---
_id: '1681'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In many social situations, individuals endeavor to find the single best possible
partner, but are constrained to evaluate the candidates in sequence. Examples
include the search for mates, economic partnerships, or any other long-term ties
where the choice to interact involves two parties. Surprisingly, however, previous
theoretical work on mutual choice problems focuses on finding equilibrium solutions,
while ignoring the evolutionary dynamics of decisions. Empirically, this may be
of high importance, as some equilibrium solutions can never be reached unless
the population undergoes radical changes and a sufficient number of individuals
change their decisions simultaneously. To address this question, we apply a mutual
choice sequential search problem in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that
allows one to find solutions that are favored by evolution. As an example, we
study the influence of sequential search on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation.
For this, we focus on the classic snowdrift game and the prisoner’s dilemma game.
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Tadeas
full_name: Priklopil, Tadeas
id: 3C869AA0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Priklopil
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
citation:
ama: Priklopil T, Chatterjee K. Evolution of decisions in population games with
sequentially searching individuals. Games. 2015;6(4):413-437. doi:10.3390/g6040413
apa: Priklopil, T., & Chatterjee, K. (2015). Evolution of decisions in population
games with sequentially searching individuals. Games. MDPI. https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040413
chicago: Priklopil, Tadeas, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Evolution of Decisions in
Population Games with Sequentially Searching Individuals.” Games. MDPI,
2015. https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040413.
ieee: T. Priklopil and K. Chatterjee, “Evolution of decisions in population games
with sequentially searching individuals,” Games, vol. 6, no. 4. MDPI, pp.
413–437, 2015.
ista: Priklopil T, Chatterjee K. 2015. Evolution of decisions in population games
with sequentially searching individuals. Games. 6(4), 413–437.
mla: Priklopil, Tadeas, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Evolution of Decisions in Population
Games with Sequentially Searching Individuals.” Games, vol. 6, no. 4, MDPI,
2015, pp. 413–37, doi:10.3390/g6040413.
short: T. Priklopil, K. Chatterjee, Games 6 (2015) 413–437.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:26Z
date_published: 2015-09-29T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-10-17T11:42:52Z
day: '29'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: NiBa
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.3390/g6040413
ec_funded: 1
file:
- access_level: open_access
checksum: 912e1acbaf201100f447a43e4d5958bd
content_type: application/pdf
creator: system
date_created: 2018-12-12T10:12:41Z
date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:12Z
file_id: '4959'
file_name: IST-2016-448-v1+1_games-06-00413.pdf
file_size: 518832
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:12Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 6'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 413 - 437
project:
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
publication: Games
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 2073-4336
publication_status: published
publisher: MDPI
publist_id: '5467'
pubrep_id: '448'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals
tmp:
image: /images/cc_by.png
legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
short: CC BY (4.0)
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 6
year: '2015'
...