---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - "Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for winning
    positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the evolution
    of bids in biological auctions. For each auction, n individuals are drawn at random
    from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which entails a cost.
    The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits are translated
    into reproductive success (fitness). Therefore, successful bidding strategies
    spread in the population. We compare two types of auctions. In “biological all-pay
    auctions”, the costs are the bid for every participating individual. In “biological
    second price all-pay auctions”, the cost for everyone other than the winner is
    the bid, but the cost for the winner is the second highest bid. Second price all-pay
    auctions are generalizations of the “war of attrition” introduced by Maynard Smith.
    We study evolutionary dynamics in both types of auctions. We calculate pairwise
    invasion plots and evolutionarily stable distributions over the continuous strategy
    space. We find that the average bid in second price all-pay auctions is higher
    than in all-pay auctions, but the average cost for the winner is similar in both
    auctions. In both cases, the average bid is a declining function of the number
    of participants, n. The more individuals participate in an auction the smaller
    is the chance of winning, and thus expensive bids must be avoided.\r\n@eng"
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krishnendu
      foaf_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
      foaf_surname: Chatterjee
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Johannes
      foaf_name: Reiter, Johannes
      foaf_surname: Reiter
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=4A918E98-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-0170-7353
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Martin
      foaf_name: Nowak, Martin
      foaf_surname: Nowak
  bibo_doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003
  bibo_issue: '1'
  bibo_volume: 81
  dct_date: 2012^xs_gYear
  dct_identifier:
  - UT:000298938200006
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Academic Press@
  dct_title: Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions@
  fabio_hasPubmedId: '22120126'
...