---
_id: '1709'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental
characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model
situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However,
in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward
auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study
the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual
corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The
decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered
bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual
is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments.
Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the
results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward
case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more
than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the
equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding
individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization
among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the
other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy
equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific
values of the rewards.
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by grants from the John Templeton Foundation,
ERC Start Grant (279307: Graph Games), FWF NFN Grant (No S11407N23 RiSE/SHiNE),
FWF Grant (No P23499N23) and a Microsoft faculty fellows award.'
article_processing_charge: No
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Johannes
full_name: Reiter, Johannes
id: 4A918E98-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Reiter
orcid: 0000-0002-0170-7353
- first_name: Ayush
full_name: Kanodia, Ayush
last_name: Kanodia
- first_name: Raghav
full_name: Gupta, Raghav
last_name: Gupta
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
citation:
ama: Reiter J, Kanodia A, Gupta R, Nowak M, Chatterjee K. Biological auctions with
multiple rewards. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B Biological
Sciences. 2015;282(1812). doi:10.1098/rspb.2015.1041
apa: Reiter, J., Kanodia, A., Gupta, R., Nowak, M., & Chatterjee, K. (2015).
Biological auctions with multiple rewards. Proceedings of the Royal Society
of London Series B Biological Sciences. Royal Society. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.1041
chicago: Reiter, Johannes, Ayush Kanodia, Raghav Gupta, Martin Nowak, and Krishnendu
Chatterjee. “Biological Auctions with Multiple Rewards.” Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London Series B Biological Sciences. Royal Society, 2015.
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.1041.
ieee: J. Reiter, A. Kanodia, R. Gupta, M. Nowak, and K. Chatterjee, “Biological
auctions with multiple rewards,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London
Series B Biological Sciences, vol. 282, no. 1812. Royal Society, 2015.
ista: Reiter J, Kanodia A, Gupta R, Nowak M, Chatterjee K. 2015. Biological auctions
with multiple rewards. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B Biological
Sciences. 282(1812).
mla: Reiter, Johannes, et al. “Biological Auctions with Multiple Rewards.” Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London Series B Biological Sciences, vol. 282, no.
1812, Royal Society, 2015, doi:10.1098/rspb.2015.1041.
short: J. Reiter, A. Kanodia, R. Gupta, M. Nowak, K. Chatterjee, Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London Series B Biological Sciences 282 (2015).
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:53:35Z
date_published: 2015-07-15T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2023-09-07T11:40:43Z
day: '15'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1098/rspb.2015.1041
external_id:
pmid:
- '26180069'
intvolume: ' 282'
issue: '1812'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4528522/
month: '07'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: P 23499-N23
name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 2587B514-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
name: Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship
publication: Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B Biological Sciences
publication_status: published
publisher: Royal Society
publist_id: '5425'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
record:
- id: '1400'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: 1
status: public
title: Biological auctions with multiple rewards
type: journal_article
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 282
year: '2015'
...