---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - "Two-player games on graphs provide the theoretical framework for many important
    problems such as reactive synthesis. While the traditional study of two-player
    zero-sum games has been extended to multi-player games with several notions of
    equilibria, they are decidable only for perfect-information games, whereas several
    applications require imperfect-information games.\r\nIn this paper we propose
    a new notion of equilibria, called doomsday equilibria, which is a strategy profile
    such that all players satisfy their own objective, and if any coalition of players
    deviates and violates even one of the players objective, then the objective of
    every player is violated.\r\nWe present algorithms and complexity results for
    deciding the existence of doomsday equilibria for various classes of ω-regular
    objectives, both for imperfect-information games, and for perfect-information
    games.We provide optimal complexity bounds for imperfect-information games, and
    in most cases for perfect-information games.@eng"
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krishnendu
      foaf_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
      foaf_surname: Chatterjee
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Laurent
      foaf_name: Doyen, Laurent
      foaf_surname: Doyen
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Emmanuel
      foaf_name: Filiot, Emmanuel
      foaf_surname: Filiot
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Jean-François
      foaf_name: Raskin, Jean-François
      foaf_surname: Raskin
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5
  bibo_volume: 8318
  dct_date: 2014^xs_gYear
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/0302-9743
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/1611-3349
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/9783642540127
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer Nature@
  dct_title: Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games@
...