--- _id: '1333' abstract: - lang: eng text: Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. In many dilemmas, such as elected governments negotiating climate-change mitigation measures, the decisions are made not by individual players but by their representatives. However, the behaviour of representatives in social dilemmas has not been investigated experimentally. Here inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emissions reductions, we experimentally study a collective-risk social dilemma that involves representatives deciding on behalf of their fellow group members. Representatives can be re-elected or voted out after each consecutive collective-risk game. Selfish players are preferentially elected and are hence found most frequently in the "representatives" treatment. Across all treatments, we identify the selfish players as extortioners. As predicted by our mathematical model, their steadfast strategies enforce cooperation from fair players who finally compensate almost completely the deficit caused by the extortionate co-players. Everybody gains, but the extortionate representatives and their groups gain the most. acknowledgement: We thank the students for participation; H.-J. Krambeck for writing the software for the game; H. Arndt, T. Bakker, L. Becks, H. Brendelberger, S. Dobler and T. Reusch for support; and the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science for funding. article_number: '10915' author: - first_name: Manfred full_name: Milinski, Manfred last_name: Milinski - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Dirk full_name: Semmann, Dirk last_name: Semmann - first_name: Ralf full_name: Sommerfeld, Ralf last_name: Sommerfeld - first_name: Jochem full_name: Marotzke, Jochem last_name: Marotzke citation: ama: Milinski M, Hilbe C, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R, Marotzke J. Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion. Nature Communications. 2016;7. doi:10.1038/ncomms10915 apa: Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R., & Marotzke, J. (2016). Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion. Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915 chicago: Milinski, Manfred, Christian Hilbe, Dirk Semmann, Ralf Sommerfeld, and Jochem Marotzke. “Humans Choose Representatives Who Enforce Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Extortion.” Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915. ieee: M. Milinski, C. Hilbe, D. Semmann, R. Sommerfeld, and J. Marotzke, “Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion,” Nature Communications, vol. 7. Nature Publishing Group, 2016. ista: Milinski M, Hilbe C, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R, Marotzke J. 2016. Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion. Nature Communications. 7, 10915. mla: Milinski, Manfred, et al. “Humans Choose Representatives Who Enforce Cooperation in Social Dilemmas through Extortion.” Nature Communications, vol. 7, 10915, Nature Publishing Group, 2016, doi:10.1038/ncomms10915. short: M. Milinski, C. Hilbe, D. Semmann, R. Sommerfeld, J. Marotzke, Nature Communications 7 (2016). date_created: 2018-12-11T11:51:25Z date_published: 2016-03-07T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:49:57Z day: '07' ddc: - '519' - '530' - '599' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/ncomms10915 file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 9ea0d7ce59a555a1cb8353d5559407cb content_type: application/pdf creator: system date_created: 2018-12-12T10:10:44Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:44Z file_id: '4834' file_name: IST-2016-661-v1+1_ncomms10915.pdf file_size: 1432577 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:44Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 7' language: - iso: eng license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ month: '03' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version publication: Nature Communications publication_status: published publisher: Nature Publishing Group publist_id: '5935' pubrep_id: '661' quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: 1 status: public title: Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 7 year: '2016' ...