@inproceedings{1645,
  abstract     = {Secret-key constructions are often proved secure in a model where one or more underlying components are replaced by an idealized oracle accessible to the attacker. This model gives rise to information-theoretic security analyses, and several advances have been made in this area over the last few years. This paper provides a systematic overview of what is achievable in this model, and how existing works fit into this view.},
  author       = {Gazi, Peter and Tessaro, Stefano},
  booktitle    = {2015 IEEE Information Theory Workshop},
  location     = {Jerusalem, Israel},
  publisher    = {IEEE},
  title        = {{Secret-key cryptography from ideal primitives: A systematic verview}},
  doi          = {10.1109/ITW.2015.7133163},
  year         = {2015},
}