@article{19074, abstract = {The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation in groups. In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions towards a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods games among asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry allows for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment each round. However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals make the same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose contributions along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next. We do so for three different models – one without any budget constraints, one with endowment constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current endowment to be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities: the welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the model with savings.}, author = {Hübner, Valentin and Hilbe, Christian and Staab, Manuel and Kleshnina, Maria and Chatterjee, Krishnendu}, issn = {2153-0793}, journal = {Dynamic Games and Applications}, pages = {1617--1645}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games}}, doi = {10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5}, volume = {15}, year = {2025}, } @article{12706, abstract = {Allometric settings of population dynamics models are appealing due to their parsimonious nature and broad utility when studying system level effects. Here, we parameterise the size-scaled Rosenzweig-MacArthur differential equations to eliminate prey-mass dependency, facilitating an in depth analytic study of the equations which incorporates scaling parameters’ contributions to coexistence. We define the functional response term to match empirical findings, and examine situations where metabolic theory derivations and observation diverge. The dynamical properties of the Rosenzweig-MacArthur system, encompassing the distribution of size-abundance equilibria, the scaling of period and amplitude of population cycling, and relationships between predator and prey abundances, are consistent with empirical observation. Our parameterisation is an accurate minimal model across 15+ orders of mass magnitude.}, author = {Mckerral, Jody C. and Kleshnina, Maria and Ejov, Vladimir and Bartle, Louise and Mitchell, James G. and Filar, Jerzy A.}, issn = {1932-6203}, journal = {PLoS One}, number = {2}, pages = {e0279838}, publisher = {Public Library of Science}, title = {{Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations}}, doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0279838}, volume = {18}, year = {2023}, } @article{13258, abstract = {Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation.}, author = {Kleshnina, Maria and Hilbe, Christian and Simsa, Stepan and Chatterjee, Krishnendu and Nowak, Martin A.}, issn = {2041-1723}, journal = {Nature Communications}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games}}, doi = {10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9}, volume = {14}, year = {2023}, } @misc{13336, author = {Kleshnina, Maria}, publisher = {Zenodo}, title = {{kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games}}, doi = {10.5281/ZENODO.8059564}, year = {2023}, } @article{10770, abstract = {Mathematical models often aim to describe a complicated mechanism in a cohesive and simple manner. However, reaching perfect balance between being simple enough or overly simplistic is a challenging task. Frequently, game-theoretic models have an underlying assumption that players, whenever they choose to execute a specific action, do so perfectly. In fact, it is rare that action execution perfectly coincides with intentions of individuals, giving rise to behavioural mistakes. The concept of incompetence of players was suggested to address this issue in game-theoretic settings. Under the assumption of incompetence, players have non-zero probabilities of executing a different strategy from the one they chose, leading to stochastic outcomes of the interactions. In this article, we survey results related to the concept of incompetence in classic as well as evolutionary game theory and provide several new results. We also suggest future extensions of the model and argue why it is important to take into account behavioural mistakes when analysing interactions among players in both economic and biological settings.}, author = {Graham, Thomas and Kleshnina, Maria and Filar, Jerzy A.}, issn = {2153-0793}, journal = {Dynamic Games and Applications}, pages = {231--264}, publisher = {Springer Nature}, title = {{Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players}}, doi = {10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3}, volume = {13}, year = {2023}, } @article{9381, abstract = {A game of rock-paper-scissors is an interesting example of an interaction where none of the pure strategies strictly dominates all others, leading to a cyclic pattern. In this work, we consider an unstable version of rock-paper-scissors dynamics and allow individuals to make behavioural mistakes during the strategy execution. We show that such an assumption can break a cyclic relationship leading to a stable equilibrium emerging with only one strategy surviving. We consider two cases: completely random mistakes when individuals have no bias towards any strategy and a general form of mistakes. Then, we determine conditions for a strategy to dominate all other strategies. However, given that individuals who adopt a dominating strategy are still prone to behavioural mistakes in the observed behaviour, we may still observe extinct strategies. That is, behavioural mistakes in strategy execution stabilise evolutionary dynamics leading to an evolutionary stable and, potentially, mixed co-existence equilibrium.}, author = {Kleshnina, Maria and Streipert, Sabrina S. and Filar, Jerzy A. and Chatterjee, Krishnendu}, issn = {1553-7358}, journal = {PLoS Computational Biology}, number = {4}, publisher = {Public Library of Science}, title = {{Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games}}, doi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523}, volume = {17}, year = {2021}, } @article{8789, abstract = {Cooperation is a ubiquitous and beneficial behavioural trait despite being prone to exploitation by free-riders. Hence, cooperative populations are prone to invasions by selfish individuals. However, a population consisting of only free-riders typically does not survive. Thus, cooperators and free-riders often coexist in some proportion. An evolutionary version of a Snowdrift Game proved its efficiency in analysing this phenomenon. However, what if the system has already reached its stable state but was perturbed due to a change in environmental conditions? Then, individuals may have to re-learn their effective strategies. To address this, we consider behavioural mistakes in strategic choice execution, which we refer to as incompetence. Parametrising the propensity to make such mistakes allows for a mathematical description of learning. We compare strategies based on their relative strategic advantage relying on both fitness and learning factors. When strategies are learned at distinct rates, allowing learning according to a prescribed order is optimal. Interestingly, the strategy with the lowest strategic advantage should be learnt first if we are to optimise fitness over the learning path. Then, the differences between strategies are balanced out in order to minimise the effect of behavioural uncertainty.}, author = {Kleshnina, Maria and Streipert, Sabrina and Filar, Jerzy and Chatterjee, Krishnendu}, issn = {2227-7390}, journal = {Mathematics}, number = {11}, publisher = {MDPI}, title = {{Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games}}, doi = {10.3390/math8111945}, volume = {8}, year = {2020}, }