---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - 'We introduce the notion of “non-malleable codes” which relaxes the notion of
    error correction and error detection. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the
    message contained in a modified codeword is either the original message, or a
    completely unrelated value. In contrast to error correction and error detection,
    non-malleability can be achieved for very rich classes of modifications. We construct
    an efficient code that is non-malleable with respect to modifications that affect
    each bit of the codeword arbitrarily (i.e., leave it untouched, flip it, or set
    it to either 0 or 1), but independently of the value of the other bits of the
    codeword. Using the probabilistic method, we also show a very strong and general
    statement: there exists a non-malleable code for every “small enough” family F
    of functions via which codewords can be modified. Although this probabilistic
    method argument does not directly yield efficient constructions, it gives us efficient
    non-malleable codes in the random-oracle model for very general classes of tampering
    functions—e.g., functions where every bit in the tampered codeword can depend
    arbitrarily on any 99% of the bits in the original codeword. As an application
    of non-malleable codes, we show that they provide an elegant algorithmic solution
    to the task of protecting functionalities implemented in hardware (e.g., signature
    cards) against “tampering attacks.” In such attacks, the secret state of a physical
    system is tampered, in the hopes that future interaction with the modified system
    will reveal some secret information. This problem was previously studied in the
    work of Gennaro et al. in 2004 under the name “algorithmic tamper proof security”
    (ATP). We show that non-malleable codes can be used to achieve important improvements
    over the prior work. In particular, we show that any functionality can be made
    secure against a large class of tampering attacks, simply by encoding the secret
    state with a non-malleable code while it is stored in memory.@eng'
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Stefan
      foaf_name: Dziembowski, Stefan
      foaf_surname: Dziembowski
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krzysztof Z
      foaf_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
      foaf_surname: Pietrzak
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Daniel
      foaf_name: Wichs, Daniel
      foaf_surname: Wichs
  bibo_doi: 10.1145/3178432
  bibo_issue: '4'
  bibo_volume: 65
  dct_date: 2018^xs_gYear
  dct_identifier:
  - UT:000442938200004
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: ACM@
  dct_title: Non-malleable codes@
...