--- _id: '1681' abstract: - lang: eng text: In many social situations, individuals endeavor to find the single best possible partner, but are constrained to evaluate the candidates in sequence. Examples include the search for mates, economic partnerships, or any other long-term ties where the choice to interact involves two parties. Surprisingly, however, previous theoretical work on mutual choice problems focuses on finding equilibrium solutions, while ignoring the evolutionary dynamics of decisions. Empirically, this may be of high importance, as some equilibrium solutions can never be reached unless the population undergoes radical changes and a sufficient number of individuals change their decisions simultaneously. To address this question, we apply a mutual choice sequential search problem in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that allows one to find solutions that are favored by evolution. As an example, we study the influence of sequential search on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. For this, we focus on the classic snowdrift game and the prisoner’s dilemma game. article_processing_charge: No article_type: original author: - first_name: Tadeas full_name: Priklopil, Tadeas id: 3C869AA0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Priklopil - first_name: Krishnendu full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 last_name: Chatterjee orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X citation: ama: Priklopil T, Chatterjee K. Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals. Games. 2015;6(4):413-437. doi:10.3390/g6040413 apa: Priklopil, T., & Chatterjee, K. (2015). Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals. Games. MDPI. https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040413 chicago: Priklopil, Tadeas, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Evolution of Decisions in Population Games with Sequentially Searching Individuals.” Games. MDPI, 2015. https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040413. ieee: T. Priklopil and K. Chatterjee, “Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals,” Games, vol. 6, no. 4. MDPI, pp. 413–437, 2015. ista: Priklopil T, Chatterjee K. 2015. Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals. Games. 6(4), 413–437. mla: Priklopil, Tadeas, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Evolution of Decisions in Population Games with Sequentially Searching Individuals.” Games, vol. 6, no. 4, MDPI, 2015, pp. 413–37, doi:10.3390/g6040413. short: T. Priklopil, K. Chatterjee, Games 6 (2015) 413–437. date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:26Z date_published: 2015-09-29T00:00:00Z date_updated: 2023-10-17T11:42:52Z day: '29' ddc: - '000' department: - _id: NiBa - _id: KrCh doi: 10.3390/g6040413 ec_funded: 1 file: - access_level: open_access checksum: 912e1acbaf201100f447a43e4d5958bd content_type: application/pdf creator: system date_created: 2018-12-12T10:12:41Z date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:12Z file_id: '4959' file_name: IST-2016-448-v1+1_games-06-00413.pdf file_size: 518832 relation: main_file file_date_updated: 2020-07-14T12:45:12Z has_accepted_license: '1' intvolume: ' 6' issue: '4' language: - iso: eng month: '09' oa: 1 oa_version: Published Version page: 413 - 437 project: - _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '291734' name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme - _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FWF grant_number: S 11407_N23 name: Rigorous Systems Engineering - _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425 call_identifier: FP7 grant_number: '279307' name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications' publication: Games publication_identifier: eissn: - 2073-4336 publication_status: published publisher: MDPI publist_id: '5467' pubrep_id: '448' quality_controlled: '1' scopus_import: '1' status: public title: Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals tmp: image: /images/cc_by.png legal_code_url: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0) short: CC BY (4.0) type: journal_article user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87 volume: 6 year: '2015' ...