conference paper published yes Krishnendu Chatterjee author 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A870000-0002-4561-241X Laurent Doyen author Emmanuel Filiot author Jean-François Raskin author KrCh department VMCAI: Verifcation, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification project Game Theory project Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications project Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship project Two-player games on graphs provide the theoretical framework for many important problems such as reactive synthesis. While the traditional study of two-player zero-sum games has been extended to multi-player games with several notions of equilibria, they are decidable only for perfect-information games, whereas several applications require imperfect-information games. In this paper we propose a new notion of equilibria, called doomsday equilibria, which is a strategy profile such that all players satisfy their own objective, and if any coalition of players deviates and violates even one of the players objective, then the objective of every player is violated. We present algorithms and complexity results for deciding the existence of doomsday equilibria for various classes of ω-regular objectives, both for imperfect-information games, and for perfect-information games.We provide optimal complexity bounds for imperfect-information games, and in most cases for perfect-information games. Springer Nature2014San Diego, CA, United States eng 0302-9743 1611-3349 9783642540127 1311.323810.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5 831878-97 https://research-explorer.ista.ac.at/record/681 Chatterjee K, Doyen L, Filiot E, Raskin J-F. 2014. Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games. VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation. VMCAI: Verifcation, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, LNCS, vol. 8318, 78–97. Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Laurent Doyen, Emmanuel Filiot, and Jean-François Raskin. “Doomsday Equilibria for Omega-Regular Games.” In <i>VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation</i>, 8318:78–97. Springer Nature, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5</a>. Chatterjee K, Doyen L, Filiot E, Raskin J-F. Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games. In: <i>VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation</i>. Vol 8318. Springer Nature; 2014:78-97. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5">10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5</a> K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, E. Filiot, J.-F. Raskin, in:, VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation, Springer Nature, 2014, pp. 78–97. Chatterjee, K., Doyen, L., Filiot, E., &#38; Raskin, J.-F. (2014). Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games. In <i>VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation</i> (Vol. 8318, pp. 78–97). San Diego, CA, United States: Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5</a> Chatterjee, Krishnendu, et al. “Doomsday Equilibria for Omega-Regular Games.” <i>VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation</i>, vol. 8318, Springer Nature, 2014, pp. 78–97, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5">10.1007/978-3-642-54013-4_5</a>. K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, E. Filiot, and J.-F. Raskin, “Doomsday equilibria for omega-regular games,” in <i>VMCAI 2014: Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation</i>, San Diego, CA, United States, 2014, vol. 8318, pp. 78–97. 108852022-03-18T13:03:15Z2026-04-16T10:00:03Z