---
_id: '2047'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Following the publication of an attack on genome-wide association studies
(GWAS) data proposed by Homer et al., considerable attention has been given to
developing methods for releasing GWAS data in a privacy-preserving way. Here,
we develop an end-to-end differentially private method for solving regression
problems with convex penalty functions and selecting the penalty parameters by
cross-validation. In particular, we focus on penalized logistic regression with
elastic-net regularization, a method widely used to in GWAS analyses to identify
disease-causing genes. We show how a differentially private procedure for penalized
logistic regression with elastic-net regularization can be applied to the analysis
of GWAS data and evaluate our method’s performance.
acknowledgement: This research was partially supported by BCS- 0941518 to the Department
of Statistics at Carnegie Mellon University.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
arxiv: 1
author:
- first_name: Fei
full_name: Yu, Fei
last_name: Yu
- first_name: Michal
full_name: Rybar, Michal
id: 2B3E3DE8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Rybar
- first_name: Caroline
full_name: Uhler, Caroline
id: 49ADD78E-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Uhler
orcid: 0000-0002-7008-0216
- first_name: Stephen
full_name: Fienberg, Stephen
last_name: Fienberg
citation:
ama: 'Yu F, Rybar M, Uhler C, Fienberg S. Differentially-private logistic regression
for detecting multiple-SNP association in GWAS databases. In: Domingo Ferrer J,
ed. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in
Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). Vol 8744. Springer;
2014:170-184. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11257-2_14'
apa: 'Yu, F., Rybar, M., Uhler, C., & Fienberg, S. (2014). Differentially-private
logistic regression for detecting multiple-SNP association in GWAS databases.
In J. Domingo Ferrer (Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
(Vol. 8744, pp. 170–184). Ibiza, Spain: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11257-2_14'
chicago: Yu, Fei, Michal Rybar, Caroline Uhler, and Stephen Fienberg. “Differentially-Private
Logistic Regression for Detecting Multiple-SNP Association in GWAS Databases.”
In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in
Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), edited by Josep
Domingo Ferrer, 8744:170–84. Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11257-2_14.
ieee: F. Yu, M. Rybar, C. Uhler, and S. Fienberg, “Differentially-private logistic
regression for detecting multiple-SNP association in GWAS databases,” in Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Ibiza, Spain, 2014, vol. 8744, pp. 170–184.
ista: 'Yu F, Rybar M, Uhler C, Fienberg S. 2014. Differentially-private logistic
regression for detecting multiple-SNP association in GWAS databases. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). PSD: Privacy in Statistical Databases, LNCS,
vol. 8744, 170–184.'
mla: Yu, Fei, et al. “Differentially-Private Logistic Regression for Detecting Multiple-SNP
Association in GWAS Databases.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Including
Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics),
edited by Josep Domingo Ferrer, vol. 8744, Springer, 2014, pp. 170–84, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11257-2_14.
short: F. Yu, M. Rybar, C. Uhler, S. Fienberg, in:, J. Domingo Ferrer (Ed.), Lecture
Notes in Computer Science (Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence
and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), Springer, 2014, pp. 170–184.
conference:
end_date: 2014-09-19
location: Ibiza, Spain
name: 'PSD: Privacy in Statistical Databases'
start_date: 2014-09-17
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:55:24Z
date_published: 2014-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-11-04T13:35:21Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
- _id: CaUh
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-11257-2_14
editor:
- first_name: Josep
full_name: Domingo Ferrer, Josep
last_name: Domingo Ferrer
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1407.8067'
intvolume: ' 8744'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.8067
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 170 - 184
project:
- _id: 25636330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
grant_number: 11-NSF-1070
name: Genome-wide Analysis of Root Traits
publication: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes
in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5004'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Differentially-private logistic regression for detecting multiple-SNP association
in GWAS databases
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8744
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '2258'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In a digital signature scheme with message recovery, rather than transmitting
the message m and its signature σ, a single enhanced signature τ is transmitted.
The verifier is able to recover m from τ and at the same time verify its authenticity.
The two most important parameters of such a scheme are its security and overhead
|τ| − |m|. A simple argument shows that for any scheme with “n bits security”
|τ| − |m| ≥ n, i.e., the overhead is lower bounded by the security parameter n.
Currently, the best known constructions in the random oracle model are far from
this lower bound requiring an overhead of n + logq h , where q h is the number
of queries to the random oracle. In this paper we give a construction which basically
matches the n bit lower bound. We propose a simple digital signature scheme with
n + o(logq h ) bits overhead, where q h denotes the number of random oracle queries.\r\n\r\nOur
construction works in two steps. First, we propose a signature scheme with message
recovery having optimal overhead in a new ideal model, the random invertible function
model. Second, we show that a four-round Feistel network with random oracles as
round functions is tightly “public-indifferentiable” from a random invertible
function. At the core of our indifferentiability proof is an almost tight upper
bound for the expected number of edges of the densest “small” subgraph of a random
Cayley graph, which may be of independent interest.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Eike
full_name: Kiltz, Eike
last_name: Kiltz
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Mario
full_name: Szegedy, Mario
last_name: Szegedy
citation:
ama: Kiltz E, Pietrzak KZ, Szegedy M. Digital signatures with minimal overhead from
indifferentiable random invertible functions. 2013;8042:571-588. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_31
apa: 'Kiltz, E., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Szegedy, M. (2013). Digital signatures with
minimal overhead from indifferentiable random invertible functions. Presented
at the CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, United
States: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_31'
chicago: Kiltz, Eike, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Mario Szegedy. “Digital Signatures
with Minimal Overhead from Indifferentiable Random Invertible Functions.” Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_31.
ieee: E. Kiltz, K. Z. Pietrzak, and M. Szegedy, “Digital signatures with minimal
overhead from indifferentiable random invertible functions,” vol. 8042. Springer,
pp. 571–588, 2013.
ista: Kiltz E, Pietrzak KZ, Szegedy M. 2013. Digital signatures with minimal overhead
from indifferentiable random invertible functions. 8042, 571–588.
mla: Kiltz, Eike, et al. Digital Signatures with Minimal Overhead from Indifferentiable
Random Invertible Functions. Vol. 8042, Springer, 2013, pp. 571–88, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_31.
short: E. Kiltz, K.Z. Pietrzak, M. Szegedy, 8042 (2013) 571–588.
conference:
end_date: 2013-08-22
location: Santa Barbara, CA, United States
name: 'CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference'
start_date: 2013-08-18
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:56:37Z
date_published: 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:56:21Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_31
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 18a3f602cb41de184dc0e16a0e907633
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:09:20Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:35Z
file_id: '4744'
file_name: IST-2016-685-v1+1_658.pdf
file_size: 493175
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:35Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 8042'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 571 - 588
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '4688'
pubrep_id: '685'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Digital signatures with minimal overhead from indifferentiable random invertible
functions
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8042
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2259'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "The learning with rounding (LWR) problem, introduced by Banerjee, Peikert
and Rosen at EUROCRYPT ’12, is a variant of learning with errors (LWE), where
one replaces random errors with deterministic rounding. The LWR problem was shown
to be as hard as LWE for a setting of parameters where the modulus and modulus-to-error
ratio are super-polynomial. In this work we resolve the main open problem and
give a new reduction that works for a larger range of parameters, allowing for
a polynomial modulus and modulus-to-error ratio. In particular, a smaller modulus
gives us greater efficiency, and a smaller modulus-to-error ratio gives us greater
security, which now follows from the worst-case hardness of GapSVP with polynomial
(rather than super-polynomial) approximation factors.\r\n\r\nAs a tool in the
reduction, we show that there is a “lossy mode” for the LWR problem, in which
LWR samples only reveal partial information about the secret. This property gives
us several interesting new applications, including a proof that LWR remains secure
with weakly random secrets of sufficient min-entropy, and very simple constructions
of deterministic encryption, lossy trapdoor functions and reusable extractors.\r\n\r\nOur
approach is inspired by a technique of Goldwasser et al. from ICS ’10, which implicitly
showed the existence of a “lossy mode” for LWE. By refining this technique, we
also improve on the parameters of that work to only requiring a polynomial (instead
of super-polynomial) modulus and modulus-to-error ratio.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Joel F
full_name: Alwen, Joel F
id: 2A8DFA8C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Alwen
- first_name: Stephan
full_name: Krenn, Stephan
id: 329FCCF0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Krenn
orcid: 0000-0003-2835-9093
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Wichs, Daniel
last_name: Wichs
citation:
ama: 'Alwen JF, Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Wichs D. Learning with rounding, revisited:
New reduction properties and applications. 2013;8042(1):57-74. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_4'
apa: 'Alwen, J. F., Krenn, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Wichs, D. (2013). Learning
with rounding, revisited: New reduction properties and applications. Presented
at the CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, United
States: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_4'
chicago: 'Alwen, Joel F, Stephan Krenn, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Daniel Wichs.
“Learning with Rounding, Revisited: New Reduction Properties and Applications.”
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_4.'
ieee: 'J. F. Alwen, S. Krenn, K. Z. Pietrzak, and D. Wichs, “Learning with rounding,
revisited: New reduction properties and applications,” vol. 8042, no. 1. Springer,
pp. 57–74, 2013.'
ista: 'Alwen JF, Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Wichs D. 2013. Learning with rounding, revisited:
New reduction properties and applications. 8042(1), 57–74.'
mla: 'Alwen, Joel F., et al. Learning with Rounding, Revisited: New Reduction
Properties and Applications. Vol. 8042, no. 1, Springer, 2013, pp. 57–74,
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_4.'
short: J.F. Alwen, S. Krenn, K.Z. Pietrzak, D. Wichs, 8042 (2013) 57–74.
conference:
end_date: 2013-08-22
location: Santa Barbara, CA, United States
name: 'CRYPTO: International Cryptology Conference'
start_date: 2013-08-18
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:56:37Z
date_published: 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:56:21Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-40041-4_4
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 16d428408a806b8e49eecc607deab115
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:11:55Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:35Z
file_id: '4912'
file_name: IST-2016-684-v1+1_098.pdf
file_size: 587898
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:35Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 8042'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 57 - 74
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '4687'
pubrep_id: '684'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: 'Learning with rounding, revisited: New reduction properties and applications'
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 8042
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2260'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is one of the most complex cryptographic
protocols deployed in practice. It allows an embedded secure processor known as
a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to attest to the configuration of its host computer
without violating the owner’s privacy. DAA has been standardized by the Trusted
Computing Group and ISO/IEC.\r\n\r\nThe security of the DAA standard and all existing
schemes is analyzed in the random-oracle model. We provide the first constructions
of DAA in the standard model, that is, without relying on random oracles. Our
constructions use new building blocks, including the first efficient signatures
of knowledge in the standard model, which have many applications beyond DAA.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: David
full_name: Bernhard, David
last_name: Bernhard
- first_name: Georg
full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: Essam
full_name: Ghadafi, Essam
last_name: Ghadafi
citation:
ama: Bernhard D, Fuchsbauer G, Ghadafi E. Efficient signatures of knowledge and
DAA in the standard model. 2013;7954:518-533. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_33
apa: 'Bernhard, D., Fuchsbauer, G., & Ghadafi, E. (2013). Efficient signatures
of knowledge and DAA in the standard model. Presented at the ACNS: Applied Cryptography
and Network Security, Banff, AB, Canada: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_33'
chicago: Bernhard, David, Georg Fuchsbauer, and Essam Ghadafi. “Efficient Signatures
of Knowledge and DAA in the Standard Model.” Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
Springer, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_33.
ieee: D. Bernhard, G. Fuchsbauer, and E. Ghadafi, “Efficient signatures of knowledge
and DAA in the standard model,” vol. 7954. Springer, pp. 518–533, 2013.
ista: Bernhard D, Fuchsbauer G, Ghadafi E. 2013. Efficient signatures of knowledge
and DAA in the standard model. 7954, 518–533.
mla: Bernhard, David, et al. Efficient Signatures of Knowledge and DAA in the
Standard Model. Vol. 7954, Springer, 2013, pp. 518–33, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_33.
short: D. Bernhard, G. Fuchsbauer, E. Ghadafi, 7954 (2013) 518–533.
conference:
end_date: 2013-06-28
location: Banff, AB, Canada
name: 'ACNS: Applied Cryptography and Network Security'
start_date: 2013-06-25
cryptoeprintid: 1
das_tickbox: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:56:37Z
date_published: 2013-06-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-06-22T14:11:25Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_33
external_id:
cryptoeprintid:
- 2012/475
intvolume: ' 7954'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/475
month: '06'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 518 - 533
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '4686'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Efficient signatures of knowledge and DAA in the standard model
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7954
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2274'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Proofs of work (PoW) have been suggested by Dwork and Naor (Crypto'92) as
protection to a shared resource. The basic idea is to ask the service requestor
to dedicate some non-trivial amount of computational work to every request. The
original applications included prevention of spam and protection against denial
of service attacks. More recently, PoWs have been used to prevent double spending
in the Bitcoin digital currency system.\r\n\r\nIn this work, we put forward an
alternative concept for PoWs -- so-called proofs of space (PoS), where a service
requestor must dedicate a significant amount of disk space as opposed to computation.
We construct secure PoS schemes in the random oracle model, using graphs with
high "pebbling complexity" and Merkle hash-trees. "
author:
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Dziembowski, Stefan
last_name: Dziembowski
- first_name: Sebastian
full_name: Faust, Sebastian
last_name: Faust
- first_name: Vladimir
full_name: Kolmogorov, Vladimir
id: 3D50B0BA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Kolmogorov
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: Dziembowski S, Faust S, Kolmogorov V, Pietrzak KZ. Proofs of Space.
IST Austria; 2013.
apa: Dziembowski, S., Faust, S., Kolmogorov, V., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2013). Proofs
of Space. IST Austria.
chicago: Dziembowski, Stefan, Sebastian Faust, Vladimir Kolmogorov, and Krzysztof
Z Pietrzak. Proofs of Space. IST Austria, 2013.
ieee: S. Dziembowski, S. Faust, V. Kolmogorov, and K. Z. Pietrzak, Proofs of
Space. IST Austria, 2013.
ista: Dziembowski S, Faust S, Kolmogorov V, Pietrzak KZ. 2013. Proofs of Space,
IST Austria,p.
mla: Dziembowski, Stefan, et al. Proofs of Space. IST Austria, 2013.
short: S. Dziembowski, S. Faust, V. Kolmogorov, K.Z. Pietrzak, Proofs of Space,
IST Austria, 2013.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:56:42Z
date_published: 2013-11-28T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-23T09:55:25Z
day: '28'
ddc:
- '530'
department:
- _id: VlKo
- _id: KrPi
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 37b61637b62fc079d9141c59d9f1a94f
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:16:11Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:36Z
file_id: '5197'
file_name: IST-2016-671-v1+1_796.pdf
file_size: 405870
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:36Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication_status: published
publisher: IST Austria
publist_id: '4670'
pubrep_id: '671'
related_material:
record:
- id: '1675'
relation: later_version
status: public
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Proofs of Space
type: report
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2291'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Cryptographic access control promises to offer easily distributed trust and
broader applicability, while reducing reliance on low-level online monitors. Traditional
implementations of cryptographic access control rely on simple cryptographic primitives
whereas recent endeavors employ primitives with richer functionality and security
guarantees. Worryingly, few of the existing cryptographic access-control schemes
come with precise guarantees, the gap between the policy specification and the
implementation being analyzed only informally, if at all. In this paper we begin
addressing this shortcoming. Unlike prior work that targeted ad-hoc policy specification,
we look at the well-established Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model, as used
in a typical file system. In short, we provide a precise syntax for a computational
version of RBAC, offer rigorous definitions for cryptographic policy enforcement
of a large class of RBAC security policies, and demonstrate that an implementation
based on attribute-based encryption meets our security notions. We view our main
contribution as being at the conceptual level. Although we work with RBAC for
concreteness, our general methodology could guide future research for uses of
cryptography in other access-control models. \r\n"
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Anna
full_name: Ferrara, Anna
last_name: Ferrara
- first_name: Georg
full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: Bogdan
full_name: Warinschi, Bogdan
last_name: Warinschi
citation:
ama: 'Ferrara A, Fuchsbauer G, Warinschi B. Cryptographically enforced RBAC. In:
IEEE; 2013:115-129. doi:10.1109/CSF.2013.15'
apa: 'Ferrara, A., Fuchsbauer, G., & Warinschi, B. (2013). Cryptographically
enforced RBAC (pp. 115–129). Presented at the CSF: Computer Security Foundations,
New Orleans, LA, United States: IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2013.15'
chicago: Ferrara, Anna, Georg Fuchsbauer, and Bogdan Warinschi. “Cryptographically
Enforced RBAC,” 115–29. IEEE, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2013.15.
ieee: 'A. Ferrara, G. Fuchsbauer, and B. Warinschi, “Cryptographically enforced
RBAC,” presented at the CSF: Computer Security Foundations, New Orleans, LA, United
States, 2013, pp. 115–129.'
ista: 'Ferrara A, Fuchsbauer G, Warinschi B. 2013. Cryptographically enforced RBAC.
CSF: Computer Security Foundations, 115–129.'
mla: Ferrara, Anna, et al. Cryptographically Enforced RBAC. IEEE, 2013, pp.
115–29, doi:10.1109/CSF.2013.15.
short: A. Ferrara, G. Fuchsbauer, B. Warinschi, in:, IEEE, 2013, pp. 115–129.
conference:
end_date: 2013-09-28
location: New Orleans, LA, United States
name: 'CSF: Computer Security Foundations'
start_date: 2013-09-26
cryptoeprintid: 1
das_tickbox: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:56:48Z
date_published: 2013-09-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-06-22T14:11:49Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1109/CSF.2013.15
external_id:
cryptoeprintid:
- 2013/492
isi:
- '000335225600008'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/492
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 115 - 129
publication_status: published
publisher: IEEE
publist_id: '4637'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Cryptographically enforced RBAC
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2940'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "A chain rule for an entropy notion H(.) states that the entropy H(X) of a
variable X decreases by at most l if conditioned on an l-bit string A, i.e., H(X|A)>=
H(X)-l. More generally, it satisfies a chain rule for conditional entropy if H(X|Y,A)>=
H(X|Y)-l.\r\n\r\nAll natural information theoretic entropy notions we are aware
of (like Shannon or min-entropy) satisfy some kind of chain rule for conditional
entropy. Moreover, many computational entropy notions (like Yao entropy, unpredictability
entropy and several variants of HILL entropy) satisfy the chain rule for conditional
entropy, though here not only the quantity decreases by l, but also the quality
of the entropy decreases exponentially in l. However, for \r\nthe standard notion
of conditional HILL entropy (the computational equivalent of min-entropy) the
existence of such a rule was unknown so far.\r\n\r\nIn this paper, we prove that
for conditional HILL entropy no meaningful chain rule exists, assuming the existence
of one-way permutations: there exist distributions X,Y,A, where A is a distribution
over a single bit, but $H(X|Y)>>H(X|Y,A)$, even if we simultaneously allow
for a massive degradation in the quality of the entropy.\r\n\r\nThe idea underlying
our construction is based on a surprising connection between the chain rule for
HILL entropy and deniable encryption. "
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Stephan
full_name: Krenn, Stephan
id: 329FCCF0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Krenn
orcid: 0000-0003-2835-9093
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Akshay
full_name: Wadia, Akshay
last_name: Wadia
citation:
ama: 'Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Wadia A. A counterexample to the chain rule for conditional
HILL entropy, and what deniable encryption has to do with it. In: Sahai A, ed.
Vol 7785. Springer; 2013:23-39. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36594-2_2'
apa: 'Krenn, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Wadia, A. (2013). A counterexample to the
chain rule for conditional HILL entropy, and what deniable encryption has to do
with it. In A. Sahai (Ed.) (Vol. 7785, pp. 23–39). Presented at the TCC: Theory
of Cryptography Conference, Tokyo, Japan: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36594-2_2'
chicago: Krenn, Stephan, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Akshay Wadia. “A Counterexample
to the Chain Rule for Conditional HILL Entropy, and What Deniable Encryption Has
to Do with It.” edited by Amit Sahai, 7785:23–39. Springer, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36594-2_2.
ieee: 'S. Krenn, K. Z. Pietrzak, and A. Wadia, “A counterexample to the chain rule
for conditional HILL entropy, and what deniable encryption has to do with it,”
presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Tokyo, Japan, 2013, vol.
7785, pp. 23–39.'
ista: 'Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Wadia A. 2013. A counterexample to the chain rule for
conditional HILL entropy, and what deniable encryption has to do with it. TCC:
Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 7785, 23–39.'
mla: Krenn, Stephan, et al. A Counterexample to the Chain Rule for Conditional
HILL Entropy, and What Deniable Encryption Has to Do with It. Edited by Amit
Sahai, vol. 7785, Springer, 2013, pp. 23–39, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36594-2_2.
short: S. Krenn, K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Wadia, in:, A. Sahai (Ed.), Springer, 2013, pp.
23–39.
conference:
end_date: 2013-03-06
location: Tokyo, Japan
name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
start_date: 2013-03-03
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:00:27Z
date_published: 2013-01-29T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-09-18T11:37:22Z
day: '29'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-36594-2_2
ec_funded: 1
editor:
- first_name: Amit
full_name: Sahai, Amit
last_name: Sahai
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: beb0cc1c0579da2d2e84394230a5da78
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2019-01-22T14:11:11Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:54Z
file_id: '5875'
file_name: 2013_LNCS_Krenn.pdf
file_size: 414823
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:54Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 7785'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '01'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 23 - 39
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3795'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '1479'
relation: later_version
status: public
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: A counterexample to the chain rule for conditional HILL entropy, and what deniable
encryption has to do with it
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7785
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '502'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Blind signatures allow users to obtain signatures on messages hidden from
the signer; moreover, the signer cannot link the resulting message/signature pair
to the signing session. This paper presents blind signature schemes, in which
the number of interactions between the user and the signer is minimal and whose
blind signatures are short. Our schemes are defined over bilinear groups and are
proved secure in the common-reference-string model without random oracles and
under standard assumptions: CDH and the decision-linear assumption. (We also give
variants over asymmetric groups based on similar assumptions.) The blind signatures
are Waters signatures, which consist of 2 group elements. Moreover, we instantiate
partially blind signatures, where the message consists of a part hidden from the
signer and a commonly known public part, and schemes achieving perfect blindness.
We propose new variants of blind signatures, such as signer-friendly partially
blind signatures, where the public part can be chosen by the signer without prior
agreement, 3-party blind signatures, as well as blind signatures on multiple aggregated
messages provided by independent sources. We also extend Waters signatures to
non-binary alphabets by proving a new result on the underlying hash function. '
author:
- first_name: Olivier
full_name: Blazy, Olivier
last_name: Blazy
- first_name: Georg
full_name: Fuchsbauer, Georg
id: 46B4C3EE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Fuchsbauer
- first_name: David
full_name: Pointcheval, David
last_name: Pointcheval
- first_name: Damien
full_name: Vergnaud, Damien
last_name: Vergnaud
citation:
ama: Blazy O, Fuchsbauer G, Pointcheval D, Vergnaud D. Short blind signatures. Journal
of Computer Security. 2013;21(5):627-661. doi:10.3233/JCS-130477
apa: Blazy, O., Fuchsbauer, G., Pointcheval, D., & Vergnaud, D. (2013). Short
blind signatures. Journal of Computer Security. IOS Press. https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-130477
chicago: Blazy, Olivier, Georg Fuchsbauer, David Pointcheval, and Damien Vergnaud.
“Short Blind Signatures.” Journal of Computer Security. IOS Press, 2013.
https://doi.org/10.3233/JCS-130477.
ieee: O. Blazy, G. Fuchsbauer, D. Pointcheval, and D. Vergnaud, “Short blind signatures,”
Journal of Computer Security, vol. 21, no. 5. IOS Press, pp. 627–661, 2013.
ista: Blazy O, Fuchsbauer G, Pointcheval D, Vergnaud D. 2013. Short blind signatures.
Journal of Computer Security. 21(5), 627–661.
mla: Blazy, Olivier, et al. “Short Blind Signatures.” Journal of Computer Security,
vol. 21, no. 5, IOS Press, 2013, pp. 627–61, doi:10.3233/JCS-130477.
short: O. Blazy, G. Fuchsbauer, D. Pointcheval, D. Vergnaud, Journal of Computer
Security 21 (2013) 627–661.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:46:50Z
date_published: 2013-11-22T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T08:01:09Z
day: '22'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.3233/JCS-130477
intvolume: ' 21'
issue: '5'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '11'
oa_version: None
page: 627 - 661
publication: Journal of Computer Security
publication_status: published
publisher: IOS Press
publist_id: '7318'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Short blind signatures
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 21
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2937'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Developers building cryptography into security-sensitive applications face
a daunting task. Not only must they understand the security guarantees delivered
by the constructions they choose, they must also implement and combine them correctly
and efficiently. Cryptographic compilers free developers from this task by turning
high-level specifications of security goals into efficient implementations. Yet,
trusting such tools is hard as they rely on complex mathematical machinery and
claim security properties that are subtle and difficult to verify. In this paper
we present ZKCrypt, an optimizing cryptographic compiler achieving an unprecedented
level of assurance without sacrificing practicality for a comprehensive class
of cryptographic protocols, known as Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge. The pipeline
of ZKCrypt integrates purpose-built verified compilers and verifying compilers
producing formal proofs in the CertiCrypt framework. By combining the guarantees
delivered by each stage, ZKCrypt provides assurance that the output implementation
securely realizes the abstract proof goal given as input. We report on the main
characteristics of ZKCrypt, highlight new definitions and concepts at its foundations,
and illustrate its applicability through a representative example of an anonymous
credential system.
acknowledgement: This work was partially funded by National Funds through the FCT
- Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portuguese Foundation for Science and
Technology) within project ENI-AC/2224/2009, by ENIAC Joint Undertaking under grant
agreement number 120224, European Projects FP7-256980 NESSoS and FP7-229599 AMAROUT,
Spanish National project TIN2009-14599 DESAFIOS 10, and Madrid Regional project
S2009TIC-1465 PROMETIDOS.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: José
full_name: Almeida, José
last_name: Almeida
- first_name: Manuel
full_name: Barbosa, Manuel
last_name: Barbosa
- first_name: Endre
full_name: Bangerter, Endre
last_name: Bangerter
- first_name: Gilles
full_name: Barthe, Gilles
last_name: Barthe
- first_name: Stephan
full_name: Krenn, Stephan
id: 329FCCF0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Krenn
orcid: 0000-0003-2835-9093
- first_name: Santiago
full_name: Béguelin, Santiago
last_name: Béguelin
citation:
ama: 'Almeida J, Barbosa M, Bangerter E, Barthe G, Krenn S, Béguelin S. Full proof
cryptography: Verifiable compilation of efficient zero-knowledge protocols. In:
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.
ACM; 2012:488-500. doi:10.1145/2382196.2382249'
apa: 'Almeida, J., Barbosa, M., Bangerter, E., Barthe, G., Krenn, S., & Béguelin,
S. (2012). Full proof cryptography: Verifiable compilation of efficient zero-knowledge
protocols. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications
security (pp. 488–500). Raleigh, NC, USA: ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382249'
chicago: 'Almeida, José, Manuel Barbosa, Endre Bangerter, Gilles Barthe, Stephan
Krenn, and Santiago Béguelin. “Full Proof Cryptography: Verifiable Compilation
of Efficient Zero-Knowledge Protocols.” In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, 488–500. ACM, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.2382249.'
ieee: 'J. Almeida, M. Barbosa, E. Bangerter, G. Barthe, S. Krenn, and S. Béguelin,
“Full proof cryptography: Verifiable compilation of efficient zero-knowledge protocols,”
in Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security,
Raleigh, NC, USA, 2012, pp. 488–500.'
ista: 'Almeida J, Barbosa M, Bangerter E, Barthe G, Krenn S, Béguelin S. 2012. Full
proof cryptography: Verifiable compilation of efficient zero-knowledge protocols.
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications security.
CCS: Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 488–500.'
mla: 'Almeida, José, et al. “Full Proof Cryptography: Verifiable Compilation of
Efficient Zero-Knowledge Protocols.” Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, 2012, pp. 488–500, doi:10.1145/2382196.2382249.'
short: J. Almeida, M. Barbosa, E. Bangerter, G. Barthe, S. Krenn, S. Béguelin, in:,
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
ACM, 2012, pp. 488–500.
conference:
end_date: 2012-10-18
location: Raleigh, NC, USA
name: 'CCS: Conference on Computer and Communications Security'
start_date: 2012-10-16
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:00:26Z
date_published: 2012-10-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-07-10T11:52:23Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1145/2382196.2382249
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/258
month: '10'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 488 - 500
publication: Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on Computer and communications
security
publication_status: published
publisher: ACM
publist_id: '3798'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Full proof cryptography: Verifiable compilation of efficient zero-knowledge
protocols'
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '2974'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We construct a perfectly binding string commitment scheme whose security
is based on the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption, or equivalently,
the hardness of decoding random linear codes. Our scheme not only allows for a
simple and efficient zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for committed values (essentially
a Σ-protocol), but also for such proofs showing any kind of relation amongst committed
values, i.e. proving that messages m_0,...,m_u, are such that m_0=C(m_1,...,m_u)
for any circuit C.\r\n\r\nTo get soundness which is exponentially small in a security
parameter t, and when the zero-knowledge property relies on the LPN problem with
secrets of length l, our 3 round protocol has communication complexity O(t|C|l
log(l)) and computational complexity of O(t|C|l) bit operations. The hidden constants
are small, and the computation consists mostly of computing inner products of
bit-vectors."
acknowledgement: "We are grateful to Petros Mol for helpful discussions on the reduction
for the hardness of the xLPN problem.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Abhishek
full_name: Jain, Abhishek
last_name: Jain
- first_name: Stephan
full_name: Krenn, Stephan
id: 329FCCF0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Krenn
orcid: 0000-0003-2835-9093
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Aris
full_name: Tentes, Aris
last_name: Tentes
citation:
ama: 'Jain A, Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. Commitments and efficient zero knowledge
proofs from learning parity with noise. In: Wang X, Sako K, eds. Vol 7658. Springer;
2012:663-680. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40'
apa: 'Jain, A., Krenn, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Tentes, A. (2012). Commitments
and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise. In X. Wang
& K. Sako (Eds.) (Vol. 7658, pp. 663–680). Presented at the ASIACRYPT: Theory
and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Beijing, China: Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40'
chicago: Jain, Abhishek, Stephan Krenn, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Aris Tentes. “Commitments
and Efficient Zero Knowledge Proofs from Learning Parity with Noise.” edited by
Xiaoyun Wang and Kazue Sako, 7658:663–80. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40.
ieee: 'A. Jain, S. Krenn, K. Z. Pietrzak, and A. Tentes, “Commitments and efficient
zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise,” presented at the ASIACRYPT:
Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Beijing, China,
2012, vol. 7658, pp. 663–680.'
ista: 'Jain A, Krenn S, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. 2012. Commitments and efficient zero
knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise. ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application
of Cryptology and Information Security, LNCS, vol. 7658, 663–680.'
mla: Jain, Abhishek, et al. Commitments and Efficient Zero Knowledge Proofs from
Learning Parity with Noise. Edited by Xiaoyun Wang and Kazue Sako, vol. 7658,
Springer, 2012, pp. 663–80, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40.
short: A. Jain, S. Krenn, K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Tentes, in:, X. Wang, K. Sako (Eds.),
Springer, 2012, pp. 663–680.
conference:
end_date: 2012-12-06
location: Beijing, China
name: 'ASIACRYPT: Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security'
start_date: 2012-12-02
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:00:38Z
date_published: 2012-12-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:40:11Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '004'
- '005'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4_40
ec_funded: 1
editor:
- first_name: Xiaoyun
full_name: Wang, Xiaoyun
last_name: Wang
- first_name: Kazue
full_name: Sako, Kazue
last_name: Sako
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: ab879537385efc4cb4203e7ef0fea17b
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:14:00Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:58Z
file_id: '5048'
file_name: IST-2016-721-v1+1_513.pdf
file_size: 482570
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:58Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 7658'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '12'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 663 - 680
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3730'
pubrep_id: '721'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Commitments and efficient zero knowledge proofs from learning parity with noise
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7658
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3250'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem has recently found many applications
in cryptography as the hardness assumption underlying the constructions of "provably
secure" cryptographic schemes like encryption or authentication protocols.
Being provably secure means that the scheme comes with a proof showing that the
existence of an efficient adversary against the scheme implies that the underlying
hardness assumption is wrong. LPN based schemes are appealing for theoretical
and practical reasons. On the theoretical side, LPN based schemes offer a very
strong security guarantee. The LPN problem is equivalent to the problem of decoding
random linear codes, a problem that has been extensively studied in the last half
century. The fastest known algorithms run in exponential time and unlike most
number-theoretic problems used in cryptography, the LPN problem does not succumb
to known quantum algorithms. On the practical side, LPN based schemes are often
extremely simple and efficient in terms of code-size as well as time and space
requirements. This makes them prime candidates for light-weight devices like RFID
tags, which are too weak to implement standard cryptographic primitives like the
AES block-cipher. This talk will be a gentle introduction to provable security
using simple LPN based schemes as examples. Starting from pseudorandom generators
and symmetric key encryption, over secret-key authentication protocols, and, if
time admits, touching on recent constructions of public-key identification, commitments
and zero-knowledge proofs.
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Pietrzak KZ. Cryptography from learning parity with noise. In: Vol 7147. Springer;
2012:99-114. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9'
apa: 'Pietrzak, K. Z. (2012). Cryptography from learning parity with noise (Vol.
7147, pp. 99–114). Presented at the SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice
of Computer Science, Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9'
chicago: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. “Cryptography from Learning Parity with Noise,”
7147:99–114. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9.
ieee: 'K. Z. Pietrzak, “Cryptography from learning parity with noise,” presented
at the SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, Špindlerův
Mlýn, Czech Republic, 2012, vol. 7147, pp. 99–114.'
ista: 'Pietrzak KZ. 2012. Cryptography from learning parity with noise. SOFSEM:
Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science, LNCS, vol. 7147, 99–114.'
mla: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. Cryptography from Learning Parity with Noise.
Vol. 7147, Springer, 2012, pp. 99–114, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9.
short: K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 99–114.
conference:
end_date: 2012-01-27
location: Špindlerův Mlýn, Czech Republic
name: 'SOFSEM: Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science'
start_date: 2012-01-21
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:15Z
date_published: 2012-02-19T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-10-09T20:54:42Z
day: '19'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-27660-6_9
intvolume: ' 7147'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '02'
oa_version: None
page: 99 - 114
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3407'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Cryptography from learning parity with noise
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7147
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3279'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We show a hardness-preserving construction of a PRF from any length doubling
PRG which improves upon known constructions whenever we can put a non-trivial
upper bound q on the number of queries to the PRF. Our construction requires only
O(logq) invocations to the underlying PRG with each query. In comparison, the
number of invocations by the best previous hardness-preserving construction (GGM
using Levin's trick) is logarithmic in the hardness of the PRG. For example, starting
from an exponentially secure PRG {0,1} n → {0,1} 2n, we get a PRF which is exponentially
secure if queried at most q = exp(√n)times and where each invocation of the PRF
requires Θ(√n) queries to the underlying PRG. This is much less than the Θ(n)
required by known constructions. \r\n"
acknowledgement: Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC)
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Abhishek
full_name: Jain, Abhishek
last_name: Jain
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Aris
full_name: Tentes, Aris
last_name: Tentes
citation:
ama: 'Jain A, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom
functions. In: Vol 7194. Springer; 2012:369-382. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21'
apa: 'Jain, A., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Tentes, A. (2012). Hardness preserving constructions
of pseudorandom functions (Vol. 7194, pp. 369–382). Presented at the TCC: Theory
of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21'
chicago: Jain, Abhishek, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Aris Tentes. “Hardness Preserving
Constructions of Pseudorandom Functions,” 7194:369–82. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21.
ieee: 'A. Jain, K. Z. Pietrzak, and A. Tentes, “Hardness preserving constructions
of pseudorandom functions,” presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference,
Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 2012, vol. 7194, pp. 369–382.'
ista: 'Jain A, Pietrzak KZ, Tentes A. 2012. Hardness preserving constructions of
pseudorandom functions. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 7194,
369–382.'
mla: Jain, Abhishek, et al. Hardness Preserving Constructions of Pseudorandom
Functions. Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp. 369–82, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21.
short: A. Jain, K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Tentes, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 369–382.
conference:
end_date: 2012-03-21
location: Taormina, Sicily, Italy
name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
start_date: 2012-03-19
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:25Z
date_published: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:42:21Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_21
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: ' 7194'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/tcc2012-index.html
month: '05'
oa_version: None
page: 369 - 382
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3367'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Hardness preserving constructions of pseudorandom functions
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7194
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3280'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'The (decisional) learning with errors problem (LWE) asks to distinguish "noisy"
inner products of a secret vector with random vectors from uniform. The learning
parities with noise problem (LPN) is the special case where the elements of the
vectors are bits. In recent years, the LWE and LPN problems have found many applications
in cryptography. In this paper we introduce a (seemingly) much stronger adaptive
assumption, called "subspace LWE" (SLWE), where the adversary can learn
the inner product of the secret and random vectors after they were projected into
an adaptively and adversarially chosen subspace. We prove that, surprisingly,
the SLWE problem mapping into subspaces of dimension d is almost as hard as LWE
using secrets of length d (the other direction is trivial.) This result immediately
implies that several existing cryptosystems whose security is based on the hardness
of the LWE/LPN problems are provably secure in a much stronger sense than anticipated.
As an illustrative example we show that the standard way of using LPN for symmetric
CPA secure encryption is even secure against a very powerful class of related
key attacks. '
acknowledgement: Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC).
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Pietrzak KZ. Subspace LWE. In: Vol 7194. Springer; 2012:548-563. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31'
apa: 'Pietrzak, K. Z. (2012). Subspace LWE (Vol. 7194, pp. 548–563). Presented at
the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31'
chicago: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. “Subspace LWE,” 7194:548–63. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31.
ieee: 'K. Z. Pietrzak, “Subspace LWE,” presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography
Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy, 2012, vol. 7194, pp. 548–563.'
ista: 'Pietrzak KZ. 2012. Subspace LWE. TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference,
LNCS, vol. 7194, 548–563.'
mla: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z. Subspace LWE. Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp.
548–63, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31.
short: K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 548–563.
conference:
end_date: 2012-03-21
location: Taormina, Sicily, Italy
name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
start_date: 2012-03-19
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:26Z
date_published: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-10-21T06:02:59Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_31
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: ' 7194'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/71940166/71940166.pdf
month: '05'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 548 - 563
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3366'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Subspace LWE
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7194
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3281'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider the problem of amplifying the "lossiness" of functions.
We say that an oracle circuit C*: {0,1} m → {0,1}* amplifies relative lossiness
from ℓ/n to L/m if for every function f:{0,1} n → {0,1} n it holds that 1 If f
is injective then so is C f. 2 If f has image size of at most 2 n-ℓ, then C f
has image size at most 2 m-L. The question is whether such C* exists for L/m ≫
ℓ/n. This problem arises naturally in the context of cryptographic "lossy
functions," where the relative lossiness is the key parameter. We show that
for every circuit C* that makes at most t queries to f, the relative lossiness
of C f is at most L/m ≤ ℓ/n + O(log t)/n. In particular, no black-box method making
a polynomial t = poly(n) number of queries can amplify relative lossiness by more
than an O(logn)/n additive term. We show that this is tight by giving a simple
construction (cascading with some randomization) that achieves such amplification.'
acknowledgement: "We would like to thank Oded Goldreich and Omer Rein- gold for discussions
at an early stage of this project, and Scott Aaronson for clarifications regarding
the collision problem.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Alon
full_name: Rosen, Alon
last_name: Rosen
- first_name: Gil
full_name: Segev, Gil
last_name: Segev
citation:
ama: 'Pietrzak KZ, Rosen A, Segev G. Lossy functions do not amplify well. In: Vol
7194. Springer; 2012:458-475. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26'
apa: 'Pietrzak, K. Z., Rosen, A., & Segev, G. (2012). Lossy functions do not
amplify well (Vol. 7194, pp. 458–475). Presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography
Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26'
chicago: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z, Alon Rosen, and Gil Segev. “Lossy Functions Do Not
Amplify Well,” 7194:458–75. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26.
ieee: 'K. Z. Pietrzak, A. Rosen, and G. Segev, “Lossy functions do not amplify well,”
presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, Taormina, Sicily, Italy,
2012, vol. 7194, pp. 458–475.'
ista: 'Pietrzak KZ, Rosen A, Segev G. 2012. Lossy functions do not amplify well.
TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 7194, 458–475.'
mla: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z., et al. Lossy Functions Do Not Amplify Well.
Vol. 7194, Springer, 2012, pp. 458–75, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26.
short: K.Z. Pietrzak, A. Rosen, G. Segev, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 458–475.
conference:
end_date: 2012-03-21
location: Taormina, Sicily, Italy
name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
start_date: 2012-03-19
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:26Z
date_published: 2012-05-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-10-21T06:03:00Z
day: '04'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-28914-9_26
intvolume: ' 7194'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/tcc2012/tcc2012-index.html
month: '05'
oa_version: None
page: 458 - 475
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3365'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Lossy functions do not amplify well
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7194
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '3282'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Traditionally, symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) are easily
built from pseudorandom functions (PRFs). In this work we propose a wide variety
of other approaches to building efficient MACs, without going through a PRF first.
In particular, unlike deterministic PRF-based MACs, where each message has a unique
valid tag, we give a number of probabilistic MAC constructions from various other
primitives/assumptions. Our main results are summarized as follows: We show several
new probabilistic MAC constructions from a variety of general assumptions, including
CCA-secure encryption, Hash Proof Systems and key-homomorphic weak PRFs. By instantiating
these frameworks under concrete number theoretic assumptions, we get several schemes
which are more efficient than just using a state-of-the-art PRF instantiation
under the corresponding assumption. For probabilistic MACs, unlike deterministic
ones, unforgeability against a chosen message attack (uf-cma ) alone does not
imply security if the adversary can additionally make verification queries (uf-cmva
). We give an efficient generic transformation from any uf-cma secure MAC which
is "message-hiding" into a uf-cmva secure MAC. This resolves the main
open problem of Kiltz et al. from Eurocrypt''11; By using our transformation on
their constructions, we get the first efficient MACs from the LPN assumption.
While all our new MAC constructions immediately give efficient actively secure,
two-round symmetric-key identification schemes, we also show a very simple, three-round
actively secure identification protocol from any weak PRF. In particular, the
resulting protocol is much more efficient than the trivial approach of building
a regular PRF from a weak PRF. © 2012 International Association for Cryptologic
Research.'
acknowledgement: Supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Starting Grant (259668-PSPC)
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Yevgeniy
full_name: Dodis, Yevgeniy
last_name: Dodis
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Eike
full_name: Kiltz, Eike
last_name: Kiltz
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Wichs, Daniel
last_name: Wichs
citation:
ama: 'Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. Message authentication, revisited.
In: Vol 7237. Springer; 2012:355-374. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22'
apa: 'Dodis, Y., Pietrzak, K. Z., Kiltz, E., & Wichs, D. (2012). Message authentication,
revisited (Vol. 7237, pp. 355–374). Presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications
of Cryptographic Techniques, Cambridge, UK: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22'
chicago: Dodis, Yevgeniy, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, Eike Kiltz, and Daniel Wichs. “Message
Authentication, Revisited,” 7237:355–74. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22.
ieee: 'Y. Dodis, K. Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, and D. Wichs, “Message authentication,
revisited,” presented at the EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques, Cambridge, UK, 2012, vol. 7237, pp. 355–374.'
ista: 'Dodis Y, Pietrzak KZ, Kiltz E, Wichs D. 2012. Message authentication, revisited.
EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, LNCS, vol. 7237,
355–374.'
mla: Dodis, Yevgeniy, et al. Message Authentication, Revisited. Vol. 7237,
Springer, 2012, pp. 355–74, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22.
short: Y. Dodis, K.Z. Pietrzak, E. Kiltz, D. Wichs, in:, Springer, 2012, pp. 355–374.
conference:
end_date: 2012-04-19
location: Cambridge, UK
name: 'EUROCRYPT: Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques'
start_date: 2012-04-15
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:27Z
date_published: 2012-03-10T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2024-10-21T06:02:59Z
day: '10'
ddc:
- '000'
- '004'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_22
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 8557c17a8c2586d06ebfe62d934f5c5f
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:14:23Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:06Z
file_id: '5074'
file_name: IST-2016-686-v1+1_059.pdf
file_size: 372292
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:46:06Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 7237'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 355 - 374
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3364'
pubrep_id: '686'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Message authentication, revisited
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: conference
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7237
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '2048'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Leakage resilient cryptography attempts to incorporate side-channel leakage
into the black-box security model and designs cryptographic schemes that are provably
secure within it. Informally, a scheme is leakage-resilient if it remains secure
even if an adversary learns a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the
schemes internal state. Unfortunately, most leakage resilient schemes are unnecessarily
complicated in order to achieve strong provable security guarantees. As advocated
by Yu et al. [CCS’10], this mostly is an artefact of the security proof and in
practice much simpler construction may already suffice to protect against realistic
side-channel attacks. In this paper, we show that indeed for simpler constructions
leakage-resilience can be obtained when we aim for relaxed security notions where
the leakage-functions and/or the inputs to the primitive are chosen non-adaptively.
For example, we show that a three round Feistel network instantiated with a leakage
resilient PRF yields a leakage resilient PRP if the inputs are chosen non-adaptively
(This complements the result of Dodis and Pietrzak [CRYPTO’10] who show that if
a adaptive queries are allowed, a superlogarithmic number of rounds is necessary.)
We also show that a minor variation of the classical GGM construction gives a
leakage resilient PRF if both, the leakage-function and the inputs, are chosen
non-adaptively.
acknowledgement: "Sebastian Faust acknowledges support from the Danish National Research
Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61061130540)
for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation, within part
of this work was performed; and from the CFEM research center, supported by the
Danish Strategic Research Council. \r\nSupported by the European Research Council/ERC
Starting Grant 259668-PSPC.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
full_name: Faust, Sebastian
last_name: Faust
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Joachim
full_name: Schipper, Joachim
id: 7BE863D4-E9CF-11E9-9EDB-90527418172C
last_name: Schipper
citation:
ama: 'Faust S, Pietrzak KZ, Schipper J. Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography.
In: Conference Proceedings CHES 2012. Vol 7428. Springer; 2012:213-232.
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13'
apa: 'Faust, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Schipper, J. (2012). Practical leakage-resilient
symmetric cryptography. In Conference proceedings CHES 2012 (Vol. 7428,
pp. 213–232). Leuven, Belgium: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13'
chicago: Faust, Sebastian, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Joachim Schipper. “Practical
Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography.” In Conference Proceedings CHES 2012,
7428:213–32. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13.
ieee: S. Faust, K. Z. Pietrzak, and J. Schipper, “Practical leakage-resilient symmetric
cryptography,” in Conference proceedings CHES 2012, Leuven, Belgium, 2012,
vol. 7428, pp. 213–232.
ista: 'Faust S, Pietrzak KZ, Schipper J. 2012. Practical leakage-resilient symmetric
cryptography. Conference proceedings CHES 2012. CHES: Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded Systems, LNCS, vol. 7428, 213–232.'
mla: Faust, Sebastian, et al. “Practical Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography.”
Conference Proceedings CHES 2012, vol. 7428, Springer, 2012, pp. 213–32,
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13.
short: S. Faust, K.Z. Pietrzak, J. Schipper, in:, Conference Proceedings CHES 2012,
Springer, 2012, pp. 213–232.
conference:
end_date: 2012-09-12
location: Leuven, Belgium
name: 'CHES: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems'
start_date: 2012-09-09
das_tickbox: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:55:25Z
date_published: 2012-09-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-07-07T13:05:30Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: ' 7428'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/ches2012/74280211/74280211.pdf
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 213 - 232
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: Conference proceedings CHES 2012
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5003'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7428
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '2049'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We propose a new authentication protocol that is provably secure based on
a ring variant of the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem. The protocol follows
the design principle of the LPN-based protocol from Eurocrypt’11 (Kiltz et al.),
and like it, is a two round protocol secure against active attacks. Moreover,
our protocol has small communication complexity and a very small footprint which
makes it applicable in scenarios that involve low-cost, resource-constrained devices.\r\n\r\nPerformance-wise,
our protocol is more efficient than previous LPN-based schemes, such as the many
variants of the Hopper-Blum (HB) protocol and the aforementioned protocol from
Eurocrypt’11. Our implementation results show that it is even comparable to the
standard challenge-and-response protocols based on the AES block-cipher. Our basic
protocol is roughly 20 times slower than AES, but with the advantage of having
10 times smaller code size. Furthermore, if a few hundred bytes of non-volatile
memory are available to allow the storage of some off-line pre-computations, then
the online phase of our protocols is only twice as slow as AES.\r\n"
acknowledgement: "Supported by the European Research Council / ERC Starting Grant
(259668- PSPC)\r\nWe would like to thank the anonymous referees of this confer-
ence and those of the ECRYPT Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography for very useful
comments, and in particular for the suggestion that the scheme is somewhat vulnerable
to a man-in-the-middle attack whenever an adversary observes two reader challenges
that are the same. We hope that the attack we described in Appendix A corresponds
to what the reviewer had in mind. We also thank Tanja Lange for pointing us to the
pa- per of [Kir11] and for discussions of some of her recent work. "
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Stefan
full_name: Heyse, Stefan
last_name: Heyse
- first_name: Eike
full_name: Kiltz, Eike
last_name: Kiltz
- first_name: Vadim
full_name: Lyubashevsky, Vadim
last_name: Lyubashevsky
- first_name: Christof
full_name: Paar, Christof
last_name: Paar
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Pietrzak
orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
citation:
ama: 'Heyse S, Kiltz E, Lyubashevsky V, Paar C, Pietrzak KZ. Lapin: An efficient
authentication protocol based on ring-LPN. In: Conference Proceedings FSE 2012.
Vol 7549. Springer; 2012:346-365. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34047-5_20'
apa: 'Heyse, S., Kiltz, E., Lyubashevsky, V., Paar, C., & Pietrzak, K. Z. (2012).
Lapin: An efficient authentication protocol based on ring-LPN. In Conference
proceedings FSE 2012 (Vol. 7549, pp. 346–365). Washington, DC, USA: Springer.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34047-5_20'
chicago: 'Heyse, Stefan, Eike Kiltz, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Christof Paar, and Krzysztof
Z Pietrzak. “Lapin: An Efficient Authentication Protocol Based on Ring-LPN.” In
Conference Proceedings FSE 2012, 7549:346–65. Springer, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34047-5_20.'
ieee: 'S. Heyse, E. Kiltz, V. Lyubashevsky, C. Paar, and K. Z. Pietrzak, “Lapin:
An efficient authentication protocol based on ring-LPN,” in Conference proceedings
FSE 2012, Washington, DC, USA, 2012, vol. 7549, pp. 346–365.'
ista: 'Heyse S, Kiltz E, Lyubashevsky V, Paar C, Pietrzak KZ. 2012. Lapin: An efficient
authentication protocol based on ring-LPN. Conference proceedings FSE 2012. FSE:
Fast Software Encryption, LNCS, vol. 7549, 346–365.'
mla: 'Heyse, Stefan, et al. “Lapin: An Efficient Authentication Protocol Based on
Ring-LPN.” Conference Proceedings FSE 2012, vol. 7549, Springer, 2012,
pp. 346–65, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34047-5_20.'
short: S. Heyse, E. Kiltz, V. Lyubashevsky, C. Paar, K.Z. Pietrzak, in:, Conference
Proceedings FSE 2012, Springer, 2012, pp. 346–365.
conference:
end_date: 2012-03-21
location: Washington, DC, USA
name: 'FSE: Fast Software Encryption'
start_date: 2012-03-19
das_tickbox: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:55:25Z
date_published: 2012-03-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-07-07T13:06:19Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-34047-5_20
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: ' 7549'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/fse2012/75490350/75490350.pdf
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 346 - 365
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '259668'
name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: Conference proceedings FSE 2012
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5002'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: 'Lapin: An efficient authentication protocol based on ring-LPN'
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7549
year: '2012'
...