<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/"
         xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
         xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd">
<ListRecords>
<oai_dc:dc xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/"
           xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/"
           xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
           xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
           xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
   	<dc:title>The exact security of PMAC</dc:title>
   	<dc:creator>Gazi, Peter</dc:creator>
   	<dc:creator>Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z ; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9139-1654</dc:creator>
   	<dc:creator>Rybar, Michal</dc:creator>
   	<dc:subject>ddc:000</dc:subject>
   	<dc:description>PMAC is a simple and parallel block-cipher mode of operation, which was introduced by Black and Rogaway at Eurocrypt 2002. If instantiated with a (pseudo)random permutation over n-bit strings, PMAC constitutes a provably secure variable input-length (pseudo)random function. For adversaries making q queries, each of length at most l (in n-bit blocks), and of total length σ ≤ ql, the original paper proves an upper bound on the distinguishing advantage of  Ο(σ2/2n), while the currently best bound is  Ο (qσ/2n).In this work we show that this bound is tight by giving an attack with advantage Ω (q2l/2n). In the PMAC construction one initially XORs a mask to every message block, where the mask for the ith block is computed as τi := γi·L, where L is a (secret) random value, and γi is the i-th codeword of the Gray code. Our attack applies more generally to any sequence of γi’s which contains a large coset of a subgroup of GF(2n). We then investigate if the security of PMAC can be further improved by using τi’s that are k-wise independent, for k &gt; 1 (the original distribution is only 1-wise independent). We observe that the security of PMAC will not increase in general, even if the masks are chosen from a 2-wise independent distribution, and then prove that the security increases to O(q&lt;2/2n), if the τi are 4-wise independent. Due to simple extension attacks, this is the best bound one can hope for, using any distribution on the masks. Whether 3-wise independence is already sufficient to get this level of security is left as an open problem.</dc:description>
   	<dc:publisher>Ruhr University Bochum</dc:publisher>
   	<dc:date>2017</dc:date>
   	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
   	<dc:type>doc-type:Article</dc:type>
   	<dc:type>Article</dc:type>
   	<dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1</dc:type>
   	<dc:identifier>https://research-explorer.ista.ac.at/record/6196</dc:identifier>
   	<dc:identifier>https://research-explorer.ista.ac.at/download/6196/6197</dc:identifier>
   	<dc:source>Gazi P, Pietrzak KZ, Rybar M. The exact security of PMAC. &lt;i&gt;IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology&lt;/i&gt;. 2017;2016(2):145-161. doi:&lt;a href=&quot;https://doi.org/10.13154/TOSC.V2016.I2.145-161&quot;&gt;10.13154/TOSC.V2016.I2.145-161&lt;/a&gt;</dc:source>
   	<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
   	<dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.13154/TOSC.V2016.I2.145-161</dc:relation>
   	<dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/e-issn/2519-173X</dc:relation>
   	<dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
</oai_dc:dc>
</ListRecords>
</OAI-PMH>
