---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - "The Full-Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme [3] forms one the most basic usages
    of random oracles. It works with a family F of trapdoor permutations (TDP), where
    the signature of m is computed as f−1(h(m)) (here f ∈R F and h is modelled as
    a random oracle). It is known to be existentially unforgeable for any TDP family
    F [3], although a much tighter security reduction is known for a restrictive class
    of TDP’s [10,14] — namely, those induced by a family of claw-free permutations
    (CFP) pairs. The latter result was shown [11] to match the best possible “black-box”
    security reduction in the random oracle model, irrespective of the TDP family
    F (e.g., RSA) one might use.\r\nIn this work we investigate the question if it
    is possible to instantiate the random oracle h with a “real” family of hash functions
    H such that the corresponding schemes can be proven secure in the standard model,
    under some natural assumption on the family F. Our main result rules out the existence
    of such instantiations for any assumption on F which (1) is satisfied by a family
    of random permutations; and (2) does not allow the attacker to invert f ∈R F on
    an a-priori unbounded number of points. Moreover, this holds even if the choice
    of H can arbitrarily depend on f. As an immediate corollary, we rule out instantiating
    FDH based on general claw-free permutations, which shows that in order to prove
    the security of FDH in the standard model one must utilize significantly more
    structure on F than what is sufficient for the best proof of security in the random
    oracle model.@eng"
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Yevgeniy
      foaf_name: Dodis, Yevgeniy
      foaf_surname: Dodis
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Roberto
      foaf_name: Oliveira, Roberto
      foaf_surname: Oliveira
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krzysztof Z
      foaf_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
      foaf_surname: Pietrzak
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/11535218_27
  bibo_volume: 3621
  dct_date: 2005^xs_gYear
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/9783540281146
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer Nature@
  dct_title: On the generic insecurity of the full domain hash@
...