---
_id: '157'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with
    group interests 1-7 . According to the ''tragedy of the commons'', these misalignments
    can lead to overexploitation and collapse of public resources. The resulting behaviours
    can be analysed with the tools of game theory 8 . The theory of direct reciprocity
    9-15 suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous
    work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we
    introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends
    on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation
    increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation
    allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas
    defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory
    of stochastic games 16-19 and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence
    of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity
    for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff
    feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor
    single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates.
    Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment - either
    naturally occurring or designed - help to overcome social dilemmas.'
acknowledgement: "European Research Council Start Grant 279307, Austrian Science Fund
  (FWF) grant P23499-N23, \r\nC.H. acknowledges support from the ISTFELLOW programme."
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Christian
  full_name: Hilbe, Christian
  id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Hilbe
  orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Štepán
  full_name: Šimsa, Štepán
  last_name: Šimsa
- first_name: Krishnendu
  full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
  id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Chatterjee
  orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Nowak, Martin
  last_name: Nowak
citation:
  ama: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Evolution of cooperation in stochastic
    games. <i>Nature</i>. 2018;559(7713):246-249. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x">10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x</a>
  apa: Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., &#38; Nowak, M. (2018). Evolution of
    cooperation in stochastic games. <i>Nature</i>. Nature Publishing Group. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x</a>
  chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Štepán Šimsa, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and Martin Nowak.
    “Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” <i>Nature</i>. Nature Publishing
    Group, 2018. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x">https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x</a>.
  ieee: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Evolution of cooperation
    in stochastic games,” <i>Nature</i>, vol. 559, no. 7713. Nature Publishing Group,
    pp. 246–249, 2018.
  ista: Hilbe C, Šimsa Š, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Evolution of cooperation in
    stochastic games. Nature. 559(7713), 246–249.
  mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Evolution of Cooperation in Stochastic Games.” <i>Nature</i>,
    vol. 559, no. 7713, Nature Publishing Group, 2018, pp. 246–49, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x">10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x</a>.
  short: C. Hilbe, Š. Šimsa, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, Nature 559 (2018) 246–249.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:56Z
date_published: 2018-07-04T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2025-04-15T06:30:08Z
day: '04'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
  isi:
  - '000438240900054'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  checksum: 011ab905cf9a410bc2b96f15174d654d
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: dernst
  date_created: 2019-11-19T08:09:57Z
  date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z
  file_id: '7049'
  file_name: 2018_Nature_Hilbe.pdf
  file_size: 2834442
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       559'
isi: 1
issue: '7713'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 246 - 249
project:
- _id: 25863FF4-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FWF
  grant_number: S11407
  name: Game Theory
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '279307'
  name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FWF
  grant_number: P 23499-N23
  name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FWF
  grant_number: S 11407_N23
  name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '291734'
  name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: Nature
publication_status: published
publisher: Nature Publishing Group
publist_id: '7764'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  link:
  - description: News on IST Homepage
    relation: press_release
    url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/engineering-cooperation/
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 559
year: '2018'
...