conference paper published yes Paul Dütting author Monika H Henzinger author 540c9bbd-f2de-11ec-812d-d04a5be856300000-0002-5008-6530 Martin Starnberger author WINE: International Conference on Web and Internet Economics We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for divisible items. We use this to show that there can also be no randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. For single-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these properties for indivisible items, but that there is a randomized mechanism that achieves this for either divisible or indivisible items. The impossibility results hold for public budgets, while the mechanism allows private budgets, which is in both cases the harder variant to show. While all positive results are polynomial-time algorithms, all negative results hold independent of complexity considerations. Springer Nature2012Liverpool, United Kingdom eng 1611-3349 9783642353109 1209.644810.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4 769544–57 https://research-explorer.ista.ac.at/record/11794 yes P. Dütting, M. Henzinger, and M. Starnberger, “Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits,” in <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i>, Liverpool, United Kingdom, 2012, vol. 7695, pp. 44–57. P. Dütting, M. Henzinger, M. Starnberger, in:, 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 44–57. Dütting, P., Henzinger, M., &#38; Starnberger, M. (2012). Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. In <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i> (Vol. 7695, pp. 44–57). Liverpool, United Kingdom: Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4</a> Dütting, Paul, et al. “Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits.” <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i>, vol. 7695, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 44–57, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4">10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4</a>. Dütting P, Henzinger M, Starnberger M. 2012. Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics. WINE: International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, LNCS, vol. 7695, 44–57. Dütting P, Henzinger M, Starnberger M. Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. In: <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i>. Vol 7695. Springer Nature; 2012:44–57. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4">10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4</a> Dütting, Paul, Monika Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. “Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits.” In <i>8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics</i>, 7695:44–57. Springer Nature, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_4</a>. 117942022-08-11T11:32:25Z2024-11-06T12:12:38Z