---
_id: '2'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Indirect reciprocity explores how humans act when their reputation is at stake,
and which social norms they use to assess the actions of others. A crucial question
in indirect reciprocity is which social norms can maintain stable cooperation
in a society. Past research has highlighted eight such norms, called “leading-eight”
strategies. This past research, however, is based on the assumption that all relevant
information about other population members is publicly available and that everyone
agrees on who is good or bad. Instead, here we explore the reputation dynamics
when information is private and noisy. We show that under these conditions, most
leading-eight strategies fail to evolve. Those leading-eight strategies that do
evolve are unable to sustain full cooperation.Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism
for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes
that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they
use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation.
When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree
on each other’s reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral
systems. These “leading-eight” strategies can maintain cooperation and resist
invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their
own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion
of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light.
Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity
when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence
of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if
a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when
errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and
synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Christian
full_name: Hilbe, Christian
id: 2FDF8F3C-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Hilbe
orcid: 0000-0001-5116-955X
- first_name: Laura
full_name: Schmid, Laura
id: 38B437DE-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Schmid
orcid: 0000-0002-6978-7329
- first_name: Josef
full_name: Tkadlec, Josef
id: 3F24CCC8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Tkadlec
orcid: 0000-0002-1097-9684
- first_name: Krishnendu
full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
last_name: Chatterjee
orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Nowak, Martin
last_name: Nowak
citation:
ama: Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. Indirect reciprocity with
private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 2018;115(48):12241-12246.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115
apa: Hilbe, C., Schmid, L., Tkadlec, J., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. (2018).
Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS.
National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115
chicago: Hilbe, Christian, Laura Schmid, Josef Tkadlec, Krishnendu Chatterjee, and
Martin Nowak. “Indirect Reciprocity with Private, Noisy, and Incomplete Information.”
PNAS. National Academy of Sciences, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810565115.
ieee: C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, and M. Nowak, “Indirect reciprocity
with private, noisy, and incomplete information,” PNAS, vol. 115, no. 48.
National Academy of Sciences, pp. 12241–12246, 2018.
ista: Hilbe C, Schmid L, Tkadlec J, Chatterjee K, Nowak M. 2018. Indirect reciprocity
with private, noisy, and incomplete information. PNAS. 115(48), 12241–12246.
mla: Hilbe, Christian, et al. “Indirect Reciprocity with Private, Noisy, and Incomplete
Information.” PNAS, vol. 115, no. 48, National Academy of Sciences, 2018,
pp. 12241–46, doi:10.1073/pnas.1810565115.
short: C. Hilbe, L. Schmid, J. Tkadlec, K. Chatterjee, M. Nowak, PNAS 115 (2018)
12241–12246.
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:44:05Z
date_published: 2018-11-27T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-08-13T22:30:49Z
day: '27'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1810565115
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
isi:
- '000451351000063'
pmid:
- '30429320'
intvolume: ' 115'
isi: 1
issue: '48'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30429320
month: '11'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 12241-12246
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '279307'
name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: P 23499-N23
name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FWF
grant_number: S 11407_N23
name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 25681D80-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
call_identifier: FP7
grant_number: '291734'
name: International IST Postdoc Fellowship Programme
publication: PNAS
publication_status: published
publisher: National Academy of Sciences
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
link:
- description: News on IST Homepage
relation: press_release
url: https://ist.ac.at/en/news/no-cooperation-without-open-communication/
record:
- id: '10293'
relation: dissertation_contains
status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information
type: journal_article
user_id: c635000d-4b10-11ee-a964-aac5a93f6ac1
volume: 115
year: '2018'
...