{"scopus_import":"1","date_published":"2023-04-12T00:00:00Z","day":"12","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","oa_version":"Published Version","author":[{"id":"38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Laura","orcid":"0000-0002-6978-7329","full_name":"Schmid, Laura","last_name":"Schmid"},{"full_name":"Ekbatani, Farbod","last_name":"Ekbatani","first_name":"Farbod"},{"full_name":"Hilbe, Christian","last_name":"Hilbe","first_name":"Christian","id":"2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0001-5116-955X"},{"orcid":"0000-0002-4561-241X","id":"2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Krishnendu","last_name":"Chatterjee","full_name":"Chatterjee, Krishnendu"}],"doi":"10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x","_id":"12861","department":[{"_id":"KrCh"}],"quality_controlled":"1","file_date_updated":"2023-04-25T09:13:53Z","volume":14,"publisher":"Springer Nature","publication_status":"published","external_id":{"isi":["001003644100020"],"pmid":["37045828"]},"user_id":"4359f0d1-fa6c-11eb-b949-802e58b17ae8","isi":1,"title":"Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information","oa":1,"article_number":"2086","date_updated":"2023-08-01T14:15:57Z","project":[{"grant_number":"863818","_id":"0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E","name":"Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications","call_identifier":"H2020"},{"name":"The Wittgenstein Prize","_id":"25F42A32-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","grant_number":"Z211","call_identifier":"FWF"}],"publication":"Nature Communications","year":"2023","pmid":1,"citation":{"ieee":"L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, and K. Chatterjee, “Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information,” <i>Nature Communications</i>, vol. 14. Springer Nature, 2023.","chicago":"Schmid, Laura, Farbod Ekbatani, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Quantitative Assessment Can Stabilize Indirect Reciprocity under Imperfect Information.” <i>Nature Communications</i>. Springer Nature, 2023. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x\">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x</a>.","apa":"Schmid, L., Ekbatani, F., Hilbe, C., &#38; Chatterjee, K. (2023). Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. <i>Nature Communications</i>. Springer Nature. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x\">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x</a>","short":"L. Schmid, F. Ekbatani, C. Hilbe, K. Chatterjee, Nature Communications 14 (2023).","ama":"Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. <i>Nature Communications</i>. 2023;14. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x\">10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x</a>","ista":"Schmid L, Ekbatani F, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K. 2023. Quantitative assessment can stabilize indirect reciprocity under imperfect information. Nature Communications. 14, 2086.","mla":"Schmid, Laura, et al. “Quantitative Assessment Can Stabilize Indirect Reciprocity under Imperfect Information.” <i>Nature Communications</i>, vol. 14, 2086, Springer Nature, 2023, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x\">10.1038/s41467-023-37817-x</a>."},"file":[{"file_name":"2023_NatureComm_Schmid.pdf","file_size":1786475,"date_updated":"2023-04-25T09:13:53Z","relation":"main_file","access_level":"open_access","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"creator":"dernst","file_id":"12868","date_created":"2023-04-25T09:13:53Z","checksum":"a4b3b7b36fbef068cabf4fb99501fef6"}],"abstract":[{"text":"The field of indirect reciprocity investigates how social norms can foster cooperation when individuals continuously monitor and assess each other’s social interactions. By adhering to certain social norms, cooperating individuals can improve their reputation and, in turn, receive benefits from others. Eight social norms, known as the “leading eight,\" have been shown to effectively promote the evolution of cooperation as long as information is public and reliable. These norms categorize group members as either ’good’ or ’bad’. In this study, we examine a scenario where individuals instead assign nuanced reputation scores to each other, and only cooperate with those whose reputation exceeds a certain threshold. We find both analytically and through simulations that such quantitative assessments are error-correcting, thus facilitating cooperation in situations where information is private and unreliable. Moreover, our results identify four specific norms that are robust to such conditions, and may be relevant for helping to sustain cooperation in natural populations.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2023-04-23T22:01:03Z","ec_funded":1,"type":"journal_article","tmp":{"legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)","short":"CC BY (4.0)","image":"/images/cc_by.png"},"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["2041-1723"]},"article_type":"original","month":"04","intvolume":"        14","article_processing_charge":"No","acknowledgement":"This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.). L.S. received additional partial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under grant Z211-N23 (Wittgenstein Award), and also thanks the support by the Stochastic Analysis and Application Research Center (SAARC) under National Research Foundation of Korea grant NRF-2019R1A5A1028324. The authors additionally thank Stefan Schmid for providing access to his lab infrastructure at the University of Vienna for the purpose of collecting simulation data.","ddc":["000"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}]}