---
OA_place: repository
_id: '21401'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "Runtime verification offers scalable solutions to improve the safety and
    reliability of systems. However, systems that require verification or monitoring
    by a third party to ensure compliance with a specification might contain sensitive
    information, causing privacy concerns when usual runtime verification approaches
    are used. Privacy is compromised if protected information about the system, or
    sensitive data that is processed by the system, is revealed. In addition, revealing
    the specification being monitored may undermine the essence of third-party verification.\r\n\r\nIn
    this thesis, we propose a protocol for privacy-preserving runtime verification
    of systems against formal sequential specifications. We develop the protocol in
    two steps. In the first step, the monitor verifies whether the system satisfies
    the specification without learning anything else, though both parties are aware
    of the specification. In the second step, we extend the protocol to ensure that
    the system remains oblivious to the monitored specification, while the monitor
    learns only whether the system satisfies the specification and nothing more. Our
    protocol adapts and improves existing techniques used in cryptography, and more
    specifically, multi-party computation.\r\n\r\nThe sequential specification defines
    the observation step of the monitor, whose granularity depends on the situation
    (e.g., banks may be monitored on a daily basis). Our protocol exchanges a single
    message per observation step, after an initialization phase. This design minimizes
    communication overhead, enabling relatively lightweight privacy-preserving monitoring.
    We implement our approach for monitoring specifications described by register
    automata and evaluate it experimentally.\r\n"
acknowledgement: "This work is part of the project VAMOS, which has received funding
  from the European\r\nResearch Council (ERC) under grant agreement No. 101020093,
  and the Austrian Science\r\nFund (FWF) SFB project SpyCoDe F8502.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- ISTA Master’s Thesis
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Mahyar
  full_name: Karimi, Mahyar
  id: 6e5417ba-5355-11ee-ae5a-94c2e510b26b
  last_name: Karimi
  orcid: 0009-0005-0820-1696
citation:
  ama: Karimi M. Privacy-preserving runtime verification. 2026. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401">10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401</a>
  apa: Karimi, M. (2026). <i>Privacy-preserving runtime verification</i>. Institute
    of Science and Technology Austria. <a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401">https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401</a>
  chicago: Karimi, Mahyar. “Privacy-Preserving Runtime Verification.” Institute of
    Science and Technology Austria, 2026. <a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401">https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401</a>.
  ieee: M. Karimi, “Privacy-preserving runtime verification,” Institute of Science
    and Technology Austria, 2026.
  ista: Karimi M. 2026. Privacy-preserving runtime verification. Institute of Science
    and Technology Austria.
  mla: Karimi, Mahyar. <i>Privacy-Preserving Runtime Verification</i>. Institute of
    Science and Technology Austria, 2026, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401">10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401</a>.
  short: M. Karimi, Privacy-Preserving Runtime Verification, Institute of Science
    and Technology Austria, 2026.
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2026-03-05T15:20:47Z
date_published: 2026-03-05T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-03-13T13:37:20Z
day: '05'
ddc:
- '000'
degree_awarded: MS
department:
- _id: GradSch
- _id: ToHe
doi: 10.15479/AT-ISTA-21401
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: 3f49f05c9d123e14d7adb73d3bc50fe2
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: mkarimi
  date_created: 2026-03-06T14:06:25Z
  date_updated: 2026-03-10T15:20:09Z
  file_id: '21404'
  file_name: 2026_Karimi_Mahyar_Thesis.pdf
  file_size: 766048
  relation: main_file
- access_level: closed
  checksum: 8fb9db4b4187e26443369a993427a5ff
  content_type: application/zip
  creator: mkarimi
  date_created: 2026-03-06T14:06:25Z
  date_updated: 2026-03-06T14:06:25Z
  file_id: '21405'
  file_name: 2026_Karimi_Mahyar_Thesis_src.zip
  file_size: 1243394
  relation: source_file
file_date_updated: 2026-03-10T15:20:09Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- Privacy-preserving verification
- Runtime verification
- Monitoring
- Reactive functionalities
- Cryptographic protocols
language:
- iso: eng
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: '60'
project:
- _id: 62781420-2b32-11ec-9570-8d9b63373d4d
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '101020093'
  name: Vigilant Algorithmic Monitoring of Software
- _id: 34a4ce89-11ca-11ed-8bc3-8cc37fb6e11f
  grant_number: F8512
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 2791-4585
publication_status: published
publisher: Institute of Science and Technology Austria
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '21020'
    relation: part_of_dissertation
    status: public
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Thomas A
  full_name: Henzinger, Thomas A
  id: 40876CD8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Henzinger
  orcid: 0000-0002-2985-7724
title: Privacy-preserving runtime verification
type: dissertation
user_id: 8b945eb4-e2f2-11eb-945a-df72226e66a9
year: '2026'
...
---
OA_place: publisher
OA_type: gold
_id: '20587'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "The blocks in the Bitcoin blockchain \"record\" the amount of work W that
    went into creating them through proofs of work. When honest parties control a
    majority of the work, consensus is achieved by picking the chain with the highest
    recorded weight. Resources other than work have been considered to secure such
    longest-chain blockchains. In Chia, blocks record the amount of disk-space S (via
    a proof of space) and sequential computational steps V (through a VDF).\r\nIn
    this paper, we ask what weight functions Γ(S,V,W) (that assign a weight to a block
    as a function of the recorded space, speed, and work) are secure in the sense
    that whenever the weight of the resources controlled by honest parties is larger
    than the weight of adversarial parties, the blockchain is secure against private
    double-spending attacks.\r\nWe completely classify such functions in an idealized
    \"continuous\" model: Γ(S,V,W) is secure against private double-spending attacks
    if and only if it is homogeneous of degree one in the \"timed\" resources V and
    W, i.e., αΓ(S,V,W) = Γ(S,α V, α W). This includes the Bitcoin rule Γ(S,V,W) =
    W and the Chia rule Γ(S,V,W) = S ⋅ V. In a more realistic model where blocks are
    created at discrete time-points, one additionally needs some mild assumptions
    on the dependency on S (basically, the weight should not grow too much if S is
    slightly increased, say linear as in Chia).\r\nOur classification is more general
    and allows various instantiations of the same resource. It provides a powerful
    tool for designing new longest-chain blockchains. E.g., consider combining different
    PoWs to counter centralization, say the Bitcoin PoW W₁ and a memory-hard PoW W₂.
    Previous work suggested to use W₁+W₂ as weight. Our results show that using e.g.,
    √{W₁}⋅ √{W₂} or min{W₁,W₂} are also secure, and we argue that in practice these
    are much better choices."
acknowledgement: "This research was funded in whole or in part by the Austrian Science
  Fund (FWF)\r\n10.55776/F85. For open access purposes, the author has applied a CC
  BY public copyright license\r\nto any author-accepted manuscript version arising
  from this submission."
alternative_title:
- LIPIcs
article_number: '16'
article_processing_charge: Yes
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Mirza Ahad
  full_name: Baig, Mirza Ahad
  id: 3EDE6DE4-AA5A-11E9-986D-341CE6697425
  last_name: Baig
- first_name: Christoph Ullrich
  full_name: Günther, Christoph Ullrich
  id: ec98511c-eb8e-11eb-b029-edd25d7271a1
  last_name: Günther
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
  ama: 'Baig MA, Günther CU, Pietrzak KZ. Nakamoto consensus from multiple resources.
    In: <i>7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies</i>. Vol 354. Schloss
    Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik; 2025. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16">10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16</a>'
  apa: 'Baig, M. A., Günther, C. U., &#38; Pietrzak, K. Z. (2025). Nakamoto consensus
    from multiple resources. In <i>7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies</i>
    (Vol. 354). Pittsburgh, PA, United States: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum
    für Informatik. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16</a>'
  chicago: Baig, Mirza Ahad, Christoph Ullrich Günther, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak.
    “Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources.” In <i>7th Conference on Advances
    in Financial Technologies</i>, Vol. 354. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für
    Informatik, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16</a>.
  ieee: M. A. Baig, C. U. Günther, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Nakamoto consensus from multiple
    resources,” in <i>7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies</i>, Pittsburgh,
    PA, United States, 2025, vol. 354.
  ista: 'Baig MA, Günther CU, Pietrzak KZ. 2025. Nakamoto consensus from multiple
    resources. 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies. AFT: Conference
    on Advances in Financial Technologies, LIPIcs, vol. 354, 16.'
  mla: Baig, Mirza Ahad, et al. “Nakamoto Consensus from Multiple Resources.” <i>7th
    Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies</i>, vol. 354, 16, Schloss Dagstuhl
    - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2025, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16">10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16</a>.
  short: M.A. Baig, C.U. Günther, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, 7th Conference on Advances in
    Financial Technologies, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2025.
conference:
  end_date: 2025-10-10
  location: Pittsburgh, PA, United States
  name: 'AFT: Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies'
  start_date: 2025-10-08
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2025-11-02T23:01:34Z
date_published: 2025-10-06T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-15T08:45:18Z
day: '06'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2025.16
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '2508.01448'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: b638adcd4fbffa77116c35393e165eb7
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: dernst
  date_created: 2025-11-04T08:19:02Z
  date_updated: 2025-11-04T08:19:02Z
  file_id: '20598'
  file_name: 2025_LIPIcsAFT_Baig.pdf
  file_size: 1061847
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2025-11-04T08:19:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       354'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1410
month: '10'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
project:
- _id: 34a4ce89-11ca-11ed-8bc3-8cc37fb6e11f
  grant_number: F8512
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
- _id: 34a34d57-11ca-11ed-8bc3-a2688a8724e1
  grant_number: F8509
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
publication: 7th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - '9783959774000'
  issn:
  - 1868-8969
publication_status: published
publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '21651'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Nakamoto consensus from multiple resources
tmp:
  image: /images/cc_by.png
  legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
  name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
  short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 354
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '14609'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "Distributed Key Generation (DKG) is a technique to bootstrap threshold cryptosystems
    without a trusted party. DKG is an essential building block to many decentralized
    protocols such as randomness beacons, threshold signatures, Byzantine consensus,
    and multiparty computation. While significant progress has been made recently,
    existing asynchronous DKG constructions are inefficient when the reconstruction
    threshold is larger than one-third of the total nodes. In this paper, we present
    a simple and concretely efficient asynchronous DKG (ADKG) protocol among n = 3t
    + 1 nodes that can tolerate up to t malicious nodes and support any reconstruction
    threshold ℓ ≥ t. Our protocol has an expected O(κn3) communication cost, where
    κ is the security parameter, and only assumes the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm.
    The\r\ncore ingredient of our ADKG protocol is an asynchronous protocol to secret
    share a random polynomial of degree ℓ ≥ t, which has other applications, such
    as asynchronous proactive secret sharing and asynchronous multiparty computation.
    We implement our high-threshold ADKG protocol and evaluate it using a network
    of up to 128 geographically distributed nodes. Our evaluation shows that our high-threshold
    ADKG protocol reduces the running time by 90% and bandwidth usage by 80% over
    the state-of-the-art."
acknowledgement: The authors would like to thank Amit Agarwal, Andrew Miller, and
  Tom Yurek for the helpful discussions related to the paper. This work is funded
  in part by a VMware early career faculty grant, a Chainlink Labs Ph.D. fellowship,
  the National Science Foundation, and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) F8512-N.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Sourav
  full_name: Das, Sourav
  last_name: Das
- first_name: Zhuolun
  full_name: Xiang, Zhuolun
  last_name: Xiang
- first_name: Eleftherios
  full_name: Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios
  id: f5983044-d7ef-11ea-ac6d-fd1430a26d30
  last_name: Kokoris Kogias
- first_name: Ling
  full_name: Ren, Ling
  last_name: Ren
citation:
  ama: 'Das S, Xiang Z, Kokoris Kogias E, Ren L. Practical asynchronous high-threshold
    distributed key generation and distributed polynomial sampling. In: <i>32nd USENIX
    Security Symposium</i>. Vol 8. Usenix; 2023:5359-5376.'
  apa: 'Das, S., Xiang, Z., Kokoris Kogias, E., &#38; Ren, L. (2023). Practical asynchronous
    high-threshold distributed key generation and distributed polynomial sampling.
    In <i>32nd USENIX Security Symposium</i> (Vol. 8, pp. 5359–5376). Anaheim, CA,
    United States: Usenix.'
  chicago: Das, Sourav, Zhuolun Xiang, Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias, and Ling Ren. “Practical
    Asynchronous High-Threshold Distributed Key Generation and Distributed Polynomial
    Sampling.” In <i>32nd USENIX Security Symposium</i>, 8:5359–76. Usenix, 2023.
  ieee: S. Das, Z. Xiang, E. Kokoris Kogias, and L. Ren, “Practical asynchronous high-threshold
    distributed key generation and distributed polynomial sampling,” in <i>32nd USENIX
    Security Symposium</i>, Anaheim, CA, United States, 2023, vol. 8, pp. 5359–5376.
  ista: Das S, Xiang Z, Kokoris Kogias E, Ren L. 2023. Practical asynchronous high-threshold
    distributed key generation and distributed polynomial sampling. 32nd USENIX Security
    Symposium. USENIX Security Symposium vol. 8, 5359–5376.
  mla: Das, Sourav, et al. “Practical Asynchronous High-Threshold Distributed Key
    Generation and Distributed Polynomial Sampling.” <i>32nd USENIX Security Symposium</i>,
    vol. 8, Usenix, 2023, pp. 5359–76.
  short: S. Das, Z. Xiang, E. Kokoris Kogias, L. Ren, in:, 32nd USENIX Security Symposium,
    Usenix, 2023, pp. 5359–5376.
conference:
  end_date: 2023-08-11
  location: Anaheim, CA, United States
  name: USENIX Security Symposium
  start_date: 2023-08-09
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2023-11-26T23:00:55Z
date_published: 2023-08-15T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-04-15T08:16:55Z
day: '15'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: ElKo
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: 1a730765930138e23c6efd2575872641
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: dernst
  date_created: 2023-11-28T09:14:34Z
  date_updated: 2023-11-28T09:14:34Z
  file_id: '14621'
  file_name: 2023_USENIX_Das.pdf
  file_size: 704331
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2023-11-28T09:14:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '         8'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1389
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 5359-5376
project:
- _id: 34a4ce89-11ca-11ed-8bc3-8cc37fb6e11f
  grant_number: F8512
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
publication: 32nd USENIX Security Symposium
publication_identifier:
  isbn:
  - '9781713879497'
publication_status: published
publisher: Usenix
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Practical asynchronous high-threshold distributed key generation and distributed
  polynomial sampling
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '14735'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "Scaling blockchain protocols to perform on par with the expected needs of
    Web3.0 has been proven to be a challenging task with almost a decade of research.
    In the forefront of the current solution is the idea of separating the execution
    of the updates encoded in a block from the ordering of blocks. In order to achieve
    this, a new class of protocols called rollups has emerged. Rollups have as input
    a total ordering of valid and invalid transactions and as output a new valid state-transition.\r\nIf
    we study rollups from a distributed computing perspective, we uncover that rollups
    take as input the output of a Byzantine Atomic Broadcast (BAB) protocol and convert
    it to a State Machine Replication (SMR) protocol. BAB and SMR, however, are considered
    equivalent as far as distributed computing is concerned and a solution to one
    can easily be retrofitted to solve the other simply by adding/removing an execution
    step before the validation of the input.\r\nThis “easy” step of retrofitting an
    atomic broadcast solution to implement an SMR has, however, been overlooked in
    practice. In this paper, we formalize the problem and show that after BAB is solved,
    traditional impossibility results for consensus no longer apply towards an SMR.
    Leveraging this we propose a distributed execution protocol that allows reduced
    execution and storage cost per executor (O(log2n/n)) without relaxing the network
    assumptions of the underlying BAB protocol and providing censorship-resistance.
    Finally, we propose efficient non-interactive light client constructions that
    leverage our efficient execution protocols and do not require any synchrony assumptions
    or expensive ZK-proofs."
acknowledgement: 'Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias is partially supported by Austrian Science
  Fund (FWF) grant No: F8512-N.'
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Christos
  full_name: Stefo, Christos
  id: a20e8902-32b0-11ee-9fa8-b23fa638b793
  last_name: Stefo
- first_name: Zhuolun
  full_name: Xiang, Zhuolun
  last_name: Xiang
- first_name: Eleftherios
  full_name: Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios
  id: f5983044-d7ef-11ea-ac6d-fd1430a26d30
  last_name: Kokoris Kogias
citation:
  ama: 'Stefo C, Xiang Z, Kokoris Kogias E. Executing and proving over dirty ledgers.
    In: <i>27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security</i>.
    Vol 13950. Springer Nature; 2023:3-20. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1">10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1</a>'
  apa: 'Stefo, C., Xiang, Z., &#38; Kokoris Kogias, E. (2023). Executing and proving
    over dirty ledgers. In <i>27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography
    and Data Security</i> (Vol. 13950, pp. 3–20). Bol, Brac, Croatia: Springer Nature.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1</a>'
  chicago: Stefo, Christos, Zhuolun Xiang, and Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias. “Executing
    and Proving over Dirty Ledgers.” In <i>27th International Conference on Financial
    Cryptography and Data Security</i>, 13950:3–20. Springer Nature, 2023. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1</a>.
  ieee: C. Stefo, Z. Xiang, and E. Kokoris Kogias, “Executing and proving over dirty
    ledgers,” in <i>27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data
    Security</i>, Bol, Brac, Croatia, 2023, vol. 13950, pp. 3–20.
  ista: 'Stefo C, Xiang Z, Kokoris Kogias E. 2023. Executing and proving over dirty
    ledgers. 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security.
    FC: Financial Cryptography and Data Security, LNCS, vol. 13950, 3–20.'
  mla: Stefo, Christos, et al. “Executing and Proving over Dirty Ledgers.” <i>27th
    International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security</i>, vol.
    13950, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 3–20, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1">10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1</a>.
  short: C. Stefo, Z. Xiang, E. Kokoris Kogias, in:, 27th International Conference
    on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 3–20.
conference:
  end_date: 2023-05-05
  location: Bol, Brac, Croatia
  name: 'FC: Financial Cryptography and Data Security'
  start_date: 2023-05-01
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2024-01-08T09:17:38Z
date_published: 2023-12-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-09T14:07:16Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: ElKo
- _id: GradSch
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-47754-6_1
external_id:
  isi:
  - '001150222600001'
intvolume: '     13950'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1554
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 3-20
project:
- _id: 34a4ce89-11ca-11ed-8bc3-8cc37fb6e11f
  grant_number: F8512
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
publication: 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
publication_identifier:
  eisbn:
  - '9783031477546'
  eissn:
  - 0302-9743
  isbn:
  - '9783031477539'
  issn:
  - 1611-3349
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Executing and proving over dirty ledgers
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 13950
year: '2023'
...
---
_id: '14829'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'This paper explores a modular design architecture aimed at helping blockchains
    (and other SMR implementation) to scale to a very large number of processes. This
    comes in contrast to existing monolithic architectures that interleave transaction
    dissemination, ordering, and execution in a single functionality. To achieve this
    we first split the monolith to multiple layers which can use existing distributed
    computing primitives. The exact specifications of the data dissemination part
    are formally defined by the Proof of Availability & Retrieval (PoA &R) abstraction.
    Solutions to the PoA &R problem contain two related sub-protocols: one that “pushes”
    information into the network and another that “pulls” this information. Regarding
    the latter, there is a dearth of research literature which is rectified in this
    paper. We present a family of pulling sub-protocols and rigorously analyze them.
    Extensive simulations support the theoretical claims of efficiency and robustness
    in case of a very large number of players. Finally, actual implementation and
    deployment on a small number of machines (roughly the size of several industrial
    systems) demonstrates the viability of the architecture’s paradigm.'
acknowledgement: 'This work is partially supported by Meta. Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias
  is partially supported by Austrian Science Fund (FWF) grant No: F8512-N. Shir Cohen
  is supported by the Adams Fellowship Program of the Israel Academy of Sciences and
  Humanities.'
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Shir
  full_name: Cohen, Shir
  last_name: Cohen
- first_name: Guy
  full_name: Goren, Guy
  last_name: Goren
- first_name: Eleftherios
  full_name: Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios
  id: f5983044-d7ef-11ea-ac6d-fd1430a26d30
  last_name: Kokoris Kogias
- first_name: Alberto
  full_name: Sonnino, Alberto
  last_name: Sonnino
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Spiegelman, Alexander
  last_name: Spiegelman
citation:
  ama: 'Cohen S, Goren G, Kokoris Kogias E, Sonnino A, Spiegelman A. Proof of availability
    and retrieval in a modular blockchain architecture. In: <i>27th International
    Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security</i>. Vol 13951. Springer
    Nature; 2023:36-53. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3">10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3</a>'
  apa: 'Cohen, S., Goren, G., Kokoris Kogias, E., Sonnino, A., &#38; Spiegelman, A.
    (2023). Proof of availability and retrieval in a modular blockchain architecture.
    In <i>27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security</i>
    (Vol. 13951, pp. 36–53). Bol, Brac, Croatia: Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3</a>'
  chicago: Cohen, Shir, Guy Goren, Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias, Alberto Sonnino, and
    Alexander Spiegelman. “Proof of Availability and Retrieval in a Modular Blockchain
    Architecture.” In <i>27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and
    Data Security</i>, 13951:36–53. Springer Nature, 2023. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3</a>.
  ieee: S. Cohen, G. Goren, E. Kokoris Kogias, A. Sonnino, and A. Spiegelman, “Proof
    of availability and retrieval in a modular blockchain architecture,” in <i>27th
    International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security</i>, Bol,
    Brac, Croatia, 2023, vol. 13951, pp. 36–53.
  ista: 'Cohen S, Goren G, Kokoris Kogias E, Sonnino A, Spiegelman A. 2023. Proof
    of availability and retrieval in a modular blockchain architecture. 27th International
    Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC: Financial Cryptography
    and Data Security, LNCS, vol. 13951, 36–53.'
  mla: Cohen, Shir, et al. “Proof of Availability and Retrieval in a Modular Blockchain
    Architecture.” <i>27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and
    Data Security</i>, vol. 13951, Springer Nature, 2023, pp. 36–53, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3">10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3</a>.
  short: S. Cohen, G. Goren, E. Kokoris Kogias, A. Sonnino, A. Spiegelman, in:, 27th
    International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Springer
    Nature, 2023, pp. 36–53.
conference:
  end_date: 2023-05-05
  location: Bol, Brac, Croatia
  name: 'FC: Financial Cryptography and Data Security'
  start_date: 2023-05-01
date_created: 2024-01-18T07:41:12Z
date_published: 2023-12-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-09T14:22:38Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: ElKo
doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-47751-5_3
external_id:
  isi:
  - '001150231600003'
intvolume: '     13951'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://fc23.ifca.ai/preproceedings/150.pdf
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 36-53
project:
- _id: 34a4ce89-11ca-11ed-8bc3-8cc37fb6e11f
  grant_number: F8512
  name: Security and Privacy by Design for Complex Systems
publication: 27th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
publication_identifier:
  eisbn:
  - '9783031477515'
  eissn:
  - 1611-3349
  isbn:
  - '9783031477508'
  issn:
  - 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Proof of availability and retrieval in a modular blockchain architecture
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 13951
year: '2023'
...
