{"user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","publication_status":"published","external_id":{"arxiv":["1209.6448"]},"extern":"1","publisher":"Springer Nature","page":"44–57","oa":1,"alternative_title":["LNCS"],"title":"Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits","status":"public","date_published":"2012-12-01T00:00:00Z","day":"01","scopus_import":"1","volume":7695,"quality_controlled":"1","_id":"11794","doi":"10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4","author":[{"full_name":"Dütting, Paul","last_name":"Dütting","first_name":"Paul"},{"last_name":"Henzinger","full_name":"Henzinger, Monika H","orcid":"0000-0002-5008-6530","first_name":"Monika H","id":"540c9bbd-f2de-11ec-812d-d04a5be85630"},{"first_name":"Martin","full_name":"Starnberger, Martin","last_name":"Starnberger"}],"oa_version":"Preprint","article_processing_charge":"No","intvolume":"      7695","month":"12","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"year":"2012","publication":"8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics","date_updated":"2023-02-21T16:28:29Z","conference":{"start_date":"2012-12-11","location":"Liverpool, United Kingdom","name":"WINE: International Conference on Web and Internet Economics","end_date":"2012-12-14"},"related_material":{"record":[{"id":"11794","relation":"later_version","status":"public"}]},"publication_identifier":{"isbn":["9783642353109"],"issn":["1611-3349"]},"type":"conference","date_created":"2022-08-11T11:32:25Z","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. For single-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for indivisible items, but that there is a randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. The impossibility results hold for public budgets, while the mechanism allows private budgets, which is in both cases the harder variant to show. While all positive results are polynomial-time algorithms, all negative results hold independent of complexity considerations."}],"main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/1209.6448"}],"citation":{"chicago":"Dütting, Paul, Monika H Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. “Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits.” In <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i>, 7695:44–57. Springer Nature, 2012. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4</a>.","apa":"Dütting, P., Henzinger, M. H., &#38; Starnberger, M. (2012). Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. In <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i> (Vol. 7695, pp. 44–57). Liverpool, United Kingdom: Springer Nature. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4</a>","ieee":"P. Dütting, M. H. Henzinger, and M. Starnberger, “Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits,” in <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i>, Liverpool, United Kingdom, 2012, vol. 7695, pp. 44–57.","ista":"Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. 2012. Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics. WINE: International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, LNCS, vol. 7695, 44–57.","mla":"Dütting, Paul, et al. “Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits.” <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i>, vol. 7695, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 44–57, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4\">10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4</a>.","short":"P. Dütting, M.H. Henzinger, M. Starnberger, in:, 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 44–57.","ama":"Dütting P, Henzinger MH, Starnberger M. Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. In: <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i>. Vol 7695. Springer Nature; 2012:44–57. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4\">10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4</a>"}}