---
_id: '1333'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain.
In many dilemmas, such as elected governments negotiating climate-change mitigation
measures, the decisions are made not by individual players but by their representatives.
However, the behaviour of representatives in social dilemmas has not been investigated
experimentally. Here inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emissions
reductions, we experimentally study a collective-risk social dilemma that involves
representatives deciding on behalf of their fellow group members. Representatives
can be re-elected or voted out after each consecutive collective-risk game. Selfish
players are preferentially elected and are hence found most frequently in the
"representatives" treatment. Across all treatments, we identify the
selfish players as extortioners. As predicted by our mathematical model, their
steadfast strategies enforce cooperation from fair players who finally compensate
almost completely the deficit caused by the extortionate co-players. Everybody
gains, but the extortionate representatives and their groups gain the most.
acknowledgement: We thank the students for participation; H.-J. Krambeck for writing
the software for the game; H. Arndt, T. Bakker, L. Becks, H. Brendelberger, S. Dobler
and T. Reusch for support; and the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science
for funding.
article_number: '10915'
author:
- first_name: Manfred
full_name: Milinski, Manfred
last_name: Milinski
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Dirk
full_name: Semmann, Dirk
last_name: Semmann
- first_name: Ralf
full_name: Sommerfeld, Ralf
last_name: Sommerfeld
- first_name: Jochem
full_name: Marotzke, Jochem
last_name: Marotzke
citation:
ama: Milinski M, Hilbe C, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R, Marotzke J. Humans choose representatives
who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion. Nature Communications.
2016;7. doi:10.1038/ncomms10915
apa: Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R., & Marotzke, J. (2016).
Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through
extortion. Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915
chicago: Milinski, Manfred, Christian Hilbe, Dirk Semmann, Ralf Sommerfeld, and
Jochem Marotzke. “Humans Choose Representatives Who Enforce Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas through Extortion.” Nature Communications. Nature Publishing Group,
2016. https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915.
ieee: M. Milinski, C. Hilbe, D. Semmann, R. Sommerfeld, and J. Marotzke, “Humans
choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion,”
Nature Communications, vol. 7. Nature Publishing Group, 2016.
ista: Milinski M, Hilbe C, Semmann D, Sommerfeld R, Marotzke J. 2016. Humans choose
representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion.
Nature Communications. 7, 10915.
mla: Milinski, Manfred, et al. “Humans Choose Representatives Who Enforce Cooperation
in Social Dilemmas through Extortion.” Nature Communications, vol. 7, 10915,
Nature Publishing Group, 2016, doi:10.1038/ncomms10915.
short: M. Milinski, C. Hilbe, D. Semmann, R. Sommerfeld, J. Marotzke, Nature Communications
7 (2016).
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:51:25Z
date_published: 2016-03-07T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T06:49:57Z
day: '07'
ddc:
- '519'
- '530'
- '599'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/ncomms10915
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 9ea0d7ce59a555a1cb8353d5559407cb
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:10:44Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:44Z
file_id: '4834'
file_name: IST-2016-661-v1+1_ncomms10915.pdf
file_size: 1432577
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:44:44Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 7'
language:
- iso: eng
license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
month: '03'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
publication: Nature Communications
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '5935'
pubrep_id: '661'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through
extortion
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 3E5EF7F0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7
year: '2016'
...