---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - This paper studies the concrete security of PRFs and MACs obtained by keying hash
    functions based on the sponge paradigm. One such hash function is KECCAK, selected
    as NIST’s new SHA-3 standard. In contrast to other approaches like HMAC, the exact
    security of keyed sponges is not well understood. Indeed, recent security analyses
    delivered concrete security bounds which are far from existing attacks. This paper
    aims to close this gap. We prove (nearly) exact bounds on the concrete PRF security
    of keyed sponges using a random permutation. These bounds are tight for the most
    relevant ranges of parameters, i.e., for messages of length (roughly) l ≤ min{2n/4,
    2r} blocks, where n is the state size and r is the desired output length; and
    for l ≤ q queries (to the construction or the underlying permutation). Moreover,
    we also improve standard-model bounds. As an intermediate step of independent
    interest, we prove tight bounds on the PRF security of the truncated CBC-MAC construction,
    which operates as plain CBC-MAC, but only returns a prefix of the output.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Peter
      foaf_name: Gazi, Peter
      foaf_surname: Gazi
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E0BFE38-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krzysztof Z
      foaf_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
      foaf_surname: Pietrzak
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Stefano
      foaf_name: Tessaro, Stefano
      foaf_surname: Tessaro
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_18
  bibo_volume: 9215
  dct_date: 2015^xs_gYear
  dct_identifier:
  - UT:000364183000018
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer@
  dct_title: 'The exact PRF security of truncation: Tight bounds for keyed sponges
    and truncated CBC@'
...