---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - We present an improved bound on the advantage of any q-query adversary at distinguishing
    between the CBC MAC over a random n-bit permutation and a random function outputting
    n bits. The result assumes that no message queried is a prefix of any other, as
    is the case when all messages to be MACed have the same length. We go on to give
    an improved analysis of the encrypted CBC MAC, where there is no restriction on
    queried messages. Letting m be the block length of the longest query, our bounds
    are about mq2/2n for the basic CBC MAC and mo(1)q2/2n for the encrypted CBC MAC,
    improving prior bounds of m2q2/2n. The new bounds translate into improved guarantees
    on the probability of forging these MACs.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Mihir
      foaf_name: Bellare, Mihir
      foaf_surname: Bellare
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krzysztof Z
      foaf_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
      foaf_surname: Pietrzak
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Phillip
      foaf_name: Rogaway, Phillip
      foaf_surname: Rogaway
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/11535218_32
  bibo_volume: 3621
  dct_date: 2005^xs_gYear
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/9783540281146
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer Nature@
  dct_title: Improved security analyses for CBC MACs@
...