---
OA_place: publisher
OA_type: hybrid
PlanS_conform: '1'
_id: '19074'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation
    in groups. In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions
    towards a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to
    free-ride on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods
    games among asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry
    allows for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment
    each round. However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals
    make the same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose
    contributions along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next.
    We do so for three different models – one without any budget constraints, one
    with endowment constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current
    endowment to be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities:
    the welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare
    corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this
    welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution
    sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency
    across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the
    model with savings.'
acknowledgement: 'This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818
  (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529:
  E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
  under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale
  de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010),
  and ARC SRIEAS Grant SR200100005 Securing Antarctica’s Environmental Future (to
  M.K.). Open access funding provided by Institute of Science and Technology (IST
  Austria).'
article_processing_charge: Yes (via OA deal)
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Valentin
  full_name: Hübner, Valentin
  id: 2c8aa207-dc7d-11ea-9b2f-f22972ecd910
  last_name: Hübner
  orcid: 0009-0001-5009-4987
- first_name: Christian
  full_name: Hilbe, Christian
  id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Hilbe
  orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Manuel
  full_name: Staab, Manuel
  last_name: Staab
- first_name: Maria
  full_name: Kleshnina, Maria
  id: 4E21749C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Kleshnina
  orcid: 0000-0002-5518-8317
- first_name: Krishnendu
  full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
  id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Chatterjee
  orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
citation:
  ama: Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. Time-dependent strategies
    in repeated asymmetric public goods games. <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>.
    2025;15:1617-1645. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5">10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5</a>
  apa: Hübner, V., Hilbe, C., Staab, M., Kleshnina, M., &#38; Chatterjee, K. (2025).
    Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. <i>Dynamic
    Games and Applications</i>. Springer Nature. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5</a>
  chicago: Hübner, Valentin, Christian Hilbe, Manuel Staab, Maria Kleshnina, and Krishnendu
    Chatterjee. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.”
    <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>. Springer Nature, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5">https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5</a>.
  ieee: V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, and K. Chatterjee, “Time-dependent
    strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games,” <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>,
    vol. 15. Springer Nature, pp. 1617–1645, 2025.
  ista: Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. 2025. Time-dependent
    strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications.
    15, 1617–1645.
  mla: Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric
    Public Goods Games.” <i>Dynamic Games and Applications</i>, vol. 15, Springer
    Nature, 2025, pp. 1617–45, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5">10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5</a>.
  short: V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, K. Chatterjee, Dynamic Games
    and Applications 15 (2025) 1617–1645.
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2025-02-23T23:01:57Z
date_published: 2025-11-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-09-16T06:58:23Z
day: '01'
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
  isi:
  - '001415587800001'
file:
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fulldoi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        15'
isi: 1
language:
- iso: eng
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Published Version
page: 1617-1645
project:
- _id: 0599E47C-7A3F-11EA-A408-12923DDC885E
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '863818'
  name: 'Formal Methods for Stochastic Models: Algorithms and Applications'
- _id: 260C2330-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: H2020
  grant_number: '754411'
  name: ISTplus - Postdoctoral Fellowships
publication: Dynamic Games and Applications
publication_identifier:
  eissn:
  - 2153-0793
  issn:
  - 2153-0785
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
quality_controlled: '1'
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scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games
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  name: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)
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type: journal_article
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...