---
_id: '3234'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'The strongest standard security notion for digital signature schemes is unforgeability
    under chosen message attacks. In practice, however, this notion can be insufficient
    due to "side-channel attacks" which exploit leakage of information about
    the secret internal state. In this work we put forward the notion of "leakage-resilient
    signatures," which strengthens the standard security notion by giving the
    adversary the additional power to learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information
    about the secret state that was accessed during every signature generation. This
    notion naturally implies security against all side-channel attacks as long as
    the amount of information leaked on each invocation is bounded and "only
    computation leaks information." The main result of this paper is a construction
    which gives a (tree-based, stateful) leakage-resilient signature scheme based
    on any 3-time signature scheme. The amount of information that our scheme can
    safely leak per signature generation is 1/3 of the information the underlying
    3-time signature scheme can leak in total. Signature schemes that remain secure
    even if a bounded total amount of information is leaked were recently constructed,
    hence instantiating our construction with these schemes gives the first constructions
    of provably secure leakage-resilient signature schemes. The above construction
    assumes that the signing algorithm can sample truly random bits, and thus an implementation
    would need some special hardware (randomness gates). Simply generating this randomness
    using a leakage-resilient stream-cipher will in general not work. Our second contribution
    is a sound general principle to replace uniform random bits in any leakage-resilient
    construction with pseudorandom ones: run two leakage-resilient stream-ciphers
    (with independent keys) in parallel and then apply a two-source extractor to their
    outputs. '
alternative_title:
- LNCS
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Faust, Sebastian
  last_name: Faust
- first_name: Eike
  full_name: Kiltz, Eike
  last_name: Kiltz
- first_name: Krzysztof Z
  full_name: Krzysztof Pietrzak
  id: 3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Pietrzak
  orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
- first_name: Guy
  full_name: Rothblum, Guy N
  last_name: Rothblum
citation:
  ama: 'Faust S, Kiltz E, Pietrzak KZ, Rothblum G. Leakage resilient signatures. In:
    Vol 5978. Springer; 2010:343-360. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21">10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21</a>'
  apa: 'Faust, S., Kiltz, E., Pietrzak, K. Z., &#38; Rothblum, G. (2010). Leakage
    resilient signatures (Vol. 5978, pp. 343–360). Presented at the TCC: Theory of
    Cryptography Conference, Springer. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21</a>'
  chicago: Faust, Sebastian, Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, and Guy Rothblum. “Leakage
    Resilient Signatures,” 5978:343–60. Springer, 2010. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21</a>.
  ieee: 'S. Faust, E. Kiltz, K. Z. Pietrzak, and G. Rothblum, “Leakage resilient signatures,”
    presented at the TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, 2010, vol. 5978, pp.
    343–360.'
  ista: 'Faust S, Kiltz E, Pietrzak KZ, Rothblum G. 2010. Leakage resilient signatures.
    TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference, LNCS, vol. 5978, 343–360.'
  mla: Faust, Sebastian, et al. <i>Leakage Resilient Signatures</i>. Vol. 5978, Springer,
    2010, pp. 343–60, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21">10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21</a>.
  short: S. Faust, E. Kiltz, K.Z. Pietrzak, G. Rothblum, in:, Springer, 2010, pp.
    343–360.
conference:
  name: 'TCC: Theory of Cryptography Conference'
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:10Z
date_published: 2010-03-26T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2021-01-12T07:41:59Z
day: '26'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_21
extern: 1
intvolume: '      5978'
month: '03'
page: 343 - 360
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
publist_id: '3447'
quality_controlled: 0
status: public
title: Leakage resilient signatures
type: conference
volume: 5978
year: '2010'
...