---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - 'The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation in groups.
    In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions towards
    a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to free-ride
    on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods games among
    asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry allows
    for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment each round.
    However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals make the
    same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose contributions
    along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next. We do so for
    three different models – one without any budget constraints, one with endowment
    constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current endowment to
    be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities: the
    welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare
    corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this
    welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution
    sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency
    across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the
    model with savings.@eng'
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Valentin
      foaf_name: Hübner, Valentin
      foaf_surname: Hübner
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
    orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Christian
      foaf_name: Hilbe, Christian
      foaf_surname: Hilbe
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Manuel
      foaf_name: Staab, Manuel
      foaf_surname: Staab
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Maria
      foaf_name: Kleshnina, Maria
      foaf_surname: Kleshnina
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-5518-8317
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krishnendu
      foaf_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
      foaf_surname: Chatterjee
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
  bibo_volume: 15
  dct_date: 2025^xs_gYear
  dct_identifier:
  - UT:001415587800001
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/2153-0785
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/2153-0793
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer Nature@
  dct_title: Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games@
...