---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - 'We construct a stream-cipher S whose implementation is secure even if a bounded
    amount of arbitrary (adversarially chosen) information on the internal state ofS
    is leaked during computation. This captures all possible side-channel attacks
    on S where the amount of information leaked in a given period is bounded, but
    overall can be arbitrary large. The only other assumption we make on the implementation
    of S is that only data that is accessed during computation leaks information.
    The stream-cipher S generates its output in chunks K1, K2, . . . and arbitrary
    but bounded information leakage is modeled by allowing the adversary to adaptively
    chose a function fl : {0,1}* rarr {0, 1}lambda before Kl is computed, she then
    gets fl(taul) where taul is the internal state ofS that is accessed during the
    computation of Kg. One notion of security we prove for S is that Kg is indistinguishable
    from random when given K1,..., K1-1,f1(tau1 ),..., fl-1(taul-1) and also the complete
    internal state of S after Kg has been computed (i.e. S is forward-secure). The
    construction is based on alternating extraction (used in the intrusion-resilient
    secret-sharing scheme from FOCS''07). We move this concept to the computational
    setting by proving a lemma that states that the output of any PRG has high HILLpseudoentropy
    (i.e. is indistinguishable from some distribution with high min-entropy) even
    if arbitrary information about the seed is leaked. The amount of leakage lambda
    that we can tolerate in each step depends on the strength of the underlying PRG,
    it is at least logarithmic, but can be as large as a constant fraction of the
    internal state of S if the PRG is exponentially hard.@eng'
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Stefan
      foaf_name: Dziembowski, Stefan
      foaf_surname: Dziembowski
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krzysztof Z
      foaf_name: Krzysztof Pietrzak
      foaf_surname: Pietrzak
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
  bibo_doi: 10.1109/FOCS.2008.56
  dct_date: 2008^xs_gYear
  dct_publisher: IEEE@
  dct_title: Leakage resilient cryptography@
...