---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms
    for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional
    valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties
    for divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized
    mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. For single-dimensional
    valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties
    for indivisible items, but that there is a randomized mechanism that achieves
    this for either divisible or indivisible items. The impossibility results hold
    for public budgets, while the mechanism allows private budgets, which is in both
    cases the harder variant to show. While all positive results are polynomial-time
    algorithms, all negative results hold independent of complexity considerations.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Paul
      foaf_name: Dütting, Paul
      foaf_surname: Dütting
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Monika H
      foaf_name: Henzinger, Monika H
      foaf_surname: Henzinger
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=540c9bbd-f2de-11ec-812d-d04a5be85630
    orcid: 0000-0002-5008-6530
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Martin
      foaf_name: Starnberger, Martin
      foaf_surname: Starnberger
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4
  bibo_volume: 7695
  dct_date: 2012^xs_gYear
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/1611-3349
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/9783642353109
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer Nature@
  dct_title: Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits@
...