---
_id: '2048'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Leakage resilient cryptography attempts to incorporate side-channel leakage
    into the black-box security model and designs cryptographic schemes that are provably
    secure within it. Informally, a scheme is leakage-resilient if it remains secure
    even if an adversary learns a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the
    schemes internal state. Unfortunately, most leakage resilient schemes are unnecessarily
    complicated in order to achieve strong provable security guarantees. As advocated
    by Yu et al. [CCS’10], this mostly is an artefact of the security proof and in
    practice much simpler construction may already suffice to protect against realistic
    side-channel attacks. In this paper, we show that indeed for simpler constructions
    leakage-resilience can be obtained when we aim for relaxed security notions where
    the leakage-functions and/or the inputs to the primitive are chosen non-adaptively.
    For example, we show that a three round Feistel network instantiated with a leakage
    resilient PRF yields a leakage resilient PRP if the inputs are chosen non-adaptively
    (This complements the result of Dodis and Pietrzak [CRYPTO’10] who show that if
    a adaptive queries are allowed, a superlogarithmic number of rounds is necessary.)
    We also show that a minor variation of the classical GGM construction gives a
    leakage resilient PRF if both, the leakage-function and the inputs, are chosen
    non-adaptively.
acknowledgement: "Sebastian Faust acknowledges support from the Danish National Research
  Foundation and The National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61061130540)
  for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation, within part
  of this work was performed; and from the CFEM research center, supported by the
  Danish Strategic Research Council. \r\nSupported by the European Research Council/ERC
  Starting Grant 259668-PSPC.\r\n"
alternative_title:
- LNCS
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Faust, Sebastian
  last_name: Faust
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Joachim
  full_name: Schipper, Joachim
  id: 7BE863D4-E9CF-11E9-9EDB-90527418172C
  last_name: Schipper
citation:
  ama: 'Faust S, Pietrzak KZ, Schipper J. Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography.
    In: <i>Conference Proceedings CHES 2012</i>. Vol 7428. Springer; 2012:213-232.
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13">10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13</a>'
  apa: 'Faust, S., Pietrzak, K. Z., &#38; Schipper, J. (2012). Practical leakage-resilient
    symmetric cryptography. In <i>Conference proceedings CHES 2012</i> (Vol. 7428,
    pp. 213–232). Leuven, Belgium: Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13</a>'
  chicago: Faust, Sebastian, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Joachim Schipper. “Practical
    Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography.” In <i>Conference Proceedings CHES 2012</i>,
    7428:213–32. Springer, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13</a>.
  ieee: S. Faust, K. Z. Pietrzak, and J. Schipper, “Practical leakage-resilient symmetric
    cryptography,” in <i>Conference proceedings CHES 2012</i>, Leuven, Belgium, 2012,
    vol. 7428, pp. 213–232.
  ista: 'Faust S, Pietrzak KZ, Schipper J. 2012. Practical leakage-resilient symmetric
    cryptography. Conference proceedings CHES 2012. CHES: Cryptographic Hardware and
    Embedded Systems, LNCS, vol. 7428, 213–232.'
  mla: Faust, Sebastian, et al. “Practical Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography.”
    <i>Conference Proceedings CHES 2012</i>, vol. 7428, Springer, 2012, pp. 213–32,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13">10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13</a>.
  short: S. Faust, K.Z. Pietrzak, J. Schipper, in:, Conference Proceedings CHES 2012,
    Springer, 2012, pp. 213–232.
conference:
  end_date: 2012-09-12
  location: Leuven, Belgium
  name: 'CHES: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems'
  start_date: 2012-09-09
das_tickbox: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T11:55:25Z
date_published: 2012-09-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-07-07T13:05:30Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrPi
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_13
ec_funded: 1
intvolume: '      7428'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: http://www.iacr.org/archive/ches2012/74280211/74280211.pdf
month: '09'
oa: 1
oa_version: Preprint
page: 213 - 232
project:
- _id: 258C570E-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '259668'
  name: Provable Security for Physical Cryptography
publication: Conference proceedings CHES 2012
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '5003'
quality_controlled: '1'
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography
type: conference
user_id: 2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
volume: 7428
year: '2012'
...