Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography

conference paper Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography LNCS published yes Sebastian Faust author Krzysztof Z Pietrzak author 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A870000-0002-9139-1654 Joachim Schipper author 7BE863D4-E9CF-11E9-9EDB-90527418172C KrPi department CHES: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems Provable Security for Physical Cryptography project Leakage resilient cryptography attempts to incorporate side-channel leakage into the black-box security model and designs cryptographic schemes that are provably secure within it. Informally, a scheme is leakage-resilient if it remains secure even if an adversary learns a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the schemes internal state. Unfortunately, most leakage resilient schemes are unnecessarily complicated in order to achieve strong provable security guarantees. As advocated by Yu et al. [CCS’10], this mostly is an artefact of the security proof and in practice much simpler construction may already suffice to protect against realistic side-channel attacks. In this paper, we show that indeed for simpler constructions leakage-resilience can be obtained when we aim for relaxed security notions where the leakage-functions and/or the inputs to the primitive are chosen non-adaptively. For example, we show that a three round Feistel network instantiated with a leakage resilient PRF yields a leakage resilient PRP if the inputs are chosen non-adaptively (This complements the result of Dodis and Pietrzak [CRYPTO’10] who show that if a adaptive queries are allowed, a superlogarithmic number of rounds is necessary.) We also show that a minor variation of the classical GGM construction gives a leakage resilient PRF if both, the leakage-function and the inputs, are chosen non-adaptively. Springer2012Leuven, Belgium eng Conference proceedings CHES 201210.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13 7428213 - 232 S. Faust, K. Z. Pietrzak, and J. Schipper, “Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography,” in Conference proceedings CHES 2012, Leuven, Belgium, 2012, vol. 7428, pp. 213–232. Faust S, Pietrzak KZ, Schipper J. 2012. Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography. Conference proceedings CHES 2012. CHES: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, LNCS, vol. 7428, 213–232. Faust S, Pietrzak KZ, Schipper J. Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography. In: Conference Proceedings CHES 2012. Vol 7428. Springer; 2012:213-232. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13">10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13</a> Faust, Sebastian, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Joachim Schipper. “Practical Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography.” In Conference Proceedings CHES 2012, 7428:213–32. Springer, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13</a>. Faust, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., & Schipper, J. (2012). Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography. In Conference proceedings CHES 2012 (Vol. 7428, pp. 213–232). Leuven, Belgium: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13</a> S. Faust, K.Z. Pietrzak, J. Schipper, in:, Conference Proceedings CHES 2012, Springer, 2012, pp. 213–232. Faust, Sebastian, et al. “Practical Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography.” Conference Proceedings CHES 2012, vol. 7428, Springer, 2012, pp. 213–32, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13">10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13</a>. 20482018-12-11T11:55:25Z2026-07-07T13:05:30Z