---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - Off-chain protocols (channels) are a promising solution to the scalability and
    privacy challenges of blockchain payments. Current proposals, however, require
    synchrony assumptions to preserve the safety of a channel, leaking to an adversary
    the exact amount of time needed to control the network for a successful attack.
    In this paper, we introduce Brick, the first payment channel that remains secure
    under network asynchrony and concurrently provides correct incentives. The core
    idea is to incorporate the conflict resolution process within the channel by introducing
    a rational committee of external parties, called wardens. Hence, if a party wants
    to close a channel unilaterally, it can only get the committee’s approval for
    the last valid state. Additionally, Brick provides sub-second latency because
    it does not employ heavy-weight consensus. Instead, Brick uses consistent broadcast
    to announce updates and close the channel, a light-weight abstraction that is
    powerful enough to preserve safety and liveness to any rational parties. We formally
    define and prove for Brick the properties a payment channel construction should
    fulfill. We also design incentives for Brick such that honest and rational behavior
    aligns. Finally, we provide a reference implementation of the smart contracts
    in Solidity.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Zeta
      foaf_name: Avarikioti, Zeta
      foaf_surname: Avarikioti
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Eleftherios
      foaf_name: Kokoris Kogias, Eleftherios
      foaf_surname: Kokoris Kogias
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=f5983044-d7ef-11ea-ac6d-fd1430a26d30
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Roger
      foaf_name: Wattenhofer, Roger
      foaf_surname: Wattenhofer
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Dionysis
      foaf_name: Zindros, Dionysis
      foaf_surname: Zindros
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-64331-0_11
  bibo_volume: '12675 '
  dct_date: 2021^xs_gYear
  dct_identifier:
  - UT:000712016200011
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/0302-9743
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/1611-3349
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/9-783-6626-4330-3
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer Nature@
  dct_title: 'Brick: Asynchronous incentive-compatible payment channels@'
...