--- _id: '157' abstract: - lang: eng text: 'Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with group interests 1-7 . According to the ''tragedy of the commons'', these misalignments can lead to overexploitation and collapse of public resources. The resulting behaviours can be analysed with the tools of game theory 8 . The theory of direct reciprocity 9-15 suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory of stochastic games 16-19 and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates. Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment - either naturally occurring or designed - help to overcome social dilemmas.' acknowledgement: "European Research Council Start Grant 279307, Austrian Science Fund (FWF) grant P23499-N23, \r\nC.H. acknowledges support from the ISTFELLOW programme." article_processing_charge: No author: - first_name: Christian full_name: Hilbe, Christian id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Hilbe orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X - first_name: Štepán full_name: Šimsa, Štepán last_name: Šimsa - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X - first_name: Martin full_name: Nowak, Martin last_name: Nowak citation: ama: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. 2018;559(7713):246-249. doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x apa: Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Štepán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak. “Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature. Nature Publishing Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x. ieee: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games,” Nature, vol. 559, no. 7713. Nature Publishing Group, pp. 246–249, 2018. ista: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. 559(7713), 246–249. mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature, vol. 559, no. 7713, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 246–49, doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x. short: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature 559 (2018) 246–249. date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:56Z date_published: 2018-07-04T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2023-09-11T13:43:22Z day: '04' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: KrCh doi: 10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x ec_funded: 1 external_id: isi: - '000438240900054' file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 011ab905cf9a410bc2b96f15174d654d content_type: application/pdf creator: dernst date_created: 2019-11-19T08:09:57Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z file_id: '7049' file_name: 2018_Nature_Hilbe.pdf file_size: 2834442 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 559' isi: 1 issue: '7713' language: - iso: eng month: '07' oa: 1 oa_version: Submitted Version page: 246 - 249 project: - _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S11407 name: Game Theory - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' - _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: P 23499-N23 name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification - _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S 11407_N23 name: Rigorous Systems Engineering - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme publication: Nature publication_status: published publisher: Nature Publishing Group publist_id: '7764' quality_controlled: '1' related_material: link: - description: News on IST Homepage relation: press_release url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/engineering-cooperation/ scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games type: journal_article user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1 volume: 559 year: '2018' ...