
apa: 'Avni, G., Guha, S., & Kupferman, O. (2018). Timed network games with clocks
(Vol. 117). Presented at the MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science,
Liverpool, United Kingdom: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik.
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2018.23'
chicago: Avni, Guy, Shibashis Guha, and Orna Kupferman. “Timed Network Games with
Clocks,” Vol. 117. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2018.23.
ieee: 'G. Avni, S. Guha, and O. Kupferman, “Timed network games with clocks,” presented
at the MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, Liverpool, United Kingdom,
2018, vol. 117.'
ista: 'Avni G, Guha S, Kupferman O. 2018. Timed network games with clocks. MFCS:
Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, LIPIcs, vol. 117, 23.'
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. Timed Network Games with Clocks. Vol. 117, 23, Schloss
Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2018, doi:10.4230/LIPICS.MFCS.2018.23.
short: G. Avni, S. Guha, O. Kupferman, in:, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für
Informatik, 2018.
conference:
end_date: 2018-08-31
location: Liverpool, United Kingdom
name: 'MFCS: Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science'
start_date: 2018-08-27
date_created: 2019-02-14T14:12:09Z
date_published: 2018-08-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T12:01:59Z
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call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
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call_identifier: FWF
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name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
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publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
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title: Timed network games with clocks
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...
---
_id: '6006'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Network games (NGs) are played on directed graphs and are extensively used
in network design and analysis. Search problems for NGs include finding special
strategy profiles such as a Nash equilibrium and a globally-optimal solution.
The networks modeled by NGs may be huge. In formal verification, abstraction has
proven to be an extremely effective technique for reasoning about systems with
big and even infinite state spaces. We describe an abstraction-refinement methodology
for reasoning about NGs. Our methodology is based on an abstraction function that
maps the state space of an NG to a much smaller state space. We search for a global
optimum and a Nash equilibrium by reasoning on an under- and an over-approximation
defined on top of this smaller state space. When the approximations are too coarse
to find such profiles, we refine the abstraction function. We extend the abstraction-refinement
methodology to labeled networks, where the objectives of the players are regular
languages. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the methodology. '
article_number: '39'
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Shibashis
full_name: Guha, Shibashis
last_name: Guha
- first_name: Orna
full_name: Kupferman, Orna
last_name: Kupferman
citation:
ama: Avni G, Guha S, Kupferman O. An abstraction-refinement methodology for reasoning
about network games. Games. 2018;9(3). doi:10.3390/g9030039
apa: Avni, G., Guha, S., & Kupferman, O. (2018). An abstraction-refinement methodology
for reasoning about network games. Games. MDPI. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030039
chicago: Avni, Guy, Shibashis Guha, and Orna Kupferman. “An Abstraction-Refinement
Methodology for Reasoning about Network Games.” Games. MDPI, 2018. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030039.
ieee: G. Avni, S. Guha, and O. Kupferman, “An abstraction-refinement methodology
for reasoning about network games,” Games, vol. 9, no. 3. MDPI, 2018.
ista: Avni G, Guha S, Kupferman O. 2018. An abstraction-refinement methodology for
reasoning about network games. Games. 9(3), 39.
mla: Avni, Guy, et al. “An Abstraction-Refinement Methodology for Reasoning about
Network Games.” Games, vol. 9, no. 3, 39, MDPI, 2018, doi:10.3390/g9030039.
short: G. Avni, S. Guha, O. Kupferman, Games 9 (2018).
date_created: 2019-02-14T14:17:54Z
date_published: 2018-09-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:49:38Z
day: '01'
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doi: 10.3390/g9030039
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issue: '3'
language:
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month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
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grant_number: M02369
name: Formal Methods meets Algorithmic Game Theory
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call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
publication: Games
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2073-4336
publication_status: published
publisher: MDPI
quality_controlled: '1'
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title: An abstraction-refinement methodology for reasoning about network games
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
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type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 9
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '608'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Synthesis is the automated construction of a system from its specification.
In real life, hardware and software systems are rarely constructed from scratch.
Rather, a system is typically constructed from a library of components. Lustig
and Vardi formalized this intuition and studied LTL synthesis from component libraries.
In real life, designers seek optimal systems. In this paper we add optimality
considerations to the setting. We distinguish between quality considerations (for
example, size - the smaller a system is, the better it is), and pricing (for example,
the payment to the company who manufactured the component). We study the problem
of designing systems with minimal quality-cost and price. A key point is that
while the quality cost is individual - the choices of a designer are independent
of choices made by other designers that use the same library, pricing gives rise
to a resource-allocation game - designers that use the same component share its
price, with the share being proportional to the number of uses (a component can
be used several times in a design). We study both closed and open settings, and
in both we solve the problem of finding an optimal design. In a setting with multiple
designers, we also study the game-theoretic problems of the induced resource-allocation
game.
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Guy
full_name: Avni, Guy
id: 463C8BC2-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Avni
orcid: 0000-0001-5588-8287
- first_name: Orna
full_name: Kupferman, Orna
last_name: Kupferman
citation:
ama: Avni G, Kupferman O. Synthesis from component libraries with costs. Theoretical
Computer Science. 2018;712:50-72. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2017.11.001
apa: Avni, G., & Kupferman, O. (2018). Synthesis from component libraries with
costs. Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2017.11.001
chicago: Avni, Guy, and Orna Kupferman. “Synthesis from Component Libraries with
Costs.” Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2017.11.001.
ieee: G. Avni and O. Kupferman, “Synthesis from component libraries with costs,”
Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 712. Elsevier, pp. 50–72, 2018.
ista: Avni G, Kupferman O. 2018. Synthesis from component libraries with costs.
Theoretical Computer Science. 712, 50–72.
mla: Avni, Guy, and Orna Kupferman. “Synthesis from Component Libraries with Costs.”
Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 712, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 50–72, doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2017.11.001.
short: G. Avni, O. Kupferman, Theoretical Computer Science 712 (2018) 50–72.
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:47:28Z
date_published: 2018-02-15T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:26:02Z
day: '15'
department:
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.1016/j.tcs.2017.11.001
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000424959200003'
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isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
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url: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.636.4529
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 50 - 72
project:
- _id: 25EE3708-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '267989'
name: Quantitative Reactive Modeling
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: Z211
name: Formal methods for the design and analysis of complex systems
publication: Theoretical Computer Science
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
publist_id: '7197'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Synthesis from component libraries with costs
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 712
year: '2018'
...