---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - "We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword
    has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations,
    which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting
    their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned
    to a bidder is bounded.\r\n\r\nWe show the following results: (1) We give the
    first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among
    slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational
    in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where
    each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive
    compatible, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and deterministic mechanism
    for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive
    compatible, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and deterministic mechanisms
    for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations.@eng"
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Riccardo
      foaf_name: Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo
      foaf_surname: Colini-Baldeschi
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Monika H
      foaf_name: Henzinger, Monika H
      foaf_surname: Henzinger
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=540c9bbd-f2de-11ec-812d-d04a5be85630
    orcid: 0000-0002-5008-6530
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Stefano
      foaf_name: Leonardi, Stefano
      foaf_surname: Leonardi
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Martin
      foaf_name: Starnberger, Martin
      foaf_surname: Starnberger
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_1
  bibo_volume: 7392
  dct_date: 2012^xs_gYear
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/0302-9743
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/9783642315848
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer Nature@
  dct_title: On multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets@
...