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   	<dc:title>Distortion of multi-winner elections on the line metric: The polar comparison rule</dc:title>
   	<dc:creator>Babashah, Negar ; https://orcid.org/0009-0007-0203-9725</dc:creator>
   	<dc:creator>Karimi, Hasti</dc:creator>
   	<dc:creator>Seddighin, Masoud</dc:creator>
   	<dc:creator>Shahkarami, Golnoosh</dc:creator>
   	<dc:subject>ddc:000</dc:subject>
   	<dc:description>We study the problem of minimizing metric distortion in multi-winner elections, where a committee of size k is selected from a set of candidates based on voters’ ordinal preferences. We assume that voters and candidates are embedded on a line metric, and social cost is determined by the underlying metric distances.
The distortion of a voting rule is the worst-case ratio between the social cost of the elected committee and an optimal committee. Previous work has focused on the q-cost model, in which a voter’s cost is given by the distance to their qth closest committee member. Here, we study the additive cost, where a voter’s cost is the sum of distances to all committee members.
We introduce the Polar Comparison Rule and analyze its distortion under utilitarian additive cost. We show that it achieves a distortion upper bound of almost 2.33 for all committee sizes k &gt; 4, improving upon the previously best-known upper bound of 3. Moreover, for k = 2 and k = 3, we establish tight distortion bounds of 2.41 and 2.33, respectively. We also derive lower bounds that depend on the parity of k and analyze the behavior of distortion for small and large committee sizes. Finally, we extend our results to the egalitarian additive cost.</dc:description>
   	<dc:publisher>ACM</dc:publisher>
   	<dc:date>2026</dc:date>
   	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
   	<dc:type>doc-type:Article</dc:type>
   	<dc:type>Article</dc:type>
   	<dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1</dc:type>
   	<dc:identifier>https://research-explorer.ista.ac.at/record/22971</dc:identifier>
   	<dc:source>Babashah N, Karimi H, Seddighin M, Shahkarami G. Distortion of multi-winner elections on the line metric: The polar comparison rule. &lt;i&gt;ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation&lt;/i&gt;. 2026. doi:&lt;a href=&quot;https://doi.org/10.1145/3843232&quot;&gt;10.1145/3843232&lt;/a&gt;</dc:source>
   	<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
   	<dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1145/3843232</dc:relation>
   	<dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/2167-8375</dc:relation>
   	<dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/e-issn/2167-8383</dc:relation>
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