[{"article_type":"original","date_published":"2025-11-01T00:00:00Z","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"scopus_import":"1","has_accepted_license":"1","file":[{"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2025-12-30T08:01:35Z","content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":1126178,"date_created":"2025-12-30T08:01:35Z","access_level":"open_access","creator":"dernst","file_name":"2025_DynGamesAppl_Huebner.pdf","checksum":"de0a412cbb7d98bf5e6a551c26acbefa","success":1,"file_id":"20888"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2153-0785"],"eissn":["2153-0793"]},"citation":{"short":"V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, K. Chatterjee, Dynamic Games and Applications 15 (2025) 1617–1645.","ista":"Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. 2025. Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications. 15, 1617–1645.","mla":"Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.” <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>, vol. 15, Springer Nature, 2025, pp. 1617–45, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5\">10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5</a>.","chicago":"Hübner, Valentin, Christian Hilbe, Manuel Staab, Maria Kleshnina, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.” <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>. Springer Nature, 2025. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5</a>.","ama":"Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>. 2025;15:1617-1645. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5\">10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5</a>","ieee":"V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, and K. Chatterjee, “Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games,” <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>, vol. 15. Springer Nature, pp. 1617–1645, 2025.","apa":"Hübner, V., Hilbe, C., Staab, M., Kleshnina, M., &#38; Chatterjee, K. (2025). Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>. Springer Nature. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5</a>"},"doi":"10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5","intvolume":"        15","day":"01","type":"journal_article","fulldoi":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5","publication_status":"published","project":[{"name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications","_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","grant_number":"863818","call_identifier":"H2020"},{"_id":"260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","name":"ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships","call_identifier":"H2020","grant_number":"754411"}],"OA_type":"hybrid","_id":"19074","month":"11","oa":1,"quality_controlled":"1","acknowledgement":"This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010), and ARC SRIEAS Grant SR200100005 Securing Antarctica’s Environmental Future (to M.K.). Open access funding provided by Institute of Science and Technology (IST Austria).","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation in groups. In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions towards a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods games among asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry allows for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment each round. However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals make the same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose contributions along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next. We do so for three different models – one without any budget constraints, one with endowment constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current endowment to be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities: the welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the model with savings."}],"publication":"Dynamic Games and Applications","corr_author":"1","author":[{"orcid":"0009-0001-5009-4987","id":"2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910","full_name":"Hübner, Valentin","last_name":"Hübner","first_name":"Valentin"},{"first_name":"Christian","id":"2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Hilbe, Christian","last_name":"Hilbe","orcid":"0000-0001-5116-955X"},{"first_name":"Manuel","full_name":"Staab, Manuel","last_name":"Staab"},{"orcid":"0000-0002-5518-8317","first_name":"Maria","id":"4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Kleshnina, Maria","last_name":"Kleshnina"},{"id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Chatterjee","full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","first_name":"Krishnendu","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X"}],"status":"public","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","year":"2025","isi":1,"volume":15,"date_updated":"2026-09-16T06:58:23Z","PlanS_conform":"1","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"page":"1617-1645","external_id":{"isi":["001415587800001"]},"file_date_updated":"2025-12-30T08:01:35Z","ec_funded":1,"oa_version":"Published Version","tmp":{"image":"/images/cc_by.png","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"ddc":["000"],"title":"Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games","article_processing_charge":"Yes (via OA deal)","publisher":"Springer Nature","related_material":{"record":[{"relation":"dissertation_contains","status":"public","id":"19903"}]},"OA_place":"publisher","date_created":"2025-02-23T23:01:57Z"},{"has_accepted_license":"1","file":[{"checksum":"798ed5739a4117b03173e5d56e0534c9","file_name":"2023_PLOSOne_Mckerral.pdf","file_id":"12712","success":1,"file_size":1257003,"content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2023-03-07T10:26:45Z","relation":"main_file","access_level":"open_access","creator":"cchlebak","date_created":"2023-03-07T10:26:45Z"}],"scopus_import":"1","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1932-6203"]},"doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0279838","citation":{"ieee":"J. C. Mckerral, M. Kleshnina, V. Ejov, L. Bartle, J. G. Mitchell, and J. A. Filar, “Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations,” <i>PLoS One</i>, vol. 18, no. 2. Public Library of Science, p. e0279838, 2023.","apa":"Mckerral, J. C., Kleshnina, M., Ejov, V., Bartle, L., Mitchell, J. G., &#38; Filar, J. A. (2023). Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations. <i>PLoS One</i>. Public Library of Science. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838</a>","ama":"Mckerral JC, Kleshnina M, Ejov V, Bartle L, Mitchell JG, Filar JA. Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations. <i>PLoS One</i>. 2023;18(2):e0279838. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838\">10.1371/journal.pone.0279838</a>","mla":"Mckerral, Jody C., et al. “Empirical Parameterisation and Dynamical Analysis of the Allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur Equations.” <i>PLoS One</i>, vol. 18, no. 2, Public Library of Science, 2023, p. e0279838, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838\">10.1371/journal.pone.0279838</a>.","chicago":"Mckerral, Jody C., Maria Kleshnina, Vladimir Ejov, Louise Bartle, James G. Mitchell, and Jerzy A. Filar. “Empirical Parameterisation and Dynamical Analysis of the Allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur Equations.” <i>PLoS One</i>. Public Library of Science, 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838</a>.","ista":"Mckerral JC, Kleshnina M, Ejov V, Bartle L, Mitchell JG, Filar JA. 2023. Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations. PLoS One. 18(2), e0279838.","short":"J.C. Mckerral, M. Kleshnina, V. Ejov, L. Bartle, J.G. Mitchell, J.A. Filar, PLoS One 18 (2023) e0279838."},"date_published":"2023-02-27T00:00:00Z","article_type":"original","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"day":"27","intvolume":"        18","publication_status":"published","fulldoi":"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0279838","type":"journal_article","_id":"12706","oa":1,"month":"02","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Allometric settings of population dynamics models are appealing due to their parsimonious nature and broad utility when studying system level effects. Here, we parameterise the size-scaled Rosenzweig-MacArthur differential equations to eliminate prey-mass dependency, facilitating an in depth analytic study of the equations which incorporates scaling parameters’ contributions to coexistence. We define the functional response term to match empirical findings, and examine situations where metabolic theory derivations and observation diverge. The dynamical properties of the Rosenzweig-MacArthur system, encompassing the distribution of size-abundance equilibria, the scaling of period and amplitude of population cycling, and relationships between predator and prey abundances, are consistent with empirical observation. Our parameterisation is an accurate minimal model across 15+ orders of mass magnitude."}],"publication":"PLoS One","quality_controlled":"1","acknowledgement":"This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training Program\r\n(RTP) Scholarship to JCM (https://www.dese.gov.au), and LB is supported by the Centre de\r\nrecherche sur le vieillissement Fellowship Program. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.","isi":1,"volume":18,"status":"public","author":[{"first_name":"Jody C.","full_name":"Mckerral, Jody C.","last_name":"Mckerral"},{"first_name":"Maria","id":"4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Kleshnina","full_name":"Kleshnina, Maria"},{"last_name":"Ejov","full_name":"Ejov, Vladimir","first_name":"Vladimir"},{"first_name":"Louise","full_name":"Bartle, Louise","last_name":"Bartle"},{"last_name":"Mitchell","full_name":"Mitchell, James G.","first_name":"James G."},{"first_name":"Jerzy A.","last_name":"Filar","full_name":"Filar, Jerzy A."}],"year":"2023","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","page":"e0279838","date_updated":"2023-10-17T12:53:30Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"file_date_updated":"2023-03-07T10:26:45Z","tmp":{"image":"/images/cc_by.png","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"oa_version":"Published Version","ddc":["000"],"issue":"2","external_id":{"isi":["000996122900022"],"pmid":["36848357"]},"publisher":"Public Library of Science","date_created":"2023-03-05T23:01:05Z","pmid":1,"title":"Empirical parameterisation and dynamical analysis of the allometric Rosenzweig-MacArthur equations","article_processing_charge":"No"},{"article_processing_charge":"Yes","title":"The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games","pmid":1,"related_material":{"record":[{"id":"13336","status":"public","relation":"research_data"}]},"date_created":"2023-07-23T22:01:11Z","publisher":"Springer Nature","external_id":{"isi":["001029450400031"],"pmid":["37438341"]},"ddc":["000"],"tmp":{"image":"/images/cc_by.png","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"oa_version":"Published Version","file_date_updated":"2023-07-31T11:32:36Z","ec_funded":1,"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2025-04-14T07:43:55Z","article_number":"4153","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","year":"2023","corr_author":"1","author":[{"id":"4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Kleshnina","full_name":"Kleshnina, Maria","first_name":"Maria"},{"last_name":"Hilbe","full_name":"Hilbe, Christian","id":"2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Christian","orcid":"0000-0001-5116-955X"},{"first_name":"Stepan","id":"409d615c-2f95-11ee-b934-90a352102c1e","full_name":"Simsa, Stepan","last_name":"Simsa","orcid":"0000-0001-6687-1210"},{"orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Chatterjee","full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","first_name":"Krishnendu"},{"first_name":"Martin A.","last_name":"Nowak","full_name":"Nowak, Martin A."}],"status":"public","volume":14,"isi":1,"acknowledgement":"This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.), the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010) (to M.K.).","quality_controlled":"1","publication":"Nature Communications","abstract":[{"text":"Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation.","lang":"eng"}],"month":"07","oa":1,"_id":"13258","type":"journal_article","publication_status":"published","fulldoi":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9","intvolume":"        14","day":"12","project":[{"_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications","call_identifier":"H2020","grant_number":"863818"},{"name":"ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships","_id":"260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"754411","call_identifier":"H2020"}],"department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"article_type":"original","date_published":"2023-07-12T00:00:00Z","doi":"10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9","citation":{"chicago":"Kleshnina, Maria, Christian Hilbe, Stepan Simsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin A. Nowak. “The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” <i>Nature Communications</i>. Springer Nature, 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9\">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9</a>.","mla":"Kleshnina, Maria, et al. “The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” <i>Nature Communications</i>, vol. 14, 4153, Springer Nature, 2023, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9\">10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9</a>.","ista":"Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. 2023. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature Communications. 14, 4153.","short":"M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, M.A. Nowak, Nature Communications 14 (2023).","ieee":"M. Kleshnina, C. Hilbe, S. Simsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. A. Nowak, “The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games,” <i>Nature Communications</i>, vol. 14. Springer Nature, 2023.","apa":"Kleshnina, M., Hilbe, C., Simsa, S., Chatterjee, K., &#38; Nowak, M. A. (2023). The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. <i>Nature Communications</i>. Springer Nature. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9\">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9</a>","ama":"Kleshnina M, Hilbe C, Simsa S, Chatterjee K, Nowak MA. The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. <i>Nature Communications</i>. 2023;14. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9\">10.1038/s41467-023-39625-9</a>"},"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["2041-1723"]},"scopus_import":"1","file":[{"creator":"dernst","access_level":"open_access","date_created":"2023-07-31T11:32:36Z","date_updated":"2023-07-31T11:32:36Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":1601682,"content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_id":"13337","file_name":"2023_NatureComm_Kleshnina.pdf","checksum":"5aceefdfe76686267b93ae4fe81899f1"}],"has_accepted_license":"1"},{"oa_version":"Published Version","oa":1,"ddc":["000"],"month":"06","_id":"13336","article_processing_charge":"No","title":"kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games","date_created":"2023-07-31T11:30:46Z","related_material":{"record":[{"id":"13258","status":"public","relation":"used_in_publication"}]},"publisher":"Zenodo","year":"2023","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","status":"public","date_published":"2023-06-20T00:00:00Z","corr_author":"1","author":[{"first_name":"Maria","last_name":"Kleshnina","full_name":"Kleshnina, Maria","id":"4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87"}],"doi":"10.5281/ZENODO.8059564","citation":{"short":"M. Kleshnina, (2023).","ista":"Kleshnina M. 2023. kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games, Zenodo, <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564\">10.5281/ZENODO.8059564</a>.","chicago":"Kleshnina, Maria. “Kleshnina/Stochgames_info: The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Zenodo, 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564\">https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564</a>.","mla":"Kleshnina, Maria. <i>Kleshnina/Stochgames_info: The Effect of Environmental Information on Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games</i>. Zenodo, 2023, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564\">10.5281/ZENODO.8059564</a>.","ama":"Kleshnina M. kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. 2023. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564\">10.5281/ZENODO.8059564</a>","apa":"Kleshnina, M. (2023). kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Zenodo. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564\">https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564</a>","ieee":"M. Kleshnina, “kleshnina/stochgames_info: The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games.” Zenodo, 2023."},"fulldoi":"https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.8059564","type":"research_data_reference","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8059564"}],"day":"20","date_updated":"2025-04-15T06:54:58Z"},{"acknowledgement":"The authors would like to acknowledge stimulating email discussions with Dr Wayne Lobb of W.A. Lobb LLC on the topic of evolutionary games. We also thank Dr Thomas Taimre for his input to the material in Sect. 3.\r\nThe authors would like to acknowledge partial support from the Australian Research Council under the Discovery grant DP180101602 and support by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411.","quality_controlled":"1","publication":"Dynamic Games and Applications","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Mathematical models often aim to describe a complicated mechanism in a cohesive and simple manner. However, reaching perfect balance between being simple enough or overly simplistic is a challenging task. Frequently, game-theoretic models have an underlying assumption that players, whenever they choose to execute a specific action, do so perfectly. In fact, it is rare that action execution perfectly coincides with intentions of individuals, giving rise to behavioural mistakes. The concept of incompetence of players was suggested to address this issue in game-theoretic settings. Under the assumption of incompetence, players have non-zero probabilities of executing a different strategy from the one they chose, leading to stochastic outcomes of the interactions. In this article, we survey results related to the concept of incompetence in classic as well as evolutionary game theory and provide several new results. We also suggest future extensions of the model and argue why it is important to take into account behavioural mistakes when analysing interactions among players in both economic and biological settings."}],"month":"03","oa":1,"_id":"10770","type":"journal_article","fulldoi":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3","publication_status":"published","intvolume":"        13","day":"01","project":[{"grant_number":"754411","call_identifier":"H2020","name":"ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships","_id":"260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"}],"department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"article_type":"original","date_published":"2023-03-01T00:00:00Z","doi":"10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3","citation":{"chicago":"Graham, Thomas, Maria Kleshnina, and Jerzy A. Filar. “Where Do Mistakes Lead? A Survey of Games with Incompetent Players.” <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>. Springer Nature, 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3</a>.","mla":"Graham, Thomas, et al. “Where Do Mistakes Lead? A Survey of Games with Incompetent Players.” <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>, vol. 13, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 231–64, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3\">10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3</a>.","short":"T. Graham, M. Kleshnina, J.A. Filar, Dynamic Games and Applications 13 (2023) 231–264.","ista":"Graham T, Kleshnina M, Filar JA. 2023. Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players. Dynamic Games and Applications. 13, 231–264.","apa":"Graham, T., Kleshnina, M., &#38; Filar, J. A. (2023). Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players. <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>. Springer Nature. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3</a>","ieee":"T. Graham, M. Kleshnina, and J. A. Filar, “Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players,” <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>, vol. 13. Springer Nature, pp. 231–264, 2023.","ama":"Graham T, Kleshnina M, Filar JA. Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players. <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>. 2023;13:231-264. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3\">10.1007/s13235-022-00425-3</a>"},"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["2153-0793"],"issn":["2153-0785"]},"scopus_import":"1","has_accepted_license":"1","file":[{"file_name":"2022_DynamicGamesApplic_Graham.pdf","checksum":"cd53b07e96f9030ddb348f305e5b58c7","success":1,"file_id":"10781","date_updated":"2022-02-21T08:54:17Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":1890512,"content_type":"application/pdf","access_level":"open_access","creator":"dernst","date_created":"2022-02-21T08:54:17Z"}],"article_processing_charge":"No","title":"Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players","date_created":"2022-02-20T23:01:32Z","publisher":"Springer Nature","external_id":{"isi":["000753777100001"]},"tmp":{"image":"/images/cc_by.png","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"ddc":["000"],"oa_version":"Published Version","file_date_updated":"2022-02-21T08:54:17Z","ec_funded":1,"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2025-04-14T07:43:48Z","page":"231-264","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","year":"2023","author":[{"first_name":"Thomas","last_name":"Graham","full_name":"Graham, Thomas"},{"first_name":"Maria","full_name":"Kleshnina, Maria","last_name":"Kleshnina","id":"4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87"},{"first_name":"Jerzy A.","last_name":"Filar","full_name":"Filar, Jerzy A."}],"status":"public","volume":13,"isi":1},{"abstract":[{"text":"A game of rock-paper-scissors is an interesting example of an interaction where none of the pure strategies strictly dominates all others, leading to a cyclic pattern. In this work, we consider an unstable version of rock-paper-scissors dynamics and allow individuals to make behavioural mistakes during the strategy execution. We show that such an assumption can break a cyclic relationship leading to a stable equilibrium emerging with only one strategy surviving. We consider two cases: completely random mistakes when individuals have no bias towards any strategy and a general form of mistakes. Then, we determine conditions for a strategy to dominate all other strategies. However, given that individuals who adopt a dominating strategy are still prone to behavioural mistakes in the observed behaviour, we may still observe extinct strategies. That is, behavioural mistakes in strategy execution stabilise evolutionary dynamics leading to an evolutionary stable and, potentially, mixed co-existence equilibrium.","lang":"eng"}],"publication":"PLoS Computational Biology","quality_controlled":"1","acknowledgement":"Authors would like to thank Christian Hilbe and Martin Nowak for their inspiring and very helpful feedback on the manuscript.","_id":"9381","month":"04","oa":1,"project":[{"_id":"260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","name":"ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships","call_identifier":"H2020","grant_number":"754411"},{"grant_number":"863818","call_identifier":"H2020","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications","_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E"}],"intvolume":"        17","day":"01","type":"journal_article","publication_status":"published","fulldoi":"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523","scopus_import":"1","file":[{"file_name":"2021_pcbi_Kleshnina.pdf","checksum":"a94ebe0c4116f5047eaa6029e54d2dac","success":1,"file_id":"9385","date_updated":"2021-05-11T13:50:06Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":1323820,"content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"kschuh","access_level":"open_access","date_created":"2021-05-11T13:50:06Z"}],"has_accepted_license":"1","citation":{"short":"M. Kleshnina, S.S. Streipert, J.A. Filar, K. Chatterjee, PLoS Computational Biology 17 (2021).","ista":"Kleshnina M, Streipert SS, Filar JA, Chatterjee K. 2021. Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games. PLoS Computational Biology. 17(4), e1008523.","chicago":"Kleshnina, Maria, Sabrina S. Streipert, Jerzy A. Filar, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Mistakes Can Stabilise the Dynamics of Rock-Paper-Scissors Games.” <i>PLoS Computational Biology</i>. Public Library of Science, 2021. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523</a>.","mla":"Kleshnina, Maria, et al. “Mistakes Can Stabilise the Dynamics of Rock-Paper-Scissors Games.” <i>PLoS Computational Biology</i>, vol. 17, no. 4, e1008523, Public Library of Science, 2021, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523\">10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523</a>.","ama":"Kleshnina M, Streipert SS, Filar JA, Chatterjee K. Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games. <i>PLoS Computational Biology</i>. 2021;17(4). doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523\">10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523</a>","apa":"Kleshnina, M., Streipert, S. S., Filar, J. A., &#38; Chatterjee, K. (2021). Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games. <i>PLoS Computational Biology</i>. Public Library of Science. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523</a>","ieee":"M. Kleshnina, S. S. Streipert, J. A. Filar, and K. Chatterjee, “Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games,” <i>PLoS Computational Biology</i>, vol. 17, no. 4. Public Library of Science, 2021."},"doi":"10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008523","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1553-7358"],"issn":["1553-734X"]},"article_type":"original","date_published":"2021-04-01T00:00:00Z","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"publisher":"Public Library of Science","pmid":1,"date_created":"2021-05-09T22:01:38Z","title":"Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games","article_processing_charge":"No","file_date_updated":"2021-05-11T13:50:06Z","ec_funded":1,"issue":"4","tmp":{"image":"/images/cc_by.png","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"ddc":["000"],"oa_version":"Published Version","external_id":{"pmid":["33844680"],"isi":["000639711200001"]},"article_number":"e1008523","date_updated":"2025-06-12T06:40:39Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"isi":1,"volume":17,"author":[{"first_name":"Maria","id":"4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Kleshnina","full_name":"Kleshnina, Maria"},{"last_name":"Streipert","full_name":"Streipert, Sabrina S.","first_name":"Sabrina S."},{"full_name":"Filar, Jerzy A.","last_name":"Filar","first_name":"Jerzy A."},{"orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X","last_name":"Chatterjee","full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Krishnendu"}],"status":"public","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","year":"2021"},{"volume":8,"isi":1,"year":"2020","user_id":"ba8df636-2132-11f1-aed0-ed93e2281fdd","status":"public","author":[{"orcid":"0000-0002-5518-8317","last_name":"Kleshnina","full_name":"Kleshnina, Maria","id":"4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Maria"},{"first_name":"Sabrina","full_name":"Streipert, Sabrina","last_name":"Streipert"},{"full_name":"Filar, Jerzy","last_name":"Filar","first_name":"Jerzy"},{"first_name":"Krishnendu","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","last_name":"Chatterjee","full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu","orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X"}],"corr_author":"1","article_number":"1945","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2026-04-07T08:37:03Z","tmp":{"image":"/images/cc_by.png","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","short":"CC BY (4.0)","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"oa_version":"Published Version","ddc":["000"],"issue":"11","ec_funded":1,"file_date_updated":"2020-11-23T13:06:30Z","external_id":{"isi":["000593962100001"]},"date_created":"2020-11-22T23:01:24Z","publisher":"MDPI","article_processing_charge":"No","title":"Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games","doi":"10.3390/math8111945","citation":{"mla":"Kleshnina, Maria, et al. “Prioritised Learning in Snowdrift-Type Games.” <i>Mathematics</i>, vol. 8, no. 11, 1945, MDPI, 2020, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945\">10.3390/math8111945</a>.","chicago":"Kleshnina, Maria, Sabrina Streipert, Jerzy Filar, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Prioritised Learning in Snowdrift-Type Games.” <i>Mathematics</i>. MDPI, 2020. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945\">https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945</a>.","ista":"Kleshnina M, Streipert S, Filar J, Chatterjee K. 2020. Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games. Mathematics. 8(11), 1945.","short":"M. Kleshnina, S. Streipert, J. Filar, K. Chatterjee, Mathematics 8 (2020).","apa":"Kleshnina, M., Streipert, S., Filar, J., &#38; Chatterjee, K. (2020). Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games. <i>Mathematics</i>. MDPI. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945\">https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945</a>","ieee":"M. Kleshnina, S. Streipert, J. Filar, and K. Chatterjee, “Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games,” <i>Mathematics</i>, vol. 8, no. 11. MDPI, 2020.","ama":"Kleshnina M, Streipert S, Filar J, Chatterjee K. Prioritised learning in snowdrift-type games. <i>Mathematics</i>. 2020;8(11). doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945\">10.3390/math8111945</a>"},"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["2227-7390"]},"has_accepted_license":"1","file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","file_size":565191,"date_updated":"2020-11-23T13:06:30Z","relation":"main_file","creator":"dernst","access_level":"open_access","date_created":"2020-11-23T13:06:30Z","checksum":"61cfcc3b35760656ce7a9385a4ace5d2","file_name":"2020_Mathematics_Kleshnina.pdf","file_id":"8797","success":1}],"scopus_import":"1","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"date_published":"2020-11-04T00:00:00Z","article_type":"original","project":[{"grant_number":"754411","call_identifier":"H2020","name":"ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships","_id":"260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425"},{"_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications","call_identifier":"H2020","grant_number":"863818"}],"fulldoi":"https://doi.org/10.3390/math8111945","publication_status":"published","type":"journal_article","day":"04","intvolume":"         8","oa":1,"month":"11","_id":"8789","publication":"Mathematics","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Cooperation is a ubiquitous and beneficial behavioural trait despite being prone to exploitation by free-riders. Hence, cooperative populations are prone to invasions by selfish individuals. However, a population consisting of only free-riders typically does not survive. Thus, cooperators and free-riders often coexist in some proportion. An evolutionary version of a Snowdrift Game proved its efficiency in analysing this phenomenon. However, what if the system has already reached its stable state but was perturbed due to a change in environmental conditions? Then, individuals may have to re-learn their effective strategies. To address this, we consider behavioural mistakes in strategic choice execution, which we refer to as incompetence. Parametrising the propensity to make such mistakes allows for a mathematical description of learning. We compare strategies based on their relative strategic advantage relying on both fitness and learning factors. When strategies are learned at distinct rates, allowing learning according to a prescribed order is optimal. Interestingly, the strategy with the lowest strategic advantage should be learnt first if we are to optimise fitness over the learning path. Then, the differences between strategies are balanced out in order to minimise the effect of behavioural uncertainty."}],"acknowledgement":"This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411, the Australian Research Council Discovery Grants DP160101236 and DP150100618, and the European Research Council Consolidator Grant 863818 (FoRM-SMArt).\r\nAuthors would like to thank Patrick McKinlay for his work on the preliminary results for this paper.","quality_controlled":"1"}]