---
_id: '157'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with
group interests 1-7 . According to the ''tragedy of the commons'', these misalignments
can lead to overexploitation and collapse of public resources. The resulting behaviours
can be analysed with the tools of game theory 8 . The theory of direct reciprocity
9-15 suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous
work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we
introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends
on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation
increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation
allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas
defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory
of stochastic games 16-19 and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence
of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity
for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff
feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor
single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates.
Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment - either
naturally occurring or designed - help to overcome social dilemmas.'
acknowledgement: "European Research Council Start Grant 279307, Austrian Science Fund
(FWF) grant P23499-N23, \r\nC.H. acknowledges support from the ISTFELLOW programme."
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Štepán
full_name: Šimsa, Štepán
last_name: Šimsa
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic
games. Nature. 2018;559(7713):246-249. doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x
apa: Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018). Evolution of
cooperation in stochastic games. Nature. Nature Publishing Group. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x
chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Štepán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak.
“Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature. Nature Publishing
Group, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x.
ieee: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Evolution of cooperation
in stochastic games,” Nature, vol. 559, no. 7713. Nature Publishing Group,
pp. 246–249, 2018.
ista: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Evolution of cooperation in
stochastic games. Nature. 559(7713), 246–249.
mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” Nature,
vol. 559, no. 7713, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 246–49, doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x.
short: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature 559 (2018) 246–249.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:56Z
date_published: 2018-07-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-11T13:43:22Z
day: '04'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000438240900054'
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 011ab905cf9a410bc2b96f15174d654d
content_type: application/pdf
creator: dernst
date_created: 2019-11-19T08:09:57Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z
file_id: '7049'
file_name: 2018_Nature_Hilbe.pdf
file_size: 2834442
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 559'
isi: 1
issue: '7713'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 246 - 249
project:
- _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S11407
name: Game Theory
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: P 23499-N23
name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: Nature
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '7764'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on IST Homepage
relation: press_release
url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/engineering-cooperation/
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 559
year: '2018'
...