---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - Indirect reciprocity explores how humans act when their reputation is at stake,
    and which social norms they use to assess the actions of others. A crucial question
    in indirect reciprocity is which social norms can maintain stable cooperation
    in a society. Past research has highlighted eight such norms, called “leading-eight”
    strategies. This past research, however, is based on the assumption that all relevant
    information about other population members is publicly available and that everyone
    agrees on who is good or bad. Instead, here we explore the reputation dynamics
    when information is private and noisy. We show that under these conditions, most
    leading-eight strategies fail to evolve. Those leading-eight strategies that do
    evolve are unable to sustain full cooperation.Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism
    for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes
    that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they
    use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation.
    When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree
    on each other’s reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral
    systems. These “leading-eight” strategies can maintain cooperation and resist
    invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their
    own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion
    of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light.
    Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity
    when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence
    of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if
    a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when
    errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and
    synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Christian
      foaf_name: Hilbe, Christian
      foaf_surname: Hilbe
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Laura
      foaf_name: Schmid, Laura
      foaf_surname: Schmid
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Josef
      foaf_name: Tkadlec, Josef
      foaf_surname: Tkadlec
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3F24CCC8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-1097-9684
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krishnendu
      foaf_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
      foaf_surname: Chatterjee
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Martin
      foaf_name: Nowak, Martin
      foaf_surname: Nowak
  bibo_doi: 10.1073/pnas.1810565115
  bibo_issue: '48'
  bibo_volume: 115
  dct_date: 2018^xs_gYear
  dct_identifier:
  - UT:000451351000063
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: National Academy of Sciences@
  dct_title: Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information@
  fabio_hasPubmedId: '30429320'
...