---
_id: '3260'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for
    winning positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the
    evolution of bids in biological auctions. For each auction, n individuals are
    drawn at random from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which
    entails a cost. The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits
    are translated into reproductive success (fitness). Therefore, successful bidding
    strategies spread in the population. We compare two types of auctions. In “biological
    all-pay auctions”, the costs are the bid for every participating individual. In
    “biological second price all-pay auctions”, the cost for everyone other than the
    winner is the bid, but the cost for the winner is the second highest bid. Second
    price all-pay auctions are generalizations of the “war of attrition” introduced
    by Maynard Smith. We study evolutionary dynamics in both types of auctions. We
    calculate pairwise invasion plots and evolutionarily stable distributions over
    the continuous strategy space. We find that the average bid in second price all-pay
    auctions is higher than in all-pay auctions, but the average cost for the winner
    is similar in both auctions. In both cases, the average bid is a declining function
    of the number of participants, n. The more individuals participate in an auction
    the smaller is the chance of winning, and thus expensive bids must be avoided.\r\n"
article_processing_charge: No
author:
- first_name: Krishnendu
  full_name: Chatterjee, Krishnendu
  id: 2E5DCA20-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Chatterjee
  orcid: 0000-0002-4561-241X
- first_name: Johannes
  full_name: Reiter, Johannes
  id: 4A918E98-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  last_name: Reiter
  orcid: 0000-0002-0170-7353
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Nowak, Martin
  last_name: Nowak
citation:
  ama: Chatterjee K, Reiter J, Nowak M. Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions.
    <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i>. 2012;81(1):69-80. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003">10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003</a>
  apa: Chatterjee, K., Reiter, J., &#38; Nowak, M. (2012). Evolutionary dynamics of
    biological auctions. <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i>. Academic Press. <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003</a>
  chicago: Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Johannes Reiter, and Martin Nowak. “Evolutionary
    Dynamics of Biological Auctions.” <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i>. Academic
    Press, 2012. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003</a>.
  ieee: K. Chatterjee, J. Reiter, and M. Nowak, “Evolutionary dynamics of biological
    auctions,” <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i>, vol. 81, no. 1. Academic Press,
    pp. 69–80, 2012.
  ista: Chatterjee K, Reiter J, Nowak M. 2012. Evolutionary dynamics of biological
    auctions. Theoretical Population Biology. 81(1), 69–80.
  mla: Chatterjee, Krishnendu, et al. “Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Auctions.”
    <i>Theoretical Population Biology</i>, vol. 81, no. 1, Academic Press, 2012, pp.
    69–80, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003">10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003</a>.
  short: K. Chatterjee, J. Reiter, M. Nowak, Theoretical Population Biology 81 (2012)
    69–80.
corr_author: '1'
date_created: 2018-12-11T12:02:19Z
date_published: 2012-02-01T00:00:00Z
date_updated: 2026-04-09T14:26:23Z
day: '01'
department:
- _id: KrCh
doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2011.11.003
ec_funded: 1
external_id:
  isi:
  - '000298938200006'
  pmid:
  - '22120126'
intvolume: '        81'
isi: 1
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: 'http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3279759/ '
month: '02'
oa: 1
oa_version: Submitted Version
page: 69 - 80
pmid: 1
project:
- _id: 2581B60A-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FP7
  grant_number: '279307'
  name: 'Quantitative Graph Games: Theory and Applications'
- _id: 25832EC2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FWF
  grant_number: S 11407_N23
  name: Rigorous Systems Engineering
- _id: 2584A770-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  call_identifier: FWF
  grant_number: P 23499-N23
  name: Modern Graph Algorithmic Techniques in Formal Verification
- _id: 2587B514-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425
  name: Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship
publication: Theoretical Population Biology
publication_status: published
publisher: Academic Press
publist_id: '3388'
quality_controlled: '1'
related_material:
  record:
  - id: '1400'
    relation: dissertation_contains
    status: public
scopus_import: '1'
status: public
title: Evolutionary dynamics of biological auctions
type: journal_article
user_id: 317138e5-6ab7-11ef-aa6d-ffef3953e345
volume: 81
year: '2012'
...