---
res:
  bibo_abstract:
  - For many cryptographic primitives, it is relatively easy to achieve selective
    security (where the adversary commits a-priori to some of the choices to be made
    later in the attack) but appears difficult to achieve the more natural notion
    of adaptive security (where the adversary can make all choices on the go as the
    attack progresses). A series of several recent works shows how to cleverly achieve
    adaptive security in several such scenarios including generalized selective decryption
    (Panjwani, TCC ’07 and Fuchsbauer et al., CRYPTO ’15), constrained PRFs (Fuchsbauer
    et al., ASIACRYPT ’14), and Yao garbled circuits (Jafargholi and Wichs, TCC ’16b).
    Although the above works expressed vague intuition that they share a common technique,
    the connection was never made precise. In this work we present a new framework
    that connects all of these works and allows us to present them in a unified and
    simplified fashion. Moreover, we use the framework to derive a new result for
    adaptively secure secret sharing over access structures defined via monotone circuits.
    We envision that further applications will follow in the future. Underlying our
    framework is the following simple idea. It is well known that selective security,
    where the adversary commits to n-bits of information about his future choices,
    automatically implies adaptive security at the cost of amplifying the adversary’s
    advantage by a factor of up to 2n. However, in some cases the proof of selective
    security proceeds via a sequence of hybrids, where each pair of adjacent hybrids
    locally only requires some smaller partial information consisting of m ≪ n bits.
    The partial information needed might be completely different between different
    pairs of hybrids, and if we look across all the hybrids we might rely on the entire
    n-bit commitment. Nevertheless, the above is sufficient to prove adaptive security,
    at the cost of amplifying the adversary’s advantage by a factor of only 2m ≪ 2n.
    In all of our examples using the above framework, the different hybrids are captured
    by some sort of a graph pebbling game and the amount of information that the adversary
    needs to commit to in each pair of hybrids is bounded by the maximum number of
    pebbles in play at any point in time. Therefore, coming up with better strategies
    for proving adaptive security translates to various pebbling strategies for different
    types of graphs.@eng
  bibo_authorlist:
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Zahra
      foaf_name: Jafargholi, Zahra
      foaf_surname: Jafargholi
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Chethan
      foaf_name: Kamath Hosdurg, Chethan
      foaf_surname: Kamath Hosdurg
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=4BD3F30E-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0009-0006-6812-7317
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Karen
      foaf_name: Klein, Karen
      foaf_surname: Klein
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E83A2F8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Ilan
      foaf_name: Komargodski, Ilan
      foaf_surname: Komargodski
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Krzysztof Z
      foaf_name: Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z
      foaf_surname: Pietrzak
      foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87
    orcid: 0000-0002-9139-1654
  - foaf_Person:
      foaf_givenName: Daniel
      foaf_name: Wichs, Daniel
      foaf_surname: Wichs
  bibo_doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-63688-7_5
  bibo_volume: 10401
  dct_date: 2017^xs_gYear
  dct_identifier:
  - UT:000438672600005
  dct_isPartOf:
  - http://id.crossref.org/issn/978-331963687-0
  dct_language: eng
  dct_publisher: Springer@
  dct_title: Be adaptive avoid overcommitting@
...
