---
_id: '1647'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Round-optimal blind signatures are notoriously hard to construct in the standard
model, especially in the malicious-signer model, where blindness must hold under
adversarially chosen keys. This is substantiated by several impossibility results.
The only construction that can be termed theoretically efficient, by Garg and
Gupta (Eurocrypt’14), requires complexity leveraging, inducing an exponential
security loss. We present a construction of practically efficient round-optimal
blind signatures in the standard model. It is conceptually simple and builds on
the recent structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes (SPSEQ) from
Asiacrypt’14. While the traditional notion of blindness follows from standard
assumptions, we prove blindness under adversarially chosen keys under an interactive
variant of DDH. However, we neither require non-uniform assumptions nor complexity
leveraging. We then show how to extend our construction to partially blind signatures
and to blind signatures on message vectors, which yield a construction of one-show
anonymous credentials à la “anonymous credentials light” (CCS’13) in the standard
model. Furthermore, we give the first SPS-EQ construction under noninteractive
assumptions and show how SPS-EQ schemes imply conventional structure-preserving
signatures, which allows us to apply optimality results for the latter to SPS-EQ.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Georg
full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hanser, Christian
last_name: Hanser
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Slamanig, Daniel
last_name: Slamanig
citation:
ama: 'Fuchsbauer G, Hanser C, Slamanig D. Practical round-optimal blind signatures
in the standard model. In: Vol 9216. Springer; 2015:233-253. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_12'
apa: 'Fuchsbauer, G., Hanser, C., & Slamanig, D. (2015). Practical round-optimal
blind signatures in the standard model (Vol. 9216, pp. 233–253). Presented at
the CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, United States:
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_12'
chicago: Fuchsbauer, Georg, Christian Hanser, and Daniel Slamanig. “Practical Round-Optimal
Blind Signatures in the Standard Model,” 9216:233–53. Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_12.
ieee: 'G. Fuchsbauer, C. Hanser, and D. Slamanig, “Practical round-optimal blind
signatures in the standard model,” presented at the CRYPTO: International Cryptology
Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, United States, 2015, vol. 9216, pp. 233–253.'
ista: 'Fuchsbauer G, Hanser C, Slamanig D. 2015. Practical round-optimal blind signatures
in the standard model. CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, LNCS, vol.
9216, 233–253.'
mla: Fuchsbauer, Georg, et al. Practical Round-Optimal Blind Signatures in the
Standard Model. Vol. 9216, Springer, 2015, pp. 233–53, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_12.
short: G. Fuchsbauer, C. Hanser, D. Slamanig, in:, Springer, 2015, pp. 233–253.
conference:
end_date: 2015-08-20
location: Santa Barbara, CA, United States
name: 'CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference'
start_date: 2015-08-16
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:14Z
date_published: 2015-08-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T09:53:46Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_12
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000364183100012'
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_12
intvolume: ' 9216'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/626.pdf
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 233 - 253
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5503'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '1225'
relation: later_version
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Practical round-optimal blind signatures in the standard model
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9216
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1648'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Generalized Selective Decryption (GSD), introduced by Panjwani [TCC’07], is
a game for a symmetric encryption scheme Enc that captures the difficulty of proving
adaptive security of certain protocols, most notably the Logical Key Hierarchy
(LKH) multicast encryption protocol. In the GSD game there are n keys k1,...,
kn, which the adversary may adaptively corrupt (learn); moreover, it can ask for
encryptions Encki (kj) of keys under other keys. The adversary’s task is to distinguish
keys (which it cannot trivially compute) from random. Proving the hardness of
GSD assuming only IND-CPA security of Enc is surprisingly hard. Using “complexity
leveraging” loses a factor exponential in n, which makes the proof practically
meaningless. We can think of the GSD game as building a graph on n vertices, where
we add an edge i → j when the adversary asks for an encryption of kj under ki.
If restricted to graphs of depth ℓ, Panjwani gave a reduction that loses only
a factor exponential in ℓ (not n). To date, this is the only non-trivial result
known for GSD. In this paper we give almost-polynomial reductions for large classes
of graphs. Most importantly, we prove the security of the GSD game restricted
to trees losing only a quasi-polynomial factor n3 log n+5. Trees are an important
special case capturing real-world protocols like the LKH protocol. Our new bound
improves upon Panjwani’s on some LKH variants proposed in the literature where
the underlying tree is not balanced. Our proof builds on ideas from the “nested
hybrids” technique recently introduced by Fuchsbauer et al. [Asiacrypt’14] for
proving the adaptive security of constrained PRFs.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Georg
full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: Zahra
full_name: Jafargholi, Zahra
last_name: Jafargholi
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Fuchsbauer G, Jafargholi Z, Pietrzak KZ. A quasipolynomial reduction for generalized
selective decryption on trees. In: Vol 9215. Springer; 2015:601-620. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_29'
apa: 'Fuchsbauer, G., Jafargholi, Z., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2015). A quasipolynomial
reduction for generalized selective decryption on trees (Vol. 9215, pp. 601–620).
Presented at the CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA,
USA: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_29'
chicago: Fuchsbauer, Georg, Zahra Jafargholi, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “A Quasipolynomial
Reduction for Generalized Selective Decryption on Trees,” 9215:601–20. Springer,
2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_29.
ieee: 'G. Fuchsbauer, Z. Jafargholi, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “A quasipolynomial reduction
for generalized selective decryption on trees,” presented at the CRYPTO: International
Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 2015, vol. 9215, pp. 601–620.'
ista: 'Fuchsbauer G, Jafargholi Z, Pietrzak KZ. 2015. A quasipolynomial reduction
for generalized selective decryption on trees. CRYPTO: International Cryptology
Conference, LNCS, vol. 9215, 601–620.'
mla: Fuchsbauer, Georg, et al. A Quasipolynomial Reduction for Generalized Selective
Decryption on Trees. Vol. 9215, Springer, 2015, pp. 601–20, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_29.
short: G. Fuchsbauer, Z. Jafargholi, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2015, pp. 601–620.
conference:
end_date: 2015-08-20
location: Santa Barbara, CA, USA
name: 'CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference'
start_date: 2015-08-16
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:14Z
date_published: 2015-08-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-22T14:34:43Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_29
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000364183000029'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 99b76b3263d5082554d0a9cbdeca3a22
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:13:31Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:08Z
file_id: '5015'
file_name: IST-2016-674-v1+1_389.pdf
file_size: 505618
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:08Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_29
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9215'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 601 - 620
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5502'
pubrep_id: '674'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: A quasipolynomial reduction for generalized selective decryption on trees
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9215
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1649'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We extend a commitment scheme based on the learning with errors over rings
(RLWE) problem, and present efficient companion zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge.
Our scheme maps elements from the ring (or equivalently, n elements from '
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Fabrice
full_name: Benhamouda, Fabrice
last_name: Benhamouda
- first_name: Stephan
full_name: Krenn, Stephan
last_name: Krenn
- first_name: Vadim
full_name: Lyubashevsky, Vadim
last_name: Lyubashevsky
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: Benhamouda F, Krenn S, Lyubashevsky V, Pietrzak KZ. Efficient zero-knowledge
proofs for commitments from learning with errors over rings. 2015;9326:305-325.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_16
apa: 'Benhamouda, F., Krenn, S., Lyubashevsky, V., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2015).
Efficient zero-knowledge proofs for commitments from learning with errors over
rings. Presented at the ESORICS: European Symposium on Research in Computer Security,
Vienna, Austria: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_16'
chicago: Benhamouda, Fabrice, Stephan Krenn, Vadim Lyubashevsky, and Krzysztof Z
Pietrzak. “Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Commitments from Learning with
Errors over Rings.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_16.
ieee: F. Benhamouda, S. Krenn, V. Lyubashevsky, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Efficient zero-knowledge
proofs for commitments from learning with errors over rings,” vol. 9326. Springer,
pp. 305–325, 2015.
ista: Benhamouda F, Krenn S, Lyubashevsky V, Pietrzak KZ. 2015. Efficient zero-knowledge
proofs for commitments from learning with errors over rings. 9326, 305–325.
mla: Benhamouda, Fabrice, et al. Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Commitments
from Learning with Errors over Rings. Vol. 9326, Springer, 2015, pp. 305–25,
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_16.
short: F. Benhamouda, S. Krenn, V. Lyubashevsky, K.Z. Pietrzak, 9326 (2015) 305–325.
conference:
end_date: 2015-09-25
location: Vienna, Austria
name: 'ESORICS: European Symposium on Research in Computer Security'
start_date: 2015-09-21
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:15Z
date_published: 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T08:40:11Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_16
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000374478000016'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 6eac4a485b2aa644b2d3f753ed0b280b
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:11:28Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:08Z
file_id: '4883'
file_name: IST-2016-678-v1+1_889.pdf
file_size: 494239
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:08Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_16
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9326'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 305 - 325
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5501'
pubrep_id: '678'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Efficient zero-knowledge proofs for commitments from learning with errors over
rings
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by_nc.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)
short: CC BY-NC (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9326
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1650'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We consider the task of deriving a key with high HILL entropy (i.e., being
computationally indistinguishable from a key with high min-entropy) from an unpredictable
source.\r\n\r\nPrevious to this work, the only known way to transform unpredictability
into a key that was ϵ indistinguishable from having min-entropy was via pseudorandomness,
for example by Goldreich-Levin (GL) hardcore bits. This approach has the inherent
limitation that from a source with k bits of unpredictability entropy one can
derive a key of length (and thus HILL entropy) at most k−2log(1/ϵ) bits. In many
settings, e.g. when dealing with biometric data, such a 2log(1/ϵ) bit entropy
loss in not an option. Our main technical contribution is a theorem that states
that in the high entropy regime, unpredictability implies HILL entropy. Concretely,
any variable K with |K|−d bits of unpredictability entropy has the same amount
of so called metric entropy (against real-valued, deterministic distinguishers),
which is known to imply the same amount of HILL entropy. The loss in circuit size
in this argument is exponential in the entropy gap d, and thus this result only
applies for small d (i.e., where the size of distinguishers considered is exponential
in d).\r\n\r\nTo overcome the above restriction, we investigate if it’s possible
to first “condense” unpredictability entropy and make the entropy gap small. We
show that any source with k bits of unpredictability can be condensed into a source
of length k with k−3 bits of unpredictability entropy. Our condenser simply “abuses"
the GL construction and derives a k bit key from a source with k bits of unpredicatibily.
The original GL theorem implies nothing when extracting that many bits, but we
show that in this regime, GL still behaves like a “condenser" for unpredictability.
This result comes with two caveats (1) the loss in circuit size is exponential
in k and (2) we require that the source we start with has no HILL entropy (equivalently,
one can efficiently check if a guess is correct). We leave it as an intriguing
open problem to overcome these restrictions or to prove they’re inherent."
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Maciej
full_name: Skórski, Maciej
last_name: Skórski
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Golovnev, Alexander
last_name: Golovnev
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Skórski M, Golovnev A, Pietrzak KZ. Condensed unpredictability . In: Vol 9134.
Springer; 2015:1046-1057. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_85'
apa: 'Skórski, M., Golovnev, A., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2015). Condensed unpredictability (Vol.
9134, pp. 1046–1057). Presented at the ICALP: Automata, Languages and Programming,
Kyoto, Japan: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_85'
chicago: Skórski, Maciej, Alexander Golovnev, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “Condensed
Unpredictability ,” 9134:1046–57. Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_85.
ieee: 'M. Skórski, A. Golovnev, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Condensed unpredictability
,” presented at the ICALP: Automata, Languages and Programming, Kyoto, Japan,
2015, vol. 9134, pp. 1046–1057.'
ista: 'Skórski M, Golovnev A, Pietrzak KZ. 2015. Condensed unpredictability . ICALP:
Automata, Languages and Programming, LNCS, vol. 9134, 1046–1057.'
mla: Skórski, Maciej, et al. Condensed Unpredictability . Vol. 9134, Springer,
2015, pp. 1046–57, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_85.
short: M. Skórski, A. Golovnev, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2015, pp. 1046–1057.
conference:
end_date: 2015-07-10
location: Kyoto, Japan
name: 'ICALP: Automata, Languages and Programming'
start_date: 2015-07-06
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:15Z
date_published: 2015-06-20T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T08:20:48Z
day: '20'
ddc:
- '000'
- '005'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_85
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000364317700085'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: e808c7eecb631336fc9f9bf2e8d4ecae
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:08:32Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:08Z
file_id: '4693'
file_name: IST-2016-675-v1+1_384.pdf
file_size: 525503
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:08Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_85
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9134'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '06'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 1046 - 1057
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5500'
pubrep_id: '675'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Condensed unpredictability '
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9134
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1651'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Cryptographic e-cash allows off-line electronic transactions between a bank,
users and merchants in a secure and anonymous fashion. A plethora of e-cash constructions
has been proposed in the literature; however, these traditional e-cash schemes
only allow coins to be transferred once between users and merchants. Ideally,
we would like users to be able to transfer coins between each other multiple times
before deposit, as happens with physical cash. “Transferable” e-cash schemes are
the solution to this problem. Unfortunately, the currently proposed schemes are
either completely impractical or do not achieve the desirable anonymity properties
without compromises, such as assuming the existence of a trusted “judge” who can
trace all coins and users in the system. This paper presents the first efficient
and fully anonymous transferable e-cash scheme without any trusted third parties.
We start by revising the security and anonymity properties of transferable e-cash
to capture issues that were previously overlooked. For our construction we use
the recently proposed malleable signatures by Chase et al. to allow the secure
and anonymous transfer of coins, combined with a new efficient double-spending
detection mechanism. Finally, we discuss an instantiation of our construction.
acknowledgement: Work done as an intern in Microsoft Research Redmond and as a student
at Brown University, where supported by NSF grant 0964379. Supported by the European
Research Council, ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Foteini
full_name: Baldimtsi, Foteini
last_name: Baldimtsi
- first_name: Melissa
full_name: Chase, Melissa
last_name: Chase
- first_name: Georg
full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: Markulf
full_name: Kohlweiss, Markulf
last_name: Kohlweiss
citation:
ama: 'Baldimtsi F, Chase M, Fuchsbauer G, Kohlweiss M. Anonymous transferable e-cash.
In: Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2015. Vol 9020. Springer; 2015:101-124.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_5'
apa: 'Baldimtsi, F., Chase, M., Fuchsbauer, G., & Kohlweiss, M. (2015). Anonymous
transferable e-cash. In Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2015 (Vol. 9020,
pp. 101–124). Gaithersburg, MD, United States: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_5'
chicago: Baldimtsi, Foteini, Melissa Chase, Georg Fuchsbauer, and Markulf Kohlweiss.
“Anonymous Transferable E-Cash.” In Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2015,
9020:101–24. Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_5.
ieee: F. Baldimtsi, M. Chase, G. Fuchsbauer, and M. Kohlweiss, “Anonymous transferable
e-cash,” in Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2015, Gaithersburg, MD, United
States, 2015, vol. 9020, pp. 101–124.
ista: 'Baldimtsi F, Chase M, Fuchsbauer G, Kohlweiss M. 2015. Anonymous transferable
e-cash. Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2015. PKC: Public Key Crypography, LNCS,
vol. 9020, 101–124.'
mla: Baldimtsi, Foteini, et al. “Anonymous Transferable E-Cash.” Public-Key Cryptography
- PKC 2015, vol. 9020, Springer, 2015, pp. 101–24, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_5.
short: F. Baldimtsi, M. Chase, G. Fuchsbauer, M. Kohlweiss, in:, Public-Key Cryptography
- PKC 2015, Springer, 2015, pp. 101–124.
conference:
end_date: 2015-04-01
location: Gaithersburg, MD, United States
name: 'PKC: Public Key Crypography'
start_date: 2015-03-30
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:15Z
date_published: 2015-03-17T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-06-18T17:50:38Z
day: '17'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_5
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000406205700005'
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_5
intvolume: ' 9020'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46447-2_5
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 101 - 124
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2015
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-3-662-46446-5
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5499'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Anonymous transferable e-cash
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 9020
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1652'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We develop new theoretical tools for proving lower-bounds on the (amortized)
complexity of certain functions in models of parallel computation. We apply the
tools to construct a class of functions with high amortized memory complexity
in the parallel Random Oracle Model (pROM); a variant of the standard ROM allowing
for batches of simultaneous queries. In particular we obtain a new, more robust,
type of Memory-Hard Functions (MHF); a security primitive which has recently been
gaining acceptance in practice as an effective means of countering brute-force
attacks on security relevant functions. Along the way we also demonstrate an important
shortcoming of previous definitions of MHFs and give a new definition addressing
the problem. The tools we develop represent an adaptation of the powerful pebbling
paradigm (initially introduced by Hewitt and Paterson [HP70] and Cook [Coo73])
to a simple and intuitive parallel setting. We define a simple pebbling game Gp
over graphs which aims to abstract parallel computation in an intuitive way. As
a conceptual contribution we define a measure of pebbling complexity for graphs
called cumulative complexity (CC) and show how it overcomes a crucial shortcoming
(in the parallel setting) exhibited by more traditional complexity measures used
in the past. As a main technical contribution we give an explicit construction
of a constant in-degree family of graphs whose CC in Gp approaches maximality
to within a polylogarithmic factor for any graph of equal size (analogous to the
graphs of Tarjan et. al. [PTC76, LT82] for sequential pebbling games). Finally,
for a given graph G and related function fG, we derive a lower-bound on the amortized
memory complexity of fG in the pROM in terms of the CC of G in the game Gp.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Joel F
full_name: Alwen, Joel F
id: 2A8DFA8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Alwen
- first_name: Vladimir
full_name: Serbinenko, Vladimir
last_name: Serbinenko
citation:
ama: 'Alwen JF, Serbinenko V. High parallel complexity graphs and memory-hard functions.
In: Proceedings of the 47th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing.
ACM; 2015:595-603. doi:10.1145/2746539.2746622'
apa: 'Alwen, J. F., & Serbinenko, V. (2015). High parallel complexity graphs
and memory-hard functions. In Proceedings of the 47th annual ACM symposium
on Theory of computing (pp. 595–603). Portland, OR, United States: ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/2746539.2746622'
chicago: Alwen, Joel F, and Vladimir Serbinenko. “High Parallel Complexity Graphs
and Memory-Hard Functions.” In Proceedings of the 47th Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing, 595–603. ACM, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1145/2746539.2746622.
ieee: J. F. Alwen and V. Serbinenko, “High parallel complexity graphs and memory-hard
functions,” in Proceedings of the 47th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing,
Portland, OR, United States, 2015, pp. 595–603.
ista: 'Alwen JF, Serbinenko V. 2015. High parallel complexity graphs and memory-hard
functions. Proceedings of the 47th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing.
STOC: Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 595–603.'
mla: Alwen, Joel F., and Vladimir Serbinenko. “High Parallel Complexity Graphs and
Memory-Hard Functions.” Proceedings of the 47th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory
of Computing, ACM, 2015, pp. 595–603, doi:10.1145/2746539.2746622.
short: J.F. Alwen, V. Serbinenko, in:, Proceedings of the 47th Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing, ACM, 2015, pp. 595–603.
conference:
end_date: 2015-06-17
location: Portland, OR, United States
name: 'STOC: Symposium on the Theory of Computing'
start_date: 2015-06-14
corr_author: '1'
cryptoeprintid: 1
das_tickbox: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:16Z
date_published: 2015-06-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-06-22T14:08:55Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1145/2746539.2746622
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
cryptoeprintid:
- 2014/238
isi:
- '000485296600063'
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1145/2746539.2746622
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/238
month: '06'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 595 - 603
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: Proceedings of the 47th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
publication_status: published
publisher: ACM
publist_id: '5498'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: High parallel complexity graphs and memory-hard functions
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1654'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "HMAC and its variant NMAC are the most popular approaches to deriving a MAC
(and more generally, a PRF) from a cryptographic hash function. Despite nearly
two decades of research, their exact security still remains far from understood
in many different contexts. Indeed, recent works have re-surfaced interest for
{\\em generic} attacks, i.e., attacks that treat the compression function of the
underlying hash function as a black box.\r\n\r\nGeneric security can be proved
in a model where the underlying compression function is modeled as a random function
-- yet, to date, the question of proving tight, non-trivial bounds on the generic
security of HMAC/NMAC even as a PRF remains a challenging open question.\r\n\r\nIn
this paper, we ask the question of whether a small modification to HMAC and NMAC
can allow us to exactly characterize the security of the resulting constructions,
while only incurring little penalty with respect to efficiency. To this end, we
present simple variants of NMAC and HMAC, for which we prove tight bounds on the
generic PRF security, expressed in terms of numbers of construction and compression
function queries necessary to break the construction. All of our constructions
are obtained via a (near) {\\em black-box} modification of NMAC and HMAC, which
can be interpreted as an initial step of key-dependent message pre-processing.\r\n\r\nWhile
our focus is on PRF security, a further attractive feature of our new constructions
is that they clearly defeat all recent generic attacks against properties such
as state recovery and universal forgery. These exploit properties of the so-called
``functional graph'' which are not directly accessible in our new constructions. "
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Gazi, Peter
id: 3E0BFE38-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Gazi
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Stefano
full_name: Tessaro, Stefano
last_name: Tessaro
citation:
ama: Gazi P, Pietrzak KZ, Tessaro S. Generic security of NMAC and HMAC with input
whitening. 2015;9453:85-109. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_4
apa: 'Gazi, P., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Tessaro, S. (2015). Generic security of NMAC
and HMAC with input whitening. Presented at the ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application
of Cryptology and Information Security, Auckland, New Zealand: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_4'
chicago: Gazi, Peter, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Stefano Tessaro. “Generic Security
of NMAC and HMAC with Input Whitening.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer,
2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_4.
ieee: P. Gazi, K. Z. Pietrzak, and S. Tessaro, “Generic security of NMAC and HMAC
with input whitening,” vol. 9453. Springer, pp. 85–109, 2015.
ista: Gazi P, Pietrzak KZ, Tessaro S. 2015. Generic security of NMAC and HMAC with
input whitening. 9453, 85–109.
mla: Gazi, Peter, et al. Generic Security of NMAC and HMAC with Input Whitening.
Vol. 9453, Springer, 2015, pp. 85–109, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_4.
short: P. Gazi, K.Z. Pietrzak, S. Tessaro, 9453 (2015) 85–109.
conference:
end_date: 2015-12-03
location: Auckland, New Zealand
name: 'ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security'
start_date: 2015-11-29
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:17Z
date_published: 2015-12-30T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T09:09:09Z
day: '30'
ddc:
- '004'
- '005'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_4
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000375152100004'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: d1e53203db2d8573a560995ccdffac62
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:09:09Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:08Z
file_id: '4732'
file_name: IST-2016-676-v1+1_881.pdf
file_size: 512071
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:08Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_4
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9453'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 85 - 109
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5496'
pubrep_id: '676'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Generic security of NMAC and HMAC with input whitening
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9453
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1668'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We revisit the security (as a pseudorandom permutation) of cascading-based
constructions for block-cipher key-length extension. Previous works typically
considered the extreme case where the adversary is given the entire codebook of
the construction, the only complexity measure being the number qe of queries to
the underlying ideal block cipher, representing adversary’s secret-key-independent
computation. Here, we initiate a systematic study of the more natural case of
an adversary restricted to adaptively learning a number qc of plaintext/ciphertext
pairs that is less than the entire codebook. For any such qc, we aim to determine
the highest number of block-cipher queries qe the adversary can issue without
being able to successfully distinguish the construction (under a secret key) from
a random permutation.\r\nMore concretely, we show the following results for key-length
extension schemes using a block cipher with n-bit blocks and κ-bit keys:\r\nPlain
cascades of length ℓ=2r+1 are secure whenever qcqre≪2r(κ+n), qc≪2κ and qe≪22κ.
The bound for r=1 also applies to two-key triple encryption (as used within Triple
DES).\r\nThe r-round XOR-cascade is secure as long as qcqre≪2r(κ+n), matching
an attack by Gaži (CRYPTO 2013).\r\nWe fully characterize the security of Gaži
and Tessaro’s two-call "
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Gazi, Peter
id: 3E0BFE38-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Gazi
- first_name: Jooyoung
full_name: Lee, Jooyoung
last_name: Lee
- first_name: Yannick
full_name: Seurin, Yannick
last_name: Seurin
- first_name: John
full_name: Steinberger, John
last_name: Steinberger
- first_name: Stefano
full_name: Tessaro, Stefano
last_name: Tessaro
citation:
ama: 'Gazi P, Lee J, Seurin Y, Steinberger J, Tessaro S. Relaxing full-codebook
security: A refined analysis of key-length extension schemes. 2015;9054:319-341.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5_16'
apa: 'Gazi, P., Lee, J., Seurin, Y., Steinberger, J., & Tessaro, S. (2015).
Relaxing full-codebook security: A refined analysis of key-length extension schemes.
Presented at the FSE: Fast Software Encryption, Istanbul, Turkey: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5_16'
chicago: 'Gazi, Peter, Jooyoung Lee, Yannick Seurin, John Steinberger, and Stefano
Tessaro. “Relaxing Full-Codebook Security: A Refined Analysis of Key-Length Extension
Schemes.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5_16.'
ieee: 'P. Gazi, J. Lee, Y. Seurin, J. Steinberger, and S. Tessaro, “Relaxing full-codebook
security: A refined analysis of key-length extension schemes,” vol. 9054. Springer,
pp. 319–341, 2015.'
ista: 'Gazi P, Lee J, Seurin Y, Steinberger J, Tessaro S. 2015. Relaxing full-codebook
security: A refined analysis of key-length extension schemes. 9054, 319–341.'
mla: 'Gazi, Peter, et al. Relaxing Full-Codebook Security: A Refined Analysis
of Key-Length Extension Schemes. Vol. 9054, Springer, 2015, pp. 319–41, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5_16.'
short: P. Gazi, J. Lee, Y. Seurin, J. Steinberger, S. Tessaro, 9054 (2015) 319–341.
conference:
end_date: 2015-03-11
location: Istanbul, Turkey
name: 'FSE: Fast Software Encryption'
start_date: 2015-03-08
corr_author: '1'
cryptoeprintid: 1
das_tickbox: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:22Z
date_published: 2015-08-12T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-06-22T14:09:37Z
day: '12'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5_16
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
cryptoeprintid:
- 2015/397
isi:
- '000363765800016'
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5_16
intvolume: ' 9054'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/397
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 319 - 341
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5481'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: 'Relaxing full-codebook security: A refined analysis of key-length extension
schemes'
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 9054
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1669'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Computational notions of entropy (a.k.a. pseudoentropy) have found many applications,
including leakage-resilient cryptography, deterministic encryption or memory delegation.
The most important tools to argue about pseudoentropy are chain rules, which quantify
by how much (in terms of quantity and quality) the pseudoentropy of a given random
variable X decreases when conditioned on some other variable Z (think for example
of X as a secret key and Z as information leaked by a side-channel). In this paper
we give a very simple and modular proof of the chain rule for HILL pseudoentropy,
improving best known parameters. Our version allows for increasing the acceptable
length of leakage in applications up to a constant factor compared to the best
previous bounds. As a contribution of independent interest, we provide a comprehensive
study of all known versions of the chain rule, comparing their worst-case strength
and limitations.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Maciej
full_name: Skórski, Maciej
last_name: Skórski
citation:
ama: Pietrzak KZ, Skórski M. The chain rule for HILL pseudoentropy, revisited. 2015;9230:81-98.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-22174-8_5
apa: 'Pietrzak, K. Z., & Skórski, M. (2015). The chain rule for HILL pseudoentropy,
revisited. Presented at the LATINCRYPT: Cryptology and Information Security in
Latin America, Guadalajara, Mexico: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22174-8_5'
chicago: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z, and Maciej Skórski. “The Chain Rule for HILL Pseudoentropy,
Revisited.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22174-8_5.
ieee: K. Z. Pietrzak and M. Skórski, “The chain rule for HILL pseudoentropy, revisited,”
vol. 9230. Springer, pp. 81–98, 2015.
ista: Pietrzak KZ, Skórski M. 2015. The chain rule for HILL pseudoentropy, revisited.
9230, 81–98.
mla: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z., and Maciej Skórski. The Chain Rule for HILL Pseudoentropy,
Revisited. Vol. 9230, Springer, 2015, pp. 81–98, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-22174-8_5.
short: K.Z. Pietrzak, M. Skórski, 9230 (2015) 81–98.
conference:
end_date: 2015-08-26
location: Guadalajara, Mexico
name: 'LATINCRYPT: Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America'
start_date: 2015-08-23
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:22Z
date_published: 2015-08-15T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T13:43:07Z
day: '15'
ddc:
- '005'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-22174-8_5
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000363793300005'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 8cd4215b83efba720e8cf27c23ff4781
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:18:29Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:11Z
file_id: '5351'
file_name: IST-2016-669-v1+1_599.pdf
file_size: 443340
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:11Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22174-8_5
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9230'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 81 - 98
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5480'
pubrep_id: '669'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: The chain rule for HILL pseudoentropy, revisited
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9230
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1671'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This paper studies the concrete security of PRFs and MACs obtained by keying
hash functions based on the sponge paradigm. One such hash function is KECCAK,
selected as NIST’s new SHA-3 standard. In contrast to other approaches like HMAC,
the exact security of keyed sponges is not well understood. Indeed, recent security
analyses delivered concrete security bounds which are far from existing attacks.
This paper aims to close this gap. We prove (nearly) exact bounds on the concrete
PRF security of keyed sponges using a random permutation. These bounds are tight
for the most relevant ranges of parameters, i.e., for messages of length (roughly)
l ≤ min{2n/4, 2r} blocks, where n is the state size and r is the desired output
length; and for l ≤ q queries (to the construction or the underlying permutation).
Moreover, we also improve standard-model bounds. As an intermediate step of independent
interest, we prove tight bounds on the PRF security of the truncated CBC-MAC construction,
which operates as plain CBC-MAC, but only returns a prefix of the output.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Gazi, Peter
id: 3E0BFE38-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Gazi
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Stefano
full_name: Tessaro, Stefano
last_name: Tessaro
citation:
ama: 'Gazi P, Pietrzak KZ, Tessaro S. The exact PRF security of truncation: Tight
bounds for keyed sponges and truncated CBC. In: Vol 9215. Springer; 2015:368-387.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_18'
apa: 'Gazi, P., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Tessaro, S. (2015). The exact PRF security
of truncation: Tight bounds for keyed sponges and truncated CBC (Vol. 9215, pp.
368–387). Presented at the CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, Santa
Barbara, CA, United States: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_18'
chicago: 'Gazi, Peter, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Stefano Tessaro. “The Exact PRF
Security of Truncation: Tight Bounds for Keyed Sponges and Truncated CBC,” 9215:368–87.
Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_18.'
ieee: 'P. Gazi, K. Z. Pietrzak, and S. Tessaro, “The exact PRF security of truncation:
Tight bounds for keyed sponges and truncated CBC,” presented at the CRYPTO: International
Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, United States, 2015, vol. 9215, pp.
368–387.'
ista: 'Gazi P, Pietrzak KZ, Tessaro S. 2015. The exact PRF security of truncation:
Tight bounds for keyed sponges and truncated CBC. CRYPTO: International Cryptology
Conference, LNCS, vol. 9215, 368–387.'
mla: 'Gazi, Peter, et al. The Exact PRF Security of Truncation: Tight Bounds
for Keyed Sponges and Truncated CBC. Vol. 9215, Springer, 2015, pp. 368–87,
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_18.'
short: P. Gazi, K.Z. Pietrzak, S. Tessaro, in:, Springer, 2015, pp. 368–387.
conference:
end_date: 2015-08-20
location: Santa Barbara, CA, United States
name: 'CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference'
start_date: 2015-08-16
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:23Z
date_published: 2015-08-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T13:50:18Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '004'
- '005'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_18
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000364183000018'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 17d854227b3b753fd34f5d29e5b5a32e
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:10:38Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:11Z
file_id: '4827'
file_name: IST-2016-673-v1+1_053.pdf
file_size: 592296
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:11Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_18
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9215'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 368 - 387
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5478'
pubrep_id: '673'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'The exact PRF security of truncation: Tight bounds for keyed sponges and truncated
CBC'
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9215
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1672'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Composable notions of incoercibility aim to forbid a coercer from using anything
beyond the coerced parties’ inputs and outputs to catch them when they try to
deceive him. Existing definitions are restricted to weak coercion types, and/or
are not universally composable. Furthermore, they often make too strong assumptions
on the knowledge of coerced parties—e.g., they assume they known the identities
and/or the strategies of other coerced parties, or those of corrupted parties—
which makes them unsuitable for applications of incoercibility such as e-voting,
where colluding adversarial parties may attempt to coerce honest voters, e.g.,
by offering them money for a promised vote, and use their own view to check that
the voter keeps his end of the bargain. In this work we put forward the first
universally composable notion of incoercible multi-party computation, which satisfies
the above intuition and does not assume collusions among coerced parties or knowledge
of the corrupted set. We define natural notions of UC incoercibility corresponding
to standard coercion-types, i.e., receipt-freeness and resistance to full-active
coercion. Importantly, our suggested notion has the unique property that it builds
on top of the well studied UC framework by Canetti instead of modifying it. This
guarantees backwards compatibility, and allows us to inherit results from the
rich UC literature. We then present MPC protocols which realize our notions of
UC incoercibility given access to an arguably minimal setup—namely honestly generate
tamper-proof hardware performing a very simple cryptographic operation—e.g., a
smart card. This is, to our knowledge, the first proposed construction of an MPC
protocol (for more than two parties) that is incoercibly secure and universally
composable, and therefore the first construction of a universally composable receipt-free
e-voting protocol.
acknowledgement: Joël Alwen was supported by the ERC starting grant (259668-PSPC).
Rafail Ostrovsky was supported in part by NSF grants 09165174, 1065276, 1118126
and 1136174, US-Israel BSF grant 2008411, OKAWA Foundation Research Award, IBM Faculty
Research Award, Xerox Faculty Research Award, B. John Garrick Foundation Award,
Teradata Research Award, Lockheed-Martin Corporation Research Award, and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency through the U.S. Office of Naval Research under
Contract N00014 -11 -1-0392. The views expressed are those of the author and do
not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the
U.S. Government. Vassilis Zikas was supported in part by the Swiss National Science
Foundation (SNF) via the Ambizione grant PZ00P-2142549.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Joel F
full_name: Alwen, Joel F
id: 2A8DFA8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Alwen
- first_name: Rafail
full_name: Ostrovsky, Rafail
last_name: Ostrovsky
- first_name: Hongsheng
full_name: Zhou, Hongsheng
last_name: Zhou
- first_name: Vassilis
full_name: Zikas, Vassilis
last_name: Zikas
citation:
ama: 'Alwen JF, Ostrovsky R, Zhou H, Zikas V. Incoercible multi-party computation
and universally composable receipt-free voting. In: Advances in Cryptology
- CRYPTO 2015. Vol 9216. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer; 2015:763-780.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_37'
apa: 'Alwen, J. F., Ostrovsky, R., Zhou, H., & Zikas, V. (2015). Incoercible
multi-party computation and universally composable receipt-free voting. In Advances
in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015 (Vol. 9216, pp. 763–780). Santa Barbara, CA, United
States: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_37'
chicago: Alwen, Joel F, Rafail Ostrovsky, Hongsheng Zhou, and Vassilis Zikas. “Incoercible
Multi-Party Computation and Universally Composable Receipt-Free Voting.” In Advances
in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015, 9216:763–80. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_37.
ieee: J. F. Alwen, R. Ostrovsky, H. Zhou, and V. Zikas, “Incoercible multi-party
computation and universally composable receipt-free voting,” in Advances in
Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015, Santa Barbara, CA, United States, 2015, vol. 9216,
pp. 763–780.
ista: 'Alwen JF, Ostrovsky R, Zhou H, Zikas V. 2015. Incoercible multi-party computation
and universally composable receipt-free voting. Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO
2015. CRYPTO: International Cryptology ConferenceLecture Notes in Computer Science,
LNCS, vol. 9216, 763–780.'
mla: Alwen, Joel F., et al. “Incoercible Multi-Party Computation and Universally
Composable Receipt-Free Voting.” Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015,
vol. 9216, Springer, 2015, pp. 763–80, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_37.
short: J.F. Alwen, R. Ostrovsky, H. Zhou, V. Zikas, in:, Advances in Cryptology
- CRYPTO 2015, Springer, 2015, pp. 763–780.
conference:
end_date: 2015-08-20
location: Santa Barbara, CA, United States
name: 'CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference'
start_date: 2015-08-16
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:23Z
date_published: 2015-08-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T09:21:24Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_37
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000364183100037'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 5b6649e80d1f781a8910f7cce6427f78
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2020-05-15T08:55:29Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:11Z
file_id: '7853'
file_name: 2015_CRYPTO_Alwen.pdf
file_size: 397363
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:11Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_37
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 9216'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 763 - 780
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2015
publication_identifier:
eisbn:
- 978-3-662-48000-7
isbn:
- 978-3-662-47999-5
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5476'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Incoercible multi-party computation and universally composable receipt-free
voting
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9216
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '1675'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Proofs of work (PoW) have been suggested by Dwork and Naor (Crypto’92) as
protection to a shared resource. The basic idea is to ask the service requestor
to dedicate some non-trivial amount of computational work to every request. The
original applications included prevention of spam and protection against denial
of service attacks. More recently, PoWs have been used to prevent double spending
in the Bitcoin digital currency system. In this work, we put forward an alternative
concept for PoWs - so-called proofs of space (PoS), where a service requestor
must dedicate a significant amount of disk space as opposed to computation. We
construct secure PoS schemes in the random oracle model (with one additional mild
assumption required for the proof to go through), using graphs with high “pebbling
complexity” and Merkle hash-trees. We discuss some applications, including follow-up
work where a decentralized digital currency scheme called Spacecoin is constructed
that uses PoS (instead of wasteful PoW like in Bitcoin) to prevent double spending.
The main technical contribution of this work is the construction of (directed,
loop-free) graphs on N vertices with in-degree O(log logN) such that even if one
places Θ(N) pebbles on the nodes of the graph, there’s a constant fraction of
nodes that needs Θ(N) steps to be pebbled (where in every step one can put a pebble
on a node if all its parents have a pebble).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Dziembowski, Stefan
last_name: Dziembowski
- first_name: Sebastian
full_name: Faust, Sebastian
last_name: Faust
- first_name: Vladimir
full_name: Kolmogorov, Vladimir
id: 3D50B0BA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Kolmogorov
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Dziembowski S, Faust S, Kolmogorov V, Pietrzak KZ. Proofs of space. In: 35th
Annual Cryptology Conference. Vol 9216. Springer; 2015:585-605. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_29'
apa: 'Dziembowski, S., Faust, S., Kolmogorov, V., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2015).
Proofs of space. In 35th Annual Cryptology Conference (Vol. 9216, pp. 585–605).
Santa Barbara, CA, United States: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_29'
chicago: Dziembowski, Stefan, Sebastian Faust, Vladimir Kolmogorov, and Krzysztof
Z Pietrzak. “Proofs of Space.” In 35th Annual Cryptology Conference, 9216:585–605.
Springer, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_29.
ieee: S. Dziembowski, S. Faust, V. Kolmogorov, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Proofs of space,”
in 35th Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, United States,
2015, vol. 9216, pp. 585–605.
ista: 'Dziembowski S, Faust S, Kolmogorov V, Pietrzak KZ. 2015. Proofs of space.
35th Annual Cryptology Conference. CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference,
LNCS, vol. 9216, 585–605.'
mla: Dziembowski, Stefan, et al. “Proofs of Space.” 35th Annual Cryptology Conference,
vol. 9216, Springer, 2015, pp. 585–605, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_29.
short: S. Dziembowski, S. Faust, V. Kolmogorov, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, 35th Annual
Cryptology Conference, Springer, 2015, pp. 585–605.
conference:
end_date: 2015-08-20
location: Santa Barbara, CA, United States
name: 'CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference'
start_date: 2015-08-16
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:24Z
date_published: 2015-08-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T09:55:25Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: VlKo
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_29
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000364183100029'
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48000-7_29
intvolume: ' 9216'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/796.pdf
month: '08'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 585 - 605
project:
- _id: 25FBA906-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '616160'
name: 'Discrete Optimization in Computer Vision: Theory and Practice'
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: 35th Annual Cryptology Conference
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- '9783662479995'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5474'
pubrep_id: '671'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '2274'
relation: earlier_version
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Proofs of space
type: conference
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 9216
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '2219'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Recently, Döttling et al. (ASIACRYPT 2012) proposed the first chosen-ciphertext
(IND-CCA) secure public-key encryption scheme from the learning parity with noise
(LPN) assumption. In this work we give an alternative scheme which is conceptually
simpler and more efficient. At the core of our construction is a trapdoor technique
originally proposed for lattices by Micciancio and Peikert (EUROCRYPT 2012), which
we adapt to the LPN setting. The main technical tool is a new double-trapdoor
mechanism, together with a trapdoor switching lemma based on a computational variant
of the leftover hash lemma.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Eike
full_name: Kiltz, Eike
last_name: Kiltz
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Masny, Daniel
last_name: Masny
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Kiltz E, Masny D, Pietrzak KZ. Simple chosen-ciphertext security from low
noise LPN. In: Vol 8383. Springer; 2014:1-18. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54631-0_1'
apa: 'Kiltz, E., Masny, D., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2014). Simple chosen-ciphertext
security from low noise LPN (Vol. 8383, pp. 1–18). Presented at the IACR: International
Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography, Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54631-0_1'
chicago: Kiltz, Eike, Daniel Masny, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “Simple Chosen-Ciphertext
Security from Low Noise LPN,” 8383:1–18. Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54631-0_1.
ieee: 'E. Kiltz, D. Masny, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Simple chosen-ciphertext security
from low noise LPN,” presented at the IACR: International Conference on Practice
and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography, 2014, vol. 8383, pp. 1–18.'
ista: 'Kiltz E, Masny D, Pietrzak KZ. 2014. Simple chosen-ciphertext security from
low noise LPN. IACR: International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key
Cryptography, LNCS, vol. 8383, 1–18.'
mla: Kiltz, Eike, et al. Simple Chosen-Ciphertext Security from Low Noise LPN.
Vol. 8383, Springer, 2014, pp. 1–18, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54631-0_1.
short: E. Kiltz, D. Masny, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2014, pp. 1–18.
conference:
name: 'IACR: International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:56:24Z
date_published: 2014-03-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:56:05Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-54631-0_1
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54631-0_1
intvolume: ' 8383'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/401
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 1 - 18
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-364254630-3
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '4748'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Simple chosen-ciphertext security from low noise LPN
type: conference
user_id: 4435EBFC-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8383
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '2236'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Consider a joint distribution (X,A) on a set. We show that for any family
of distinguishers, there exists a simulator such that 1 no function in can distinguish
(X,A) from (X,h(X)) with advantage ε, 2 h is only O(2 3ℓ ε -2) times less efficient
than the functions in. For the most interesting settings of the parameters (in
particular, the cryptographic case where X has superlogarithmic min-entropy, ε
> 0 is negligible and consists of circuits of polynomial size), we can make
the simulator h deterministic. As an illustrative application of our theorem,
we give a new security proof for the leakage-resilient stream-cipher from Eurocrypt'09.
Our proof is simpler and quantitatively much better than the original proof using
the dense model theorem, giving meaningful security guarantees if instantiated
with a standard blockcipher like AES. Subsequent to this work, Chung, Lui and
Pass gave an interactive variant of our main theorem, and used it to investigate
weak notions of Zero-Knowledge. Vadhan and Zheng give a more constructive version
of our theorem using their new uniform min-max theorem.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Dimitar
full_name: Jetchev, Dimitar
last_name: Jetchev
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Jetchev D, Pietrzak KZ. How to fake auxiliary input. In: Lindell Y, ed. Vol
8349. Springer; 2014:566-590. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24'
apa: 'Jetchev, D., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2014). How to fake auxiliary input. In
Y. Lindell (Ed.) (Vol. 8349, pp. 566–590). Presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography
Conference, San Diego, USA: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24'
chicago: Jetchev, Dimitar, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “How to Fake Auxiliary Input.”
edited by Yehuda Lindell, 8349:566–90. Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24.
ieee: 'D. Jetchev and K. Z. Pietrzak, “How to fake auxiliary input,” presented at
the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, San Diego, USA, 2014, vol. 8349, pp.
566–590.'
ista: 'Jetchev D, Pietrzak KZ. 2014. How to fake auxiliary input. TCC: Theory of
Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 8349, 566–590.'
mla: Jetchev, Dimitar, and Krzysztof Z. Pietrzak. How to Fake Auxiliary Input.
Edited by Yehuda Lindell, vol. 8349, Springer, 2014, pp. 566–90, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24.
short: D. Jetchev, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Y. Lindell (Ed.), Springer, 2014, pp. 566–590.
conference:
end_date: 2014-02-26
location: San Diego, USA
name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
start_date: 2014-02-24
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:56:29Z
date_published: 2014-02-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-06-11T08:02:25Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24
ec_funded: 1
editor:
- first_name: Yehuda
full_name: Lindell, Yehuda
last_name: Lindell
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 42960325c29dcd8d832edadcc3ce0045
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:17:21Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:34Z
file_id: '5275'
file_name: IST-2016-681-v1+1_869_1_.pdf
file_size: 313528
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:34Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 8349'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 566 - 590
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-364254241-1
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '4725'
pubrep_id: '681'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: How to fake auxiliary input
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8349
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '2852'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: A robust combiner for hash functions takes two candidate implementations and
constructs a hash function which is secure as long as at least one of the candidates
is secure. So far, hash function combiners only aim at preserving a single property
such as collision-resistance or pseudorandomness. However, when hash functions
are used in protocols like TLS they are often required to provide several properties
simultaneously. We therefore put forward the notion of robust multi-property combiners
and elaborate on different definitions for such combiners. We then propose a combiner
that provably preserves (target) collision-resistance, pseudorandomness, and being
a secure message authentication code. This combiner satisfies the strongest notion
we propose, which requires that the combined function satisfies every security
property which is satisfied by at least one of the underlying hash function. If
the underlying hash functions have output length n, the combiner has output length
2 n. This basically matches a known lower bound for black-box combiners for collision-resistance
only, thus the other properties can be achieved without penalizing the length
of the hash values. We then propose a combiner which also preserves the property
of being indifferentiable from a random oracle, slightly increasing the output
length to 2 n+ω(log n). Moreover, we show how to augment our constructions in
order to make them also robust for the one-wayness property, but in this case
require an a priory upper bound on the input length.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Marc
full_name: Fischlin, Marc
last_name: Fischlin
- first_name: Anja
full_name: Lehmann, Anja
last_name: Lehmann
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: Fischlin M, Lehmann A, Pietrzak KZ. Robust multi-property combiners for hash
functions. Journal of Cryptology. 2014;27(3):397-428. doi:10.1007/s00145-013-9148-7
apa: Fischlin, M., Lehmann, A., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2014). Robust multi-property
combiners for hash functions. Journal of Cryptology. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-013-9148-7
chicago: Fischlin, Marc, Anja Lehmann, and Krzysztof Z Pietrzak. “Robust Multi-Property
Combiners for Hash Functions.” Journal of Cryptology. Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-013-9148-7.
ieee: M. Fischlin, A. Lehmann, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Robust multi-property combiners
for hash functions,” Journal of Cryptology, vol. 27, no. 3. Springer, pp.
397–428, 2014.
ista: Fischlin M, Lehmann A, Pietrzak KZ. 2014. Robust multi-property combiners
for hash functions. Journal of Cryptology. 27(3), 397–428.
mla: Fischlin, Marc, et al. “Robust Multi-Property Combiners for Hash Functions.”
Journal of Cryptology, vol. 27, no. 3, Springer, 2014, pp. 397–428, doi:10.1007/s00145-013-9148-7.
short: M. Fischlin, A. Lehmann, K.Z. Pietrzak, Journal of Cryptology 27 (2014) 397–428.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:59:56Z
date_published: 2014-07-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-29T11:09:56Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/s00145-013-9148-7
external_id:
isi:
- '000336370500001'
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-013-9148-7
intvolume: ' 27'
isi: 1
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '07'
oa_version: None
page: 397 - 428
publication: Journal of Cryptology
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3940'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '3225'
relation: earlier_version
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Robust multi-property combiners for hash functions
type: journal_article
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 27
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '2082'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'NMAC is a mode of operation which turns a fixed input-length keyed hash function
f into a variable input-length function. A practical single-key variant of NMAC
called HMAC is a very popular and widely deployed message authentication code
(MAC). Security proofs and attacks for NMAC can typically be lifted to HMAC. NMAC
was introduced by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [Crypto''96], who proved it to
be a secure pseudorandom function (PRF), and thus also a MAC, assuming that (1)
f is a PRF and (2) the function we get when cascading f is weakly collision-resistant.
Unfortunately, HMAC is typically instantiated with cryptographic hash functions
like MD5 or SHA-1 for which (2) has been found to be wrong. To restore the provable
guarantees for NMAC, Bellare [Crypto''06] showed its security based solely on
the assumption that f is a PRF, albeit via a non-uniform reduction. - Our first
contribution is a simpler and uniform proof for this fact: If f is an ε-secure
PRF (against q queries) and a δ-non-adaptively secure PRF (against q queries),
then NMAC f is an (ε+ℓqδ)-secure PRF against q queries of length at most ℓ blocks
each. - We then show that this ε+ℓqδ bound is basically tight. For the most interesting
case where ℓqδ ≥ ε we prove this by constructing an f for which an attack with
advantage ℓqδ exists. This also violates the bound O(ℓε) on the PRF-security of
NMAC recently claimed by Koblitz and Menezes. - Finally, we analyze the PRF-security
of a modification of NMAC called NI [An and Bellare, Crypto''99] that differs
mainly by using a compression function with an additional keying input. This avoids
the constant rekeying on multi-block messages in NMAC and allows for a security
proof starting by the standard switch from a PRF to a random function, followed
by an information-theoretic analysis. We carry out such an analysis, obtaining
a tight ℓq2/2 c bound for this step, improving over the trivial bound of ℓ2q2/2c.
The proof borrows combinatorial techniques originally developed for proving the
security of CBC-MAC [Bellare et al., Crypto''05].'
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Gazi, Peter
id: 3E0BFE38-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Gazi
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Michal
full_name: Rybar, Michal
id: 2B3E3DE8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Rybar
citation:
ama: 'Gazi P, Pietrzak KZ, Rybar M. The exact PRF-security of NMAC and HMAC. In:
Garay J, Gennaro R, eds. Vol 8616. Springer; 2014:113-130. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2_7'
apa: 'Gazi, P., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Rybar, M. (2014). The exact PRF-security
of NMAC and HMAC. In J. Garay & R. Gennaro (Eds.) (Vol. 8616, pp. 113–130).
Presented at the CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, USA:
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2_7'
chicago: Gazi, Peter, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Michal Rybar. “The Exact PRF-Security
of NMAC and HMAC.” edited by Juan Garay and Rosario Gennaro, 8616:113–30. Springer,
2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2_7.
ieee: 'P. Gazi, K. Z. Pietrzak, and M. Rybar, “The exact PRF-security of NMAC and
HMAC,” presented at the CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara,
USA, 2014, vol. 8616, no. 1, pp. 113–130.'
ista: 'Gazi P, Pietrzak KZ, Rybar M. 2014. The exact PRF-security of NMAC and HMAC.
CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, LNCS, vol. 8616, 113–130.'
mla: Gazi, Peter, et al. The Exact PRF-Security of NMAC and HMAC. Edited
by Juan Garay and Rosario Gennaro, vol. 8616, no. 1, Springer, 2014, pp. 113–30,
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2_7.
short: P. Gazi, K.Z. Pietrzak, M. Rybar, in:, J. Garay, R. Gennaro (Eds.), Springer,
2014, pp. 113–130.
conference:
end_date: 2014-08-21
location: Santa Barbara, USA
name: 'CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference'
start_date: 2014-08-17
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:55:36Z
date_published: 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-08T14:18:39Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2_7
ec_funded: 1
editor:
- first_name: Juan
full_name: Garay, Juan
last_name: Garay
- first_name: Rosario
full_name: Gennaro, Rosario
last_name: Gennaro
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: dab6ab36a5f6af94f2b597e6404ed11d
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:13:17Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:28Z
file_id: '4999'
file_name: IST-2016-682-v1+1_578.pdf
file_size: 492310
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:28Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44371-2_7
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 8616'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 113 - 130
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '4955'
pubrep_id: '682'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '838'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: The exact PRF-security of NMAC and HMAC
type: conference
user_id: 4435EBFC-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8616
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '2185'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We revisit the classical problem of converting an imperfect source of randomness
into a usable cryptographic key. Assume that we have some cryptographic application
P that expects a uniformly random m-bit key R and ensures that the best attack
(in some complexity class) against P(R) has success probability at most δ. Our
goal is to design a key-derivation function (KDF) h that converts any random source
X of min-entropy k into a sufficiently "good" key h(X), guaranteeing
that P(h(X)) has comparable security δ′ which is ''close'' to δ. Seeded randomness
extractors provide a generic way to solve this problem for all applications P,
with resulting security δ′ = O(δ), provided that we start with entropy k ≥ m +
2 log (1/δ) - O(1). By a result of Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma, this bound on k
(called the "RT-bound") is also known to be tight in general. Unfortunately,
in many situations the loss of 2 log (1/δ) bits of entropy is unacceptable. This
motivates the study KDFs with less entropy waste by placing some restrictions
on the source X or the application P. In this work we obtain the following new
positive and negative results in this regard: - Efficient samplability of the
source X does not help beat the RT-bound for general applications. This resolves
the SRT (samplable RT) conjecture of Dachman-Soled et al. [DGKM12] in the affirmative,
and also shows that the existence of computationally-secure extractors beating
the RT-bound implies the existence of one-way functions. - We continue in the
line of work initiated by Barak et al. [BDK+11] and construct new information-theoretic
KDFs which beat the RT-bound for large but restricted classes of applications.
Specifically, we design efficient KDFs that work for all unpredictability applications
P (e.g., signatures, MACs, one-way functions, etc.) and can either: (1) extract
all of the entropy k = m with a very modest security loss δ′ = O(δ·log (1/δ)),
or alternatively, (2) achieve essentially optimal security δ′ = O(δ) with a very
modest entropy loss k ≥ m + loglog (1/δ). In comparison, the best prior results
from [BDK+11] for this class of applications would only guarantee δ′ = O(√δ) when
k = m, and would need k ≥ m + log (1/δ) to get δ′ = O(δ). - The weaker bounds
of [BDK+11] hold for a larger class of so-called "square- friendly"
applications (which includes all unpredictability, but also some important indistinguishability,
applications). Unfortunately, we show that these weaker bounds are tight for the
larger class of applications. - We abstract out a clean, information-theoretic
notion of (k,δ,δ′)- unpredictability extractors, which guarantee "induced"
security δ′ for any δ-secure unpredictability application P, and characterize
the parameters achievable for such unpredictability extractors. Of independent
interest, we also relate this notion to the previously-known notion of (min-entropy)
condensers, and improve the state-of-the-art parameters for such condensers.'
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Yevgeniy
full_name: Dodis, Yevgeniy
last_name: Dodis
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Wichs, Daniel
last_name: Wichs
citation:
ama: 'Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Wichs D. Key derivation without entropy waste. In: Nguyen
P, Oswald E, eds. Vol 8441. Springer; 2014:93-110. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_6'
apa: 'Dodis, Y., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Wichs, D. (2014). Key derivation without
entropy waste. In P. Nguyen & E. Oswald (Eds.) (Vol. 8441, pp. 93–110). Presented
at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Copenhagen,
Denmark: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_6'
chicago: Dodis, Yevgeniy, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Daniel Wichs. “Key Derivation
without Entropy Waste.” edited by Phong Nguyen and Elisabeth Oswald, 8441:93–110.
Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_6.
ieee: 'Y. Dodis, K. Z. Pietrzak, and D. Wichs, “Key derivation without entropy waste,”
presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques,
Copenhagen, Denmark, 2014, vol. 8441, pp. 93–110.'
ista: 'Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Wichs D. 2014. Key derivation without entropy waste.
EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, LNCS, vol. 8441,
93–110.'
mla: Dodis, Yevgeniy, et al. Key Derivation without Entropy Waste. Edited
by Phong Nguyen and Elisabeth Oswald, vol. 8441, Springer, 2014, pp. 93–110, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_6.
short: Y. Dodis, K.Z. Pietrzak, D. Wichs, in:, P. Nguyen, E. Oswald (Eds.), Springer,
2014, pp. 93–110.
conference:
end_date: 2014-05-15
location: Copenhagen, Denmark
name: 'EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques'
start_date: 2014-05-11
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:56:12Z
date_published: 2014-04-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:55:51Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_6
editor:
- first_name: Phong
full_name: Nguyen, Phong
last_name: Nguyen
- first_name: Elisabeth
full_name: Oswald, Elisabeth
last_name: Oswald
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: da1aa01221086083b23c92e547b48ff4
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:08:43Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:31Z
file_id: '4705'
file_name: IST-2016-680-v1+1_708.pdf
file_size: 505389
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:31Z
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55220-5_6
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 8441'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '04'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 93 - 110
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '4795'
pubrep_id: '680'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Key derivation without entropy waste
type: conference
user_id: 4435EBFC-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8441
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '1643'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We extend the notion of verifiable random functions (VRF) to constrained VRFs,
which generalize the concept of constrained pseudorandom functions, put forward
by Boneh and Waters (Asiacrypt’13), and independently by Kiayias et al. (CCS’13)
and Boyle et al. (PKC’14), who call them delegatable PRFs and functional PRFs,
respectively. In a standard VRF the secret key sk allows one to evaluate a pseudorandom
function at any point of its domain; in addition, it enables computation of a
non-interactive proof that the function value was computed correctly. In a constrained
VRF from the key sk one can derive constrained keys skS for subsets S of the domain,
which allow computation of function values and proofs only at points in S. After
formally defining constrained VRFs, we derive instantiations from the multilinear-maps-based
constrained PRFs by Boneh and Waters, yielding a VRF with constrained keys for
any set that can be decided by a polynomial-size circuit. Our VRFs have the same
function values as the Boneh-Waters PRFs and are proved secure under the same
hardness assumption, showing that verifiability comes at no cost. Constrained
(functional) VRFs were stated as an open problem by Boyle et al.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Georg
full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Fuchsbauer
citation:
ama: 'Fuchsbauer G. Constrained Verifiable Random Functions . In: Abdalla M, De
Prisco R, eds. SCN 2014. Vol 8642. Springer; 2014:95-114. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_7'
apa: 'Fuchsbauer, G. (2014). Constrained Verifiable Random Functions . In M. Abdalla
& R. De Prisco (Eds.), SCN 2014 (Vol. 8642, pp. 95–114). Amalfi, Italy:
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_7'
chicago: Fuchsbauer, Georg. “Constrained Verifiable Random Functions .” In SCN
2014, edited by Michel Abdalla and Roberto De Prisco, 8642:95–114. Springer,
2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_7.
ieee: G. Fuchsbauer, “Constrained Verifiable Random Functions ,” in SCN 2014,
Amalfi, Italy, 2014, vol. 8642, pp. 95–114.
ista: 'Fuchsbauer G. 2014. Constrained Verifiable Random Functions . SCN 2014. SCN:
Security and Cryptography for Networks, LNCS, vol. 8642, 95–114.'
mla: Fuchsbauer, Georg. “Constrained Verifiable Random Functions .” SCN 2014,
edited by Michel Abdalla and Roberto De Prisco, vol. 8642, Springer, 2014, pp.
95–114, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_7.
short: G. Fuchsbauer, in:, M. Abdalla, R. De Prisco (Eds.), SCN 2014, Springer,
2014, pp. 95–114.
conference:
end_date: 2014-09-05
location: Amalfi, Italy
name: 'SCN: Security and Cryptography for Networks'
start_date: 2014-09-03
corr_author: '1'
cryptoeprintid: 1
das_tickbox: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:13Z
date_published: 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-06-22T14:10:02Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_7
ec_funded: 1
editor:
- first_name: Michel
full_name: Abdalla, Michel
last_name: Abdalla
- first_name: Roberto
full_name: De Prisco, Roberto
last_name: De Prisco
external_id:
cryptoeprintid:
- 2014/537
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_7
intvolume: ' 8642'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/537
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 95 - 114
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: SCN 2014
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5509'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Constrained Verifiable Random Functions '
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8642
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '1907'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Most cryptographic security proofs require showing that two systems are indistinguishable.
A central tool in such proofs is that of a game, where winning the game means
provoking a certain condition, and it is shown that the two systems considered
cannot be distinguished unless this condition is provoked. Upper bounding the
probability of winning such a game, i.e., provoking this condition, for an arbitrary
strategy is usually hard, except in the special case where the best strategy for
winning such a game is known to be non-adaptive. A sufficient criterion for ensuring
the optimality of non-adaptive strategies is that of conditional equivalence to
a system, a notion introduced in [1]. In this paper, we show that this criterion
is not necessary to ensure the optimality of non-adaptive strategies by giving
two results of independent interest: 1) the optimality of non-adaptive strategies
is not preserved under parallel composition; 2) in contrast, conditional equivalence
is preserved under parallel composition.'
article_number: '6875125'
author:
- first_name: Grégory
full_name: Demay, Grégory
last_name: Demay
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Gazi, Peter
id: 3E0BFE38-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Gazi
- first_name: Ueli
full_name: Maurer, Ueli
last_name: Maurer
- first_name: Björn
full_name: Tackmann, Björn
last_name: Tackmann
citation:
ama: 'Demay G, Gazi P, Maurer U, Tackmann B. Optimality of non-adaptive strategies:
The case of parallel games. In: IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory. IEEE; 2014. doi:10.1109/ISIT.2014.6875125'
apa: 'Demay, G., Gazi, P., Maurer, U., & Tackmann, B. (2014). Optimality of
non-adaptive strategies: The case of parallel games. In IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory. Honolulu, USA: IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2014.6875125'
chicago: 'Demay, Grégory, Peter Gazi, Ueli Maurer, and Björn Tackmann. “Optimality
of Non-Adaptive Strategies: The Case of Parallel Games.” In IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory. IEEE, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2014.6875125.'
ieee: 'G. Demay, P. Gazi, U. Maurer, and B. Tackmann, “Optimality of non-adaptive
strategies: The case of parallel games,” in IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory, Honolulu, USA, 2014.'
ista: 'Demay G, Gazi P, Maurer U, Tackmann B. 2014. Optimality of non-adaptive strategies:
The case of parallel games. IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory.
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings, 6875125.'
mla: 'Demay, Grégory, et al. “Optimality of Non-Adaptive Strategies: The Case of
Parallel Games.” IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 6875125,
IEEE, 2014, doi:10.1109/ISIT.2014.6875125.'
short: G. Demay, P. Gazi, U. Maurer, B. Tackmann, in:, IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory, IEEE, 2014.
conference:
end_date: 2014-07-04
location: Honolulu, USA
name: IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings
start_date: 2014-06-29
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:54:39Z
date_published: 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:53:59Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1109/ISIT.2014.6875125
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2014.6875125
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/299
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
publication: IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
publication_status: published
publisher: IEEE
publist_id: '5188'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: 'Optimality of non-adaptive strategies: The case of parallel games'
type: conference
user_id: 4435EBFC-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2014'
...
---
OA_place: repository
OA_type: green
_id: '1927'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Constrained pseudorandom functions have recently been introduced independently
by Boneh and Waters (Asiacrypt’13), Kiayias et al. (CCS’13), and Boyle et al.
(PKC’14). In a standard pseudorandom function (PRF) a key k is used to evaluate
the PRF on all inputs in the domain. Constrained PRFs additionally offer the functionality
to delegate “constrained” keys kS which allow to evaluate the PRF only on a subset
S of the domain. The three above-mentioned papers all show that the classical
GGM construction (J.ACM’86) of a PRF from a pseudorandom generator (PRG) directly
yields a constrained PRF where one can compute constrained keys to evaluate the
PRF on all inputs with a given prefix. This constrained PRF has already found
many interesting applications. Unfortunately, the existing security proofs only
show selective security (by a reduction to the security of the underlying PRG).
To achieve full security, one has to use complexity leveraging, which loses an
exponential factor 2N in security, where N is the input length. The first contribution
of this paper is a new reduction that only loses a quasipolynomial factor qlog
N, where q is the number of adversarial queries. For this we develop a new proof
technique which constructs a distinguisher by interleaving simple guessing steps
and hybrid arguments a small number of times. This approach might be of interest
also in other contexts where currently the only technique to achieve full security
is complexity leveraging. Our second contribution is concerned with another constrained
PRF, due to Boneh and Waters, which allows for constrained keys for the more general
class of bit-fixing functions. Their security proof also suffers from a 2N loss,
which we show is inherent. We construct a meta-reduction which shows that any
“simple” reduction of full security from a noninteractive hardness assumption
must incur an exponential security loss.
acknowledgement: "We are grateful to Mihir Bellare for his feedback on earlier versions
of this paper. We are indebted to Vanishree Rao for her generous assistance in preparing
this proceedings version.\r\nResearch supported by ERC starting grant (259668-PSPC)."
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Georg
full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: Momchil
full_name: Konstantinov, Momchil
last_name: Konstantinov
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Vanishree
full_name: Rao, Vanishree
last_name: Rao
citation:
ama: 'Fuchsbauer G, Konstantinov M, Pietrzak KZ, Rao V. Adaptive security of constrained
PRFs. In: 20th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology
and Information Security. Vol 8874. Springer Nature; 2014:82-101. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_5'
apa: 'Fuchsbauer, G., Konstantinov, M., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Rao, V. (2014). Adaptive
security of constrained PRFs. In 20th International Conference on the Theory
and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (Vol. 8874, pp. 82–101).
Kaoshiung, Taiwan, China: Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_5'
chicago: Fuchsbauer, Georg, Momchil Konstantinov, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Vanishree
Rao. “Adaptive Security of Constrained PRFs.” In 20th International Conference
on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, 8874:82–101.
Springer Nature, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_5.
ieee: G. Fuchsbauer, M. Konstantinov, K. Z. Pietrzak, and V. Rao, “Adaptive security
of constrained PRFs,” in 20th International Conference on the Theory and Application
of Cryptology and Information Security, Kaoshiung, Taiwan, China, 2014, vol.
8874, pp. 82–101.
ista: 'Fuchsbauer G, Konstantinov M, Pietrzak KZ, Rao V. 2014. Adaptive security
of constrained PRFs. 20th International Conference on the Theory and Application
of Cryptology and Information Security. ASIACRYPT: Conference on the Theory and
Application of Cryptology and Information Security, LNCS, vol. 8874, 82–101.'
mla: Fuchsbauer, Georg, et al. “Adaptive Security of Constrained PRFs.” 20th
International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information
Security, vol. 8874, Springer Nature, 2014, pp. 82–101, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_5.
short: G. Fuchsbauer, M. Konstantinov, K.Z. Pietrzak, V. Rao, in:, 20th International
Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security,
Springer Nature, 2014, pp. 82–101.
conference:
end_date: 2014-12-11
location: Kaoshiung, Taiwan, China
name: 'ASIACRYPT: Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information
Security'
start_date: 2014-12-07
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:54:45Z
date_published: 2014-12-15T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T09:47:44Z
day: '15'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_5
ec_funded: 1
extern: '1'
fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45608-8_5
intvolume: ' 8874'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/416
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 82-101
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: 20th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology
and Information Security
publication_identifier:
eisbn:
- '9783662456088'
eissn:
- 1611-3349
isbn:
- '9783662456071'
issn:
- 0302-9743
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
publist_id: '5167'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Adaptive security of constrained PRFs
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8874
year: '2014'
...