---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental
    characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model
    situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However,
    in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward
    auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study
    the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual
    corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The
    decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered
    bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual
    is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments.
    Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the
    results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward
    case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more
    than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the
    equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding
    individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization
    among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the
    other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy
    equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific
    values of the rewards.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Johannes
      foaf_name: Reiter, Johannes
      foaf_surname: Reiter
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=4A918E98-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-0170-7353
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Ayush
      foaf_name: Kanodia, Ayush
      foaf_surname: Kanodia
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Raghav
      foaf_name: Gupta, Raghav
      foaf_surname: Gupta
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Martin
      foaf_name: Nowak, Martin
      foaf_surname: Nowak
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krishnendu
      foaf_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
      foaf_surname: Chatterjee
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
  bibo_doi: 10.1098/rspb.2015.1041
  bibo_issue: '1812'
  bibo_volume: 282
  dct_date: 2015^xs_gYear
  dct_identifier:
  - UT:000362305500021
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Royal Society@
  dct_title: Biological auctions with multiple rewards@
  fabio_hasPubmedId: '26180069'
...